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Anthropology since its inception has contained a dual  
but contradictory heritage. On the one hand, it derives from a  
humanistic tradition of concern with  people. On the other hand,  
anthropology is a discipline developed alongside and within the  
growth of the colonial and imperial powers. By what they have studied  
(and what they have not studied) anthropologists have assisted in,  
or at least acquiesced to, the goals of imperialist policy.
R A D I C A L  C A U C U S  O F  T H E  A M E R I C A N  A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L  A S S O C I AT I O N  | 1969
Anthropologists who study South Pacific cargo cults  
have come to expect and receive research grants as much  
as Melanesians expect to receive cargo.
T E R R E N C E  B E L L  | 1989
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The analytic branch of the cia is given to tweedy, pipe- smoking intellectuals  
who work much as if they  were  doing research back in the universities  
whence many of them came. It probably has more Ph.Ds than any other area  
of government and more than many colleges. Their expertise ranges from  
anthropology to zoology. Yet, for all that, they can be wrong.
S TA N S F I E L D  T U R N E R  | former director of Central Intelligence, 1985
P R E FA C E
This book considers some of the ways that military and intelligence agencies 
quietly  shaped the development of anthropology in the United States during 
the first three de cades of the Cold War.  Whether hidden or open secrets,  these 
interactions transformed anthropology’s development in ways that continue to 
influence the discipline  today. This is an anthropological consideration of an-
thropology; studying up in ways I hope help the discipline reconsider its inevi-
table engagements with the world it studies (Nader 1972).
In many of the early Cold War interfaces connecting anthropology and 
military- intelligence agencies documented  here, the anthropologists produc-
ing research of interest to governmental agencies pursued questions of genuine 
interest to themselves and their discipline. Sometimes gentle nudges of available 
funding opportunities helped anthropologists choose one par tic u lar ele ment 
of a larger topic over another; in other instances anthropologists in de pen-
dently pursued their own intellectual interests, producing work that was only 
 later of interest or of use to military or intelligence agencies. In some instances 
anthropologists recurrently produced work of no value to, or opposing poli-
cies of,  these agencies. Anthropological research was sometimes directly com-
missioned to meet the needs of, or answer specific questions of, military and 
intelligence agencies, while other times sponsorship occurred without funded 
anthropologists’ knowledge.
Laura Nader argues that one of anthropology’s fundamental jobs is to pro-
vide context: to enlarge the scope of study beyond par tic u lar instances and en-
compass larger contexts of power, mapping power’s influence on the creation 
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and uses of social meanings. Understanding power involves studying the eco-
nomic and social systems from which power relations arise. Given the military- 
industrial complex’s dominance in postwar Amer i ca, anthropologists might well 
expect to find the explanatory systems of our culture to be embedded in and 
reflecting  these larger elements of militarization in ways that do not appear 
obvious to participants. Cultures frequently integrate, generally without criti-
cal reflection, core features of their base economic systems into widely shared 
ideological features of a society. Most generally  these are seen as naturally oc-
curring features of a culture, often ethnocentrically assumed to be views shared 
by any society. Among pastoral peoples this may mean that religious systems 
integrate meta phors of gods as shepherds (who  shall not want), pristine des-
potic hydraulic states worshipping their chief bureaucratic administrators as 
god- kings, or capitalists constructing versions of a Jesus whose Sermon on the 
Mount somehow supports the cruelties of laissez- faire capitalism. Such ideo-
logical integrations of a society’s economic foundations are common subjects 
of anthropological inquiry, though the disciplinary histories of the last half  century 
have seldom consistently focused on po liti cal economy as a primary force shap-
ing the theory and practice of anthropology.
Anthropologists, sociologists, and some disciplinary historians study the 
interplay between po liti cal economy and the production and consumption of 
anthropological knowledge. Since Karl Mannheim’s (1936) observations on the 
sociology of knowledge systems,  there has been broad ac cep tance of such links. 
Thomas Patterson’s Social History of Anthropology in the United States (2003) 
connects po liti cal and economic impacts on the development of the discipline. 
Anthropologists like June Nash, Eric Wolf, Gerald Berreman, Kathleen Gough, 
or Sidney Mintz direct attention to the po liti cal and economic forces shaping 
field research or the se lection of research topics ( whether peasants or geopo liti-
cal regions) (Berreman 1981; Gough 1968; Mintz 1985; Nash 2007: 3; Jorgensen 
and Wolf 1970). Eric Ross’s Malthus  Factor (1998b) brilliantly shows how the 
development of demographic theory from the age of Malthus to the Cold War 
was inherently linked to the po liti cal economy of the age. In dif er ent ways, 
William Roseberry’s essay “The Unbearable Lightness of Anthropology” (1996) 
and Marvin Harris’s Theories of Culture in Postmodern Times (1998) challenged 
anthropologists to connect postmodernism’s explicit neglect of the importance 
of po liti cal economy with broader disciplinary po liti cal disengagements. Critiques 
of colonialism’s impact on anthropology by Asad (1973), Gough (1968), and 
 others dominated discourse in the 1970s and significantly  shaped anthropol-
ogy’s understanding of its role in po liti cal and economic-colonial formations. 
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Yet, while the Central Intelligence Agency (cia), the Pentagon, and facets of 
American militarism marked po liti cal crises from Proj ect Camelot to the Thai 
Afair, anthropologists’ scholarly attempts to put the agency back in the Central 
Intelligence Agency have been episodic and fleeting. Joseph Jorgensen and Eric 
Wolf ’s (1970) essay, “Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand,” provided a 
framework and sketched enough details to launch the serious academic pursuit 
of such questions, yet the academic pursuit of documenting such disciplinary 
interactions remained largely ignored.
I have gone to  great lengths to base this narrative and analy sis on documents 
that meet standards of academic research, striving to provide citations for each 
piece of this puzzle— which both limits and strengthens what can be said of 
 these relationships; in several instances I have excluded discussion of appar-
ent connections with intelligence agencies  because of the limited availability of 
supporting documents. This book is not an exhaustive study of  these relation-
ships; it provides a framework for further work and a sample of  these pervasive 
mutually beneficial interactions. I made extensive use of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (foia) to file hundreds of requests with the cia, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (fbi), the Department of Defense, and other agencies, request-
ing documents on anthropologists and organizations where anthropologists 
worked during the Cold War. I have also drawn heavily on governmental and 
private archival sources, as well as previously published materials. While foia 
allowed me to access tens of thousands of remarkable documents from the cia 
and other agencies, the cia continues to guard much of its history and usually 
complies with foia requests in the most limited way, resisting intrusions into 
its institutional history. Yet even with this re sis tance, it is pos si ble to docu-
ment specific incidents and infer general patterns from the sample of available 
documents.1
While portions of my research for this book began during the early post– 
Cold War years, the emergence of the post-9/11 security state significantly and 
inevitably  shaped my analy sis of past and present interactions between anthro-
pologists and military- intelligence organizations, just as my historical analy-
sis of post-9/11 developments was influenced by my historical research on past 
intelligence agency abuses (see, e.g., Price 2004a). In struggling to add po liti cal 
context to our historical consideration of the development of Cold War an-
thropology, I hope to have sufficiently complicated the narrative by stressing 
the dual use nature of this history: showing that anthropologists often pursued 
questions of their own design, for their own reasons, while operating in specific 
historical contexts where the overarching military- industrial university complex 
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had its own interest in the knowledge generated from  these inquiries. The dual 
use dynamics of  these relationships are of central interest to this book.
For some readers, writing about the cia raises questions of conspiracies, but 
I find no hidden forces at work  here any larger than  those directing capitalism 
itself. As social forces of significant breadth and power, and playing impor tant 
roles in supporting Amer i ca’s militarized economy, the Pentagon and the cia 
can be difficult to write about in ways that do not make them out to be totaliz-
ing forces that explain every thing, and thereby nothing, at the same time. While 
some may misinterpret my focus on the importance of  these military and intel-
ligence elements, exaggerating their significance to the exclusion of other social 
features, my focus on  these militarized elements of midcentury American po-
liti cal economy is as central to this work as Richard Lee’s (1979) focus on !Kung 
San hunting and collecting, June Nash’s (1979b) focus on Bolivian mining  labor 
relations, or Roy Rappaport’s (1984) focus on Tsembaga Maring horticulture 
and feasting cycles. Anthropological analy sis of systems of knowledge produc-
tion (even its own) needs to contextualize the worlds in which this knowledge 
exists. As Steve Fuller argues in his intellectual biography of Thomas Kuhn, 
“Part of the critical mission of the sociology of knowledge . . .  is to get  people 
to realize that their thought stands in some systemic relationship to taken- for- 
granted social conditions” (2000: 232). And while the Cold War’s national secu-
rity state was not the only force acting on anthropology during this period, it 
is the subject of this book— and a force with significant power in midcentury 
Amer i ca— and it thus receives a lot of attention  here.
Dual Use Anthropology
The phrase “dual use” appearing in the book’s title is borrowed from the physical 
sciences, which have long worried about the symbiotic relationships between 
the “pure” and “applied” sciences, relationships in which academic theoretical 
developments are transformed into commercial products or military applica-
tions. Dual use science became a central feature of experimental natu ral sci-
ences during the twentieth  century. This transformation  shaped branches of 
physics, chemistry, biology, and medicine, and scientists from  these and other 
fields increasingly came to surrender concerns about the applied uses of the knowl-
edge they produced as being part of the natu ral order of things if they  were to 
be able to do their work. As physics moved from answering questions with 
mathematics, pen and paper, and  simple apparatus, to requiring the manufacture 
of massive, expensive machinery built not by a dozen scientists but by hundreds or 
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thousands of scientists, to plumb secrets of the subatomic realm, it needed spon-
sors whose uses of such knowledge  were fundamentally dif er ent from  those of 
pure knowledge and discovery. With the increased weaponization of physics, 
such funds came to flow from militarized sources with such frequency that the 
silence surrounding such occurrences became a common feature of the disci-
pline’s milieu.
The dynamics of  these pro cesses and the outcomes of this dual use nature 
of scientific advancements are well known, and the general understanding that 
“pure science” has both “nonpractical” and “applied” uses has widespread ac cep-
tance in American society. During the second half of the twentieth  century, this 
dynamic became a thematic ele ment of Americans’ shared beliefs in scientific 
progress. The tragedy of Robert Oppenheimer’s slow comprehension that he and 
his colleagues would be excluded from decision- making pro cesses concerning 
how their weapons would be used became part of the American dual use narra-
tive. Most scientists understand that the knowledge they produce enters a uni-
verse in which they likely have no control over how this knowledge is used; some 
of this awareness comes from the  legal conditions governing the labs where they 
work, conditions in which employers often own the intellectual rights to the 
fruits of their labors, but  these dynamics go far beyond such  legal concerns.
For de cades the phrase “dual use research” has described the militarized ap-
plications of basic science research, at times describing scientific breakthroughs 
that have both commercial and military applications, such as developments in 
global positioning satellites that led to both precision weapons targeting sys-
tems and commercial dashboard navigation systems for  family cars. Debates 
over dual use science often focus on biomedical breakthroughs that si mul ta-
neously hold the potential both for cures and for the development of devastat-
ing weapons. Such potential applications often mix “pure science” research with 
commercial or military dual uses in ways that confound or mix understandings 
of “defensive” and “ofensive” uses of biomedical knowledge (Miller and Selge-
lid 2008). Approaches to such biological research are far from uniform. Some 
groups of scientists, like the Cambridge Working Group, raise public concerns 
posed by research into viruses and other transmittable diseases;  others, like 
members of Scientists for Science, advocate for the right to continue such re-
search (Greenfieldboyce 2014).2 But even with  these disputes, this awareness 
of the dual use potential of such work helps focus and clarify the fundamental 
issues of  these debates.
Dual use research programs significantly altered the trajectories of 
twentieth- century physics, and the payouts for commercial interests and the 
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weapons- industrial complex have been so sizable that the  U.S. government 
supports massive funding programs for supercolliders and other large expen-
ditures that appear to have no direct applications to weapons work. But if past 
per for mance is any predictor of  future uses,  either applications or new fron-
tiers of adaptable useful knowledge  will follow. David Kaiser (2002) argues that 
many of the expensive large physics projects with no apparent military applica-
tions, such as supercolliders, functionally create a surplus of physicists who can 
assist military projects as needed.
The dynamics governing the direction of the knowledge flow of dual use 
research appear to often  favor transfers of knowledge from pure to applied re-
search projects, but a close examination of interplays between theory and appli-
cation finds any determinative statements far too simplistic to account for the 
feedback between theory and application. Notions of “applied” and “pure” science 
are constructions that, although useful, have limitations. In 1976, Stewart Brand 
asked Gregory Bateson about the roots of his cybernetic research. Bateson ex-
plained that his initial interest in developing cybernetic theories of cultural sys-
tems came not out of abstract, nonapplied theoretical musings but from applied 
military research. Bateson’s interest in cybernetic feedback in cultural systems 
was, ironically, itself propagated by an instance of reverse feedback insofar as 
his abstract theoretical interest came from concrete problems arising from de-
signing self- guiding missile systems. In a move reversing what might appear to 
be general trends of dual use information flow, Bateson took applied military 
knowledge and transferred it into the basis of a theoretical abstraction analyzing 
biological and cultural systems.
Distinctions between “applied” and “pure” research shift over time. Some-
times the abstractions of theoretical or pure research follow from applied prob-
lems; other times theoretical developments lead to applied innovations in ways 
that diminish the utility of  these distinctions. The physical sciences long ago 
acknowledged the dual use nature of their discoveries: assuming that discover-
ies or inventions made with one intention necessarily  were open to other, at 
times often militarized, uses. Some scientific developments like radar, the Internet, 
gps navigation systems, walkie- talkies, jet propulsion engines, night vision, 
and digital photography  were initially introduced as military applications and 
 later took on dual civilian uses; in other cases, what  were initially  either com-
mercial or “pure research” scientific discoveries took on military applications, 
such as the discovery that altimeters could become detonation triggers, or the 
chain of theoretical physics discoveries that led to the design and use of atomic 
weapons.
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Field research projects in other disciplines have also brought dual uses linked 
to the Cold War’s national security state. Michael Lewis’s analy sis of the Pacific 
Ocean Biological Survey (pobs), a U.S.- financed ornithological study in India 
in the 1960s involving ornithologist, Office of Strategic Ser vices (oss) alumnus, 
and Smithsonian director S. Dillon Ripley, shows a proj ect that provided scien-
tists and American intelligence agencies with the data they separately sought: the 
ornithologists gained impor tant data on migratory bird patterns, and the De-
fense Department gained vital knowledge it sought for a biological weapons pro-
gram. Lewis found the survey was not simply a “cover” operation but instead 
“exactly what it was purported to be—an attempt to determine what diseases 
birds of the central Pacific naturally carried, and to determine bird migration 
patterns in that region. And it is also clear that pobs was connected to the US 
biological warfare programme” (Lewis 2002: 2326). The proj ect was directed 
from the army’s Biological Warfare Center at Fort Detrick, with plans (appar-
ently never enacted) to test biological agents to monitor disbursement patterns. 
As Lewis observed, “Studying the transmission of biological pathogens by birds 
for defensive purposes is only a hair’s- breadth from turning that information to 
an ofensive purpose” (2326).
American anthropology has been slow to acknowledge the extent to which 
it is embedded in dual use pro cesses, preferring to imagine itself as somehow 
in de pen dent not only from the militarized po liti cal economy in which it is 
embedded but also from the traceable uses to which American academic geo-
graphic knowledge has been put. The Second World War and the Cold War 
years that followed  were an unacknowledged watershed for dual use anthropo-
logical developments. During the war, cultural anthropologists worked as spies, 
educators, cultural liaison officers, language and culture instructors, and strate-
gic analysts. Not only did anthropological linguists prove their worth in learn-
ing and teaching the languages needed for waging the war, but their research 
into language training made fundamental breakthroughs in language teaching 
techniques; one dual use of  these developments was that pocket foreign lan-
guage phrase books, based on model sentences with inserted vocabulary words, 
became the basis of Berlitz’s commercial foreign language pocket book series 
(D. H. Price 2008a: 76–77). Physical anthropologists contributed forensic skills 
to body identifications and  were in demand to assist in anthropometric designs 
of uniforms and new war- fighting machines. Diverse technological innovations 
(from developments of isotope- based absolute dating techniques to adapta-
tions of radar and new forms of aerial stenographic photography) derived from 
advancements pushed forward during the Second World War.
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While it is seldom acknowledged, many anthropological projects during the 
Cold War occurred within po liti cal contexts in which the American govern-
ment had counterinsurgent (or, occasionally, insurgent) desires for studied 
populations. Counterinsurgency encompasses vari ous practices designed to sub-
due uprisings or other challenges to governments. Some forms of counterinsur-
gency rely on what po liti cal scientist Joseph Nye (2005) termed “hard power”; 
 others draw on soft power. Hard power uses military or paramilitary force and 
other forms of vio lence to attack insurgents; soft power uses co- option and cor-
rosion to win  favor among insurgents.  Whether anthropologists provided cul-
tural information to military or intelligence agencies or assisted in the imple-
mentation of international aid programs to stabilize foreign regimes, this book 
finds that they played many roles linked to counterinsurgency operations—at 
times undertaking  these roles while pursuing their own research projects.
In part, cultural anthropology’s self- conception as a discipline generally 
removed from the pro cesses of dual use science arose from how so many of 
its prac ti tion ers appeared to remain in control of their disciplinary means of 
production. While grants or other funds that allow anthropologists to spend 
months or years in the field make life easier, self- financed ethnography or the 
production of social theory still occurred with relatively meager funds. Most 
anthropologists do not need to work in expensive teams and do not rely on 
cyclotrons or particle accelerators; at its most basic, ethnography needs time, 
 people, libraries, theory, reflection, and colleagues.
Although archaeologists routinely work on large, multiyear, coordinated, expen-
sive research projects, relatively few cultural anthropological research projects 
during the postwar period had high- budget needs similar to  those spawning the 
expansion of dual use trends in chemistry or physics. Few cultural anthropo-
logical research designs required significant material support beyond the basic 
essentials of travel funds, pencils, paper, pith helmet, mosquito nettings, and 
portable typewriters. Early Cold War anthropology projects rarely required 
expensive equipment or brought together numerous scholars working on a 
single  proj ect.
Government- financed language programs, like the Army Special Training 
Language Program or Title VI– funded basic language acquisition, gave schol-
ars the academic skills needed for field research, but  these programs lacked 
mechanisms of coercive focus that could automatically capture funded scholars 
for some sort of  later state purpose. Some postwar projects hired unpre ce dented 
large teams of anthropologists to undertake forms of coordinated fieldwork proj-
ects. Some of  these  were governmental programs like the Coordinated Investi-
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gation of Micronesian Anthropology (cima, funded by the U.S. Navy);  others 
 were largely funded by private foundations with ties to U.S. po liti cal policy like 
the Ford Foundation’s Modjokuto Proj ect— run out of mit’s cia- linked Center 
for International Studies.
 Because so much of anthropology’s postcolonial history all but ignores in-
teractions between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies, I 
worry that my focus on  these direct and indirect relationships risks creating its 
own distortions by creating the impression that an overwhelming majority of 
anthropological research directly fed military and intelligence apparatus. This 
was not the case. I assume that the majority of anthropological research had no 
direct military or intelligence applications, though the indirect ways  these pro-
grams informed military and civilian agencies about regional knowledge  were 
often significant, and the desires of  these agencies routinely  shaped the funding 
of anthropologists’ research.
 These dual use relationships also nurtured dual personalities among some 
anthropologists who attempted to balance disciplinary and state interests.3 The 
postwar years leave rec ords of anthropologists seeking funding opportunities 
directly and indirectly linked to Cold War projects through patterns reminis-
cent of Talal Asad’s depiction of Bronislaw Malinowski as a “reluctant imperialist” 
(1973: 41–69). Although Malinowski at least partially understood the potential 
negative impacts of such funding relationships, beyond the rare dissent of soon- 
to- be- disciplinary outsider Jerome Rauch (1955),  there was  little public consid-
eration of such impacts  until the mid-1960s.  These silences birthed schisms 
within anthropologists, like Julian Steward, who developed stripped- down 
Marxian materialist ecological models while campaigning for Cold War area 
study funds, even while training a new generation of scholars whose work more 
directly drew on Marx.  There  were schisms within archaeologists and cultural 
anthropologists exploring the rise of pristine state formations using theories 
of Karl Wittfogel, a Red- baiting anticommunist, whose own dual personality 
openly quoted and used Marx’s writings with impunity while he informed on 
Marxist colleges and students to the fbi and the tribunals of McCarthyism (D. H. 
Price 2008c). Other dual personality traits developed as anthropologists like 
Clyde Kluckhohn and Cliford Geertz worked on projects with direct or indirect 
connections to the cia or the Pentagon, even as they omitted such links from 
the textual descriptions they thinly constructed.
Even during the early days of the Cold War, some anthropologists  were critical 
of encroachments of American Cold War politics into anthropological practice. 
Elizabeth Bacon, John Embree, and Jerome Rauch voiced insightful critiques 
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of the sort familiar to contemporary anthropologists. Their work and other 
examples of early critical analy sis can inform contemporary anthropologists 
seeking alternatives to military- linked anthropological prospects in a world 
increasingly seeking to draw on anthropological analy sis for post-9/11 military, 
intelligence, and security projects.
One lesson I learned by studying the work of Cold War anthropologists is 
that individual anthropologists’ beliefs that they  were engaged in apo liti cal or 
po liti cally neutral work had  little bearing on the po liti cal context or nature of 
their work. Instead,  these scientists’ claims of neutrality often meant they had 
unexamined alignments with the predominating po liti cal forces, which went 
unnoted  because they occurred without friction. But as Marvin Harris argued 
in The Rise of Anthropological Theory almost half a  century ago, “Ethical and 
po liti cal neutrality in the realm of social- science research is a limiting condi-
tion which cannot be approached by a posture of indiference. Neither the re-
searcher who preaches the partisanship of science, nor [he or she] who professes 
complete po liti cal apathy, is to be trusted. Naturally, we demand that the scien-
tific ethic— fidelity to data— must be the foundation of all research. But we must 
also demand that scientific research be oriented by explicit hypotheses, whose po-
liti cal and moral consequences in both an active and passive sense are understood 
and rendered explicit by the researcher” (1968: 222). Extending this observation 
to this proj ect, I find that my own po liti cal and ethical orientations align with 
my academic critiques of the cia and the Pentagon as organizations threaten-
ing rather than protecting demo cratic movements at home and abroad, though 
during the two de cades of this research, my po liti cal and ethical views them-
selves have been transformed by the act of historical research. But, as Harris 
argues, regardless of declared or undeclared ethical or po liti cal positions, it is 
the fidelity to the data by which research is judged, as should the moral and po-
liti cal consequences (both active and passive) derived from the seeds we sow.
Situating This Book
This is the final book in a trilogy chronicling interactions between American 
anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies. The first volume (chron-
ologically, though not published in this order), Anthropological Intelligence 
(2008a), detailed how American anthropologists contributed their disciplinary 
knowledge to meet the military and intelligence needs of the Second World 
War. The second volume, Threatening Anthropology (2004b), explored how loy-
alty hearings and the fbi’s surveillance of American anthropologists during 
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the McCarthy period limited the discipline’s theory and practice— deadening what 
might have been critical theoretical developments and discouraging applied 
forms of activist anthropology tied to issues of social justice and equality.
This final volume connects elements of  these earlier books; whereas Threat-
ening Anthropology told the story of victims of the national security state’s persecu-
tion of anthropologists who questioned the justice or rationality of Amer i ca’s 
Cold War era po liti cal economy, this volume analyzes how Cold War anthro-
pologists’ work at times aligned with the interests of rich and power ful agencies, 
such as the cia or the Pentagon. This volume connects with the exploration in 
Anthropological Intelligence of how the needs of World War II transformed an-
thropology in ways that would  later take on new meanings during the Cold War. 
Few Americans who came to see anthropological contributions to military or 
intelligence agencies while fighting fascism and totalitarianism during the Sec-
ond World War critically stopped to reconsider the impacts of extending such 
relationships into the Cold War.
This book traces a historical arc connecting transformations in anthropolo-
gists’ support for military and intelligence activities during the Second World 
War to the widespread condemnation of anthropological contributions to 
American military and intelligence campaigns in the American wars in South-
east Asia. This spans a complex historical period marked by cultural revolu-
tions, startling revelations of fbi and cia illegal activities, secret wars, cynical 
neo co lo nial governmental programs, and increasing awareness of anthropol-
ogy’s historical connections to colonialism. In less than three de cades the discipline 
shifted from a near- total alignment supporting global militarization eforts, to 
widespread radical or liberal opposition to American foreign policy and re sis-
tance to anthropological collaborations with military and intelligence agencies. 
This was a profound realignment of intellectual orientations to the state.
Cold War Anthropology focuses on how shifts in the Cold War’s po liti cal econ-
omy provided anthropology with rich opportunities to undertake well- funded 
research of interest to anthropologists, while providing this new national secu-
rity state with general and specific knowledge. Once- secret documents now show 
funding programs and strategies that  were used to shape the work of scholars 
conducting international research. Many Americans continued to interpret 
early Cold War po liti cal developments with views linked closely to the world 
of the previous war. Occupations and other postwar programs found anthro-
pologists continuing to use many of the skills developed during the last war, now 
in a world pursuing new po liti cal goals. The postwar reor ga ni za tion of the Ameri-
can Anthropological Association (aaa) anticipated new funding opportunities. 
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Area study centers and other postwar regroupings of social scientists studying 
questions of interest to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
and intelligence organizations broadly impacted postwar anthropologists.
Anthropologists and military or intelligence agencies interacted through 
four distinct types of relationships: as witting- direct, witting- indirect, unwitting- 
direct, and unwitting- indirect participants (D. H. Price 2002: 17).  After the 
war, many anthropologists transformed elements of their war time ser vice into 
governmental research, policy, development, or intelligence work. Some devel-
oped careers at the Department of State or the cia. Some of the work involved 
seamless applications of war time work, adapted to shifts in the postwar world.
Investigative reporting and congressional hearings identified several cia- 
linked social science research projects financed by cia funding fronts. Press 
reports from 1967 revealed the Asia Foundation as a cia funding front, and the 
Asia Foundation’s relationship with the aaa is examined. The  Human Ecol ogy 
Fund is also examined as a cia front that financed and harvested anthropologi-
cal research of interest to the cia.
One way that anthropologists’ fieldwork intersected with intelligence agen-
cies was through their writings being accessed without their knowledge; in 
other instances, cultural anthropologists and archaeologists used fieldwork as a 
cover for espionage. I examine one instance in which a cia agent received an-
thropological funding and was sent to the field  under the guise of conducting 
anthropological research.
In several cases, anthropologists or research groups used military- linked 
funds for basic research, producing knowledge that had national security uses. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the  Human Relations Area Files (hraf) subcon-
tracted army area handbooks and used the funds from this work to finance basic 
theoretical research of interest to hraf anthropologists. American University’s 
Special Operations Research Office (soro) and Counterinsurgency Informa-
tion and Analy sis Center (cinfac) wrote counterinsurgency reports drawing 
on anthropological writings. One soro program, Proj ect Camelot, significantly 
impacted the aaa, and rec ords from Ralph Beals’s post- Camelot inquiries into 
military and intelligence interactions with anthropologists provide significant 
new information detailing how the cia sought assistance and information from 
anthropologists during the early Cold War.
 After leaked documents revealed that American anthropologists  were 
 undertaking counterinsurgency work in Thailand, several anthropologists be-
came embroiled in public clashes within the aaa over the po liti cal and ethical 
propriety of such work. Anthropological research for the rand Corporation 
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on Vietnam and anthropologists’ contributions to usaid, arpa, and aact 
counterinsurgency projects in Thailand show increased uses of anthropological 
knowledge for counterinsurgency. The fallout from the Thai Afair pressed the 
aaa to adopt its first ethics code, prohibiting secret research, orienting anthro-
pological research  toward the interests of research subjects, and requiring new 
levels of disclosure. The aaa’s focus on ethical issues raised by anthropological 
contributions to military and intelligence projects identified some of the disci-
plinary problems with military uses of anthropology, yet many of the core ques-
tions about the dual use nature of anthropological research remain unanswered 
within the discipline  today.
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When I began publishing work on anthropologists and the Cold War and was 
not sure  whether to do a single book spanning the materials covered in this 
volume, Threatening Anthropology, and Anthropological Intelligence, three wise 
 women (Nina Glick- Schiller, Janice Harper, and Laura Nader) in de pen dently 
told me to break the stories up into separate volumes and to lead with the Mc-
Carthy story. Janice Harper explic itly told me that anthropologists love stories 
in which we are victims (McCarthyism) but  won’t like being shown as “collabo-
rators.” I had no idea it would take me two de cades of largely unfunded, but 
highly rewarding, research to document this story.
The influences for this proj ect are broad, but the seeds for  these volumes 
 were planted three de cades ago when I was an undergraduate reading the work 
of June Nash, Laura Nader, Delmos Jones, Joseph Jorgenson, Gerry Berreman, 
Eric Wolf, and  others on how power ful forces and organizations like the cia 
and the Pentagon have directed anthropological inquiries. My gradu ate work 
with Marvin Harris strengthened my writing and focused my attention on 
political- economic forces shaping the worlds in which anthropological knowl-
edge was produced and consumed. My years as a pre- Internet  human- Google 
working as Marvin’s research assistant in his largely abandoned campus office 
found me surrounded by his old 1960s and early 1970s issues of the American 
Anthropological Association Fellows Newsletter, reading accounts of some of the 
history recorded  here. Though Marvin Harris and Marshall Sahlins famously 
clashed over significant epistemological diferences, and even with my clear 
links to Harris, Sahlins has encouraged me and supported my eforts to docu-
ment  these past connections between anthropologists and military and intel-
ligence agencies.
My friendship and work with Alexander Cockburn and Jefrey St. Clair and 
writing for CounterPunch strengthened my writing voice, and helped me connect 
what are often misunderstood as separate academic and po liti cal worlds. Nina 
Glick- Schiller was the first editor to take my po liti cal historical work seriously 
enough to get me into print without dampening my critique; her encourage-
ment and support helped me continue to work on a topic that most editors 
found intriguing but  were hesitant to publish (see Price 1998). I am deeply grateful 
for the editorial guidance and friendship provided by Gustaaf Houtman, who 
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helped me publish post-9/11 critiques of militarized social science in the Royal 
Anthropological Institute’s Anthropology  Today during a period when it was 
difficult to publish such work in the U.S. When I experienced difficulties pub-
lishing a report documenting the aaa’s 1951 covert relationship with the cia 
described in chapter 3 in the American Anthropologist ( after three split reviews 
questioning the wisdom of exploring such matters in public), aaa president 
Louise Lamphere convened a panel at the association’s 2000 business meeting 
(late in the eve ning,  after the infamous Darkness in El Dorado public airing 
of grievances) to discuss  these findings. Without Louise’s support and Laura 
Nader’s encouragement, I might have chosen to abandon a topic that was im-
possible to find research grants to sponsor, and nearly impossible to publish on 
when I started and returned to working in the  Middle East. Roberto González’s 
detailed comments on the manuscript helped me better focus elements of my 
argument. Karen Jaskar’s librarian sensitivities wisely convinced me to not hy-
phenate “dual use” in the title, or elsewhere, to avert  future searching and cata-
loging catastrophes. I am indebted to Jack Stauder for generously giving me a 
trea sure trove of documents and artifacts from his years in the aaa’s Radical 
Caucus and Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action.
This book was not funded by traditional research grants. The failures to secure 
research grants early on in this proj ect led me, without regrets, to finance this 
research by other means. Many of the archival trips  were added on to invited 
speaking engagements at universities (American University, Berkeley, Brown, 
Chicago, Columbia, uc Irvine, George Mason, University of New Mexico, Syr-
acuse, Yale,  etc.) or academic conferences, or I used small funds from Saint 
Martin’s University: a teaching excellence award cash prize, two one- semester 
sabbaticals (in the last twenty years), and some sparse faculty development 
funds. Funds for some foia pro cessing  were provided by the Institute for the 
Advancement of Journalistic Clarity. My dear friends Cathy Wilson and David 
Patton hosted me at their home during many archival trips to Washington, DC. 
Ken Wissoker’s guidance and support at Duke University Press have been 
invaluable in helping all three of  these volumes come into print. I am deeply 
grateful to all the scholars who hosted my campus talks or helped publish my 
work, at times weathering criticisms and setbacks for bringing  these critiques 
directly to the environments where they work.
I have been researching this book for two de cades. Earlier versions of some 
of the historical episodes recounted  here have appeared in dif er ent forms: An-
thropology  Today published earlier analyses of the  Human Ecol ogy Fund (D. H. 
Price 2007b, 2007c) and the m- vico System (D. H. Price 2012b). I published 
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a chapter exploring anthropological responses to American military actions 
in Southeast Asia as part of a School for Advanced Research seminar volume 
(D. H. Price 2011b). I also published an early analy sis of cia- aaa interac-
tions (D. H. Price 2003a), although documents I discovered  later reshaped sig-
nificant portions of that analy sis.
Among the many other colleagues and friends who played impor tant 
roles in shaping the production and form of this work during the past de cades 
are David Aberle, Philip Agee, John Allison, David Altheide, Thomas Anson, 
Olivia Archibald, Julian Assange, Alan Bain, Sindre Bangstad, Russ Bernard, 
Gerry Berreman, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, Catherine Besteman, Andy Bickford, 
Jef Birkenstein,  Father Bix, Karen Brodkin, Brenda Chalfin, Noam Chomsky, 
 Harold Conklin, Lorraine Copeland, Dalia Corkrum, Jonathan Dentler, Dale 
Depweg, Sigmund Diamond, Jim Faris, Greg Feldman, Brian Ferguson, Les 
Field, Sverker Finnström, Carolyn Fluehr- Lobban, Maximilian Forte, Kerry Fos-
her, Andre Gunder Frank, Charles Frantz, Irina Gendelman, Deborah Gewertz, 
McGuire Gibson, Aaron Goings, Jonathan Graubart, Linda Green, Hugh 
Gusterson, Erik Harms, Chris Hebdon, Alan Howard, Jean Jackson, Bea Jaure-
gui, Barbara Rose Johnston, Adrian Resa Jones, Linda Jones, John Kelly, Chun 
Kyung- soo, Roger Lancaster, Robert Lawless, Richard Lee, Sara Leone, Robert 
Leopold, Kanhong Lin, Thomas Love, Catherine Lutz, Andrew Lyons, Har-
riet Lyons, Jon Marks, Ray McGovern, Brian McKenna,  Father Kilian Malvey, 
Erika Manthey, Stephen  X. Mead, David Miller, Sidney Mintz, Bill Mitchell, 
Sean Mitchell, John Moore, Laura Nader, Steve Niva, Greg Orvis, Mark Pap-
worth, Bill Peace, Glenn Petersen, Jack Price, Milo Price, Nora Price, Steve Reyna, 
Eric Ross, Mike Salovesh, Schuyler Schild, Robert Scott, Daniel Segal, Michael 
Seltzer, Gerry Sider, Duane Smith, Molly Smith, Roger Snider, Lawrence Guy 
Straus, George Stocking, Ida Susser, David Vine, Eric Wakin, Jeremy Walton, 
and Teresa Winstead.
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aaa  American Anthropological Association
aact  Academic Advisory Council for Thailand
acls  American Council of Learned Socie ties
afme  American Friends of the  Middle East
afosr  Air Force Office of Scientific Research
aid  Agency for International Development (see also usaid)
aifld  American Institute for  Free  Labor Development
air  American Institute for Research
als  Army Language School
apra  Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil
ard  Accelerated Rural Development (Thai government proj ect)
aro  Army Research Office
arpa  Advanced Research Projects Administration
arvn  Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam
asa  Afghan Student Association
cenis  Center for International Studies, Mas sa chu setts Institute of 
Technology
cfa  Committee for  Free Asia ( later became Asia Foundation)
cia  Central Intelligence Agency
cima  Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology
cinfac  Counterinsurgency Information and Analy sis Center (part of soro)
cointelpro  Counter Intelligence Program (FBI domestic 
counterinsurgency program, 1956–1971)
cords  Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
cress  Center for Research in Social Systems
dci  Director of Central Intelligence (cia)
dod  Department of Defense
dsb  Defense Science Board
eca  Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan)
erp  Eu ro pean Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)
fargc  Foreign Area Research Coordinating Group (also called far)
fasd  Foreign Area Studies Division (a division of soro)
fbi  Federal Bureau of Investigation
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fisee  Fund for International Social and Economic Education
fmad  Foreign Morale Analy sis Division
foa  Foreign Operations Administration
foia  Freedom of Information Act
fsi  Foreign Ser vice Institute
fulro  Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees
gvn  Government of [South] Vietnam
hef  Human Ecol ogy Fund
hraf  Human Relations Area Files
hrip  Harvard Refugee Interview Proj ect
ica  International Cooperation Agency
ida  Institute for Defense Analy sis
iiaa  Institute of Inter- American Afairs
ifis  Institute for Intercultural Studies
ihr  Institute of  Human Relations
ipr  Institute of Pacific Relations
msa  Mutual Security Agency
msug  Michigan State University Group
naca  National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
nas  National Acad emy of Sciences
nfss  National Foundation on Social Science
nimh  National Institute of  Mental Health
nlf  National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
nrc  National Research Council
nsa  National Security Agency
nsc  National Security Council
nsf  National Science Foundation
oni  Office of Naval Intelligence
onr  Office of Naval Research
opc  Office of Policy Coordination
ops  Office of Public Safety
osrd  Office of Scientific Research and Development
oss  Office of Strategic Ser vices
owi  Office of War Information
pobs  Pacific Ocean Biological Survey
ppr  Principles of Professional Responsibility
psb  Psychological Strategy Board
racp  Remote Area Conflict Program (an arpa program)
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rand  Research ANd Development (rand Corporation)
rcc  Research in Contemporary Cultures
rrc  Rus sian Research Center (Harvard University)
seadag  Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group
si  Secret Intelligence Branch, Office of Strategic Ser vices
sihe  Society for the Investigation of  Human Ecol ogy
sil  Summer Institute of Linguistics
smc  Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
soro  Special Operations Research Office, American University
spare  Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics
sri  Stanford Research Institute
ssrc  Social Science Research Council
ssu  Strategic Ser vices Unit
stem  U.S. Special Technical and Economic Mission
tca  Technical Cooperation Administration
unesco  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ ization
urpe  Union of Radical Po liti cal Economy
usaid  U.S. Agency for International Development
usia  U.S. Information Agency
usis  U.S. Information Ser vice
usom  U.S. Operation Mission
wahraf  Washington Area  Human Relations Area Files
This page intentionally left blank
PA R T  I   C O L D  WA R  P O L I T I C A L -  E C O N O M I C 
D I S C I P L I N A R Y  F O R M AT I O N S
This page intentionally left blank
The cia,  after all, is nothing more than the secret police of American  
capitalism, plugging up leaks in the po liti cal dam night and 
day so that shareholders of US companies operating in poor  
countries can continue enjoying the rip- of.
P H I L I P  A G E E  | ex- cia agent, 1975
O N E   P O  L I T I  C A L  E C O N O M Y  
A N D  H I S T O R Y  O F  A M E R I C A N  
C O L D  WA R  I N T E L L I G E N C E
The end of the Second World War left the United States in a unique position 
among the victors. Not only was it the only nation on earth possessing a new 
weapon capable of instantly leveling entire cities, but the lack of damage to its 
industrial home front gave Amer i ca the exclusive economic opportunities be-
fitting a global conqueror.
The United States entered an era of economic prosperity the likes of which 
the world had never seen. With an expanding global economic system, and 
much of the world slowly recovering from the war, Amer i ca found itself with 
what George Kennan secretly described as a nation holding “about 50% of the 
world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. . . .  In this situation, we cannot 
fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period 
is to devise a pattern of relationships which  will permit us to maintain this posi-
tion of disparity. . . .  To do so, we  will have to dispense with all sentimentality 
and day- dreaming; and our attention  will have to be concentrated everywhere 
on our immediate national objectives. . . .  We should cease to talk about vague 
and . . .  unreal objectives such as  human rights, the raising of living standards 
and demo cratizations” (1948: 121–22). Kennan understood that  U.S. foreign 
policy could not seriously support eforts to improve  human rights, raising 
standards of living and introducing demo cratic reforms, though he underesti-
mated the importance of the need to “talk about”  these vague and unreal objec-
tives as tools of domestic and international propaganda. Kennan’s cynicism was 
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matched by the inability of many U.S. social scientists of the era to acknowledge 
that such self- serving motivations lay at the base of many Cold War American 
foreign policies and programs linked to American academics.
The war’s end brought uncertainty for American intelligence agencies.  Under 
President Truman’s Executive Order 9621, the oss disbanded on October 1, 
1945, and the agency’s functions  were reassigned to the Department of State and 
the War Department. Had President Roo se velt lived to the postwar period, the 
oss may have remained a permanent agency, but oss director William Dono-
van lacked Truman’s support. Truman’s fiscal approach to government envi-
sioned a smaller postwar military and intelligence apparatus, and he initially 
opposed expanded postwar intelligence functions.1
Before the war, the United States had no permanent agency devoted to in-
ternational intelligence. When Truman disbanded the oss, 1,362 of its Research 
and Analy sis Branch personnel  were reassigned to the Department of State’s 
Interim Research and Intelligence Ser vice, and another 9,028 of oss Opera-
tions personnel (such as covert action)  were transferred to the War Department 
(Troy 1981: 303; 313–14). The oss’s Research and Analy sis Branch was renamed 
the Interim Research and Intelligence Ser vice and placed  under the leadership 
of Alfred McCormack.2 When oss’s Secret Intelligence (si) Branch and Coun-
terespionage (X2) Branch  were relocated to the War Department, they became 
the new Strategic Ser vices Unit (ssu). Three months  later, in January 1946, 
President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group which took over the 
responsibilities, and many of the personnel, of the War Department’s ssu. All 
of this shifting, realigning, and relocating of intelligence personnel was short- 
lived. The permanent restructuring and relocation of both the analy sis and the 
covert action functions of American international intelligence shifted to a new 
centralized agency in the summer of 1947, when Truman signed the National 
Security Act on July 26, establishing the Central Intelligence Agency.
During the 664 days between the dissolution of the oss and the creation of 
the cia, American intelligence personnel continued many of the types of tasks 
undertaken by oss during the war, though  there was greater institutional disar-
ray, with less intense focus than had existed  under a culture of total warfare.3 
Had Truman stuck with his initial decision to divide intelligence analy sis and 
operations into two separate governmental agencies (analy sis at State, opera-
tions at the War Department), the practices and uses of American intelligence 
might have developed in profoundly dif er ent ways than occurred during the 
Cold War. Combining analy sis with operations structurally fated the cia to a 
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history of covert action and episodes of cooking analy sis to meet the desires of 
operations and presidents.
When the National Security Act of 1947 established the cia, the American 
military and intelligence apparatus was reor ga nized with the establishment 
of the National Security Council (nsc), and the June 12, 1948, nsc Directive of 
Special Projects (nsc 10/2) authorized the cia to undertake covert action and 
intelligence operations. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949  later 
provided bud getary authority to the agency and authorization to undertake 
domestic and international activities.
During the cia’s early years, its employees’ work was divided between the In-
telligence Division (Office of Collection and Dissemination; Office of Reports 
and Estimates) and the Operations Division (Office of Operations; Office of 
Special Operations). The cia sought to become the eyes, ears, and mind of 
Amer i ca. It envisioned itself as an elite body harnessing the intellectual power 
of its citizens to gather information. The cia’s charter authorized no domestic 
or international law enforcement authority; instead, the agency was charged 
with the collection and analy sis of intelligence relating to national security. The 
cia was administered by the executive branch, with a bureaucracy providing 
oversight by a group known as the Forty Committee, which could authorize 
cia covert operations in consultation with the executive branch. The looseness 
of its charge allowed the agency to undertake a wide range of operations with 
no oversight outside of the executive branch.
From the cia’s earliest days, its analysts monitored postwar, postcolonial shifts 
in global power. As postwar in de pen dence movements reshaped global rela-
tions, cia analysts considered how  these shifts would pit American anticolo-
nialist historical values against Amer i ca’s emerging role as a global superpower.
“The Break- Up of the Colonial Empires  
and Its Implications for US Security”
The cia’s confidential report The Break- Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Im-
plications for US Security (1948) described the global setting in which the an-
thropological field research of the second half of the twentieth  century would 
transpire (cia 1948). Most anthropologists undertook this fieldwork without 
reference to the dynamics described in this report, yet  these dynamics  shaped 
the funding of par tic u lar research questions and geographic areas. The report 
stated the agency’s understanding of the problems facing the postwar world, 
where shifting power relations presented threats and opportunities to the new 
American superpower:
The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded in break-
ing up a large part of the Eu ro pean colonial system and in creating a series of new, 
nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for US security, 
particularly in terms of pos si ble world conflict with the USSR. This shift of the 
dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the prob-
able Eu ro pean allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital 
bases and raw materials in  these areas in event of war. Should the recently liberated 
and current emergent states become oriented  toward the USSR, US military and 
economic security would be seriously threatened. (cia 1948: 1)
The report identified upcoming dominant Cold War dynamics, as the United 
States and the Soviet Union would spend trillions of dollars in the next four 
de cades struggling over postcolonial loyalties around the globe. The key ele-
ments to  future strategies  were the collapse of Eu ro pean colonialism, growing 
native nationalism, the likelihood of Soviet eforts to capture clients in  these 
new states, the presence of (cheap) raw materials needed for  U.S. economic 
growth, and envisioned conflicts with the Soviet Union over control of  these 
nations and resources.
The cia observed that the postwar collapse of existing Eu ro pean and Japa-
nese colonialism in Asia and Africa fueled “the release of bottled-up national-
ist activities,” and it conceded the “further disintegration” of global Eu ro pean 
colonial holdings was “inevitable” (cia 1948: 1). It stressed the economic impact 
of anticolonial movements, lamenting that “no longer can the Western Pow-
ers rely on large areas of Asia and Africa as assured sources of raw materials, 
markets, and military bases” (2). Capturing the “good  will” of nations achieving 
their in de pen dence was vital, and a failure to do so would result in antagonism 
 toward the United States and a loss of vital clients (3).
At this moment in history, the cia could have positioned itself to side with 
the liberation of  people of the world who  were ruled and taxed without direct 
repre sen ta tion, but agency analysts instead framed this primarily as a proxy 
strug gle between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that “the grav-
est danger to the US is that friction engendered by  these issues may drive the 
so- called colonial bloc into alignment with the USSR” (cia 1948: 2). The cia 
explained native nationalist liberation movements as deriving from a mixture 
of historical, social, po liti cal, and economic forces, and it identified the five pri-
mary causes as increased awareness of stratification, colonial powers’ discrimi-
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natory treatment of subject populations, the “deep- seated racial hostility of native 
populations,” the global spread of Western values favoring in de pen dence and 
nationalism, and “the meteoric rise of Japan, whose defeats of the Eu ro pean 
powers in the Russo- Japanese War and especially World War II punctured the 
myth of white superiority” (5).
The cia noted the neo co lo nial control of the British in Egypt, the French in 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the Italians in Libya and mentioned bur-
geoning in de pen dence movements in Indonesia, Madagascar, and Nigeria. It 
understood that “states like India and Egypt have already brought colonial is-
sues into the un and may be expected increasingly to take the leadership in 
attempting to hasten in this and other ways the liberation of remaining colonial 
areas” (cia 1948: 7).
Even in 1948, the cia recognized the role that foreign aid and promises of 
technical assistance and modernization could play in courting would-be in-
de pen dent nations. As explained in its report, “The economic nationalism of 
the underdeveloped nations conflicts sharply with US trade objectives and  these 
countries tend to resent US economic dominance. On the other hand, they 
urgently need external assistance in their economic development, and the US is 
at present the only nation able to supply it. The desire for US loans and private 
investment  will have some efect in tempering the antagonism of  these states 
 toward US policies” (cia 1948: 8).  Under the direction of Cold War economists 
and strategists like Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, and Allen Dulles, aid  later be-
came a power ful soft power component of American international policy.
The cia viewed coming colonial collapses as “inevitable” and predicted 
 these developments would  favor the Soviet Union (cia 1948: 9). The agency 
was concerned about the Soviet alignment with international liberation move-
ments. Without addressing Leninist critiques of imperialism, the cia observed 
the Soviets  were “giving active support through agitators, propaganda, and 
local Communist parties to the nationalist movements throughout the colo-
nial world” (9). The agency acknowledged the USSR held advantages over the 
United States  because
as a non- colonial power, the USSR is in the fortunate position of being able to 
champion the colonial cause unreservedly and thereby bid for the good  will of co-
lonial and former colonial areas. Its condemnation of racial discrimination pleases 
native nationalists and tends to exclude the USSR from the racial animosity of 
East  toward West. The Communists have sought to infiltrate the nationalist par-
ties in the dependent and formerly dependent areas and have been, as in Burma, 
Indonesia, and Indochina, among the most vocal agitators for in de pen dence. The 
Soviet Union has found the World Federation of Trade Unions an efective weapon 
for penetrating the growing  labor movements in Asia and Africa and for turning 
them against the colonial powers. (9)
Nationalism was expected to have increasing importance for poor nations un-
dergoing rapid transformations, and the cia believed that cultural diferences 
between colonizers and the colonized would increase antagonism in historic 
colonial regions like Indochina, Indonesia, and North Africa (10).
The cia identified opportunities for American interests given that newly in-
de pen dent nations would need help from “the  great powers for protection and 
assistance” in the new “power vacuum” (cia 1948: 11). Establishing the “good 
 will” of the leaders and peoples of  these countries would be key, and the report 
noted that American racial segregationist policies allowed the Soviets to por-
tray the United States as a bigoted nation.
The report identified five impacts that the collapse of the global colonial system 
would have on U.S. security. First, colonial liberation would eco nom ically weaken 
Amer i ca’s Eu ro pean allies, which would diminish access to cheap minerals and 
other natu ral resources and strategic military outposts. Second, po liti cal upheaval 
could leave the United States with reduced access to  these same resources. 
 Because of this threat, the cia insisted that “the growing US list of strategic and 
critical materials — many of which like tin and rubber are available largely in 
colonial and former colonial areas — illustrates the dependence of the US upon 
 these areas. The US has heretofore been able to count upon the availability of 
such bases and materials in the colonial dependencies of friendly powers; but 
the new nations arising in  these areas, jealous of their sovereignty, may well be 
reluctant to lend such assistance to the US” (cia 1948: 12). Third, if the Soviet 
Union established close relationships with new nations in Asia, such relation-
ships would undermine U.S. interests. Fourth, the cia recognized dangers for 
American interests if the United States was identified as supporting colonial 
powers. Finally, the Soviet Union was expected to create unrest in colonial re-
gions and to exploit any resulting upheaval to its po liti cal advantage (12–13).
The agency concluded it was vital for the United States to generate goodwill 
in  these new nations. It recommended that the United States temper its support 
for Eu ro pean allies engaged in colonial control of foreign lands in order to not 
be identified with colonialism. The cia predicted colonialism would become 
a losing venture for Eu rope and that “attempts at forcible retention of critical 
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colonial areas in the face of growing nationalist pressure may actually weaken 
rather than strengthen the colonial powers” (cia 1948: 13).4
It is worth speculating on what lost strands of U.S. intelligence analy sis favor-
ing postcolonial in de pen dence might have developed in an alternate universe 
where Truman left the oss’s former intelligence and operations branches dis-
articulated into the State Department and War Department, but in a world 
where intelligence and operations  were conjoined, and Kennan’s Cold War game 
plan aggressively guided American policy, such developments  were not to be. 
As a result, cia reports questioning the wisdom of aligning American interests 
with colonial powers  were destined to be ignored and overwritten by emerging 
hegemonic Cold War desires.
Seeing Like a cia
From its beginnings, the cia established links with academia.  These earliest links 
exploited connections with academics with war time oss ser vice who returned 
to university positions  after the war. An article in the cia’s journal Studies in 
Intelligence noted that “close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and 
American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 
1947” (Cook 1983: 33). Given the connections of oss personnel to Harvard, Yale, 
Columbia, and other elite universities, it was natu ral that “a disproportionate 
number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors 
who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on 
campuses for consultation and assistance. This ‘old boy’ system was quite pro-
ductive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus,  there was 
an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools” 
(Cook, 34; Jefreys- Jones 1985).
In 1951, the cia launched its University Associates Program, which secretly 
connected the agency with university professors on fifty U.S. campuses. Select 
universities became “consultant- contacts who would receive a nominal fee for 
spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of inter-
est to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment” (Cook 
1983: 34). But the cia’s recruitment techniques narrowed rather than expanded 
its views. In 1954, the Doolittle Commission Report found the cia’s close link 
to World War II networks hampered its development, and that the heavy use 
of elite universities for recruitment limited the agency’s potential. It recom-
mended that the cia fire some of its oss- era employees and expand its campus 
recruitment eforts to a broader variety of university campuses (Doolittle et al. 
1954: 25).5
The cia secretly groomed campus contacts, known within the agency as “P- 
Sources” (professor sources) (Cook 1983; Price 2011f). P- Sources, who had high 
value within the agency, sometimes provided debriefings  after travel to foreign 
nations and at other times wrote papers relating to their academic expertise. 
The number of  these P- Sources is unknown, but William Corson, a historian 
and a Marine Corps lieutenant col o nel, estimated that by the mid-1970s as 
many as five thousand academics  were cooperating with the cia on at least a 
part- time basis (Corson 1977: 312). During the early 1950s, professional orga-
nizations like the American Anthropological Association at times secretly, or 
unwittingly, worked with the cia, providing it with membership lists and lists 
of area specialists (see chapters 3 and 7).
The agency sometimes secretly drew on groups of academics possessing de-
sired knowledge to supplement its understanding of issues. One such group, 
known as the Prince ton Con sul tants, was established in early 1951 and was 
tasked with complementing the work of the cia’s newly established Office of 
National Estimates. The original group consisted of eight scholars who  were 
paid a modest stipend and met in Prince ton with cia personnel four times 
a year to discuss specific problems of interest to the agency, bringing outside 
views and broader approaches to problems (Steury 1994: 111; see cia 1959b: 2). 
The group, which grew in size, continued to meet in Prince ton for de cades (cia 
1959a; see  table 1.1).
When the existence of the Prince ton Con sul tants became public in the 1970s, 
members Cyril Black and Klaus Knorr “denied any relationship between the 
National Intelligence Estimates and the cia’s covert activities” (Cavanagh 1980). 
Black’s and Knorr’s denials  were in one sense true given that most of their work 
was aligned with making projections for the Office of National Estimates and 
the improbability that they had access to details about covert actions. However, 
as Cavanagh (1980) noted, Calvin Hoover’s memoirs suggest some of the work 
provided by the Prince ton Con sul tants was consistent with the preparatory 
work undertaken in plotting the cia’s 1953 Ira nian coup.
In 1963, the cia’s 100 Universities Program sought to improve the agency’s 
public image and to boost campus recruitments by expanding its presence 
on American campuses (see cia 1963c). Former cia case officer John Stock-
well described the agency’s Foreign Resources Division as its “domestic covert 
operations division,” linking cia case officers with professors and students at 
“ every major campus in the nation. They work with professors, using aliases on 
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TA B L E  1 . 1 .   Listing of the CIA’s Prince ton Con sul tants
N A M E I N S T I T U T I O N A L  A F F I L I AT I O N C I TAT I O N
Norman Armour Former ambassador (Steury 1994: 110)
Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong
Foreign Affairs (Montague 1992: 135;  
cia 1959b)
Samuel Bemis Yale University (Steury 1994: 110)
James Billington Prince ton University, History (Cavanagh 1980)
Richard Bissell cia, Deputy Director of Plans (Steury 1994: 110)
Cyril Black Prince ton University,  
Soviet Studies
(Cavanagh 1980;  
cia 1959b)
Robert Bowie Harvard, International Studies (Cavanagh 1980)
Vannevar Bush osrd, naca (Montague 1992: 135)
Burton Fahs Director of Humanities,  
Rocke fel ler Foundation
(Steury 1994: 110;  
Montague 1992: 136)
Gordon Gray Secretary of the Army/ 
national security adviser
(Steury 1994: 110)
Joseph Grew Former ambassador (Steury 1994: 110)
Caryl P. Haskins Car ne gie Inst., director (Cavanagh 1980)
Barklie Henry New York businessman (Montague 1992: 136;  
Steury 1994: 110)
Calvin Hoover Duke, Soviet Economics (Cavanagh 1980;  
cia 1959b)
William H. Jackson cia, Deputy Director (Steury 1994: 110)
George Kennan  Career, Foreign Ser vice  etc. (Montague 1992: 135)
Klaus Knorr Prince ton University,  
Strategic Studies
(Cavanagh 1980;  
cia 1959b)
William Langer Harvard, History (Steury 1994: 110)
George A. Lincoln (cia 1959b)
Harold F. Linder Chair, Export- Import Bank,  
Asst. Sec of State
(Cavanagh 1980)
Max Millikan mit, International Studies, Econ (Steury 1994: 110)
Philip Mosely Columbia University (Steury 1994: 110;  
cia 1959b)
Lucian Pye mit, Po liti cal Science (Cavanagh 1980)
Raymond Sontag uc Berkeley, Eu ro pean History (Steury 1994: 110)
Alexander Standing (Montague 1992: 136)
Joseph Strayer Prince ton, Medieval history (Steury 1994: 110; cia  
1959b)
T. Cuyler Young Sr. Prince ton, Near East studies (Steury 1994: 110)
vari ous programs. Their activities include building files on students whom the 
professors help them target” (Stockwell 1991: 102–3).
Curating Knowledge and Intelligence at the cia
As part of its efort to monitor and control international developments, the early 
cia collected and curated global knowledge. The agency envisioned that even 
the almost random collection of knowledge could eventually, if or ga nized and 
retrievable,  later be used in intelligence capacities. The scope of its approach to 
collecting disarticulated bits of knowledge is shown in Jane Schnell’s classified 
article “Snapshots at Random” (1961), which described a cia collection known 
as the “Graphic Register.” This was the agency archive of photographs collected 
from all over the world showing routine features and elements of physical cul-
ture.  These photographs  were cata loged and analyzed for use at some unknown 
date in cia operations.
Schnell encouraged cia employees planning  future trips to “some less well 
frequented place” to contact agency personnel maintaining the Register to see 
if it was interested in providing them with film and a camera (Schnell 1961: 17). 
The cia wanted almost any image from abroad. Schnell wrote, “The fact that 
an object may have been photographed previously by no means disqualifies it: 
changes, or the absence of changes, in it over a period of years or of weeks may 
be impor tant. And changes aside, it is amazing how many pictures of the same 
object can be taken without telling the  whole story” (18).
The scale of Schnell’s proj ect revealed core cia conceits from this period, 
as if the unguided particularist collection of at- the- time meaningless informa-
tion could inevitably lead to useful breakthroughs  later. The cia believed that if 
enough information was collected from enough  angles, American intelligence 
could develop a comprehensive view of the world it sought to control. No mun-
dane event or artifact was too insignificant for collection. According to Schnell:
If a new gas storage tank is being built in the city where you are stationed and you 
drive past it  going to work  every day, why not photo graph it once a week or once a 
month? The photos  will tell how long it takes to build it, what types of materials 
and methods of construction are used, and how much gas storage capacity is being 
added. Maybe you  don’t know what a gas storage tank looks like, and all you see 
is a big tank being built. Take a picture of it anyway; obviously it is built to store 
something. What you  don’t know about it the analyst  will. That is what he is an 
analyst for, but he  can’t analyze it if you  don’t get him the pictures. (1961: 18–19)
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This proj ect was an emblematic repre sen ta tion of the cia’s midcentury proj-
ect: it was well funded, global, brash, panoptical, without borders or limits. It 
was funded despite the unlikelihood that it would ever produce much useful 
intelligence, and working  under conditions of secrecy removed normal general 
expectations of outcomes or accountability.
Other Cold War intelligence agencies also established massive collections 
they  imagined could be of use at some hypothetical  future date. While enrolled 
in a spycraft lock- picking class, former British mi5 counterintelligence agent 
Peter Wright encountered a massive cellar room with thousands of keys, me-
ticulously cata loged and arranged on walls. His instructor told the class that 
mi5 made it a practice to secretly collect key imprints “of offices, hotels, or pri-
vate  houses . . .  all over Britain.” The instructor’s explanation for the collection 
was simply that “you never know when you might need a key again” (Wright 
1988: 51). In The File (1998), Timothy Garton Ash described the East German 
intelligence agency, Stassi’s, massive collection of personal items (including un-
derwear and other articles of clothing) that might be of use at some unknown 
 future date if Stassi needed to use tracking dogs to locate the owner of the stolen 
item.  These items  were pro cessed and placed in plastic bags, then sorted and 
stored in Stassi’s im mense, efficient archival filing system for unknown  future 
uses. Edward Snowden’s more recent disclosures of rampant National Security 
Agency (nsa) electronic monitoring establish that the agency collected previ-
ously unfathomable amounts of data on billions of  people on the assumption 
the information might be of use at some  future date (Greenwald 2014; Price 
2013c).
Intelligence agencies’ vast collections of (immediately) useless objects illus-
trate institutional commitments to establishing stores of intangibly useful re-
sources that might have intelligence uses at unforeseen  future times. A power ful 
national security state collecting unlimited numbers of obscure, useless snap-
shots with no conceivable direct applications thought nothing of supporting 
area study centers (teaching a spectrum of languages, which ranged from hav-
ing obvious to non ex is tent security applications), and a broad range of nonap-
plied anthropological research grants without direct applications to intelligence 
work. Academics might well collect needed bits of unconnected knowledge 
that cia analysts could  later use for tasks yet to be determined.
But this rapid growth in intelligence activities also brought unease as Presi-
dent Eisenhower (1961) raised awareness of the “danger that public policy could 
itself become the captive of a scientific- technological elite.” The secret report, 
titled “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on 
Information Activities Abroad” (ciaa 1960), more commonly known as “The 
Sprague Report,” captured the unease, philosophical position, and growing reli-
ance on academics as the cia embarked on a new phase of the Cold War. The 
report described the agency’s use of U.S.  labor  unions to establish relationships 
with  labor  union movements in communist countries and noted po liti cal gains 
from open academic exchange programs funded by public or private means 
(ciaa 1960: 53–54, 65). Academic exchanges  were acknowledged as impor tant 
Cold War weapons that needed funding  because “in our exchange programs we 
must outdo the Sino- Soviet Bloc in se lection of leaders and students with leader-
ship potential, quality of programs ofered, and treatment accorded visitors” (78).
George Ecklund’s secret article “Guns or Butter Problems of the Cold War” 
unapologetically noted that “the world now spends about $135 billion annually 
on the war industry, roughly as much as the entire income of the poorer half 
of mankind. The United States spends a  little more than a third of the total, the 
USSR about a third, and the rest of the world a  little less than a third” (1965: 
1–2). Ecklund described the negative impacts of such high levels of military 
spending on the Soviet economy and the problems this presented for the Sovi-
ets’ ability to spend funds on  human needs at home and on  those they hoped 
to influence in international technical assistance programs. He projected that 
such continued levels of military spending would be devastating to economic 
growth for the Soviet Union.
Ecklund did not consider  whether American runaway military spending 
would establish domestic crippling economic deficits or direct federal spend-
ing priorities away from national health care, mass transit infrastructure, edu-
cation, and other programs. Instead, Ecklund asked and answered questions 
in ways that ignored what  these developments meant for the homeland while 
stressing the anticipated devastating impact on the Soviet system.
The Fourth Estate Reveals Ongoing Patterns of  
cia Lawlessness
The de cade between 1966 and 1976 brought numerous journalistic exposés that 
revealed cia involvement in widespread covert and illegal activities. White 
House and congressional investigations followed, as did startling revelations by 
disillusioned former cia agents. Both mainstream and alternative newspapers 
and magazines played crucial roles in uncovering  these activities. Many Ameri-
cans viewed  these secret programs as undermining the possibility of American 
democracy.  These revelations shocked the public and pushed Congress to pass 
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legislation limiting specific practices and establishing increased congressional 
oversight of the cia through the Hughes- Ryan Act of 1974.
The cia used dummy foundations known as funding fronts to provide the 
appearance of neutral funds for scholars conducting research of interest to the 
agency. Early public revelations about  these fronts financing academic re-
search and travel  were made by Sol Stern in Ramparts magazine in 1967. Stern 
discovered this cia connection as a result of Representative Wright Patman’s 
1964 congressional hearings investigating the impacts of nonprofits on Ameri-
can po liti cal pro cesses (U.S. Congress 1964). Patman’s subcommittee investigated 
Internal Revenue Ser vice (irs) documents of vari ous groups and uncovered 
anomalies in the rec ords of several foundations. When Patman inquired about 
irregularities in the Kaplan Fund’s rec ords, Mitchell Rogovin, assistant to the 
irs commissioner, privately told him that the fund was a cia front, used to 
finance programs of interest to the agency, an arrangement that was confirmed 
by the cia representative Patman contacted. Patman identified eight nonprofits 
that had financially supported the Kaplan Fund while it was operating as a cia 
conduit: the Gotham Foundation, the Michigan Fund, the Andrew Hamilton 
Fund, the Borden Trust, the Price Fund, the Edsel Fund, the Beacon Fund, and 
the Kentfield Fund (U.S. Congress 1964: 191; Hailey 1964). Patman publicly re-
vealed  these cia- Kaplan connections  after the cia refused to comply with his 
requests for information about  these relationships (U.S. Congress 1964: 191).
 After Patman’s revelations, several newspapers condemned  these practices. 
The New York Times called for the end of cia funding fronts, arguing that they 
allowed “the Communists and the cynical everywhere to charge that Ameri-
can scholars, scientists, and writers  going abroad on grants from foundations 
are cover agents or spies for C.I.A. All scholars — especially  those involved in 
East- West exchanges —  will sufer if the integrity of their research is thus made 
suspect” (nyt 1964: 28). On September 7, 1964, the Pittsburgh Post Gazette & 
Sun wrote that “the cia’s intrusion into policy- making, its reported defiance 
of higher executive authority on occasion and its secret operations in the do-
mestic field are enough to make citizens wary of its role in a democracy” (re-
produced in U.S. Congress 1964: Exhibit 48).  Because Patman did not further 
pursue cia wrongdoing (Pearson 1967), even with such concerns over unlawful 
interference in domestic activities,  there  were no further investigations into the 
agency’s use of  these fronts  until three years  later, when Sol Stern published his 
exposé in Ramparts. Stern’s article established that the cia secretly had pro-
vided the National Student Association with $1.6 million since 1959, during a 
period in which the association was experiencing funding difficulties.
Starting with information from 1964 news reports on Wright Patman’s hearings, 
Stern used Patman’s discoveries and identified more cia funding fronts, con-
duits, and recipients. Stern determined that the cia had used fronts identified 
by Patman to fund the National Student Association and to manipulate poli-
cies within the association. He learned that, in 1965, the cia had approached 
the president of a “prominent New  England foundation” requesting access to 
the foundation’s list of funded organizations.  After viewing the list, cia agents 
explained that they would like to use the foundation to support some already 
funded and new organizations of interest to the cia, so that they could “chan-
nel cia money into the foundation without it ever being traced back to the cia. 
They said they  were very skilled at  these manipulations” (Stern 1967: 31). This 
foundation’s board rejected the cia’s proposal, but other foundations accepted 
cia funds and passed them along to unwitting individuals and programs.
One Ramparts reporter found that when he tracked down cia front founda-
tion addresses, he “usually found himself in a law office where no one was will-
ing to talk about the Funds” (Stern 1967: 31). Stern traced cia funds passing 
through several intermediary foundations (e.g., the J. Frederick Brown Foun-
dation and the In de pen dence Foundation) that  were themselves funded by 
cia fronts (31), with other money coming from the cia- linked Rabb, Kaplan, 
Farfield, San Jacinto Foundation, In de pen dence, Tower, and Price Funds and 
eventually reaching the National Student Association with no vis i ble links to 
the cia (32).
Stern’s report had a significant impact on the public. Ramparts purchased 
large ads in the New York Times announcing the piece, and  there  were wide-
spread reactions to the story. Art Buchwald (1967) wrote a humorous piece, spin-
ning ridicu lous cia cover stories, including one in which the cia had acciden-
tally funded the National Student Association, thinking it was giving money 
to the National Security Agency. While numerous editorials on  these fronts 
criticized the cia, Thomas Braden published “I’m Glad the cia Is ‘Immoral’ ” 
(1967) in the Saturday Eve ning Post, describing his role in passing cia funds 
to the American Federation of  Labor to bolster anticommunist  unions in Eu-
rope. Braden disclosed that cia funding had helped the Boston Symphony Or-
chestra, the International Committee of  Women, and the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom advance against the forces of international communism. He bragged 
about the cia secretly using Jay Lovestone, the former leader of the Communist 
Party usa and an anticommunist, to subvert communist advances in French 
 labor struggles. Carl Rowan, former director of the U.S. Information Ser vice 
(usis), claimed in his syndicated column that the National Student Associa-
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tion exposé in Ramparts was part of a communist plot (Richardson 2009: 78). 
Stern’s investigation did not need communist agents passing on cia front 
identities: his information was in the congressional rec ord, and Rowan’s usis 
background suggests his attack was nothing more than “disinformation from 
the cia propaganda machine” (Richardson 2009: 78).6
Stern’s revelations led mainstream media outlets to investigate the cia’s use 
of funding fronts to infiltrate domestic organizations (see Newsweek 1967). Pub-
lic concerns led President Johnson to appoint  Under Secretary of State Nicho-
las Katzenbach to lead a commission investigating cia programs that stood to 
“endanger the integrity and in de pen dence of the educational community.” But 
with Director of Central Intelligence (dci) Richard Helms on the committee, 
 there was  little chance of uncovering anything that the agency did not want 
made public, and even less chance that the committee would recommend crim-
inal  trials for cia employees violating the agency’s charter limiting its domestic 
activities. President Johnson  later received po liti cal payback for appointing a 
committee supporting the status quo; “having ‘saved’ the Agency, he demanded 
its loyalty on the Vietnam issue. His demand produced further cosmetic exer-
cises, including an attempt to discredit po liti cal protest against the war and the 
suppression of dissent within the cia” (Jefreys- Jones 1989: 156). But even as the 
Katzenbach Commission downplayed cia criminal wrongdoing, it confirmed 
widespread cia infiltration of domestic po liti cal organizations and revealed 
that the agency covertly funded the publication of more than a thousand books 
for academic and general audiences, as well as magazines like Encounter and 
Partisan Review (Wilford 2008; U.S. Senate 1976: 189).
Movements to keep the cia of American campuses began in 1966; with 
time this campaign spread and focused on keeping both cia recruiters and 
sponsored research of campus (Mills 1991; Price 2011e). A confidential 1968 
cia report titled “Student Reaction to cia Recruitment Activities on Campus” 
summarized the stages of the movement’s growth and credited Ramparts with 
spawning antirecruitment campaigns at Grinnell College, the City College 
of New York, San Jose State, and Harvard in 1966 (cia 1968b: 1). The cia found 
that while  these protests brought unfavorable publicity to the agency, a “New 
York Times series of articles on the Agency’s world- wide activities did much 
good and no perceptible harm. On the  whole, the publicity and  free advertising 
did more good than harm for the recruitment efort — inspiring a  great many 
write-in candidates of whom we might never have heard other wise — and em-
phasized the fact that the press and the reading public  will take a special inter-
est in what the Agency does” (1).7 The following year brought more anti- cia 
campus campaigns, with an increase from four campus incidents in 1966 to 
twenty- seven in 1967, including “a physical incarceration of two recruiters at 
Columbia University” (2). By 1968,  there  were seventy- seven anti- cia campus 
protests, with the agency identifying the [Students for a Demo cratic Society] as 
the “primary instigators” (2).
In 1968, Julius Mader published Who’s Who in the cia, claiming to iden-
tify hundreds of individuals with cia connections. Mader’s methodology was 
crude, drawing mostly on published biographical details of Americans working 
in diplomatic and other capacities, focusing particularly on individuals with 
war time intelligence links, but also on  those in roles traditionally fulfilled by 
cia agents at foreign embassies. Mader’s scattershot approach led to several 
errors, and his work was rumored to have been produced with kgb and Stassi 
assistance.8 This book and a growing number of nonscholarly works making un-
true claims about the cia fed growing public concerns about the agency’s 
unchecked powers.
President Johnson’s eforts at damage control and at managing public opin-
ions about the cia had limited results. The period from 1967  until the mid-
1970s brought ongoing revelations about cia, the fbi, and military intelligence 
engaging in widespread illegal activities, including unlawful use of  these agen-
cies to monitor and manipulate domestic po liti cal developments.  These activi-
ties afected American college campuses, with the fbi not only monitoring 
anthropologists and other students on campus but at times also using young 
 future anthropologist agent provocateurs to infiltrate, disrupt, and spy on cam-
pus po liti cal movements (see Divale 1970). In 1970, Christopher Pyle, a former 
army employee, revealed that the army had a secret intelligence network de-
voted to spying on U.S. citizens protesting the Vietnam War. Pyle disclosed that 
“The Army employed more than 1,500 plainclothes agents, coast to coast, to 
watch  every demonstration of 20  people or more” (2002). Investigations led by 
Senator Sam Ervin and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
substantiated Pyle’s revelations.
On March 8, 1971, a small group of activists broke in to the fbi Field Station in 
Media, Pennsylvania, and stole rec ords documenting the fbi’s illegal  Counter 
Intelligence Program (cointelpro), which harassed and spied on leftist po-
liti cal groups (see Medsger 2014).  These rec ords established how groups rang-
ing from the American Indian Movement to the Black Panthers  were infil-
trated, harassed, and at times encouraged to engage in illegal activities by the 
fbi. With each revelation, the American public came to understand that open 
demo cratic pro cesses had been covertly subverted by a hidden network of in-
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telligence agencies; with further leaks documenting cia and fbi lawlessness, 
pressures built for congressional investigations.
The cia’s  Family Jewels
Richard Helms resigned as the director of the cia in February 1973 and was 
replaced by James R. Schlesinger.9 In May 1973, Schlesinger directed the agency 
to conduct a classified secret in- house study identifying all past and present 
cia operations that  were likely outside of its operational charter. By the time 
the report was completed, William Colby had replaced Schlesinger as dci. 
The report, known as “The  Family Jewels,” was a 693- page compilation of por-
tions of memos and files that provided a detailed account of the cia’s illegal 
activities. “The  Family Jewels” described the agency’s involvement in extensive 
illegal domestic intelligence operations including broad surveillance of  U.S. 
news reporters and American po liti cal dissidents (including compiling almost 
10,000 pages of files on anti– Vietnam War protesters); break- ins at homes of 
defectors, former cia employees, and cia critics; forging of id documents; and 
kidnappings and assassination plots against state leaders (Fidel Castro, Patrice 
Lumumba, and Rafael Trujillo). News reporting on this document caused a po-
liti cal eruption that the executive and legislative branches could not ignore.
On December 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh published a New York Times story, 
titled “Huge cia Operation Reported in US against Anti- war Forces, Other 
Dissidents in Nixon Years,” that drew on leaked portions of “The  Family Jewels” 
(Hersh 1974b); President Ford and members of Congress first learned of this 
program from Hersh’s article.  After Hersh revealed Operation chaos’ illegal 
monitoring of more than one hundred thousand U.S. citizens, Ford asked dci 
Colby for a background report on chaos. Colby briefed the president on a 
range of illegal activities revealed in the report, including the Inspector Gen-
eral’s 1967 report on the cia’s program for assassinating foreign leaders. A few 
weeks  later, in an “of- the- rec ord” meeting with the New York Times editorial 
board, President Ford raised concerns that congressional investigations could 
unearth the existence of cia’s assassination programs.
The Times did not report on the cia’s assassination program. But when cbs 
newsman Daniel Schorr, who had no ties to the Times, learned that Ford had 
acknowledged cia involvement in assassinations, Schorr (incorrectly) assumed 
 these  were domestic assassinations, and when Colby responded to Schorr’s ef-
forts to get more information on the program, Colby inadvertently redirected 
Schorr’s focus to international assassinations. With this information Schorr 
broadcast the news of an international cia assassination program on cbs tele-
vi sion on February 28, 1975 (see Schorr 1977: 144–49). The Church Committee 
hearings  later examined cia eforts to assassinate a number of foreign lead-
ers, including Fidel Castro of Cuba, Ngao Dinh Diem of Vietnam, Patrice Lu-
mumba of the Congo, General René Schneider of Chile, and Rafael Trujillo of 
the Dominican Republic.
Wishing to preempt a disruptive congressional investigation, President Ford 
appointed Vice President Nelson Rocke fel ler to chair the eight- member fact- 
finding commission.10 The Rocke fel ler Commission report (Report to the Presi-
dent by the Commission on cia Activities within the United States, June 1975) 
identified several illegal cia activities and issued recommendations for cia 
reform, including that a cia database on hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
cans be destroyed (N. Rocke fel ler 1975). The commission provided descriptive 
summaries rather than specific accounts of a range of illegal activities, and its 
weak recommendations reduced its impact and indicated Ford’s desire to limit 
Americans’ knowledge of cia activities.
The Rocke fel ler Commission established that the cia had read more than 
2.3 million pieces of American mail in its Soviet mail monitoring program; 
 indexed 7 million individual names ( under Operation chaos) (Rocke fel ler 
1975: 24–34, 41); and used the Agency for International Development and an un-
named American university to run a cia counterinsurgency “training school 
for foreign police and security officers” in the United States, which also “sold 
small amounts of licensed firearms and police equipment to the foreign offi-
cers and their departments” (39). Despite the report’s admonitions that the cia 
should not repeat  these illegal and inadvisable acts, no one at the agency was 
arrested, and no concrete forms of oversight  were forthcoming as a result of the 
Rocke fel ler report.
In 1975, former cia agent Philip Agee published Inside the Com pany: cia 
Diary, providing detailed accounts of his activities as a cia operative in Ec ua-
dor, Uruguay, and Mexico. Agee identified 250 cia agents or officers, as well as 
Latin American presidents who collaborated with the cia, and he recounted 
bugging operations and cia torture and described how he had recruited and 
managed cia spy networks abroad. Inside the Com pany publicized how the 
agency undermined foreign demo cratic movements aligned with socialism, 
depicting it as a cynical organ ization supporting authoritarian governments 
aligned with U.S. business interests.11 Agee’s  later work with Louis Wolf on the 
book Dirty Work and in the magazines CounterSpy and Covert Action Informa-
tion Bulletin led to the publication of hundreds of other cia employee names.
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The Church Committee
In response to the revelations of ongoing press reports on “The  Family Jew-
els,” Watergate, and cointelpro and growing suspicions of illegal activities 
undertaken by the fbi and the cia, in 1975 the U.S. Senate Select Committee 
to Study Governmental Operations with Re spect to Intelligence Activities held 
hearings investigating the cia’s illegal activities. The committee, which came 
to be known simply as the Church Committee ( after its chair, Senator Frank 
Church, D- ID), produced fourteen volumes of reports documenting hundreds 
of illegal activities ranging from kidnapping, murder, and drugging of unsus-
pecting civilians to the widespread infiltration and subversion of domestic aca-
demic institutions.
Book 1, section 10, of the Church Committee’s report summarized the com-
mittee’s findings on the cia’s ability to covertly influence the production of 
academic knowledge. The committee found that the cia’s Domestic Collection 
Division routinely contacted American academics traveling abroad, and that 
the Foreign Resources Division was “the purely operational arm of the cia in 
dealing with American academics.” Between  these two divisions, the cia had 
contacts “with many thousands of United States academics at hundreds of U.S. 
academic institutions” (U.S. Senate 1976: 189).
The cia’s Office of Personnel secretly worked with university administrators 
to facilitate the recruitment of students. The cia’s operational use of academ-
ics raised “troubling questions as to preservation of the integrity of American 
academic institutions” (U.S. Senate 1976: 189). The report described extensive 
covert contacts with American academics, yet the committee chose not to iden-
tify specific individuals or institutions compromised by the cia.
The Church Committee’s investigations into the use of funding fronts for 
international research projects had significance for anthropology, as the com-
mittee determined the following:
The cia’s intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only be described 
as massive. Excluding grants from the “Big Three”— Ford, Rocke fel ler, and Car-
ne gie — of the 700 grants over $10,000 given by 164 other foundations during the 
period 1963–1966, at least 108 involved partial or complete cia funding. More im-
portantly, cia funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non– “Big Three” 
foundations made during this period in the field of international activities.12 In 
the same period more than one- third of the grants awarded by non– “Big Three” in 
the physical, life and social sciences also involved cia funds. . . .  A 1966 cia study 
explained the use of legitimate foundations was the most efective way of conceal-
ing the cia’s hand as well as reassuring members of funding organizations that the 
organ ization was in fact supported by private funds. The Agency study contended 
that this technique was “particularly efective for democratically- run membership 
organizations, which need to assure their own unwitting members and collabora-
tors, as well as their hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private 
sources of income. (U.S. Senate 1976: 182–83, emphasis added)
In most instances the academics receiving  these funds  were unaware that the 
cia funded their work. The committee identified “several hundred” instances 
in which the cia had established covert relationships with academics at more 
than a hundred university campuses performing cia- backed jobs, including 
“making introductions for intelligence purposes” and writing books or “mate-
rial to be used for propaganda purposes abroad” (U.S. Senate 1976: 190). At 
most universities no one outside of the cia contact knew of  these relationships, 
and all such contacts  were guarded by the agency, which considered “ these op-
erational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps 
its most sensitive domestic area and [imposed] strict controls governing  these 
operations” (190).
One of the ways that the cia  shaped the funding of international research 
was by planting agency employees in key positions on foundations. In 1955, dci 
Dulles responded to a request by Don K. Price, acting president of the Ford 
Foundation, to loan a cia employee to serve on the Ford Foundation staf, writ-
ing that he would make a cia employee (female, identity redacted) available to 
the foundation for two years, adding that “we consider her competency such 
that, with a period of ser vice with you, she and this Agency  will gain significantly” 
(foia cia- rdp80B01676R004000140015–9, AD to DKP, 8/13/55). The strategic 
placement of one such cia employee within Ford or other Foundations could 
influence untold numbers of funding decisions; though the rec ord is incom-
plete (due to the cia’s refusal to publicly release its own rec ords), we can as-
sume that this relationship at Ford was replicated at other key foundations.13
Recently declassified cia reports have shed light on some of the ways that 
the cia, the Pentagon, and other governmental agencies working on counter-
insurgency projects or other intelligence matters influenced and benefited from 
government- funded social science research during the Cold War. Henry Loomis 
(of the Psychological Strategy Board [psb]) produced “Report on Social Science 
Research in Cold War Operations” (1952), a cia report outlining strategies for 
using American social science research to further the agency’s knowledge and 
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goals (foia cia- cia- rdp80R01731R001700230005–8, 4/11/52). Loomis worked 
with Max Millikan (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003300090002–9, 5/5/52) where 
he advocated letting the psb oversee this cia- linked research within and out-
side the agency (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003300090003–8, 5/19/52). The articu-
lations of such relationships  were described in some detail in a 1962 cia report:
The External Research Division maintains an index of government sponsored con-
tractual research on foreign areas, obtaining the pertinent data from the sponsor-
ing agencies. Each calendar quarter it publishes an inventory of contracts. (The 
publication is classified “Secret.”) A tabulation of some 400 contracts reported in 
the publication over a period of several quarters reveals that the Agency for Inter-
national Development reported roughly 155 contracts, Air Force reported 125 and 
cia reported 56. Other agencies varied from a low of one (nsa and Arms Control, 
one each) to a high of 22 for Army. The information on  these contracts is usually 
gathered and published  after the research contracts have been let. Advance coor-
dination through the External Research Division is not required and, therefore, 
 there is not a uniform method of coordination. Some offices (osi for example) 
conduct a search of the quarterly published inventory prior to entering into new 
contracts. orr, in addition to searching the published inventory, coordinates its 
external research requirements through the Economic Intelligence Committee 
(usib) and the eic, in turn, requests the External Research Division to conduct a 
search of its rec ords. The offices do, however, make consistent use of the inventory. 
The value of a central rec ord such as that maintained by the External Research 
Division was demonstrated recently when the Division, in response to a request 
from Senator Fulbright, was able to supply the Senator with a consolidated report 
of government sponsored external research on the USSR and Communist China.
 . . .  In addition to the rec ords maintained and published on government spon-
sored research, the Division maintains a private research cata logue of social science 
research conducted in the United States on foreign areas and international afairs. 
Information for the cata logue is obtained through annual surveys of universities, 
foundations, research centers,  etc. The cata logue is unclassified and is open to the 
public. External Research lists of current private research on foreign areas and 
international afairs are published and distributed throughout the government 
and to university libraries, department heads, individual scholars, and foreign aca-
demic institutions. (foia cia- rdp80B01676R002400030004–1, 7/26/62)
During 1962 discussions on how the cia, the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (usaid), Air Force Intelligence, and other governmental agencies might 
best coordinate the use of the social and behavioral science research being 
produced, the cia suggested the formation of a “working group” with “a num-
ber of coordinating specialists thoroughly familiar with the lit er a ture in the rel-
evant fields whose duty it would be to maintain liaisons with all government 
agencies and research scholars” (foia cia- rdp80B01676R002400030004–1, 
7/26/62).
Between 1952 and 1967, the cia covertly funded U.S. scholars to write more 
than a thousand books representing views the agency wished to propagate. Of 
 these books, the Church Committee determined that “approximately 25  percent 
of them  were written in En glish. Many of them  were published by cultural or-
ganizations which the cia backed, and more often than not the author was 
unaware of cia subsidization. Some books, however, involved direct collabora-
tion between the cia and the writer” (U.S. Senate 1976: 193). Former cia agent 
E. Howard Hunt’s testimony confirmed cia books  were distributed in the U.S., 
and the Church Committee concluded “that such fallout may not have been 
unintentional,” adding that U.S. citizens  were “a likely audience” when this pro-
paganda was published in En glish (U.S. Senate 1976: 198–99). When asked by 
the committee (which was concerned that the cia had illegally engaged in do-
mestic propaganda) if the agency took steps to limit domestic exposure to the 
cia books published by Praeger or  others, Hunt replied:
It was impossible  because Praeger was a commercial  U.S. publisher. His books 
had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought  here, had to be read. . . .  
If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They  don’t all necessarily read 
En glish, and we had a bilateral agreement with the British that we  wouldn’t pro-
pagandize their  people. So  unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is pub-
lished in India, for example, where En glish is a lingua franca, then you have some 
basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the proj ect review 
board . . .  was that the ultimate target was foreign, which was true, but how much 
of the Praeger output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable. 
(U.S. Senate 1976: 198–99)
In response to Hunt’s revelations that Praeger had published cia propaganda 
in the United States, the committee concluded that, “given the paucity of infor-
mation and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the cia may have helped 
shape American attitudes  toward the emerging China. The cia considers such 
‘fallout’ inevitable” (U.S. Senate 1976: 199).
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Pike Commission
The House investigations of the cia  were more aggressive than the Senate’s, and 
unlike the Senate’s Church Committee, the House proceeded largely without 
the cia’s cooperation. The House Select Committee on Intelligence began its 
investigation in February 1975  under the leadership of Congressman Lucien N. 
Nedzi. The initial se lection of Nedzi as chair raised concerns that his previous 
role as chair of the House Armed Ser vices Subcommittee on Intelligence had 
compromised his ability to conduct an in de pen dent investigation. When a New 
York Times story revealed that dci Colby had privately briefed Nedzi about 
the cia’s “ Family Jewels” in 1973, Nedzi was replaced as chair by Congressman 
Otis Pike.
Conflicts between Pike and dci Colby began before the hearings  were con-
vened. Pike interpreted congressional oversight of cia to include the right to 
declassify documents and information as Congress saw fit. The cia maintained 
it had control of what information would be given to Congress (see Haines 
1989: 84). Colby was contemptuous of the Pike Committee and refused to dis-
close the cia’s bud get in public session, while within the agency, Colby was 
despised by many cia loyalists who resented him allowing any critical public 
scrutiny of the agency.
In an efort to understand the range of cia actions and the oversight that the 
Forty Committee had exercised over cia activities, the committee reviewed all 
cia covert actions between 1965 and 1975 (Pike Report 1977: 187). The commit-
tee devised six historical tests to mea sure the efectiveness of the cia’s analytical 
abilities to correctly foresee significant po liti cal events: the 1968 Tet Ofensive in 
Vietnam, the August 1968 Soviet action in Czecho slo va kia, the 1973 war be-
tween Israel and Syria and Egypt, the April 1974 coup in Portugal, the cia’s 
monitoring of India’s nuclear arms program, and the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The 
committee found that the cia failed to meaningfully anticipate any of  these 
developments, and that  these failures left Amer i ca in a weakened position.
The Pike Committee found that even  after President Johnson wrote direc-
tives prohibiting the cia from covertly funding U.S. educational institutions 
( after the 1967 National Student Association revelations in Ramparts), the 
cia “unilaterally reserved the right to, and does, depart from the Presidential 
order when it has the need to do so” (Pike Report 1977: 117). The committee 
determined that between 1965 and 1975 about one- third of the covert actions 
approved by the Forty Committee involved cia eforts to influence the out-
comes of foreign elections (190). Another third (29  percent) of the cia’s Forty 
Committee– approved covert activities during this period involved “media and 
propaganda projects” (190).  These projects included covert cia control of the 
publication of books and magazines within the U.S. and abroad, though “by far 
the largest single recipient has been a Eu ro pean publishing  house funded since 
1951,” with a “number of similar operations in the region” (190). About a quarter 
of the funds (23  percent) for the cia’s operations during this period went to the 
procurement and distribution of arms and covert paramilitary training, and 
“at times, cia has been used as a conduit for arms transfers in order to bypass 
Congressional scrutiny” (191).
The report evaluated three types of cia covert operations: “election support” 
(e.g., subverting demo cratic movements abroad), arms support, and the back-
ing of independence movements of the National Front for the In de pen dence of 
Angola (fnla) and the National Union for the Total In de pen dence of Angola 
(unita) in Angola. Investigation into the cia’s use of usaid “foreign police 
training” programs on American university campuses found  these programs 
 were also used by the cia to monitor campus activities (Pike Report 1977: 228–29).
Whereas the Church Committee found the cia to at times be a “rogue” 
agency engaging in unauthorized illegal activities, the Pike Committee found 
that the cia bypassed congressional oversight and operated  under executive 
branch control. This finding of consistent executive branch cia oversight was 
the crucial finding of the Pike Report. It showed how presidents, through the 
nsc, the Forty Committee, and at times directly through dcis, used the cia 
as a covert tool of executive branch policy. As former  career cia agent Ralph 
McGehee  later wrote, “My view backed by 25 years of experience is, quite sim-
ply, that the cia is the covert action arm of the Presidency” (1983: xi). The Pike 
Report concluded that “all evidence in hand suggests that the cia, far from 
being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the Presi-
dent and the Assistant to the President for National Security Afairs. It must be 
remembered, however that the cia director determines which cia- initiated co-
vert action projects are sufficiently ‘po liti cally sensitive’ to require Presidential 
attention” (Pike Report 1977: 189). While the executive branch exercised control 
of the cia’s covert actions, proposed cia covert actions also came from  others, 
including “a foreign head of state, the Department of Defense, the Department 
of State, an Ambassador, cia, the Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Afairs, a cabinet member or the President himself ” (Pike Report 1977: 
187).14 As Pike put it, “The cia never did anything the White House  didn’t want. 
Sometimes they  didn’t want to do what they did” (Pike qtd. in Haines 1998: 88). 
House Republicans blocked publication of the final report, but Daniel Schorr 
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leaked an early draft to the Village Voice, which published it in its entirety 
(Schorr 1976; Pike Report 1977; Benson 1976).
One short- term outcome of press revelations and of the findings of the Rocke-
fel ler, Pike, and Church committees was the establishment of new congressional 
oversight of cia activities. President Ford signed Executive Order 11905, ban-
ning po liti cal assassinations, creating the new National Security Committee on 
Foreign Intelligence, replacing the Forty Committee with the Operations Ad-
visory Group, and clarifying the necessity of reporting illegal activities to the 
executive branch. In 1978, President Car ter signed Executive Order 12036, re-
structuring oversight groups, a change that was widely interpreted as providing 
more cia oversight, yet the executive branch retained oversight control over 
the agency. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) established new 
congressional and judicial oversight of the cia’s domestic surveillance abilities.
Although the cia appeared publicly complacent with presidential and con-
gressional reform eforts, it resisted eforts to curtail its covert relationships with 
universities. When pressed by Senator Edward Kennedy to contact individuals 
and universities that had unwittingly received cia funding through MK- Ultra 
projects (discussed in chapter 8), the cia refused to undertake  these most basic 
of reparations (U.S. Senate 1977: 36, 45).
Writing the CIA into Disciplinary Histories
The United States’ postwar global po liti cal stance shifted American orienta-
tions  toward the peoples anthropologists studied. As the United States and the 
Soviet Union competed for the hearts, minds, debts, and arms contracts of 
the world’s nonaligned nations,  there  were tangible uses for the forms of in-
tangible knowledge that anthropologists brought home from the remote areas 
where they worked;  whether their work involved esoteric symbolic studies or 
radical Marxist analy sis, the cia saw prospects of useful knowledge.
Anthropology departments grew with the postwar wealth that flowed from 
gi Bill tuition, and this growth was nurtured by the dual use dynamics of Cold 
War research needs. Anthropologists sought training funds, opportunities for 
field research, linguistic training, and travel funds so that they could pursue 
research questions of interest to them and their discipline. Postwar govern-
mental agencies needed knowledge about the peoples of the world where the 
new American superpower developed relationships favoring American domi-
nance.  These  were often symbiotic relationships allowing academics to research 
topics of their choosing or to pursue theoretical questions of interest; in other 
instances, the questions or geographic regions of inquiry  were more closely 
 shaped by the availability of funds.  Either way, fields of knowledge  were funded 
that benefited individual anthropologists and generated knowledge for a brain 
trust.
Rarely was this brain trust a concrete conglomeration of scholars, of the 
type exemplified by the Prince ton Con sul tants; generally the knowledge was 
far more difuse and participants pursued knowledge in what appeared to be 
a mostly  free- range manner. Yet the revelations, first from a wave of journalis-
tic investigations, then from a wave of presidential and congressional commit-
tees disclosing the cia’s influence on international scholarship during the early 
Cold War,  were “massive.”
What is easily lost on readers in  later years marked by increased surveillance 
is the level of shock and outrage that  these initial revelations of cia lawlessness 
unleashed in Amer i ca in the 1960s and  1970s. The cia’s reliance on assassi-
nations, lying, cheating, death squads, destabilizing foreign demo cratic move-
ments, torture, bribery, kidnapping, or cooking intelligence reports to fit the 
needs of the executive branch directly undermined American ideals of democ-
racy and openness. The American public’s lessening ability to be shocked by 
revelations of cia lawlessness and domestic programs is remarkable, but anthro-
pologists recognize how the numbing tendencies of enculturation can normal-
ize atrocities. Sustaining shock is always difficult, outrage’s half- life is short, and 
the toll of cognitive dissonance weighs heavy. With time the outrageous and of-
fensive can be seen as the “unfortunately necessary,” and the currency of shock 
is short- lived as once current events become historicized.
Revelations of the cia’s lawlessness, its role in covert actions, its use of fund-
ing fronts, and its self- serving use of unwitting citizens have now become staples 
of the American imagination. In the milieu of  these press and congressional 
revelations  were films like Sydney Pollack’s Three Days of the Condor (1975), 
Costa- Gavras’s State of Siege (1972), Francis Ford Coppola’s The Conversation 
(1974), and Alan Pakula’s Parallax View (1974), or even Pakula’s Watergate jour-
nalistic detective story based on Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s book All 
the President’s Men (1976). Amer i ca’s popu lar imagination comfortably incor-
porated Condor’s cia funding fronts, The Parallax View’s assassinations, The 
Conversation’s borderless surveillance panopticon, and All the President’s Men’s 
all- encompassing lawless cancer on the presidency.
 There remained lasting vis i ble and invisible fallout from the Church and Pike 
investigations throughout American culture. Initially, a general distrust of the 
cia and fbi spread, but the cultural incorporation of this new knowledge of 
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cia practices took many forms, some based on fact,  others on fantasies or de-
lusions. Revelations of cia practices spawned a range of paranoid conspiracy 
theories that often began with facts or partial facts about  actual cia programs 
unearthed by the press or congressional hearings, but  these facts  were mixed 
with a range of delusional fantasies involving supposed successful mind control 
programs with  imagined “monarch slaves” and a host of international conspira-
cies involving bankers and agents of the Illuminati. While the cia’s MK- Ultra 
program funded a bizarre range of scientific research exploring the possibility 
of “mind control,” other than some new techniques for “enhanced interroga-
tions,” the cia did not develop any efective “mind control” program (beyond its 
covert use of newspapers and academic presses to influence public discourse). 
With time, the mixing of fact and fiction in popu lar accounts of cia activities 
contributed to the American public’s confusion about the agency’s history, as 
documented cia atrocities became indistinguishable in the public memory 
from absurd claims. This haziness of Americans’ shared cia memory mixed 
with the popu lar ized paranoid fantasies about this history, along with post-9/11 
Hollywood fantasies of cia saviors operating beyond the law, diminished the 
likelihood of the American public demanding new levels of cia accountability.
While the leaked Pike Report and released Church Committee Report ex-
panded public knowledge about cia wrongdoing and ongoing lawlessness, the 
findings of  these committees brought  little long-term change in the way the 
agency did business, or how Congress exercised due oversight of the agency. 
Congressional and journalistic revelations increased the American public’s 
distrust of the cia and the fbi.  These disclosures weakened the confidence of 
many educated Americans in the cia and strengthened growing movements to 
keep the cia of of American university campuses.
Several years  after the fact, in the pages of the cia’s in- house classified jour-
nal, Studies in Intelligence, Timothy S. Hardy gloated that, while Seymour Hersh 
and other journalists had successfully spawned White House and congressional 
investigations of cia activities, “yet Hersh may not even merit a historical foot-
note, perhaps,  because the ball he started rolling never  really knocked down all, 
or even any of the pins. . . .  The cia is thriving in Langley, its constituent parts 
all strung together, its basic mission unchanged. The Defense Department still 
spends more than 80  percent of the billions of national intelligence dollars in 
ways only vaguely known to the American public” (1976: 1). Given the depth 
of anti- cia feelings at the time Hardy wrote this, his remarks may seem like 
a form of dismissive denial, but if one takes the long view, Hardy’s focus on 
the speed at which Americans came to adjust to and accept news of the cia’s 
lawlessness proved to be profoundly accurate. Americans  were enculturated to 
learn to accept cia death squads, wiretaps, kidnappings, covert arms dealing, 
support for foreign dictators, and even massive nsa metadata surveillance as 
necessary details of the modern world. In post-9/11 Amer i ca, the ac cep tance of 
cia torture, invasions of domestic privacy, assassinations, and attacks on inter-
national demo cratic movements updated this enculturation pro cess to a point 
where increasing numbers of Americans accept  these practices as necessary 
and just, while the agency’s history and the public’s outrage over past revela-
tions dis appear from public memory.
While this overview of Cold War strategies, revelations of cia lawlessness, 
and interactions with academics during the Cold War is crucial for our consid-
eration of how American anthropology interacted with military and intelligence 
agencies during the period, it is impor tant to keep in mind that most anthropol-
ogists  were then unaware of the secret shifts in American policy and practices 
during the earliest days of the Cold War, as fighting of the Second World War 
subsided and the postwar era began. Although this lack of awareness  shaped 
anthropologists’ motivations, innocence did not mitigate harm; as Thomas 
Fowler argued in The Quiet American, “Innocence is like a dumb leper who has 
lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm” (Greene 1955: 36).
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The end of the war brought the anthropologists back to the campuses but  
with empty notebooks, and the American Anthropologist reflected this  
lack of a research backlog for the first few years of our period.
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T W O   W O R L D  WA R  I I ’ S  
L O N G  S H A D O W
Due to war time publishing interruptions, Cora Du Bois’s prewar ethnography 
of eastern Indonesian culture, The  People of the Alor, was not published  until 
1944. A de cade and a half  after the war’s end, she wrote an appendix to the 
original preface that briefly broke disciplinary standards muting discussions of 
ways that anthropology had intersected with the war. The years between writ-
ing  People of Alor and its 1960 republication had been active ones for Du Bois. 
She began the war in Washington at oss headquarters, using her 1930s eth-
nographic fieldwork experiences to inform her war knowledge of Indonesia; 
she  later relocated to Ceylon, at an oss base where she directed operations in 
Malaysia, southern China, Siam, and Burma (Seymour 2015).
Du Bois’s updated appendix acknowledged that the  people of Alor described 
in her book  were forever changed by the war and by their prewar contact with 
her. She wrote that  after the war’s end she received a “jovial, almost flippant 
letter” from “a young controleur who was sent to Alor during the Dutch in-
terregnum before Indonesia achieved in de pen dence.” This young man asked 
for a copy of her ethnography and passed along news of the island, with some 
details of the Japa nese occupation during the war (Du Bois 1960: xiv). He de-
scribed how the Japa nese had established a station and run patrols near the 
village, Atimelang, where Du Bois had lived and conducted her fieldwork 
in 1937–39. He wrote to Du Bois that one day, the Japa nese command learned 
that the leaders of Atimelang “ were claiming that Hamerika would win the 
war”— Hamerika being how they pronounced the name of the strange, distant 
land from which Du Bois had traveled to live among them. Du Bois added that 
the notion that the  great  house of Hamerika would win the war
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could have been nothing but the most innocent fantasy to my friends in Atimelang 
since they had never even heard of the United States prior to my arrival. But to the 
Japa nese, sufering from all the ner vous apprehensions of any occupying power in 
a strange and therefore threatening environment, such talk could mean only rebel-
lion. . . .  so the Japa nese sent troops to arrest five of my friends in Atimelang. I am 
not sure who all of them  were from the young controleur’s letter, but apparently 
Thomas Malelaka, and the Chief of Dikimpe  were among them. In Kalabahi they 
 were publicly decapitated as a warning to the populace.
 There is no end to the intricate chain of responsibility and guilt that the pursuit 
of even the most arcane social research involves. (1960: iv– v)
The personal responsibility Du Bois assumed for her indirect involvement in 
the execution of  these five  people was remarkable and arguably beyond a rea-
sonable interpretation of individual guilt; but in acknowledging the rampant 
killing unleashed in the Second World War, Du Bois broke a fourth wall of 
postwar ethnographic writing in ways that  were unusual for her time. This wall 
supported the standard narrative contrivance in which not only the ethnog-
rapher as a person but also the geopo liti cal events impacting fieldwork  were 
removed from the focus of the text. Ethnographies  adopted tones presenting 
objective accounts of a natu ral world where the scientist- ethnographers  were 
neutral observers. Du Bois’s blunt ac knowl edg ment that anthropology was part 
of “the intricate chain of responsibility and guilt” linked to even the “most ar-
cane social research,” with generally unacknowledged atrocities and lesser con-
sequences, was reminiscent of Kipling’s lama warning Kim that he had “loosed 
an act upon the world, and as a stone thrown into a pool so spread the conse-
quences thou canst not tell how far” (1922: 334). Many postwar ethnographic 
works all but erased the war and its wake of slaughter from their narratives. The 
consistency of the ways that post– World War II ethnographers glossed over the 
war’s transformative impacts informs us about the world in which they wrote.
The Postwar Ethnographic World
Postwar anthropological works recorded and ignored the war’s impacts in vary-
ing ways. Some eforts, like Joseph Tenenbaum’s interviews with survivors and 
 others linked to Nazi concentration camps, appearing in the book In Search of a 
Lost  People (1946),  were works of tragic salvage ethnography, while other works 
moved the war’s impacts beyond the horizon of the ethnographic present. Some 
ethnographers studied impacts of the war in New Guinea and elsewhere. Ian 
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Hogbin’s Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village 
(1951) described how the war and the postwar period  shaped the villages of New 
Guinea. Cyril Belshaw’s book The  Great Village (1957) chronicled New Guinea 
villagers’ eforts to rebuild and reestablish their village  after it was destroyed dur-
ing the war. Anthropological studies of cargo cults connected  these millennial 
movements with villagers’ experiences with gi culture during the war.
Kenneth Read described how the Japa nese, British, and Australian war time 
occupations impacted the peoples of New Guinea’s Markham Valley, noting 
that the Japa nese, who also “possessed the white man’s weapons,”  were initially 
viewed much as the Eu ro pean occupiers had been (Read 1947: 98). Read was 
reproached for the Eu ro pe ans’ hy poc risy that forbade locals to fight, yet “Eu-
ro pe ans  were engaged in a war with another  people” (Read 1947: 99). Anthro-
pologists studied how the war disrupted traditional New Guinea subsistence 
and altered local foodways (Read 1947; Hogbin 1951).
The Australian government had worried that native loyalties could easily 
shift during the war. One government report on Japa nese interactions with Ab-
origines noted that aboriginals “openly stated that the Japs told them that the 
country belonged to the blacks, had been stolen from them by the whites and 
that ‘bye bye’ they (the Japs) would give it back to them (the blacks). In fact, the 
writer suggested that whoever supplied ‘food and tobacco’ would have the sup-
port of the Aborigines” (Gray 2005: 19).
Micronesians first endured Japa nese occupations, then an American lib-
eration that became an occupation. In regions where indigenous populations 
prior to the war had been pacified  under the forces of colonialism, the war 
sometimes found old and new colonial managers rolling back other wise strictly 
enforced prohibitions against traditional forms of warfare and other forms of 
vio lence (D. H. Price 2008a: 71–72). For  those living in the war’s path, the end of 
the war did not bring peace or freedom as much as it brought new relationships 
of control and domination.
The war transformed the settings of postwar ethnographies around the world. 
Cultures of Melanesia, Indonesia, and the Philippines experienced combat and 
occupations, while North African cultures from Morocco to Egypt  were caught 
in the  middle of American and Eu ro pean battles. Cornelius Osgood’s book The 
Koreans and Their Culture mixed war zone ethnography with lengthy discus-
sions of the Japa nese, Rus sian, and American occupations of the twentieth 
 century, along with sympathetic narratives explaining why villagers would be 
drawn to align with communism. With acknowl edgments thanking Dean Ache-
son and Edgar Furniss, Osgood noted that attempts “to undertake in de pen dent 
research  under the aegis of a military occupation should be avoided if pos si ble 
for, though cooperation is generous and sincere, it can be even more confusing 
than the complications of operating as an alien in a country at war” (1951: 9).
Bringing the War Back Home
 After the armistice, American soldiers returned home and resumed civilian life. 
Most anthropologists who had served the war in an alphabet soup of military 
and intelligence agencies returned to universities, museums, and other civilian 
workplaces. Classrooms  were soon packed with students entering college  under 
the gi Bill. Many anthropologists returned to teaching, and large universities 
and small colleges expanded curriculum to meet the demands for the growing 
postwar interest in anthropology courses. A 1947 article in the News Bulletin of 
the American Anthropological Association described how even small colleges 
expanded their anthropology course oferings and required anthropological 
faculty to meet the growing demand for courses (nbaaa 1947 1[3]: 45).1
Not all anthropologists returned to the classrooms they had left for the war. 
 After the war’s end, some continued working in military or civilian positions 
like  those they held during the war.  Others applied anthropology to the mana-
gerial problems the American victors faced in managing lands they now oc-
cupied. Some anthropologists worked on postwar projects in Eu rope, Asia, or 
the Pacific. Some continued the work they had done for military intelligence 
agencies, at times extending questionable methodologies forged in the heat of 
war time.
Some scholars repurposed war time data for peacetime academic research. 
At Harvard, E. A. Hooton and ( future cia anthropologist) J. M. Andrews ana-
lyzed fifty thousand somatotype photographs of military inductees, hopelessly 
searching for correlations between body type and “education, occupation, mili-
tary ser vice and achievement” (nbaaa 1947, 1[4]: 49). In 1948, Weston La Barre 
received a Guggenheim Fellowship to write a book “on oriental character struc-
ture based on materials gathered during the war as an officer in [the Office of 
Naval Intelligence; oni] and oss (cbi and seac), in China, India and Ceylon” 
(nbaaa 1948 2[3]: 43).2 La Barre published two papers from this oss and oni 
work in Psychiatry, on Japa nese and Chinese personality types (La Barre 1945, 
1946a, 1946b).
La Barre’s study of Chinese personality reduced the complexity of Chinese 
culture to brief caricatures. Such overly simplified cultural repre sen ta tions cir-
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culated widely as classified memos during the war and helped inform or rein-
force the views of military and intelligence personnel, but the publication of 
such an amateurish work in the peer- reviewed pages of Psychiatry  after the war 
indicates the militarist milieu that remained in postwar academia. La Barre’s 
 later work studying culture and personality among the Aymara showed levels of 
nuance and moderation of analy sis distinct from the sort of army surplus analy-
sis that he published  after the war in Psychiatry.
The National Research Council (nrc) and the Social Science Research Coun-
cil (ssrc) funded the Library of Congress’s Document Expediting Proj ect, 
which salvaged and declassified two thousand army, navy, and oss civil afairs 
reports, which  were distributed to American universities interested in using 
 these materials for research (nbaaa 1947 1[3]: 34). In 1949, the army’s Histori-
cal Division sought anthropologists interested in analyzing a cache of military 
documents collected from overseas military outposts during the war (nbaaa 
1949 3[1]: 13).
Alexander Leighton’s work bridged the Second World War and the Cold War 
in ways that illustrate how American social science remained connected to war-
time themes. During the war, Leighton managed interned Japa nese Americans 
at Poston, Arizona, and his published writings on his work at the Poston Deten-
tion Camp conveyed a detached, observational narrative tone. As described in 
his book The Governing of Men, Leighton strove to study  human interactions as 
a neutral scientific observer mea sur ing the variables of  human culture, an efect 
designed to present this po liti cal act with a façade of scientific neutrality as if 
he  were but a passive observer, not an inflictor, of “natu ral” pro cesses (Leighton 
1945; D. H. Price 2008a: 149–51).
Leighton’s  Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations on the Use 
of the Social Sciences (1949) opened with an account of his December 1945 
visit to Hiroshima, four months  after its bombing. He described the remarks 
of the  people he encountered, but his narrative was far from the sort of thick 
description that  later anthropological writing would strive to achieve; instead, 
Leighton’s postwar Hiroshima was a world where tragic stories mixed with col-
lections of information on  human data points. Leighton approached the Japa-
nese  people as variables to be understood so that they could be altered to suit 
the needs of American interests, in the name of peace in a “changing world.” 
His ethnographic frame was carefully chosen, opening with a skeptical gi Jeep 
driver assuring him that Hiroshima was no dif er ent from any other bombed 
Japa nese city, followed by descriptions of a nuclear bomb– decimated landscape, 
children playing among ruins, the ways and means of his local Japa nese hosts, 
and his own insistence that the bombing was no more of a crime against hu-
manity than any other war time bombardment.
Leighton visited Hiroshima while on assignment for the U.S. Strategic Bomb-
ing Survey, which continued collecting information on local populations  after 
the war. Leighton’s encounters with survivors provided a composite ethno-
graphic narrative of the experiences of the  people of Hiroshima. He compiled 
shared memories of the calm morning before the attack, followed by the flash, 
the burning air, vaporized  people, the shock,  dying children,  dying parents, and 
dead bodies everywhere. The vice mayor of a neighboring town told him how, 
 after the bombing, “every body looked alike. The eyes appeared to be a mass of 
melted flesh. The lips  were split up and also looked like a mass of molten flesh. 
Only the nose appeared the same as before. The death scene was awful. The 
color of the patient would turn to blue and when we touched the body the skin 
would stick to our hands” (Leighton 1949: 29). The Strategic Bombing Survey’s 
sponsorship and anticipated consumption of Leighton’s report altered it from 
a neutral collection of stories into a sociocultural ballistics report detailing the 
outcomes of a calculated, intentional use of a new weapon. This transformation 
occurred not  because Leighton’s narrative lacked  human compassion (it had no 
such deficit) but  because the context in which this agency consumed his narra-
tive repurposed it as a part of dual use pro cesses regardless of his compassion, 
sympathies, or intentions.
Leighton described the routinized pro cesses for using data collected from 
Japa nese prisoners of war: “Interrogation reports  were coded and data deal-
ing with morale factors and background information  were reduced to punch 
cards which could be sorted and tabulated by machines. In addition to this, 
however, extracts  were made from the reports and filed in two systems, one 
dealing with the morale of the fighting forces and the other with the home front” 
(1949: 83). Postarmistice Foreign Morale Analy sis Division (fmad) reports in-
cluded attitudinal data mea sur ing Japa nese dissatisfaction as fmad switched 
from attempting to spawn war time insurgent movements to fearing postwar 
counterinsurgencies (e.g., Leighton 1949: 68).
 Human Relations in a Changing World argued that a fundamental lesson 
learned at fmad was that science could mea sure, explain, and control  human 
be hav ior. Leighton took for granted that such social science control over soci-
ety would be used for “the prevention of war and the promotion of workable 
relationships between nations” instead of for one nation or class to exploit the 
weaknesses of  others, or for leaders to manipulate their own populations to sup-
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port wars serving the interests of elites but not the populous manipulated into 
supporting and fighting them (Leighton 1949: 101). He advocated that the same 
sort of analytical techniques developed by fmad be used by the U.S. govern-
ment to solve domestic and international social problems.3 This work betrayed 
 little awareness of the po liti cal dimensions of scientific research. Leighton did 
not acknowledge that individuals and groups used knowledge both for the 
greater good of all and for themselves; in the book’s conclusion, he conceded 
the existence of a “fear that social scientists  will sell their skills to ‘conscienceless 
manipulators,’ ” and while not dismissing this as a possibility, he diluted such 
concerns, arguing that  these dangers face all branches of science (207).
The Marshall Plan and Postwar Occupations
The Soviet’s Molotov Plan of 1947 brought postwar aid to Eastern Eu rope’s So-
viet bloc, extending Soviet influence in ways similar to the relationships se-
cured for the United States the following year  under the Marshall Plan. The 
Marshall Plan launched the United States on a new soft power international 
interventionist trajectory linked to the Truman Doctrine. Named  after Secre-
tary of State George Marshall, a retired army general, and designed primarily 
by William Clayton and George Kennan at the State Department, the Marshall 
Plan’s Eu ro pean Recovery Program (erp) funneled $13 billion to programs for 
rebuilding Western Eu ro pean economies and infrastructure. From 1947 to 1951, 
the erp spent 3  percent of the U.S. gdp on Cold War Eu ro pean recovery proj-
ects (contrast this with the 0.19  percent of gdp the United States spends on all 
foreign aid; Keating 2014).4
The Marshall Plan had general domestic bipartisan support, but on the po-
liti cal right, Senator Robert A. Taft, a Republican, opposed all forms of interna-
tional aid; on the left, Henry Wallace criticized the plan as a Cold War tactic weak-
ening  labor movements, propping up private business interests, and increasing 
schisms between the United States and the Soviet Union. Michael Hogan, his-
torian of the Marshall Plan wrote that Wallace viewed “the erp as the work 
of American monopolists and imperialists who  were seeking to promote their 
interests at home and overseas at the expense of social justice and world peace. 
Wallace denounced what he saw as the invasion of government by private busi-
ness and financial leaders who had turned the State Department and other 
public agencies into servants of mono poly capital” (Hogan 1987: 94).
Wallace found cynical motives  behind American plans to rebuild Eu rope, 
arguing that “Western Eu ro pean countries can no longer count on colonial loot 
to sustain their customary standards of living. They must now earn their own 
way through reconstruction and expansion of their economies” (1948: 6). Wallace 
believed the Marshall Plan would “underwrite the military bud gets of reaction-
ary governments which  will do the bidding of American private capital” (18). 
He criticized the ways the plan undermined Eu ro pean eforts to nationalize 
industries while empowering private trusts benefiting from the particulars of 
reconstruction and economic reforms as the plan pressed Eu ro pean nations 
 toward adopting regionally integrated economic relations. Foreseeing critiques 
of Reaganomics, he argued, “We can draw a just parallel between the [Eu ro pean 
Recovery Plan] and the [Herbert] Hoover plans for combating depression  here 
at home in the early 30’s. Both plans  were based on the thoroughly discredited 
notion that you bolster the wealthy and entrenched interests, and benefits  will 
automatically trickle down to the  people” (17). Combined with coming nato 
formations, the Marshall Plan entwined American global power and Eu ro pean 
economic reorganization in ways that sharply divided the world into the Cold 
War’s dichotomous camps of East and West.
The Marshall Plan brought stability to Western Eu rope, but it also re- formed 
Eu rope in a Cold War context adopting specific anticommunist, antisocialist 
po liti cal economic positions. The vision of the Marshall Plan would remain 
an attractive nuisance for vari ous Cold War development schemes claiming to 
liberate the underdeveloped world from poverty.5
Some Eu ro pean anthropologists, like Pierre Bessaignet of France, worked for 
the Marshall Plan in their home countries, but anthropologists’ involvement 
with Eu ro pean reconstruction was not as widespread or centrally coordinated 
as  were their involvements in the postwar Japa nese occupation, or the Microne-
sian ethnographic explorations of the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian 
Anthropology group (cima) (Gaillard 2004: 188).  These regional diferences 
in anthropological contributions likely occurred for a combination of reasons, 
including larger numbers of available State Department personnel who  were 
already familiar with the languages and cultures of Eu rope.
Occupations starkly demonstrate power relations, and anthropologists’ con-
tributions to occupations reveal disciplinary alignments to power. Occupa-
tions during and  after the war betrayed structural imbalances whose internal 
logics often suggested retribution could  settle scores as war time collabora-
tors faced their countrymen and countrywomen, and postwar occupiers had 
to resist temptations to make losers pay for the personal losses the occupiers 
experienced.6
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The American military leadership realized that the successful postwar oc-
cupation of Japan required significant knowledge about Japa nese culture. With 
the passing of de cades, many Americans came to view the occupation as a peace-
ful, smooth transition. As American strategists contemplated occupations in 
Iraq and Af ghan i stan in the early twenty- first  century, public discourse often 
nostalgically referred to the ease and success of the ghq’s postwar occupation of 
Japan. Japan has been presented as a model occupation that brought peace to a 
war- torn nation by installing American- style democracy. Notions of a peaceful 
Japa nese occupation  were regularly contrasted with the clashing factions using 
improvised explosive devices to kill and maim American occupiers in Af ghan i-
stan and Iraq. Typical of  these claims about the Japa nese occupation is this pas-
sage from a New York Times essay from 2003, lamenting the absence of anthro-
pologists to help guide the American occupation of Iraq: “As the occupation 
of Iraq appears more complex by the day, where are the new Ruth Benedicts, 
authoritative voices who  will carry weight with both Iraqis and Americans?” 
(Stille 2003).7 While the occupation of postwar Japan brought relatively low 
levels of interpersonal or orga nizational vio lence directed against occupiers, 
 there  were other difficulties and forms of structural vio lence that such ebullient 
narratives con ve niently neglect.
Many anthropologists have come to believe that Ruth Benedict and other 
anthropologists influenced decisions to allow the Japa nese emperor to retain 
ceremonial power at the war’s end, and that The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword, Benedict’s study of Japan, guided General Douglas MacArthur’s post-
war occupation. While Benedict’s book has been read by millions of Japa nese 
in the postwar period,  there is no evidence that Benedict’s recommendations to 
spare the mikado had any direct impact on his fate — MacArthur and  others al-
ready understood that the emperor should remain (D. H. Price 2008a: 171–99). 
Likewise, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was not a central text influencing 
the Japa nese occupation in the ways characterized by Stille and  others. Like 
other anthropological counterinsurgency- linked texts, Chrysanthemum’s great-
est impact was on the home front, as it helped frame American understandings 
of the conquered Japa nese.
As John W. Dower’s Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II 
shows, the postwar occupation of Japan was far more complicated than as de-
picted in popu lar American retcon narratives. Dower documents a remarkably 
compliant occupied Japa nese population that aligns with popu lar renderings, but 
he also reveals the incredible hardships and severe cultural annihilation that lay 
 behind this layer of “nonviolent” compliance, a compliance enforced by ghq’s 
totalitarian control of traditional Japa nese cultural and po liti cal pro cesses.
Dower contrasted the sort of nuanced American academic approach to Japa-
nese culture that emerged during the war as a new generation of “American and 
British anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists [entered] 
into the general areas of intelligence analy sis and psychological warfare” (1999: 
219) with that of the war’s elder generation of Asia experts, who concluded that 
the Japa nese would be incapable of adopting democracy  after the war. A cohort 
of American social scientists who recognized the malleability of enculturation 
pro cesses and the innate forces of cultural relativism advocated for an occupa-
tion based on aggressive social engineering.8 An older generation of Asia ex-
perts with ties to the United Kingdom’s Royal Institute of International Afairs 
judged the Japa nese as not being able to adopt democracy  because they  were 
an “obedient herd.” According to Dower, if this generation of “Asia experts had 
their way, the very notion of inducing a demo cratic revolution would have died 
of ridicule at an early stage. As happened instead, the ridicule was deflected by 
the views of experts of a dif er ent ilk — behavioral scientists who chose to em-
phasize the ‘malleability’ of the Japa nese ‘national character,’ along with planners 
and policy makers of liberal and left- wing persuasions who sincerely believed 
that demo cratic values  were universal in their nature and appeal” (1999: 218). 
Dower speculated that had the emperor followed his advisers’ counsel and sur-
rendered at the beginning of 1945, Japan not only would have avoided conven-
tional, jellied gasoline, and atomic bombing campaigns but also might have 
avoided “the occupation’s revolution from above. As of early 1945,  there was no 
plan to induce a demo cratic revolution in the defeated nation. The old Japan 
hands [e.g., British analysts] who still controlled post surrender planning an-
ticipated a mild reform agenda at best” (220).
Dower reveals an American occupation full of brutalities and degradations, 
as the Japa nese public  were denigrated through programs like a government- 
organized prostitution operation supervised by the local police (1999: 124–26) 
and a collapse of the production and distribution of basic foodstufs that was 
still so severe in October 1947 that a young, honest municipal judge died of 
starvation  after refusing to purchase food on the black market (99). The United 
States’ refusal to shoulder the costs of occupation exacerbated Japa nese hard-
ships. In contrast to  those living  under the Marshall Plan in Eu rope, many Japa-
nese starved as they  were required to pay the costs of the American occupation, 
a burden that “amounted to a staggering one- third of the regular bud get at the 
beginning of the occupation” (115).
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In 1950, anthropologist George Foster was appointed to be the American 
Anthropological Association (aaa) delegate to the Commission on the Occu-
pied Areas’ Second National Conference on the Occupied Countries (aa 1951 
53[3]:456). Foster reported on conference pre sen ta tions describing the state of 
American occupations of Austria, Germany, Japan, and the Ryukyus, in which 
he criticized American military officials’ grasp of the realities and problems of 
an occupation, and broad beliefs in faulty cultural engineering assumptions. 
Foster described a series of upbeat military- linked occupation reports making 
unrealistic claims of transformed occupied populations that fit Americans’ ex-
pectations. According to Foster:
The report of Col. Nugent on Japan was very discouraging  because of the atti-
tude and point of view. He painted a glowing picture in which every thing is  going 
beautifully in Japan and  there are no problems. As a result of the U.S. program, 
Japa nese character, personality and culture have been entirely changed during the 
past five years and they are well on the road to American democracy. The ethno-
centric approach on the part of most delegates and officials  toward all of the oc-
cupied countries was almost unbelievable. Nearly  every discussion and comment 
was predicated on the assumption that American institutions are perfect and that 
success in the occupied countries consists only in recasting them more nearly in 
our own image. It was implied that what is wrong with Japa nese culture is that it 
is so unlike American culture. . . .  Japa nese universities  were thoroughly excori-
ated  because they  were copied  after the Eu ro pean pattern and not the American 
pattern. Unquestionably, foreign nationals representing the occupied areas must 
have felt that most of the discussion was an unvarnished insult to their national 
cultures. (aa 1951 53[3]: 456–57)
Foster’s  bitter assessment was ignored not only by American policy makers but 
also by some in the generation of coming applied anthropologists who avoided 
such assessments that directly countered American policy positions, instead 
adopting managerial views that better aligned with American policy.
Several American anthropologists conducted fieldwork in occupied Japan. 
Douglas Haring took a leave of absence from Syracuse University during 1951 
and  1952 to serve on the nrc’s Pacific Science Board in the Ryukyus, where 
he worked on an army program documenting local culture. The Wenner- Gren 
Foundation  later funded Haring’s research evaluating U.S.- backed reforms  after 
the American occupation of Japan ended (J. W. Hall 1952: 293–94). Some Amer-
icans conducted community studies: Arthur Raper surveyed rural fishing com-
munities, gathering information on the impacts of postoccupation land reform 
programs (see Raper et. al. 1950); John Bennett modeled his research on Walter 
Goldschmidt’s ethnographic field research on California agricultural commu-
nities, as he studied neighborhood associations, the “ labor boss” system, and 
“problems of ‘freedom and control’ ” in a rural forestry community in the Toch-
igi Prefecture (Bennett 1951: 1–2).9  These community studies gathered data used 
for planning and to integrate translated background material gathered by re-
search staf. Japa nese staf helped design efective surveys, questionnaires, and 
other data- gathering methods and collected attitudinal surveys, interviews, 
and local archival materials (Bennett 1951: 2).
Bennett’s analy sis  adopted a “Weber- Parsons scheme of analy sis for institu-
tional economics” to account for studying variations in social integration (1951: 
3), while other research was more descriptive and less theory oriented. Bennett’s 
study analyzed how market conditions determined wages and prices, while cul-
tural traditions and intricate systems of obligations, rituals, and values  shaped 
Japa nese business relationships. Bennett found that Japa nese cultural traditions 
cultivated “a strong local demo cratic res pect for individual and  family rights, 
[which also led to the] exploitation of workers by ‘bosses,’ who manipulate the 
traditionalistic structure and demand loyalty in return for protection” (4).
Occasionally, data and analy sis from  these community studies impacted occu-
pation policy decisions. In one instance, data from Bennett’s fishery rights study 
 were integrated by the Natu ral Resources Section when it wrote new fisheries laws 
(Bennett 1951: 4). While some research impacted policy decisions, it is unclear to 
what extent the social science programs of occupied Japan described by Bennett 
and  others influenced shifts in Japa nese cultural policy. Such questions are high-
lighted by the work of Iwao Ishino, an anthropologist formerly employed by the 
Japan Occupation’s Public Opinion and So cio log i cal Research Division work-
ing alongside Bennett, who published an analy sis of the shifts in the traditional 
Matsui  labor supply system in which “ labor bosses” controlled hiring in certain 
Japa nese job sectors (dockworkers, carpenters, cooks,  etc.). Ishino (1956) ar-
gued that traditional economic forces, rather than nuanced understanding of 
cultural meanings, likely accounted for the collapse of the  labor boss system.
Many of  these occupation studies sought to understand how traditional 
Japa nese cultural systems of obligation interfered with claimed efficiencies of 
capitalism- unfettered markets. One of Bennett’s occupation studies, titled “Eco-
nomic Aspects of a Boss- Henchman System in the Japa nese Forestry Indus-
try” (1958), described his attempts to understand how traditional systems using 
local networks of employment obligations led to inefficiencies and incurred 
unnecessary costs.
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Bennett detailed the importance of customary loyalties and showed how 
expectations  were embedded in traditional logging and wood- processing occu-
pations. Bennett described this “informal social system, with its web- like fab-
ric, extending via kinship, ritual or simulated kinship, and chains of obligations 
through the  whole nation, [which] can be efficiently mobilized for national 
purposes,” while conceding that to American outsiders this traditional system 
would appear “incompatible” and irrational (1958: 28). He observed that plans 
to modernize underdeveloped nations generally sought to discard traditional 
obligation- bound systems, and he conceded that in many instances, such as  those 
involving heavy industry, such changes  were appropriate; but Bennett advo-
cated that small Japa nese industries, with unskilled, mi grant  labor, be allowed 
to continue using  these cumbersome (to outsiders and occupiers) systems of 
obligation. He argued that “in  these contexts, the Japa nese economy contin-
ues to display familistic and traditionalistic social patterns and is able to blend 
them with standard commercial and business methods” (28–29). He found that 
the forest industry’s boss- henchman system met  these criteria and that Western 
models of development needed to be more flexible and to integrate local cul-
tural practices before assuming that conforming to external top- down manage-
rial changes would increase productivity, profits, or efficiency.
The Japa nese Village in Transition
In November 1950, ghq published The Japa nese Village in Transition, a mono-
graph based on the research of Arthur  F. Raper, Tami Tsuchiyama, Herbert 
Passin, and David Sills.10 Raper was a con sul tant for ghq’s Natu ral Resources 
Section, and the other contributors  were staf at ghq’s Public Opinion and So-
cio log i cal Research Division (Raper et al. 1950). Transition showcased a level 
of interdisciplinary collaborative research that was rare in the prewar period. 
This interdisciplinary team approach grew from the experiences of social sci-
entists who worked on similar interdisciplinary projects at oss, Office of War 
Information (owi), oni, and other agencies. Transition drew on ethnographic 
research and survey data gathered in thirteen Japa nese villages between 1947 
and 1948; Raper evaluated agricultural developments, Tsuchiyama summarized 
social and cultural issues, and a rich collection of photographs and brief de-
scriptions illustrated the layout of villages and farmland, and daily life in post-
war rural Japan.
Transition analyzed po liti cal participation by  women, changes in the form 
and function of the extended  family, marriage, inheritance practices, kinship 
solidarity, retirement, child rearing, the financial collapse of shrines, schools, 
youth associations, the black market, land reclamation programs, and the im-
pact of agricultural cooperatives installed by American occupation forces to 
undermine the power of the traditional agricultural associations. It evaluated 
impacts of new demo cratic institutions and land reformation programs man-
dated by ghq to undermine the traditional grip of power ful Japa nese families 
and royalty (Lu 1996: 491).
The monograph’s ethnographic descriptions of land reform and imposed de-
mocracy in Yokogoshi illustrated larger trends in occupied Japan, and its nar-
rative highlighted the counterinsurgency goals at the heart of  these policies. An 
account of a village meeting reported the following:
A meeting was held in the village hall assembly room. Looking up at the large por-
traits of six of the former headmen, the present officials stated that not one of the 
officers in the village hall at that time could have held office  under conditions pre-
vailing when  these earlier mayors  were in authority. . . .  The present mayor owns 
no land. He had been a clerk in the village office for more than 30 years  until he 
became deputy mayor; in 1947, he was elected mayor. He has long been identified 
with the farmers’  union. His background is generally similar to that of the major-
ity of the present assemblymen, nearly all of whom are new owner- operators who 
 were tenants a  couple of years ago.  Under the previous seven mayors, practically 
all of the assemblymen had been landowners despite the fact that just before the 
land reform program was launched, 46  percent of all farmers rented 90  percent or 
more of the land they cultivated, and 72  percent rented half or more of their land. 
(Raper et al. 1950: 166)
Replacing leaders with new individuals from outside traditional circles of power 
was a counterinsurgency technique to establish new power relations that broke 
with the past. Raper and colleagues stressed themes of increased repre sen ta-
tion and equality, while seldom examining how the demo cratic installation of 
occupation- ready local leaders undermined the old cultural order.
American social scientists studied farmers’ complaints, learning about their 
worries over increased taxes, inflation, a decline in the black market, increased 
agricultural production quotas, shortages of consumable goods, limited avail-
able farmlands, and a lack of adequate technical assistance (Raper et al. 1950: 
182–91). Transition contrasted the new demo cratically controlled agricultural 
cooperatives with the traditional “feudal” system.
This new imposed counterinsurgent demo cratic system eroded traditional 
relationships and obligations in ways that incentivized allegiances to occupiers. 
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For many farmers, this shift brought opportunities, as Raper and colleagues 
reported: “The new agricultural cooperatives are generally reported by farmers 
to be a real improvement over the earlier agricultural associations. Vari ous con-
crete improvements are mentioned, particularly the fact that the delivery quo-
tas need not be turned in at the new agricultural cooperatives  unless the farmer 
elected to do so.  Under the present system, any dealer who has been designated 
as an official handler can receive quota deliveries, and almost any dealer can 
be designated as such if enough farmers certify their desire to deliver to him” 
(1950: 180).
Perhaps the anthropologically riskiest engineered changes in the cultural 
practices of postwar rural Japan  were the postsurrender Civil Code’s revisions 
of traditional inheritance laws. Article 900 of the Civil Code nullified the tra-
ditional system of primogeniture and replaced it with rules stating that a sur-
viving spouse would inherit one- third of the property, and surviving children 
would inherit two- thirds of the property, to be divided equally among them 
(see Raper et al. 1950: 211). When Raper’s team asked locals about the impact 
of  these inheritance changes, they found that “the consensus of most of the 
farmers interviewed was that if the inheritance provision of the revised Civil 
Code  were carried out, the  family as an economic unit would encounter  great 
difficulty” (211). The American occupiers who  were designing  these changes 
seemed unconcerned about accelerating the forces of devolution of landhold-
ings, focusing instead on how  these laws provided greater equity. Young  people 
uniformly favored the traditional inheritance system, arguing that the respon-
sibilities of care for el derly parents required a greater level of inheritance (212).
The occupation’s enforcement of Articles 14 and 24 of the new constitution 
undermined the traditional “house” system and demo cratized  family arrange-
ments in ways that transformed property relations and intergenerational obli-
gations. Article 24, section II stated, “With regard to choice of spouse, property 
rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to 
marriage and the  family, laws  shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual 
dignity and the essential equality of the sexes” (Schmidt 2005: 323n165).  After 
1952, conservative Japa nese politicians tried to restore the traditional “house” 
system, citing the rapid fragmentation of landholdings in rural communities, 
but  these eforts failed “ because of the determined opposition mainly from 
youth and  women’s organizations, but also due to the fact that the conservatives 
 were losing their rural strongholds in the wake of the efects of industrializa-
tion and urbanization” (Schmidt 2005: 328). Petra Schmidt noted that from the 
postwar occupation  until the 1960s, several failed attempts  were made to allow 
a single child to inherit agricultural holdings, with compensation to siblings, 
and while  these eforts failed, other agricultural legislation accomplished  these 
goals (2005: 328–29).
Drawing on fieldwork in the village of Futomi funded by the Rocke fel ler 
Foundation and the Office of Naval Research (onr), John Bennett  later ex-
panded some of the work that had appeared in Transition (Bennett and Ishino 
1955: 41n1). Bennett and Ishino’s  later publications drew on unpublished data 
collected by occupation forces,  later integrating this research into an anthro-
pological narrative examining how Japa nese culture coped with the extreme 
environmental and economic limitations of this “land- hungry village” (42–43).
Bennett and Ishino examined the impact of ecological limitations on the 
development of specific cultural formations. Describing Futomi as a village 
limited by “land scarcity,” where economic limitations  shaped postwar devel-
opments, theirs was an ecological argument in which farmers maximized good 
soils with high- yield crops, and poor soils  were planted with low- yield crops. 
The local carry ing capacities limited population growth (Bennett and Ishino 
1955: 43).
Their account of villagers’ cultural adaptation to living in such circumscribed 
environments relied on mechanical structural functionalist meta phors, pre-
senting the village as having “devised elaborate and sensitive machinery to fight 
the problems brought about by land scarcity and poverty of natu ral resources” 
(Bennett and Ishino 1955: 43). This was an innovative ecological analy sis, yet 
the lack of analy sis of the po liti cal economy of the occupation stunted their 
explanations of a world occupied and partially restructured by American force, 
which was acknowledged but not an active force worthy of analy sis itself.
The Coordinated Investigation of  
Micronesian Anthropology
Former theaters of war soon became training grounds for a new generation 
of anthropologists. Postwar occupations provided funding opportunities for 
gradu ate students looking for fieldwork research possibilities, increasingly mov-
ing American anthropologists to dissertation fieldwork outside of the United 
States. William Lessa, Thomas Gladwin, and Ward Goodenough  were part of a 
new generation of American anthropologists whose Micronesian fieldwork was 
sponsored by postwar funding sources like the onr (through the nrc Council’s 
Pacific Science Board’s) and cima (see  table 2.1) (Falgout 1995; Fischer 1979).
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 TA B L E   2 . 1 .   Postwar cima Anthropologists (Source: Spoehr 1957)
P R O J  E C T I N V E S T I G AT O R A R E A I N S T I T U T I O N
cima Homer G. Barnett Carolines University of Oregon
cima C. Bentzen Carolines University of Southern 
California
cima N. M. Bowers Marianas University of Michigan
cima Mrs. N. M. Bowers Marianas University of Michigan
cima P. H. Buck Carolines Bishop Museum
cima E. G. Burrows Carolines University of Connecticut
cima A. Capell Carolines University of Sydney
cima M. Chave Marshalls University of Hawaii
cima I. Dyen Carolines Yale
cima S. H. Elbert Carolines Bishop Museum
cima K. Emory Carolines Bishop Museum
cima P. L. Garvin Carolines University of Indiana
cima T. Gladwin Carolines Yale
cima Ward Goodenough Carolines Yale
cima E. E. Hunt Carolines Harvard
cima A. Joseph Marianas Institute of Ethnic Afairs
cima N. R. Kidder Carolines Harvard
cima C. Lathrop Carolines Bishop Museum
cima F. M. LeBar Carolines Yale
cima W. A. Lessa Carolines University of Chicago
cima J. L. Lewis Carolines University of Pennsylvania
cima F. Mahoney Carolines University of Wisconsin
cima George P. Murdock Carolines Yale
cima A. Murphy Carolines University of Oregon
cima R. E. Murphy Carolines Clark University
cima V. Murray Marianas Inst. of Ethnic Afairs
cima R. I. Murrill Carolines amnh
cima J. Rauch Carolines Columbia University
cima S. H. Riesenberg Carolines University of California




cima M. Spiro Carolines Northwestern University
cima Alexander Spoehr Marshalls Chicago, Natu ral History 
Museum
cima W. D. Stevens Carolines Harvard
(continued)
In 1946, cima directed a proj ect sponsored by the U.S. Commercial Com-
pany Economic Survey, sending twenty- two social scientists to field settings 
throughout Micronesia to gather economic, po liti cal, and social data on post-
war conditions (see Oliver 1951). Between 1947 and  1948, cima hired forty- 
two field researchers, twenty- five of whom  were cultural anthropologists, to 
gather primary data on the state of Micronesian society. The approach used 
by cima was modeled  after previous projects for the U.S. Bureau of American 
Ethnology and the Philippines Ethnology Survey — an early episode of applied 
anthropology described by Roberto González as one in which “colonial adminis-
tration was reduced to a prob lem of rational scientific management” (2010: 141; 
 TA B L E   2 . 1   (continued)
P R O J  E C T I N V E S T I G AT O R A R E A I N S T I T U T I O N
cima B. Tolerton Carolines Columbia University
cima J. Useem Carolines University of Wisconsin
cima H. Uyehara Carolines University of Wisconsin
cima A. Vidich Carolines University of Wisconsin
cima J. E. Weckleter Carolines University of Southern 
California
cima C. Wong Carolines Yale, Harvard
sim Proj ect Isidor Dyen Yap, Ponape, Yale
 Truk
sim Proj ect A. M. Fischer Truk Radclife College
sim Proj ect Ward Goodenough Gilberts University of Pennsylvania
sim Proj ect Leonard E. Mason Marshalls University of Hawaii
sim Proj ect Alexander Spoehr Marianas Chicago Natu ral History 
Museum
sim Proj ect John E. Tobin Marshalls University of Hawaii
sim Proj ect H. Uyehara Marshalls University of Hawaii
uscc Survey William R. Bascom Ponape Northwestern University
uscc Survey Edwin H. Bryan Bishop Museum
uscc Survey E. E. Gallahue Marianas U.S. Department of Agriculture
uscc Survey E. T. Hall Truk University of Denver
uscc Survey Leonard E. Mason Marshalls U.S. Department of State
uscc Survey Douglas L. Oliver Director of ussc  
Survey
uscc Survey Karl J. Pelzer Truk U.S. Department of Agriculture
uscc Survey John Useem Palau University of Wisconsin
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Kiste and Marshall 2000: 267). The cima ethnographic research was primarily 
funded by the onr, with supplemental funding from the Wenner- Gren Founda-
tion (Spoehr 1951: 2). In 1949 the nrc’s Pacific Science Board began sponsoring 
the Scientific Investigations in Micronesia’s ecological studies of island envi-
ronments and cultural research, including traditional diets and archaeologi-
cal inventories (Mason 1953). Felix Keesing developed a training program for 
Micronesian administrators from 1946 to 1949 (Keesing 1947; Mason 1953: 1; 
nbaaa 1947 1[2]: 15).
Ward Goodenough did fieldwork in the Gilberts on the Onotoa Atoll in 1951 
and Bengt Danielsson worked on the Raroia Atoll in 1952 (Mason 1953: 2). As a 
gradu ate student at Harvard, David Schneider originally planned on conducting 
fieldwork in Africa, but  after learning of cima- funded fieldwork opportunities 
on Yap, he  later wrote, “The jingle of coins attracted my attention” (Schneider 
and Handler 1995: 85).
The Handbook on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands drew on the work 
of cima anthropologists, focusing on managerial outcomes that mirrored war-
time Pacific handbooks that Murdock and  others had produced a few years 
earlier (ocno 1948). The Handbook was a neo co lo nial administrative guide 
describing local property relations, work habits, land tenure systems, exchange 
systems, land disputes, settlement patterns, the primacy of kinship, and so on.
The Handbook described managerial strategies of direct and indirect rule, 
arguing that adopting an indirect approach “clears the way for normal evolution 
of the familial local system  toward po liti cal forms more in keeping with mod-
ern world conditions.” Notions of “normal evolution” reinforced neo co lo nial 
policies within cultural evolutionary frameworks that helped justify changes 
in local governmental structures that would help local cultures progress, rather 
than explanations focusing on American geopo liti cal interests (ocno 1948: 
124). The Handbook identified problems for indirect rule, including local cor-
ruption, nepotistic tendencies, and the abuse of authority, at times referring to 
local leaders as “kings” and using other terms that drew on historical Eu ro pean 
notions of social structure. The Handbook advocated for a special “double 
type of leadership,” such as was installed in the Marshall Islands, or Ponape, 
where “the paramount chiefs of the districts hold the top official positions, but 
district secretaries are held mainly responsible for carry ing the load of practi-
cal afairs. In the Marshalls, too, the kings are given fullest ceremonial honors, 
but local administrative responsibilities are in the hands of magistrates” (125). It 
suggested capturing the loyalties of local youth and recommended creating 
ceremonial roles for traditional chiefs, with an understanding that, with time, 
 these traditional leaders “ will be called upon less for practical leadership” (125). 
The Handbook supported cima anthropologist Saul Riesenberg’s suggestion that 
potential heirs to traditional leadership titles be shipped out for Western school-
ing in Hawaii and the U.S. mainland (125).
The Handbook warned that external management of native populations 
could lead to a “growth of po liti cal consciousness” and advised administrators 
to not stir up nativist or nationalist feelings, which can “arise primarily out 
of the social unrest which comes from disintegration of the old cultures, and 
from the pressures of alien domination and discrimination” (ocno 1948: 126). 
Administrators  were cautioned that past uprisings caused foreign administra-
tors to react in ways that strengthened local support, and they  were advised 
to maintain local input on some administrative decisions in order to reduce 
the possibility of revolts. The Handbook theorized that coming in de pen dence 
eforts would likely be island group– specific, and given the existing linguistic 
and geographic separation, it was unlikely that separate island groups would 
develop a sense of “common identity,” so threats to American rule would be 
localized, not pan- Micronesian (126).
Anthropologists at cima frequently acknowledged the recent war in their 
narratives, and in some instances vestiges of the war may have been represented 
as core cultural features of  these socie ties. As Lin Poyer shows, Thomas Glad-
win and Seymour Sarason’s work in postwar Truk used psychological inventory 
tests indicating “food anxiety,” a cultural trait they connected to the near starvation 
faced by islanders during the war (Poyer 2004: 161–62). Some anthropologists 
characterized the impacts of the war on Micronesian cultures as devastating. 
Douglas Oliver concluded that the “conquest of the islands by combat and the 
defeat of Japan destroyed completely the prewar economic structure,” and that 
the war destroyed the islanders’ income sources (1951: 32). Oliver described “the 
presence of [U.S.] armed forces is unduly blocking the economic development 
of Micronesians” (1951: 11). He recommended that the United States support the 
restoration of native economies, and that the U.S. military restore some lands 
taken from natives for U.S. military installations. Oliver advocated developing 
support programs to supply pigs and chickens for  every  family.
Alexander Spoehr’s 1951 report for the Naval Civil Administration Unit in 
the Marianas described the ongoing transfer of administration from the U.S. 
Navy to the U.S. Department of the Interior. Spoehr argued that anthropological 
insights into Micronesian customs  were needed if Americans  were to under-
take an “enlightened administration” of the islands (Spoehr 1951: 1). Anthropolo-
gists provided instructional materials to the School of Naval Administration, 
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anthropologist Lieutenant Commander Phillip Drucker oversaw applied pro-
grams in Micronesia, and Homer Barnett took up  these duties when the ad-
ministration was transferred from the navy to the Department of the Interior 
(Spoehr 1951: 2–3).
Research projects at cima provided a broad range of fieldwork opportuni-
ties for fledgling and midcareer American anthropologists, fieldwork that was a 
gateway for the careers of a new generation and led to the production of classic 
anthropological texts and impor tant theoretical works on kinship and other 
topics, while si mul ta neously generating knowledge that was at least conceived 
of as having managerial uses. With a confluence of naval intelligence needs and 
anthropological theoretical desires, George Murdock’s work for both cima 
and the Institute of  Human Relations (ihr) made ihr’s proj ect “the largest re-
search efort in the history of American anthropology and a major program 
in applied anthropology” (Kiste and Marshall 2000: 265). Many cima ethno-
graphic reports read as fractured, hurried works, in part  because Murdock pro-
vided financial bonuses that encouraged this sort of work, but also  because the 
fractured theoretical approach and functional uses of the work reinforced such 
approaches. David Schneider recalled Murdock ofering “a $500 bonus if you 
wrote up your report real quickly” (Schneider and Handler 1995: 21).
From Fighting Fascism to Supporting Occupations
Many who took part in transforming the postwar world did so while continu-
ing to use the previous war as an ideological reference point. Most anthropolo-
gists working on occupations or aid programs conceived of their role as that 
of a stabilizer or liberator, not an active agent of a new American empire.11 The 
Second World War brought a unity of purpose for many Americans, most of 
whom  were impacted by notions of fighting totalitarianism and making the 
world safe for democracy. The threats of Nazi ideologies championing racial 
superiority, postwar news of the extent of the horrors of the Holocaust, and 
Japa nese atrocities during Japan’s occupation of the Philippines, China, Burma, 
and elsewhere in Asia helped some justify American war losses and attacks on 
civilian populations abroad.  These postwar residues helped nurture ideological 
justifications for a new era’s conceptions of American exceptionalism.
Anthropology has long been ambivalent about how to cope with the po liti cal 
pro cesses in which it is enveloped. This ambivalence is found in the discipline’s 
contradictory early articulation of the innate equality of all cultures, while 
si mul ta neously assisting in the colonial subjugation of  those recognized as 
theoretically equal. Some contradictions can be reduced to diferences in indi-
vidual anthropologists’ po liti cal perspectives, but the collective positions of dis-
ciplinary professional associations have been as inconsistent as  these individual 
positions. Anthropologists, like  others of their time and place, internalize the 
po liti cal views of their times in ways that generally coalesce the po liti cal pro-
cesses of their society.
The milieu of the Second World War and shadows of anthropologists’ war-
time contributions lay draped over the discipline  after the war in ways that  were 
not always obvious at the time. American anthropologists’ responses to World 
War II helped them misinterpret and support their nation’s Cold War interna-
tional policies in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. This interpretive lag 
is a crucial ele ment for understanding how American anthropology came to so 
easily align its orientation with policy agendas supporting American expan-
sion. The normalcy of anthropology’s military links is seen in the pages of post-
war issues of the News Bulletin of the aaa. The front page of the April 1950 issue 
included two job announcements marking this milieu: one for naval operations 
field con sul tants on Yap and Ponape, the second seeking anthropologists for a 
classified research proj ect at Air University’s Arctic, Desert, and Tropic Infor-
mation Center (nbaaa 1950 4[2]: 1).12
As Bruce Cumings observed, during the early postwar period, “scholars caught 
up in one historical system and one discourse that defined discipline, depart-
ment, area, and subject suddenly found themselves in another emerging field 
of inquiry, well in advance of imagining or discovering the subject themselves. 
To put a subtle relationship all too crudely, power and money had found their 
subject first, and  shaped fields of inquiry accordingly” (Cumings 1999: 179). 
This historical shift can be easily discerned with hindsight, but for  those living 
through  these transformations, the preexisting lens of interpretation anchored 
in past practices was most often used to explain po liti cal developments. The 
range of critiques of American policies developing at the time is impressive. 
It is not that some anthropologists or po liti cal writers did not understand the 
po liti cal transformations of the Cold War as they  were occurring. Some clearly 
did, but  these  were minority views, outside the mainstream consciousness of 
the time. Most notable among  those Americans who understood the transfor-
mations of the Cold War to be fundamentally dif er ent than Amer i ca’s po liti cal 
purpose during the Second World War  were  those of the radical left. Publica-
tions like the Nation, the Progressive, and I. F. Stone’s Weekly provided timely 
analy sis that interpreted American postwar foreign policy as serving fundamen-
tally dif er ent ends than  those advanced in the war years and before.
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Henry Wallace’s reasons for rejecting the Marshall Plan highlight the limita-
tions presented by strictly historicist analy sis. The presence of Wallace’s sophis-
ticated, marginalized critique of 1947 (or the analy sis of Jerome Rauch, discussed 
in chapter 4) demonstrates how strictly “historicist” positions necessarily cham-
pion and hegemonically elevate past voices from a dominant majority, most 
frequently aligned with power, over  those from a marginalized minority. It is 
difficult to imagine who might have funded such marginal critiques during this 
period so marked by the rise of McCarthyism.
A range of forces align to support the rise of one research proj ect or interpre-
tive school over another. The coming availability of government and private 
foundation funds to finance postwar academic research helped transform uni-
versities and professional associations, like the American Anthropological Associ-
ation and the Society for Applied Anthropology, as  these and other organizations 
sought to best align themselves with new funding opportunities —  alignments 
that mutually served the funders and recipients of  these funds.
The mighty edifice of government science dominated  
the scene in the  middle of the twentieth- century as a Gothic  
cathedral dominated a thirteenth- century landscape.
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T H R E E   R E B O O T I N G  
P R O F E S S I O N A L  A N T H R O P O L O G Y  
I N  T H E  P O S T WA R  W O R L D
During the last months of the Second World War, the American Anthropologi-
cal Association formed the Temporary Organ izing Committee to prepare the 
association for anticipated academic and financial opportunities that appeared 
to be coming to the postwar world (Frantz 1974: 9).1 Two weeks  after ve Day, 
 future aaa executive secretary Frederick Johnson wrote Julian Steward a letter 
recapping their recent discussions concerning the desirability of establishing a 
large, centralized organ ization of American anthropologists positioned to take 
advantage of emerging opportunities. With clear enthusiasm, and joking about 
a drinking session with a col o nel described as an “erstwhile ‘Wall Street Mer-
chant,’ ” Johnson wrote:
As the alcoholic mists cleared during the  ride north on the train I had a dream. 
I pass it on to you for what it is worth. As I thought about your suggestion that 
 there be or ga nized a society of professional anthropologists I had much difficulty 
in finding a common denominator for the  whole field.  There is one, of course, but 
it may be so broad that it is useless. I wondered if it might not be pos si ble to rec-
ognize the division of the field into several professional bodies, such as archaeol-
ogy, ethnography, and social anthropology. This could be done for the purpose of 
developing criteria for professional status and would have no reference to scientific 
problems or ambitions. Professionals chosen in this way would be anthropolo-
gists and thus be eligible for a general professional body. At the outset this appears 
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as a complicated  thing fraught with all kinds of difficulties. However it might be 
shaken down to become something of use.
The need for such a body, no  matter how it originates, is  great and it is urgent. 
My past experience is sufficient reason to convince me. Sudden developments in the 
Committee make it even more imperative. Confidentially I can say that even now the 
status of the Committee is being questioned. I do not know  whether this is a real dif-
ficulty or a desire to develop the most complicated arrangement pos si ble. I doubt 
if this is serious  because I have just fired of a big gun, if this does not work we 
might as well quit. I have a  couple of more shots but  these must be saved to further 
the work of the Committee rather than simply to form it. (isa 7, FJ to JS 5/22/45)
Steward replied that Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, John Cooper, and Clyde 
Kluckhohn supported this plan, adding that “if this fine collection of prima 
donnas is so unanimously for it, I am positive the  thing is sure fire” (isa 7, JS 
to FJ 5/29/45).
In the month following Japan’s surrender, Steward wrote Johnson about “the 
 battle of Washington” over a coming strug gle  either within the aaa or with the 
formation of a new central anthropological association “scrambling for status 
and permanency comparable to the days of the depression and again of the first 
part of the war.” A tentative constitution was drafted, and Steward described the 
status of generational factions among anthropologists in which “the venerable 
generation is not interested but  won’t oppose it.  Those of a slightly younger gen-
eration who have achieved fame are suspicious of it as a means  either of trapping 
them or of building up their rivals. The younger generation is 100% for it” (isa 
7, JS to FJ 9/20/45). Steward anticipated that new governmental sources of social 
science funding  were coming, and a well- organized professional association 
could position itself to take advantage of  these opportunities. He saw a “ great 
furor about getting social science into some sort of a national research founda-
tion to implement the [Vannevar] Bush plan for the physical sciences. Several 
bills of the Bush plan are now before Congress and  there is a mad scramble to 
get the social science plan ready before the hearings start in a few weeks” (isa 
7, JS to FJ 9/20/45). Steward initially considered creating a new anthropologi-
cal association, a “proposed Society for Professional Anthropologists” (rb, JS 
to RB 10/25/45), but by early 1946, he realized that a reorganization of the aaa 
would be preferable to splintering of a new organ ization.
In the fall of 1945, Steward urged the aaa to publish a monograph detail-
ing American anthropologists’ contributions to the war. The National Research 
Council had sponsored a monograph chronicling psy chol ogy’s contributions to 
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the war, and Steward envisioned producing a larger work detailing anthropol-
ogy’s war years (rb, JS to RB 10/25/45), but this history was never published.2 
In late 1945 Steward drafted a statement titled “Anthropology’s Justification of 
Federal Support for Social Science Research” for congressional hearings con-
sidering postwar national science policies. He argued that anthropological 
knowledge could help explain the root causes of  human vio lence, and that in 
a nation devoting federal funding to the physical sciences at unpre ce dented 
levels, “knowledge of  human forces must parallel knowledge of physical forces 
if World Or ga ni za tion is to discharge its trust” (aaap 37, Sec. Memos, 9/29/45; 
see also aa 1946 48[2]: 309). Steward pitched anthropology almost as a form of 
Comtian social physics, claiming that “as an analyst and source of information, 
the social scientist has a function comparable to that of the research physicist 
or biologist” (aaap 37, Sec. Memos, 9/29/45). He argued that like other sci-
entists, anthropologists produced neutral data that would be used by policy 
makers  because “a scientist as such has no po liti cal objectives” (aaap 37, Sec. 
Memos, 9/29/45). Steward cited anthropologists’ valuable contributions to the 
war, stressed anthropologists’ roles facilitating “Indian Administration,” and 
saluted anthropologists’ roles supporting “colonial afairs of  Great Britain, Hol-
land, and France” (aaap 37, Sec. Memos, 9/29/45).
Steward envisioned anthropological knowledge supporting the implementa-
tion of American foreign policy on projects ranging from the economic devel-
opment of China to problems of postwar occupations and the “reeducation” of 
“backward peoples.” He argued:
In our eforts to aid Japan, Germany, or any other nation to achieve a government 
acceptable to the  family of nations we must understand the native institutions we are 
dealing with lest our eforts have unexpected results or, at best, amount to nothing 
more than po liti cal imperialism. Reeducation of masses of  people to alter their 
basic values and habits of thinking  will succeed only as the values and habits are 
properly comprehended. Again, if we are to participate in or sanction trusteeship 
for backward peoples, we are morally obligated to make  every efort to ascertain 
the probable consequences of the policies we underwrite. (aaap 37, Sec. Memos, 
9/29/45)
As other disciplines or ga nized themselves in anticipation of coming funding 
opportunities, anthropologists settled subfield diferences within the aaa and 
worked to reor ga nize the association’s members to more efectively compete 
for funding. In December 1945, at the first postwar annual meeting of the aaa, 
a committee was appointed to collect information from the membership and 
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from “allied socie ties, and other local groups” concerning their views on reor-
ga niz ing the structure of the aaa, establishing a permanent secretary, “and other 
means of furthering professional interests.” The committee was in part selected 
to represent anthropology’s four field divisions, with a membership of Julian 
Steward (chair), Elliot D. Chapple, A. I. Hallowell, Frederick Johnson, George 
Peter Murdock, William Duncan Strong, C. F. Voegelin, S. Washburn, and Les-
lie White (st 177, 3).
At a 1946 meeting of the aaa Reorganization Committee, Steward extolled 
the benefits of a more centralized association lobbying for new federal funds. 
When Hallowell and  others argued that the nrc and other existing bodies 
could best achieve  these ends, Steward countered that “it  will be better in the 
final pay- of when the money is allotted if anthropology has made a case for it-
self ” (aaap 131, aaa Reorganization Materials, 3). This small group of men ne-
gotiated the basic features of the coming reorganization, determining qualifica-
tions for membership; proposing the structure and election of the association’s 
board, president, and liaisons; and arguing for a new structure that could meet 
more than once or twice a year and best represent members in the anticipated 
new age of funding opportunities.
New Postwar Funding Horizons
During the 1950s and 1960s, several governmental bodies considered establish-
ing a federally funded social science research agency. Some eforts sought con-
nections with national security– related agencies;  others tried creating more in-
de pen dent funding bodies. In 1950,  after three years of legislative struggles, the 
National Science Foundation (nsf) was founded as the primary federal institu-
tion responsible for funding scientific research aligned with national science 
policies, but at its founding the nsf did not fund social science research.
The strug gle to establish permanent federal funding of social science had been 
ongoing since the war’s end. On May 20, 1947, Senator William Fulbright failed in 
his attempts to amend the provisional National Science Foundation Act to include 
nsf social scientific research funding. Fulbright negotiated Public Law 53A, in the 
Seventy- Ninth Congress, allowing surplus overseas funds to be used for the train-
ing of citizens from  these countries for academic study and other related activities 
in the United States.  Later revisions of the Fulbright Act expanded academic op-
portunities for Americans to travel abroad as scholars. In 1947, the News Bulletin of 
the aaa announced that Fulbright funds  were available in countries such as Indo-
nesia, the Philippines, and French Indochina, and that anthropological fieldwork 
projects could be funded  under the Fulbright Act’s guidelines (nbaaa 1947 1[2]: 
1). Within a few years’ time, other countries became available for research: Burma, 
Jamaica, Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Norway, Greece, Italy, Australia, 
Iran, Egypt, Malta, Hong Kong, and the Federation of Malaya.
Many in Congress rejected the prospect of large- scale federal funding of 
academics. American anti- intellectualism in the late 1940s and 1950s fueled 
skepticism over the contributions that academics could make to relevant 
Cold War issues. Typical of  these views  were the remarks of Senator John 
McClellan (Arkansas) at a 1953 hearing on academics (like Walt Rostow and 
Max Millikan) receiving funds to “determine how to carry on psychological 
warfare against the Soviet [Union] and satellites,” in which Senator McClel-
lan complained that such research was “simply throwing money away” and 
that all the taxpayers received from such projects was “just a lot of profes-
sor theories and all that stuf ” (U.S. House 1952: 345). Such anti- intellectual 
grandstanding played well with segments of the American public, but it failed 
to feed the incipient national security state’s growing hunger for social sci-
ence informed intelligence.
Cold War concerns so deeply influenced the establishment of the nsf that 
the House version of the bill establishing the nsf required all grant recipients 
to undergo fbi background investigations — though this requirement was cut 
from the final reconciliation bill (H.R. 4846, March 1950; nbaaa 1950 4[2]: 3).
Anthropology received  little federal science funding during the early 1950s 
(Solovey 2013: 167), and in 1954 the nsf began funding a limited number of 
anthropological projects  under its Biological and Medical Sciences Division 
(Solovey 2013: 157). In 1958, the nsf recognized anthropology (along with eco-
nomics, sociology, history, and philosophy of science) as a discipline with its 
own nsf funding status,  under its new Social Science Programs (Larsen 1992: 
40–52). Anthropology initially received “more than half (52.9   percent) of the 
resources allocated to social science” at the nsf (Larsen 1992: 64).
Two months  after the launch of Sputnik, Julian Steward sent a tele gram to 
aaa president  E. Adamson Hoebel expressing concerns that Amer i ca’s new 
space race would undermine aaa struggles for federal funds to study anthro-
pology. Steward wrote that the government’s “increased support for education 
in the physical and hard sciences while ignoring social science implies a race 
for the ultimate weapon is the only deterrent to war[;] I hope that anthropolo-
gists and our fellow social scientists see behavioral understandings as better 
solutions to international tensions than threats of total destruction” (aaap 48, 
JS to EAH 12/28/57).
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While federal funding sources for anthropological research during the 1950s 
did not emerge at rates anticipated by Steward and  others, the rapid growth of 
area study centers and private foundations funded significant growth in an-
thropological research. But military and intelligence agencies would eventually 
identify gaps in the sort of social science research for which they had uses.
In 1963, the Office of Naval Research funded a study, overseen by Ithiel de 
Sola Pool of the Center for International Studies (cenis) at mit, that resulted 
in a 270- page report titled Social Science Research and National Security (Pool 
1963).3 The study sought to answer the question “How can a branch of social sci-
ence be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national 
security matters, and how can talented individuals from within social science 
be drawn into this area?” (Pool 1963: 10). The report discussed a broad range 
of social science applications: usis polls of foreign populations, military ap-
plications of game theory, assisting counterinsurgency operations, theories of 
strategy and alliance, nuclear strategy, psychological warfare, “problems of in-
ternational tensions related to military postures” (56), the production of intelli-
gence information, eforts to anticipate the behaviors of other nations, military 
developments in new nations, and demographic impacts on national military 
policies. Pool argued that “social science needs a kind of engineering to go with 
it” (17). The report identified a need for standardized forms of accessing or or-
ga niz ing cultural data.  Human Relations Area Files (hraf) research was cited 
as having “contributed substantially” to the strategic collection of global atti-
tudinal information that could be of strategic use to national security sectors 
(Wilbur Schramm in Pool 1963: 52).
Pool’s report informed a congressional revival attempting to establish a fed-
eral social science funding agency. In 1966, Senator Fred Harris (Oklahoma) 
proposed a bill to establish a National Foundation on Social Science (nfss) to 
address gaps in federal social science funding at nsf, but it also linked Penta-
gon and intelligence needs with the production of social science research while 
maintaining some in de pen dence (Larsen 1992). The New York Times reported 
that the proposed nfss would “be in de pen dent of all other Federal agencies, 
and it would be forbidden to allow interference with its personnel or policies 
from any other Federal official or department” (Eder 1966a:5).
In response to the academic freedom problems raised by Proj ect Camelot and 
other military- linked programs (see chapter 10), Harris wanted a federal agency 
that would steer clear of military, intelligence, or secret research (Solovey 2012: 
64). Harris proposed creating a twenty- five- person oversight board to review re-
search proposals. Harris would have allowed cia- or Pentagon- related research, 
but “all research would be made available to the public” (Eder 1966a). Harris’s 
proposed nfss died in 1969 (aaafn 1970 11[1]: 7), but a House amendment 
proposed by Congressman Emilio Daddario and  adopted in 1968 amended 
the nsf’s charter, expanding the funding of social science research (Solovey 
2012).
Private Interests Linked to State:  
Ford, Rocke fel ler, Car ne gie
As the Pike and Church congressional committees would  later discover, even 
without directive Camelot- like federal funding programs for social science re-
search, the cia had secretly developed ways of directing private foundation 
funding. But more openly, the leadership of Amer i ca’s most influential private 
foundations consisted of individuals rotating in and out of federal agencies 
with national security interests.
Public foundations worked with governmental agencies to prioritize research 
agendas. In 1949, John Gillin, Sol Tax, and Charles Wagley produced an nrc 
list titled “Research Needs in the Field of Modern Latin American Culture” 
(claanrc 1949). This was a broad list, including studies on enculturation, 
culture and personality, urbanization, gender roles, and the impact of culture 
on notions of “race.” That same year, the aaa appointed the nrc Committee 
on Asian Anthropology, which generated a list of recommended projects that 
included a mixture of field- based and library research on topics such as com-
munity studies, colonialism, national structure, population shifts, land use, and 
cultural values (claanrc 1949). The nrc’s Committee on Asian Anthropology 
at this time recommended that anthropologists could use classified documents 
to produce a “series of volumes on China, Japan, Indonesia and India would be 
feasible at the present time and should be encouraged by boards of competent 
scholars in  these fields. Obviously such studies should be undertaken only  after 
a thorough exploration of classified and unclassified materials of a comparable 
nature have been examined both in the U.S. and abroad” (aa 51[3]:540).
Rocke fel ler, Ford, Car ne gie, and other private foundations bearing the 
names of Roo se veltian malefactors of  great wealth  shaped the funding of an-
thropological research during the Cold War. Functioning as intergenerational 
trusts,  these foundations protected against the dissolution of the massive con-
glomeration of wealth upon the death of the funds’ creators. With the estab-
lishment of  family members controlling boards (sometimes with significant 
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compensation or with  family use of trust properties) and following established 
policies aligned with the desires of the funds’ patrons, the interests of wealthy 
magnates could stretch beyond their corporal existence while estate taxes  were 
evaded in ways that created intergenerational tax shelters. Joan Roelofs de-
scribed  these foundations as “examples of mortmain, the dead hand of past 
wealth controlling the  future” (2003: 20).4  These foundations funded not only 
research projects aligned with their intellectual, po liti cal, or class interests 
but also less- aligned projects (with some limitations), though they favored 
the coverage of specific geographic regions or specific social problems during 
given periods.
 These private foundations funded social science in ways that nurtured the 
establishment of an academic elite that, as David Nugent observed,
was to be trained in the virtues of empirically grounded, practically oriented re-
search within one of the philanthropies’ remade institutions of higher learning. In 
order to make it pos si ble to train a new elite along  these lines, the philanthropies 
provided their remade institutions of higher learning with large sums of money 
specifically for the training of students. The philanthropies made it pos si ble for 
 these institutions to ofer scholarships to fund the entire gradu ate training of 
“promising” students. The philanthropies thus helped influence entire cohorts 
of gradu ate students, who  were schooled in the scientific, empirically grounded, 
practically oriented concepts, methods, and techniques that the philanthropies 
believed would make a contribution to the pressing social problems of the day. 
(2002: 11)
Car ne gie, Ford, and Rocke fel ler  were selectively predisposed to nurture ideas 
aligned with their found ers’ political- economic interests, and funds  were dis-
bursed that supported causes ranging from spreading specific forms of Ameri-
can democracy, to advancing the Green Revolution, to studies of foreign  labor 
systems favoring management.  These wealthy private foundations  were often 
directed by elite men who moved between  these positions and Cold War gov-
ernmental roles. John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk moved from Rocke fel ler 
Foundation presidencies to becoming secretary of state. When McGeorge 
Bundy left his White House national security post, where he liaisoned with the 
cia, he replaced John McCloy as chair of the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foun-
dation’s director of international afairs during the 1950s and  1960s, Shepard 
Stone, had served in army intelligence and the State Department. With such 
ties, it seemed natu ral for the Ford Foundation to provide replacement funds 
 after the cia’s secret funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was exposed, 
providing needed financial support in the cia’s embarrassed absence (Epstein 
1967: 16–17n1).
Bruce Cumings’s examination of how Philip Mosely linked the cia, the Ford 
Foundation, and area study centers at vari ous universities clarifies how the cia 
used private foundations, such as Ford, to shape academic research during the 
1950s and 1960s. Cumings cited 1953 correspondence between Mosley and Paul 
Langer discussing how the Ford Foundation would consult with cia director 
Allen Dulles to establish how Ford- funded research projects could be selected 
in ways that coalesced with the cia’s needs (Cumings 1999: 184). Cumings 
showed how “Mosley provided a working linkage among Ford, the cia, and the 
acls/ssrc well into the 1960s,” with back- channel correspondence between 
Mosley and the cia working out who the cia should use as regional con sul-
tants (185). Cumings concluded that this
suggests that the Ford Foundation, in close consultation with the cia, helped to 
shape postwar area studies and impor tant collaborative research in modernization 
studies and comparative politics that  were  later mediated through well- known 
Ford- funded ssrc projects (ones that  were required reading when I was a gradu ate 
student in the late 1960s). According to Christopher Simpson’s study of declassified 
materials, however, this interweaving of foundations, universities, and state agen-
cies (mainly the intelligence and military agencies) extended to the social sciences 
as a  whole: “For years, government money . . .  not always publicly acknowledged 
as such — made up more than 75  percent of the annual bud gets of institutions such 
as Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Research at Columbia University, Hadley 
Cantril’s Institute for International Social Programs at Prince ton, Ithiel de Sola 
Pool’s cenis program at mit and  others” . . .  My own work in postwar American 
archives over the past two de cades has taught me how many books central to the 
po liti cal science profession in the 1950s and 1960s emerged first as internal, classi-
fied government studies. (Cumings 1999: 186)
The spread of  these funds in postwar area study centers provided opportunities for 
anthropologists seeking fieldwork, while also shaping the questions they pursued.
The aaa’s First Postwar De cade and Select Po liti cal Advocacy
The aaa membership grew rapidly during the postwar years, rising from 1,271 in 
1946 to 3,000 in 1949 (nbaaa 1949 3[4]: 5). Increased membership funded a 
full- time professional staf, and in 1949 anthropologist Frederick Johnson was 
hired as the association’s executive secretary. Johnson helped advance the asso-
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ciation’s standing with New York’s and Washington’s newly emerging networks 
of public and private funding sources; as foundations  were established, a new 
generation of funds emerged for overseas fieldwork with programs like the ssrc’s 
Training and Travel Fellowships (nbaaa 1949 3[1]: 7) and fellowships dedicated 
to studying problems of foreign nations (nbaaa 1948 2[1]: 5–6). The Depart-
ment of State ofered new programs like the Government Fellowship in Ameri-
can Republics for gradu ate students, which funded six months of study and 
travel in Central and South Amer i ca (nbaaa 1949 3[1]: 9). In 1952, the Ford 
Foundation had opportunities for one hundred Foreign Study and Research 
Fellowships (nbaaa 1952 6[2]: 8).  There  were also programs with more obvious 
governmental applications, with the aaa publishing requests for information 
from the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research seeking anthro-
pologists’ dissertation abstracts for circulation within governmental agencies 
(nbaaa 1951 5[2]: 5).
During the de cade following the war, the aaa strug gled with how to address 
several po liti cal issues. At the first aaa meeting  after the American bombing 
of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the membership  adopted a resolution proclaiming 
the association’s dedication to studying atomic energy and to working to guard 
against the dangers of  these new weapons (aa 1946 48[2]: 319). In 1946, the 
aaa Executive Board appointed Carleton Coon (Chair), Gregory Bateson, Earl 
Count, Melville Herskovits, and Alfred Métraux to the Committee to Inves-
tigate the Possibility of Strengthening Non- Nazi Anthropologists in  Enemy 
Countries (aa 1946 48[2]: 319). The war time ser vice of  these five anthropolo-
gists represented the range of activities undertaken by many aaa fellows: Coon 
and Bateson had both served in Office of Strategic Ser vices (oss) field opera-
tions, Count taught  human anatomy to military surgeons in training, Hersko-
vits worked at the Smithsonian’s Ethnogeographic Board, and Métraux worked 
for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (D. H. Price 2008a; Sade 1997).
The committee was charged with determining which specific anthropolo-
gists in “ enemy or  enemy- occupied countries had been on our side and which 
opposed us,” but it soon abandoned this task, arguing that it was unqualified to 
delineate which anthropologists had been Nazi collaborators. The committee 
had difficulty evaluating conflicting reports about individual anthropologists 
and was concerned that some scholars might be settling personal vendettas 
against colleagues. It reported that the French  were “having  great sport accus-
ing each other of being collaborators” (aa 1947: 353).
In abandoning its charge, chair Carleton Coon explained that the committee 
“considered that if a German served in the armed forces of his country he was 
no more guilty from our point of view than  those of us who had done the same 
 thing. At first glance, we considered blackballing  those who had used their po-
sitions for propaganda, but we soon realized that a  great number of our own an-
thropologists had done the same  thing and if we had supported that course of 
action we would have had to condemn some of our own colleagues” (aa 1947: 
353). This argument revealed an understanding of the complexities of duties of 
ser vice during war time, as well as lingering misgivings some anthropologists 
had about their war work, but it also revealed an unexamined argument of 
assumed po liti cal, ethical, and moral equivalence between Axis and Allied ap-
plications of anthropology.
This decision by the aaa to ignore po liti cal diferences between using an-
thropology for campaigns of genocidal fascist tyranny and, arguably, for liberation 
from such forms of oppression had  later consequences for American anthro-
pology.  These would include the association’s proclivity to sidestep po liti cal 
concerns in  favor of ethical considerations in ways that focused on professional 
“best practices” for fieldwork yet ignored po liti cal outcomes of projects using 
anthropology and anthropologists. Diferentiating between ethical and po liti-
cal critiques is not without epistemological and practical difficulties. Yet mean-
ingful distinctions can be made by recognizing that ethical critiques focus on 
best practices followed by professionals — often in a context of providing dis-
closure, gaining consent, minimizing harm, maintaining informed autonomy, 
and so forth — whereas po liti cal critiques focus on power relations, including 
macro questions of empire, neo co lo nial ism, and imperialism. This practice of 
focusing primarily on ethics while avoiding confronting po liti cal issues would 
become a significant feature of  later anthropological critiques of disciplinary 
militarization (D. H. Price 2014b).
Perhaps the war time experiences of  these committee members influenced 
this decision. Gregory Bateson’s oss propaganda work in Burma included 
overseeing black propaganda broadcasts (in which his oss team pretended 
to be Japa nese radio broadcasters while supplying disinformation) made 
from a clandestine radio station, work that Bateson  later regretted for having 
been deceitful (Mandler 2013;  D.  H. Price 1998). While some committee 
members may have undertaken war work that paralleled some of the war work of 
German anthropologists, this did not mean their work was morally or po liti-
cally equivalent, given the diferences in the larger Allied and Axis po liti cal 
projects.
The committee stipulated that if “special cases” of Nazi anthropologist col-
laborators came to its attention, it would investigate and determine the facts of 
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specific alleged instances, but it did not look for any such “special cases.” Had 
the committee investigated, it would have easily found disturbing examples of 
anthropologists’ Nazi collaborations. As Gretchen Schafft’s research shows, the 
contributions of German anthropologists to the Nazi cause  were widespread 
and apparent. Had  these scholars investigated, they would have found rec ords of 
anthropological collaborations ranging from research supporting the Nurem-
berg Race Laws of 1935 to the cooking of fake scientific racial reports (Schafft 
2004: 73, 17–27). The atrocities of professionally trained anthropologist Josef 
Mengele would have been easily identified examples had the committee chosen 
to undertaken even the most cursory of investigations (Schafft 2004: 183).
But the aaa found it easier to weigh in on other po liti cal issues. Anthro-
pologists’ concerns about American racism led to policy changes within the 
association. In 1947, the Executive Board canceled plans to hold the associa-
tion’s annual meeting in St. Louis  because “all large hotels in St. Louis maintain 
discriminatory practices against some of our members” (nbaaa 1[3]: 1). The 
meeting was relocated to Albuquerque, where the University of New Mexico gra-
ciously provided  free accommodations in campus dormitories that  were empty 
for the Christmas break.  These progressive moves by the association  were the 
sort of activities devoted to racial equality that would eventually garner the 
fbi’s attention and harassment for activist anthropologists in the 1950s (D. H. 
Price 2004b).
The aaa joined the eforts of other professional organizations collecting aca-
demic books to be sent to devastated academies around the world (aa 1946 
48[3]: 490). The association  adopted a po liti cal statement declaring that na-
tive peoples should not sufer  under the impacts of increased Western milita-
rization. At the 1946 aaa annual meeting the membership passed a resolution 
deploring “the proposed action of the British Military Mission in Australia to 
fire destructive projectiles into an area of Western Australia occupied by many 
living aborigines, and calls upon the Mission to cancel all such action” (aa 1947 
19[2]: 365).
In 1947, Melville Herskovits drafted a “Declaration of  Human Rights” that 
was presented to the Department of State and the United Nations (nbaaa 1947 
1[3]: 41). The declaration, which acknowledged the difficulties of identifying 
fundamental  human rights in a context completely in de pen dent of cultural 
pro cesses, stated three fundamental positions:
1. The individual realizes his personality through his culture, hence res pect for 
individual diferences entails a res pect for cultural diferences.
2. Re spect for diferences between cultures is validated by the scientific fact that 
no technique of qualitatively evaluating cultures has been discovered.
3. Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that 
any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of 
one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of 
 Human Rights to mankind as a  whole. (aa 1947: 541–42)
Julian Steward criticized the statement, voicing doubts that
in urging that values be respected  because “man is  free only when he lives as his 
society defines freedom,” we  really mean to approve the social caste system of 
India, the racial caste system of the United States, or many of the other va ri e ties 
of social discrimination in the world. I should question that we intend to con-
done the exploitation of primitive peoples through the Euro- American system of 
economic imperialism, while merely asking for more understanding treatment of 
them: or, on the other hand, that we are prepared to take a stand against the values 
in our own culture which [underlie] such imperialism. (1948: 351)
Steward identified problems that arise when anthropological associations use 
their scientific positions to advocate on po liti cal issues. He concluded:
We have gotten out of our scientific role and are struggling with contradictions. 
During the war, we gladly used our professional techniques and knowledge to ad-
vance a cause, but I hope that no one believes that he had a scientific justification 
for  doing so. As individual citizens, members of the Association have  every right 
to pass value judgments, and  there are some pretty obvious things that we would 
all agree on. As a scientific organ ization, the Association has no business dealing 
with the rights of man. I am sure that we  shall serve science better, and I daresay 
we  shall eventually serve humanity better, if we stick to our purpose. Even now, a 
declaration about  human rights can come perilously close to advocacy of Ameri-
can ideological imperialism. (1948: 352)
Steward brought questions of scientific neutrality and advocacy, as well as is-
sues of applying anthropological understandings of culture, power, and equal-
ity, to the foreground, but most of the discipline remained silently disengaged 
from weighing in on  these issues (see D. H. Price 2014b).5
In July 1950, Ashley Montagu (with the assistance of Claude Lévi- Strauss, 
Ernest Bea glehole, and  others) drafted unesco’s progressive statement re-
jecting biological essentialist notions of race, known as “The Race Question” 
(A. Métraux 1951; unesco 1969: 30–35). Asserting that “scientists have reached 
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general agreement in recognizing that mankind is one: that all men belong to 
the same species, Homo sapiens,” this unesco statement advanced Boasian no-
tions of the social construction of race in an international sphere.
The statement declared that scientists had determined that all of humanity 
was a single species, and that while ge ne tic diferences between groups  were 
evident, using the concept of “race” to describe dif er ent populations was sci-
entifically arbitrary. Métraux deconstructed notions that nations or religious 
groups constituted “races.” He described a number of acquired characteristics, 
such as “personality and character,” “temperament,” and cultural diferences, 
and rejected the possibility that biological pro cesses  were responsible for  these 
diferences, declaring that “ ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as a 
social myth. The myth of ‘race’ has created an enormous amount of  human and 
social damage” (Métraux 1951: 144). The statement argued for  human equality, 
pointing out that “the characteristics in which  human groups difer from one 
another are often exaggerated and used as a basis for questioning the validity of 
equality in the ethical sense” (144).
As the aaa membership and the association’s focus expanded  after the war, 
some governmental agencies found opportunities to capitalize on this conver-
gence of research opportunities, money, and anthropologists’ desires to con-
tribute to building a better world.
A Secret Sharer and the aaa’s Membership Roster
During the Second World War, the aaa had helped the oss’s institutional pre-
de ces sor, the Office of the Coordinator of Information , compile rosters identifying 
anthropologists’ geographic and linguistic expertise;  later the Ethnogeographic 
Board compiled similar lists for military and intelligence agencies (D. H. Price 
2008a: 97–101).  These rosters  were vital tools during the war, and as the Cold 
War progressed, the American government had renewed needs for such lists.
The cia’s interest in compiling rosters listing biographical information on 
specialists with skill sets of interest stretched back to the agency’s earliest days. 
A May 12, 1948, cia memo to the  future director of the cia- funded Asia Foun-
dation, Robert Blum (then working in the office of the secretary of defense), 
rec ords the cia already prioritizing the creation of databases containing such 
rec ords (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003400050047–3, 5/12/48).6 In 1974, former 
aaa executive secretary Charles Frantz reported that in the 1950s the nrc, the 
nsf, and the cia had been the main agencies pushing the aaa to compile a 
membership roster (Frantz 1974: 7).7 Frantz observed that facilitating projects 
that connected members with federal agencies and funding opportunities was 
a natu ral extension of the reor ga nized aaa’s goals. The new association bylaws 
“further specified that the officers  were obligated to maintain rec ords of profes-
sional anthropologists, to serve as a clearing house for professional and scien-
tific anthropological matters, to publish a bulletin for Fellows on activities of 
professional interest, to hold referenda on urgent matters, and to establish liai-
sons with other scientific organizations and institutions” (Frantz 1974: 12).
In February 1951, the aaa’s executive secretary, Frederick Johnson, wrote 
President Howells and the Executive Board (John  O. Brew, John Gillin,  E. 
Adamson Hoebel, Morris Opler, Froelich  G. Rainey, and Edward  H. Spicer) 
that governmental agencies had contacted the association to request a cross- 
indexed roster of the aaa membership, noting that the “ people who desire the 
roster are, somewhat justifiably impatient” (aaap 6, FJ memo 4, 2/21/51). As the 
only nonrevolving member of the Executive Board, Johnson exerted significant 
influence on the board’s transient members.  After exploring several options 
for agencies to oversee and support the compiling of the roster, Johnson de-
termined that the cia would do a superior job, though the agency insisted on 
secrecy. Johnson wrote, “In searching for the ways and means of setting up a 
roster of Anthropologists I have a general proposal from Central Intelligence 
Agency. This agency is reluctant to have its name connected with the proposal. 
It  will do the work as generally and tentatively outlined below provided the 
Association  will sponsor the proj ect” (aaap 6, FJ memo 4, 2/21/51, 2).8
Johnson asked board members to signify  whether or not they wanted to pur-
sue this ofer from the cia; a second ballot item asked approval for Johnson to 
investigate how the association might maintain  future versions of the roster. 
The ballot stated:
The Executive Secretary is empowered to continue negotiations with Central Intel-
ligence Agency for the purpose of compiling a roster of Anthropological Personnel. 
The final agreement  will be based on the idea that the Anthropological Association 
 will sponsor the roster and the Agency  will do the technical work connected with 
it. The [Central Intelligence] Agency  will be allowed to keep one copy of the roster 
for its own use and it  will deliver to the Association a duplicate copy the use of 
which  will not be restricted. The final agreement between the Association and the 
agency  shall be such that the Association  shall be liable only for mailing charges 
and such incidental expenses as it may be able to aford. The final agreement  shall 
be approved by the Executive Board. (aaap 6, memo 4, 2/21/51)
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The board approved  these arrangements, with five members voting yes, one 
voting no, and two not voting; the board also authorized Johnson to investigate 
options for making the roster updatable.
President Howells wrote Johnson:
The cia proposal is ideal. We should go along with it, with the understanding 
that they give us duplicate ibm cards and duplicates of the questionnaires, which 
they can easily do; they are  great at reproducing things. If a reasonable question-
naire, suitable to both parties, can be worked out, we  will both get what we want, 
and except for the mailing they  will put the  whole  thing through from beginning 
to end, and the chances are we  will get something that we want; if we  don’t, then 
the questionnaire method is no good anyhow, and we  don’t stand to lose. (aaap 
6, WH to FJ, 3/2/51)
Howells proposed to Johnson that the aaa establish an anthropologist liaison 
committee that could link the association with government agencies. Respond-
ing to a suggestion apparently already made by Johnson, Howells advocated 
designating an individual to act as a liaison between the cia and the aaa, 
writing:
I think that we should appoint a committee along the lines you suggest, and it can 
work, and no fooling. We have anthropologists in the cia, of course and I should 
think we could get one appointed liaison member for the cia, and go to work. I 
suggest: Newman, Fenton, Collins (bad health?), Foster, Flannery, Roberts, Stir-
ling, all obvious as candidates for committee. What have we for a linguist? And 
yourself, ex- officio. For your information, we  shall be in Washington April 6 and 7, 
and we can make time for some work, e.g. seeing Jim Andrews or somebody about 
it, if necessary. (aaap 6, WH to FJ 3/2/51)9
The aaa’s surviving correspondence provides no further information on what 
became of Howells’s suggestion that the aaa appoint a “liaison member for 
the cia.”10
Johnson, who had his own ideas about which anthropologists should liaison 
with the cia, responded, “Of the group you suggested I am only enthusiastic 
about Foster and with some reservations Bud Newman” (aaap 6, FJ to WH 
3/6/51). Johnson eliminated most of Howells’s nominees, complaining that 
“Stirling does not know what it is all about and usually does not care. Col-
lins’ ideas concerning Anthropology are rather narrow. Fenton, on the basis 
of the rec ord is greatly over- rated. Flannery is almost as restricted as Collins. 
Roberts on the other hand might be of use especially since he has had some 
experience with similar things. However, I happen to know a lot about his situ-
ation and what he has to do and I am fairly certain that if he took on the job 
he would not be able to do as much as he should” (aaap 6, FJ to WH 3/7/51:2). 
Johnson wanted liaison members to be based in Washington, but he rejected 
several suggested Washington- based individuals. He wanted a certain type of 
DC- based anthropologist; as he explained to Howells, they should
select a group of Anthropologists representing all fields who in- so- far as pos si ble 
are heads of departments. Ask  these men to select from their advanced students 
 people who  will do the work  under supervision. This accomplishes two things. 
It gets the work done without overloading the experienced man. It “trains” the 
younger men in committee work. The  later is getting to be impor tant. Now that 
our, at least my hair is getting gray we are losing touch with the new generation. If 
we can get some of  these men started up the line in the Association it  will be that 
much easier to get more representatives and active committees in the  future. The 
gray- beards are nice and we know what they can do, but  there comes a time when 
they cannot or  will not. (aaap 6, FJ to WH 3/7/51, 2)
Johnson favored creating a closed structure of power, drawing on a young gen-
eration of anthropologists, which would establish ongoing bonds between the 
association and the bureaucratic power structures of Washington.
Howells did not press the issue. He relinquished his authority to Johnson, 
writing that he could
keep  after this as you like, as far as I am concerned. My suggestions of the Wash-
ington  people  were only the names that occurred to me, and I  will not stick to 
them. On the other hand I do not care much for the idea of advanced students 
taking the job at hand; they are apt to be too enthusiastic and overdo things, ac-
cording to my experience. Actually, you on the one hand and the cia on the other 
are the key  people, and could probably agree on the data wanted in a very short 
time. Certainly a committee which is representative should help, but too many cooks 
might spoil the broth. Why  don’t you and Mr. Kelley draft something up? This 
might save a lot of time. What I am saying is rather random. I am inclined to 
suggest that Duncan Strong might come in on it,  because of his past experience. 
(aaap 6: WH to FJ 3/16/51)
Strong’s “past experience” was likely a reference to his war work on the Ethno-
geographic Board’s roster (D. H. Price 2008a: 97–100). Howells and Johnson 
recognized that with aaa members’ information entered into the cia’s com-
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puters,  these data could be adapted and rearranged  later, and  future editions and 
updates to the roster could be easily adapted. Howells wrote the board a few days 
 later to provide an update on Johnson’s progress with the cia and suggestions 
for how cia anthropologists could assist this proj ect, explaining that Johnson 
“would like to see a working committee set up to collaborate with the cia; 
I have suggested that this should be made up of Washington  people, espe-
cially since  there are already anthropologists in the cia, and the questionnaire 
could be set up more quickly, always of course  under Fred’s eye; this is his baby” 
(aaap 6: WH to Board 3/6/51). Howells wanted the cia to produce duplicate 
computer punch cards so that the cia and the aaa could both have copies of 
the data, and he wrote Johnson, saying he wished to meet with anthropologist 
and cia employee James Madison Andrews IV to discuss details of the roster. 
Johnson responded that this sounded like a good idea:
By all means go and see Jim Andrews and  others in the cia when you are in Wash-
ington. If the members of the Board would only return their “ballots” to me I could 
go ahead with this business. Mr. Francis Kelley who worked out the proposal with 
me is very anxious to get this started. I had hoped that the Association would act 
efficiently in this  matter simply  because we should do our job. In any case, I sus-
pect that the ballots  will be in before you get to Washington and that I  will have 
taken the next step. I hope so for then  there  will be something for you and  others 
to put your teeth into. (aaap 6, FJ to WH 3/7/51)11
As aaa executive secretary, a nonelected position, Johnson exerted extraordi-
nary control over policy decisions. He drafted resolutions and  later forwarded 
 these to Howells, who sent them to the board for ratification as if he had written 
them. Howells facilitated this and even took steps to hide this practice, prohib-
ited by the bylaws, of a non– board member introducing a motion by develop-
ing their own “protocol.” Howells asked Johnson, “May I make a suggestion 
about protocol? That is, that if you send out proposals to the Board accompanied 
by ‘ballots,’ so marked, it looks like a motion being made and seconded by the 
Executive Secretary instead of from within the Board, which is unconstitu-
tional, and we might get our lines tangled. E.g., it sometimes might embarrass 
me in trying to act on your behalf, as in the previous paragraph, when I think 
you  ought to be put on the committee” (aaap 6, WH to FJ 3/2/51). Johnson 
replied that this was “certainly food for thought,” admitting that he had in the 
past introduced several motions  adopted by the board, a violation of associa-
tion bylaws, and that on some issues he had skirted procedures, but he assured 
Howells this was in the interest of streamlining the pro cess: “This was perhaps 
a  little legalistic but I found myself on the verge of tacitly committing the As-
sociation to an activity. Theoretically I should have submitted the proposal to 
you. Members of the Board should move and second it and then vote on it. 
In my brash way I have short- circuited this and submitted the ‘motion’ for a 
vote. I have done this in the interest of saving time and correspondence” (aaap 
6, FJ to WH 3/7/51).12 Johnson proposed that he and Howells set up an arrange-
ment where Johnson could present proposals that Howells could then restate 
as a motion coming from him so that the board could vote (aaap 6, FJ to WH 
3/7/51).
Johnson negotiated with the cia, and by mid- April 1951 an agreement for 
collaboration was reached. Johnson informed the board that  under this agree-
ment, “the C.I.A.  will compile a preliminary questionnaire. The  people who 
 will do this have had experience with the rosters being made by the nsrb and 
they  will be advised by anthropologists on the C.I.A. staf ” (aaap 6, FJ to EB 
4/17/51).
The identities of the cia anthropologists who assisted in this work  were not 
disclosed in archived aaa correspondence. Johnson collaborated with cia per-
sonnel to produce the questionnaire sent to aaa members. The only appreciable 
cost for the association coming from this arrangements was the approximately 
two hundred dollars in postage for mailing questionnaires to members.
In September 1951, Johnson sent a “Memorandum to Committee on Roster” 
providing a “checklist” of information to be collected for the roster. Johnson 
supplied a page from the American Council of Learned Socie ties (acls) ques-
tionnaire for its po liti cal science roster and suggested that the aaa separate out 
the subfields of social anthropology, applied anthropology, physical anthropol-
ogy, linguistics, archaeology, and ethnography. Johnson recommended that the 
aaa collect information on the following “functions”: “research, development 
or field exploration,” “management or administration, teaching,” “technical writ-
ing and editing or library work,” “consulting, clinical practice or evaluation,” 
and “student” (aaap 36, FJ memo, 9/13/51). He wrote the board that “a volun-
tary registration of specialized personnel is frequently viewed as closely related 
to recruitment and placement activities. While it is pos si ble that the projected 
registration  will be used in connection with recruitment and placement pro-
grams, no definite plans for such use have yet been developed by the acls or 
the Office of Naval Research” (aaap 6, Johnson memo, 10/15/51).
Though I searched numerous archives and libraries and filed several Free-
dom of Information Act (foia) requests with the cia and other governmental 
agencies, I have not located a surviving copy of the aaa roster. In response to 
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a foia request, the fbi mailed me a 129- page file relating to the aaa’s activities 
with the acls, which included a copy of the final survey instrument that was 
mailed to aaa members in 1952. The fbi stumbled across this roster question-
naire while undertaking a mail intercept operation involving an (unidentified) 
anthropologist who received the roster survey.
The fbi recognized the usefulness of this instrument for itself and other in-
telligence agencies. The fbi reported that “such a repository appears to be [of] 
 great value to the Bureau from an investigative standpoint, and it is suggested 
that consideration be given to developing reliable sources in the organ ization 
and utilizing this material to the fullest advantage. The thought occurs that the 
questionnaires may have been initiated by some Governmental agency, such as 
cia, for the express purpose of obtaining intelligence data” (fbi 100–387756–8).13 
While American anthropologists passed along a wealth of personal informa-
tion with  little apparent concern of how it might be used, the fbi understood 
how such information would be invaluable to the cia as it set up covert opera-
tions and contacts all over the underdeveloped world.
The fbi reproduced the aaa’s original six- page questionnaire, along with a 
sheet requesting “additional names” that might be included in the roster, and 
cover letters from aaa executive secretary Johnson, and Bernard V. Bothmer, 
general secretary of the Archaeological Institute of Amer i ca. Figure 3.1 repro-
duces the second page of the roster questionnaire, showing the detailed level 
of information that was gathered. The questionnaire asked aaa members to 
provide information on educational background, languages studied, countries 
visited, academic specialties, citizenship status, professional honors, professional 
membership, past military ser vice and current military status, employment 
history, and income levels. The questionnaire did not divulge the cia’s role 
in the proj ect, only telling members that “the data compiled from this Roster 
 will be used in the analy sis of manpower problems and for pos si ble placement 
and allocation purposes” (fbi 100–387756–2). The roster questionnaire was 
announced in the January 1952 issue of the News Bulletin of the aaa and in 
American Anthropologist (see nbaaa 1952 6[1]: 1; aa 1952 54[2]: 288–89). As-
sociation members  were told that the roster was being compiled  because “the 
present lack of information concerning specialists in the humanities and social 
sciences is a serious stumbling block to a kind of planning which is urgently 
needed. Mobilization activities which  will continue over a long period of time 
have strongly emphasized the basic need for apprising our defense program as 
related to the concept of national security. Analy sis of the data from this registra-
tion  will throw considerable light on the potentialities of the vari ous fields, 
F I G U R E  3 . 1 .   Page 2 of the aaa’s 1952 roster questionnaire as reproduced in fbi file 100-387756-
2. The fbi collected this questionnaire while conducting surveillance on aaa members, and 
fbi analy sis of the document led them to correctly assume the cia was likely  involved in the 
collection of this information.
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including Anthropology” (nbaaa 1952 6[1]:1). A 1952 report of aaa committees 
listed members of the Committee on the Roster of Anthropologists as W. W. 
Howells, Frederick Johnson, D. B. Stout (ex officio), David Aberle, Wendell C. 
Bennett, Marshall Newman, Alexander Spoehr, and Carl F. Voegelin. The cia 
drafted components of the questionnaire, and it is unknown what activities this 
committee undertook, or  whether committee members not on the board knew 
of the agency’s links to the roster (aa 1952 54[2]: 289).
Other organizations with  later- identified cia links collected information on 
anthropologists and other scholars for their own roster projects (see Colby and 
Dennett 1995: 339). In 1955, the Bulletin of the aaa carried a small advertisement 
announcing the National Conference on Exchange of Persons, sponsored and 
or ga nized by Kenneth Holland, president of the Institute of International Edu-
cation, which was held in New York in February 1955 (baaa 1955 3[1]: 13). The 
advertisement reported the roster had rec ords on “210,000 persons who have 
studied, trained or taught in countries other than their own” and was financed 
by the Ford Foundation (baaa 1956 4[2]: 4–5).14
The aaa produced other membership and departmental rosters in  later 
years, but  these did not contain the level of profiling detail of this first cia- 
assisted roster and  were produced by aaa personnel without assistance from 
the cia.
Postwar Applied Anthropology
The Society for Applied Anthropology (sfaa) was founded months before the 
United States entered the Second World War. With so many anthropologists en-
gaged in war work, the organ ization’s membership grew rapidly, and the post-
war years brought opportunities for anthropologists working in the emerging 
public ser vice sector and on new international aid programs connected with 
Amer i ca’s Cold War development strategies. The Cold War provided opportu-
nities for applied anthropologists, with some military and intelligence agencies 
using them for jobs similar to  those performed by anthropologists during the 
war.
Louis Dupree or ga nized the session “Anthropology in the Armed Ser vices” 
at the 1958 annual meeting of the sfaa. The impetus for this session occurred 
two years earlier, when,  after presenting a paper at a conference on using an-
thropology to study air force survival techniques, anthropologists  C.  W.  M. 
Hart and  H.  T.  E. Hertzberg asked Dupree to or ga nize a session for applied 
anthropologists working for the military. Hart and John Bennett  later helped 
add this armed ser vices session to the 1958 program (Dupree 1958: 2; see nbaaa 
1952 6[2]: 16).
For a discipline that had been so thoroughly engrossed in warfare only a 
de cade and a half earlier, this 1958 session found anthropology significantly 
distanced from the military and now more commonly working in industry, on 
community- based projects, or on governmental projects financed through the 
Departments of the Interior or the Department of State. Most of the session 
topics had anthropological corollaries during the Second World War, yet the 
papers did not connect with this now- silent past.
Paul Nesbitt’s overview of air force projects identified anthropological studies 
of “social stratification of U.S. Air Force Bases,” “combat be hav ior,” “psychologi-
cal and so cio log i cal vulnerability of peoples in satellite tension areas,” and stud-
ies administering “national intelligence surveys of Africa, Asia and Eu rope” 
(Nesbitt 1958: 4–5). Nesbitt argued that anthropology could efectively study 
and improve  people’s abilities to use new weapons systems (5). He examined 
oral histories and other rec ords, finding themes in descriptions of more than a 
thousand bail- out incidents. Nesbitt artificially created the conditions encoun-
tered by a downed crew of a B-52 and then used ethnographers to conduct par-
ticipant observations with the crew as they enacted what they would do in an 
actual survival situation (8). Nesbitt described air force uses of hraf data and 
other ethnographic sources to produce five- by- eight- inch “ethnic information” 
cards containing ethnographic data that crew members carried in their flight 
suit pockets. He found that “each ethnic group is described in terms of popu-
lations, range, environment, physical appearance, language, religion, social 
organ ization, economy, diet, transportation, and reputation for being friendly 
or hostile. In addition, each card bears a photo graph of a typical male and fe-
male and a map which pinpoints the location and range of the par tic u lar ethnic 
group. . . .  To date more than 150 of  these studies have been published” (11).  These 
cards, which  were produced by civilian and air force anthropologists, supplied 
ethnographic profiles of seventy ethnic groups within the USSR, twenty in the 
 Middle East, and another twenty in the Far East (11).
Joan Chriswell (1958) summarized some of the World War II navy research 
by the Institute of  Human Relations and connected this work with anthropolo-
gists’ postwar roles at cima and the Scientific Investigation of Micronesia. He 
highlighted Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead’s onr- sponsored work at the Re-
search on Contemporary Cultures proj ect, and John Bennett’s onr- sponsored 
research in Japan. Paul T. Baker, a physical anthropologist who had spent five 
years working for the army, identified two dozen reports and publications by 
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army physical anthropologists (Baker 1958: 23–25). He described military medi-
cal anthropological eforts stretching from the Civil War era to World War II, 
including projects contributing to survival and area culture guides, forensic 
methods of identifying war dead, and physical anthropologists’ designs for gas 
masks (23–25). Baker envisioned a bright  future for military anthropologists, 
emphasizing that “the anthropologist employed by the Army  will find himself 
armed with considerably greater funds and resources than in almost any other 
research position” (26). The paper “The  Future of Anthropology in the Depart-
ment of Defense,” by Col o nel Philip H. Mitchell of the U.S. Air Force, exam-
ined the bureaucratic context in which anthropological research would be used 
(P. H. Mitchell 1958: 47–50).
Dupree concluded the volume by reporting that despite the optimism of as-
sembled scholars, their enthusiasm for harnessing anthropology for Pentagon 
uses was not shared by their anthropological audience. He wrote: “What was 
conceived in optimism died in pessimism. The discussion following the pre sen-
ta tion of papers seemed to indicate a current lack of interest in anthropology 
and social science research in the Armed Ser vices” (L. Dupree 1958: 52). The 
audience response was tepid, and Dupree concluded that “except to dig up and 
rec ord the fate of cities at the conclusion of a nuclear war, archaeologists per se 
have  little place in the scheme of modern warfare planning” (52).
Pentagon Careers
While Dupree despaired over the military anthropology session’s lackluster re-
ception by mainstream applied anthropologists, he underestimated the variety 
of work being undertaken by anthropologists at the Department of Defense. A 
growing cadre of military anthropologists — at times rotating in and out of uni-
versities and applied military employment settings — developed in the postwar 
years. A brief survey of some of  these anthropologists’ work provides perspec-
tive on the range of developments that  were occurring beyond the acad emy.
Donald Stanley Marshall’s  career combined years of Polynesian fieldwork with 
national security strategic planning and ethnographic explorations of  human 
sexuality. Educated at Harvard and at the Army Command and General Staf 
College and the Army War College, Marshall was awarded Fulbright, McCon-
naughy, Guggenheim, and Peabody fellowships for his fieldwork in New Zea-
land (1951–52). He conducted extensive fieldwork at vari ous other locations in 
Polynesia and Southeast Asia during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, widely pub-
lishing books and articles based on this anthropological work (e.g., Marshall 
1957, 1961). Marshall joined the army in 1942. According to his September 7, 2005, 
obituary in the Washington Post, an encounter with San Blas Cuna Indians while 
he was stationed in Panama during the war sparked his interest in anthropol-
ogy. He played multiple military roles, including chief of the army’s Long Range 
Planning Task Force, and deputy director of the salt Task Force from 1973 
to 1974, and wrote counterinsurgency works on Southeast Asia, including the 
two- volume Program for the Pacification and Long Term Development of South 
Vietnam (1966) and several multivolume reports on Thailand and Vietnam.
At least one anthropologist worked for the National Security Agency. Rich-
ard Wesley Howell was an nsa intelligence analyst, working in Washington, 
DC, and Japan from 1953 to 1958;  later sent to Japan as a cryptolinguist with the 
Army Security Agency and became a professor of anthropology at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii, Hilo (bic 2014b). Theodore Allen Wertime was an oss operative 
in China during World War II. His April 16, 1982, obituary in the Washington 
Post indicated that he then “did further intelligence work with the State De-
partment from 1945  until 1955,”  later establishing a  career as an anthropology 
research associate at the Smithsonian Institution.
During the 1950s, Thomas Sebeok oversaw the production of sixteen Uralic 
monographs for the army’s chief of psychological warfare and wrote training 
materials for teaching Hungarian for the War Department (bic 2014f). Robert 
Brainerd Ekvall graduated from the Missionary Training Institute in 1922; a 
de cade  later he began gradu ate work in anthropology at the University of Chi-
cago (1937–38), work that informed his U.S. Army intelligence work focusing 
on Burma and China (1944–51). Ekvall held appointments as a research associ-
ate in the University of Chicago’s anthropology department (1951–53) and as a 
research fellow on the University of Washington’s Inner Asia Research Proj ect 
(1958–60) (bic 2014e).
Sometimes anthropologists working for military organizations came  under 
fbi scrutiny for holding progressive po liti cal beliefs. Bela Maday earned his 
doctorate in 1937 at Pazmany University in Hungary.  After the war, Maday worked 
for the Hungarian Red Cross. The cia’s release of documents  under foia and 
the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act included reports indicating that Maday 
came to the attention of intelligence agents working on Proj ect Symphony (an 
oss- ssu proj ect designed to identify communist and Soviet agents among Jew-
ish refugees emigrating to Palestine). According to one declassified secret cia 
document, Proj ect Symphony identified Maday as directing the Vienna office 
of the Hungarian Red Cross, where intelligence reports indicated that staf 
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“have been variously suspected of intelligence activities and the smuggling of 
Nazis into the Allied Zones” (cia 4/18/46; 1705143 File hq File lvx 219).15
Maday immigrated to the United States on a postdoctoral fellowship in 
1947 and in the early 1950s became chair of the Army Language School’s (als) 
department of Hungarian language.  After an employee at the als reported to the 
fbi that Maday supposedly said “he was happy the Communists came to power 
in Hungary,” the fbi began an investigation of him in October 1955 (fbi 140–
10547–8). The fbi interviewed several professors and staf members at the als 
(fbi 140–10547–4) but found no evidence of communist ties or tendencies (fbi 
140–10547–5); nor did checks with the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and the cia find anything that suggested communist ties (fbi 140–10547–9). 
Maday’s eforts to become an American citizen  were  later complicated by this 
report, although he did become a citizen in 1956 (fbi 140–10547- nr, 12/29/67). 
Maday began teaching at George Washington University and American Uni-
versity in 1956. His FBI file includes a sixty- page report from 1959 evaluating 
his “suitability for access to classified information” related to his employment 
at American University’s Special Operations Research Office (soro) (fbi 
140–10547- nr, 12/29/67). At soro Maday wrote a series of military and State 
Department manuals: he coauthored Area Handbook for Brazil and Area Hand-
book for Malaysia and Singapore and wrote Magyar Grammar (1950) for the als.
“Just a Lot of Professor Theories and  
All That Stuff”
In the years following the Second World War, the aaa’s Executive Board saw 
nothing wrong with governmental agencies compiling information on anthro-
pologists for rosters. But two de cades  later, with increased knowledge of the 
uses to which military and intelligence agencies put such lists, anthropologists’ 
attitudes  were significantly changed as the aaa Executive Board would take 
steps to limit the U.S. government’s access to its members. When the aaa lead-
ership learned in 1971 that the National Science Foundation had been compil-
ing the National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel, the aaa joined 
other professional associations in objecting to “its locator function which en-
abled any government agency to request and receive lists of scientists, with 
their specialties, in the participating fields” (aaafn 1971 12[4]: 1). In severing 
its ties to this proj ect, the aaa announced, “The aaa Board in February unani-
mously voted to condemn the locator use of the roster, recognizing its potential 
for misuse. Data for the National Register, a requirement of the National Sci-
ence Foundation Act of 1950, has been collected since 1954 in biennial surveys 
of scientists chosen by their professional associations” (naaa 1971 12[4]: 1).
Given congressional claims of the 1950s that social science research was too 
biased or too liberal to receive federal funding, it is ironic that an increased flow 
of militarized funds for directed social science research would, as we  will see 
in  later chapters, invert this feared dynamic.  These funds fed increasing liberal 
notions of militarizing the social sciences, with a new generation of counter-
insurgency projects that showed the Pentagon and intelligence agencies how 
easily they could buy a piece of anthropology.
During the de cade following the end of the Second World War, American 
universities  were packed with  eager students funded by the gi Bill, and a new 
wave of first- generation college students brought to anthropology mid- twentieth- 
century hopes of internationalism, theory building, and cross- cultural under-
standing. Both students and professors remained transformed by the Second 
World War and Cold War impacts on higher learning in ways that  were seldom 
considered at the time.
Most of the professors who had contributed their anthropological skills to 
the war efort had worked on large projects, with dozens of other scholars and 
with goals and outcomes determined by  others. This type of workplace environ-
ment encouraged working on research questions that had been determined by 
external forces, and as the Cold War brought new sources of funds for scholars 
working on certain research topics,  these war time experiences helped inform 
the approaches to this work.
Anthropologists at times joined interdisciplinary teams. Some of  these  were 
new interdisciplinary arrangements of academic departments, such as Har-
vard’s Department of Social Relations; other anthropologists joined new types 
of ethnographic research teams, such as Columbia University’s Puerto Rico 
Proj ect (funded by the Rocke fel ler Foundation; see Patterson and Lauria- 
Perricelli 1999) or Harvard’s Modjokuto proj ect in Indonesia (funded by the 
Ford Foundation), Norman McQuown’s Chiapas Proj ect (funded by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health and the nsf), or George Foster’s research at the In-
stitute of Social Anthropology. The postwar availability of substantial support 
for fieldwork dramatically increased the number of anthropologists working in 
foreign countries as funds from Fulbright, ssrc, Ford, Rocke fel ler, nsa, nih, 
the Viking Fund, and the Wenner- Gren Foundation provided the ways and 
means for anthropologists to conduct fieldwork all over the world.
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F O U R   A F T E R  T H E  S H O O T I N G  WA R
Centers, Committees, Seminars, and Other Cold War Projects
Before the Second World War,  there  were few centrally impor tant sources of 
American anthropological funding. Funding was provided predominantly by 
museums and universities and occasionally by rich patrons sponsoring sal-
vage anthropology or archaeology projects to collect what they envisioned as 
the  dying embers of a once- thriving Native American culture.1 Outside of a few 
philanthropically funded, museum- financed, or Department of the Interior proj-
ects, most prewar fieldwork developed as modest self- or university- funded self- 
directed projects.
The most significant diference between pre- and postwar funding was not a 
transformation in scale of funding (which did occur), but a shift from anthro-
pologists working mainly on projects following their own interests to anthro-
pologists, if not following the questions of  others, then following geographic 
or topical funding streams.2 It was not that anthropologists abandoned pursu-
ing theoretical questions of their own choosing; the early Cold War brought a 
re nais sance of anthropological theory. But like colleagues in the physical sci-
ences, postwar anthropologists increasingly engaged in dual use research projects, 
pursuing questions of interest to themselves on topics of interest to sponsors 
(see D. H. Price 2003b, 2011e, 2012c).
Hopes of increased postwar funding led anthropologists William Fenton, 
Charles Wagley, and Julian Steward to advocate for area study programs. Fen-
ton’s Area Studies in American Universities (1947) envisioned centers fostering 
the type of interdisciplinary environment he experienced during the war at 
the Smithsonian’s Ethnogeographic Board. Fenton conceived of such centers 
as serving the national strategic needs of the postwar world, and training new 
generations in the languages and cultures needed to support Amer i ca’s rising 
global dominance (see Mead 1979: 151).
At the 1947 ssrc National Conference on the Study of World Areas, anthro-
pologists  were represented in larger numbers than any other discipline (Wagley 
1948: iv) (see  table 4.1).3 Area panels  were held for Latin Amer i ca, Eu rope, the 
Soviet Union, Southeast Asia and India, the Near East, and the Far East (Wagley 
1948: 28) — with no panels on the Pacific Islands or Africa. Most of  those in at-
tendance represented universities, but  there  were also representatives of private 
foundations, Congress, and military, policy, and intelligence agencies — includ-
ing Sherman Kent, historian and  future director of the cia Office of National 
Estimates (Wagley 1948: 53–57).4
Charles Wagley described how, at the war’s end, university campuses that 
had  housed war time Army Specialized Training Programs and the Civil Afairs 
Training Program shifted their emphasis to area studies gradu ate programs 
(Wagley 1948: 1–2). Wagley pitched anthropology as the discipline for area studies 
to emulate, envisioning centers coordinating interdisciplinary research projects 
such as Ralph Beals, George Foster, and Robert West’s Tarascan research and 
Gordon Willey’s Viru Valley projects (Wagley 1948: 11).
Julian Steward combined academic and national security arguments for con-
ducting community studies research, writing that the value of such projects 
could be seen in the gap in contemporary studies of China (Steward 1950: xii, 
52), observing that “few community studies have been made in China: none have 
been made of communist towns” (53). Steward stressed the importance of an-
thropologists’ national character studies, noting the work of Linton, Kardiner, 
Du Bois, Mead, Hallowell, Benedict, Haring, Kluckhohn, Bateson, and Gorer 
(80). While most anthropologists self- conceived their work outside of Steward’s 
Cold War po liti cal framing,  these issues elicited interest from the governmental 
and private bodies funding this research.  These diferences  were seldom ad-
dressed; whereas war time anthropologists had clearly understood the potential 
uses of their work, postwar anthropologists worked in environments that more 
easily ignored  these issues.
Anthropology students’ first encounters with area study centers  were fre-
quently as language students. Universities received military funds for language 
programs, and area study centers benefited from  these funds. Funding programs 
like: Fulbright, Foreign Language and Area Studies, Title VI, and International 
Research and Exchanges Board became significant means for anthropology stu-
dents to fund their education. Most programs had no requirements that recipi-
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 TA B L E   4 . 1 .   Anthropologists Attending the 1947 National Conference on the 
Study of World Areas (Sources: Wagley 1948: 53–58; Price 2008a)
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Ralph Beals ucla National Research Council
Ruth Benedict Columbia Office of War Information
Wendell C. Bennett Columbia Ethnogeographic Board
Carleton Coon Harvard Office of Strategic Ser vices
Cora Du Bois Office of Intelligence Research, 
State Department
Office of Strategic Ser vices
Fred Eggan Chicago Civil Afairs Training 
Program
John P. Gillin University of North Carolina U.S. Board of Economic 
Warfare, Peru
A. Irving Hallowell National Research Council None (was chair, University 
of Pennsylvania)
Douglas G. Haring Syracuse University Civil Afairs Training School
Melville J. Herskovits Northwestern University Ethnogeographic Board
Felix Keesing Hoover Institute, Stanford 
University
Office of Strategic Ser vices
Raymond Kennedy Yale Office of Strategic Ser vices
Clyde Kluckhohn Harvard Office of War Information
Li An- Che Yale (unknown)
Ralph Linton Yale Office of Strategic Ser vices
David Mandelbaum University of California Office of Strategic Ser vices
George P. Murdock Yale Office of Naval Intelligence
R. Lauriston Sharp Cornell Department of State
Marian W. Smith Columbia None (fieldwork in India)
Julian Steward Columbia Institute of Social 
Anthropology
W. Duncan Strong Columbia Ethnogeographic Board
Mischa Titiev Michigan Office of Strategic Ser vices
Charles Wagley Columbia Department of State
T. Cuyler Young Prince ton Office of Strategic Services
ents  later work for the government or pay back the money they had received. 
Other than assuring that some segment of the population was familiar with a 
variety of languages and cultures,  there was  little connection between the fund-
ing sources and  those funded. Some area studies centers advanced specific the-
oretical approaches; in  others, specific funding lines helped channel questions 
and answers. But even without such dynamics, notions of regional culture areas 
focused inquiries in ways unlike anthropology departments. As area study cen-
ters became increasingly impor tant dispensers of funds, they helped shape the 
questions anthropologists asked and the answers they found.
Harvard’s Rus sian Research Center and Clyde Kluckhohn, 
Anthropologist Cold Warrior
During the earliest days of the Cold War, Harvard University and Columbia 
University established area study centers focusing scholarship on the Soviet 
Union, combining public, openly stated research projects with classified re-
search projects.  These early Cold War programs mixed private initiatives with 
governmental desires, and at times, groups like the Joint Committee on Slavic 
Studies met privately with cia personnel to discuss the needs of the agency and 
academic programs (see foia cia- rdp80B01676R003800020121–7, 1/10/58). 
Harvard’s Rus sian Research Center (rrc) exemplified some of the ways that 
area study centers fulfilled po liti cally circumscribed dual use Cold War roles.
Anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn was the first director of the Harvard rrc. 
During the Second World War, Kluckhohn worked for George Taylor and Alex-
ander Leighton at the Office of War Information, and many of the intelligence 
analyst skills he developed  there had  later applications at the rrc. Kluckhohn 
had a top secret security clearance (O’Connell 1990: 139), and along with mon-
ies from the Departments of State and Defense, “ ‘baseline funding’ for the Har-
vard Rus sian Research Center came from the cia” (O’Connell 1990: 186).
Kluckhohn secretly shared students’ and staf ’s research reports with cia, 
air force intelligence, and Department of State personnel (O’Connell 1990; Dia-
mond 1992). One declassified cia document shows Kluckhohn in July 1948 
sending the agency’s R. H. Hillenkoetter a report titled “The Automobile Indus-
try That’s  behind the Iron Curtain” (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003100040052–1, 
7/6/48).5 Harvard knew of Kluckhohn’s relationships with the cia, the State 
Department, and the fbi, and Kluckhohn reported to Provost Paul Buck his 
success in establishing connections with State Department and Pentagon per-
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sonnel through Harrison Reynolds, who directed cia activities in the region 
(Diamond 1992: 109–10). Military and intelligence personnel at times recom-
mended rrc academic projects to Kluckhohn and  later accessed results from 
rrc scholarship. In 1951, the Boston fbi special agent in charge reported:
One of the jobs of Kluckhohn is to obtain pertinent information requested by gov-
ernment departments and within limits shape the research program of the center 
to the needs of the United States. He cited as an instance of the application [sic] 
the State Department would communicate with him to suggest they  were short 
of a certain aspect of Soviet activity. Kluckhohn would then suggest to a gradu ate 
student at the School that he might do a thesis on this par tic u lar prob lem, making 
no mention to him of the fact that the State Department was also interested. Sub-
sequently the results of the individual research could be brought to the attention 
of the State Department. (Diamond 1992: 59)
Alfred Meyer, Kluckhohn’s assistant director, described how the U.S. govern-
ment secretly used the rrc to fulfill its research needs using a pro cess whereby 
“once in a while Kluckhohn would suggest to the entire academic staf of the 
Center some topic for discussion in a seminar, or a topic on which we all might 
want to write papers” (qtd. in O’Connell 1990: 145). Meyer reported that in 1952, 
when he was the assistant director of the rrc, Kluckhohn
called me into his office for a confidential chat. “Once in a while,” he said, “I send a 
memo around to all the members of the Center in which I suggest that we discuss 
a specific prob lem.” Of course, I had seen such memos and responded to them. 
“Well,” he continued, “such suggestions of mine usually come from the local field 
office of the cia, who phone me, saying, “Our  uncle in Washington would like 
to know what you  people think about such a prob lem.” Kluckhohn told me that 
during the next semester he was  going to be on leave, and the cia agents wanted 
someone appointed to be their contact person. (Meyer 2000: 21–22)
Kluckhohn’s study of the “overseas interrogation of current refugees” was de-
scribed in a secret 1950 cia report “Psychological Warfare Research Studies 
within the Air Force,” as “a proj ect primarily designed to obtain so cio log i cal, psy-
chological, and po liti cal data on defectors from  behind the Iron Curtain. This 
is part of a larger proj ect listed  under B-13. The proj ect is  under the direction of 
Dr. Kluckhohn, Harvard University and is now underway in Germany” (foia 
cia- rdp80R01731R003500150016–5). This cia report also referenced sociolo-
gist Kingsley Davis’s study on “methods of interrogation” using “interviews of 
defectors from the Soviet zone, to arrive at [the] most efective method of in-
terrogation for Soviet defectors” (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003500150016–5).6
In the early 1950s, Kluckhohn directed the Harvard Refugee Interview Proj-
ect (hrip). This proj ect, sponsored by the  Human Resources Research Institute 
of the U.S. Air Force, interviewed more than three thousand Rus sian refugees 
(nbaaa 1951 5[4]: 4). In 1949,  future anthropologist Paul Friedrich helped Merle 
Fainsod with “interrogating non- returnees and recent escapees” in Germany 
as part of an air force– funded proj ect (Engerman 2009: 53; Diamond 1992).7 
 Under Harvard rrc’s contract with the  Human Resources Research Institute at 
Maxwell Field Air Force Base’s Air University, in 1950–51 Fainsod and Friedrich 
interviewed over one hundred Soviet refugees for the hrip. Using standardized 
interview questionnaires, they collected refugees’ biographies, eliciting infor-
mation on their po liti cal background (see hpsss).
Sociologist Sigmund Diamond documented that the University of Michi-
gan’s Survey Research Center interviewed individuals coming to the United 
States from the USSR in the 1940s without informing them that their survey data 
would be “turned over to Clyde Kluckhohn, director of the Harvard Rus sian 
Research Center, which had its own connections with the fbi and cia” (Dia-
mond 1993: 409; see Diamond 1988). Despite such secret machinations, Harvard 
social scientists made audacious public claims about their intellectual in de pen-
dence. Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons claimed that he and Kluckhohn suc-
cessfully sidestepped the damages of McCarthyism by  handling “with  great deli-
cacy the po liti cally sensitive problems of a university organ ization engaged in the 
study of Communist society,” yet this statement ignored the extent to which his 
and Kluckhohn’s work secretly aligned with government policies and needs (Par-
sons 1973: 36). Parsons did not make  these remarks while unaware of Kluckhohn’s 
entanglements with government security and intelligence agencies.
Even as Harvard professors secretly worked with the cia and the Pentagon 
on projects large and small, “Parsons denied the existence of a po liti cal director-
ate composed of corporate, military, and governmental elites as claimed by [C. 
Wright] Mills” (O’Connell 1990: 484). Given the extent of elite influence on the 
work of Parsons and his colleagues, O’Connell concluded that “Parsons’ criticism 
of Mills was in bad faith. Parsons knew better than to argue that Mills was wrong 
 because he himself had witnessed Policy Planning Staf covert operations. He 
himself had seen a Morgan Guaranty Trust director successfully demand the dis-
missal of Stuart Hughes and threaten to withhold funding of the Rus sian Research 
Center if the demand was not met. And he himself knew that Harvard scholars 
as advisors and con sul tants  were indeed part of an informal po liti cal directorate” 
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(484). As C. Wright Mills complained (following sociologist David Lockwood), 
Parsons’s work “delivers the sociologist from any concern with ‘power,’ with eco-
nomic and po liti cal institutions,” yet Parsons posed as if he  were “removed” from 
politics  because his work supported the politics of the status quo (1959: 35).
The University of Michigan’s Near East Study Center
The University of Michigan’s Near East Study Center emerged  after the war, cre-
ating an academic environment that brought together historians, language spe-
cialists, literary scholars, and anthropologists. In this era in which area study 
centers comfortably engaged with governmental agencies, summer sessions 
brought prominent scholars from other universities and State Department per-
sonnel (Daily Michigan, 3/28/52, 2).
In 1951, Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett wrote the study cen-
ter’s first director, George  G. Cameron,  after reading Cameron’s remark in a 
newspaper story that “the Rus sians still had the edge on us in the propaganda 
 battle in parts of the  Middle East.” Barrett conceded that the United States faced 
difficulties, and that American operations would benefit from Cameron’s “ob-
servations and constructive suggestions.” Barrett asked Cameron to share his 
remarks or meet with him and Shepard Jones (“who is concerned primarily 
with information operations in that area”) the next time he was in Washington 
(gwu- nsa, EB to GC 10/4/51).8
Cameron responded at length, evaluating U.S. propaganda eforts in Iraq and 
suggesting improvements. Much of his analy sis drew on his recent fieldwork in 
the region. He wrote:
For about six months we lived among Iraqi and Ira nian Kurds, returning peri-
odically to our base in Baghdad or to a secondary base in Iran. We  were busy at 
our own tasks involving teamwork examination of the area from many points of 
view — history, language, geography, anthropology, archaeology and government. 
We had  little opportunity and inclination to observe the operation of the Depart-
ment of State in the propaganda  battle. Inevitably, however, we saw some of the 
results, as well as the reaction of the  people, especially in the Kurdistan to them. 
They  were not particularly  wholesome.
For example, we spent several days in the area of a Baradost chieftain. In his tent 
we found a  little tract with pictures representing a pig with hammer and sickle tail, 
the pig intent upon gobbling up vari ous quarters of the world. The language of the 
tract was Kurdish. This chieftain, who presides over some 5,000 Kurds, was highly 
indignant. His  people, he said, knew of communism, but they knew better their 
own ill [health] and poverty. “I know,” he said, “the Baghdad man who is produc-
ing this sheet for your Government. I know how much he is being paid yearly to 
produce it. If one fourth of that amount was to be made available in medicines 
or in some other more tangible product of your country which could be used to 
lessen the poverty or to better the health of my  people, would it not be a far more 
successful propaganda approach?”
According to information which came to me, this area is in truth honeycombed 
with propagandists for the other side. It was, of course, not wise for us to inquire 
concerning the techniques of infiltration and we made no efort to do so. I fear, 
however, that we have taken inadequate accounting of the tremendous power of 
the radio. In Iran,  every tea house possesses one, and the anti- British and some-
times anti- American propaganda has seriously damaged our position. The Ira ni-
ans feel that the British tail is all too successfully wagging the American dog. They 
have not been touched by the animosity of the more western Moslems or Arabs 
 toward Amer i ca as a result of our backing of the Government of Israel. The Iraqis, 
on the other hand, are not only vocal — their antipathy to us stems directly from 
the Palestine war. For them,  there is only one side of the  matter and they combat 
any attempt to present the other side. One does become very tired of trying to 
explain Amer i ca’s position, trying to make them see that American streets are not 
paved with gold to be had for the asking, or to make them see that  there are other 
countries also which badly need some assistance. It seemed to me constantly that 
Amer i ca desperately needs to pass on a  little of the information about widespread 
commitments in all parts of the world which have been made, to explain in terms 
of the local monetary units just how much in time as in money has been poured 
into each par tic u lar area. (gwu- nsa, GGC to EWB 10/24/51)
Barrett thanked Cameron for his letter. He expressed hopes that upcoming 
Point IV programs (one of the Cold War’s first international aid programs) 
would provide “the technical know- how” to improve health conditions, and he 
inquired about  whether Cameron had seen “any of the excellent usie Disney 
health films —  simple, direct explanations in an attractive form on a number 
of local diseases and how to avoid them,” adding that  these  were “often shown 
with a Kurdish language sound track” (gwu- nsa, EWB to GGC 11/19/51).
At Michigan, Cameron developed prob lem- oriented seminars that shared 
some characteristics with Kluckhohn’s rrc seminars.  These seminars drew 
heavily on faculty, as an “interdisciplinary seminar devoted to the analy sis of 
major problems in the Near East, both professors and students present papers” 
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(Liss 1953). One of  these interdisciplinary seminars received Ford Foundation 
funding to send anthropology professor William Schorger and five gradu ate stu-
dents to Syria for fieldwork at the Aleppo Field Session (Liss 1953; University of 
Michigan 2000: 189; Shiloh 1959: 99). Louise Sweet, an anthropologist on this 
Syrian team, reportedly  later learned the cia had sent its own  people as members 
of the field research proj ect. This information upset Sweet, who over the years told 
several colleagues about the distress  these discoveries caused her. When she ran 
for a position on the aaa’s newly created Committee on Ethics, her campaign 
statement directly addressed  these issues, indicating that she “would not know-
ingly, much less willingly, accept support of any kind from or give information 
to any agency, public or private, of the United States or any other country, which 
engages in or promotes in any way espionage, manipulation of individuals or 
groups, interventionism, counterinsurgency, or technological, economic, social, 
po liti cal or ideological domination and coercion over any internal part of its 
own system or over any other country in  whole or in part” (naaa 1971 12[6]: 
10–11). Years  later she told archaeologist McGuire Gibson how her unwitting in-
volvement in this cia- linked proj ect had damaged her  career.9 Gibson recalled:
She was then teaching in the University of Kuwait or aub, one of the several places 
she worked  because she  couldn’t get a permanent job at the time  because she was 
tainted by the cia involvement in the proj ect that she had taken part in. . . .  The 
gist of the story was that in the early 1950s, the cia infiltrated a large research proj-
ect conducted by the University of Michigan in Syria. It was multi- disciplinary 
(soils, agriculture, botany, public health I think too), with anthropology as a part. 
Just as it did in Iraq, about the same time, the cia had its own “scholars” in the 
program who  were supposed to be working on specific projects (in Iraq, one or 
two actually published short articles of no merit). (MG to DHP, 12/30/13)
In  later writings, Sweet cited this interdisciplinary fieldwork proj ect (Sweet 
1960: iii–iv), but like other scholars who discovered unwanted interactions with 
the cia, she refrained from exposing or critiquing  these connections in print. 
In de pen dent substantiation and details of Sweet’s claim that the cia infiltrated 
Michigan’s Aleppo Field Session are lacking, though colleagues recall the im-
pact of  these events on her  career.
cenis as Dual Use Model
In 1952, mit established the Center for International Studies (cenis) as a new 
type of program linking the dual use needs of scholars conducting international 
research and of American military and intelligence seeking informed input for 
their own projects. At cenis, Proj ect Troy brought together diverse scholars 
who studied intercultural communications to investigate means of countering 
Soviet jamming of American broadcasts into the Soviet Union and explored 
the possibility of engineering a collapse of the Soviet Union through remote 
propaganda broadcasts. James Killian, president of mit, and Harvard provost 
Paul Buck recruited faculty for Proj ect Troy, pitching the venture as an in-
terdisciplinary opportunity to “bring together a group of first- rate minds to let 
them attack the prob lem in a  free- wheeling, uninhibited manner” (Blackmer 
2002: 7).
Troy collected interdisciplinary teams of social scientists, physicists, chem-
ists, engineers, economists, and po liti cal scientists. Clyde Kluckhohn was 
among the first four Harvard professors to join the proj ect. Max Millikan came 
to Troy from his position as assistant director of the cia, envisioning a program 
that would “exploit mit’s facilities and connections in science and engineering” 
and “pioneer . . .  inter- disciplinary treatment of the social studies questions” by 
developing and testing social science theory (Blackmer 2002: 10).
Troy proposed devoting technological research to problems of overcoming 
Soviet radio jamming technologies that  were dominating Eastern Eu rope and 
also sought new forms of psychological or po liti cal warfare. It envisioned uni-
versity centers hosting “government research programs in the field of po liti cal 
warfare utilizing university personnel  either on a part- time basis or by the use 
of a rotation plan which would permit university specialists to remain in their 
‘home atmospheres’ during leaves of absence from university duties” (Blackmer 
2002: 14). The mit program aspired to become a prestigious center with the ap-
pearance of academic in de pen dence, hosting scholars  under “a rotation plan” 
in which they spent time in residence at the center contributing to cenis Cold 
War projects such as Troy.
Kluckhohn told mit’s President Killian that Troy was “one of the most fruit-
ful experiences of his professional  career and that the world of scholarship 
would lose something impor tant if mit did not turn the classified program into 
a continuing, interdisciplinary, unclassified research center” (Blackmer 2002: 18). 
But Kluckhohn’s hopes for a declassified center  were ignored as cenis’s funding 
source shifted from the State Department to secret cia funds (2002: 20).
The Center for International Studies collected  great minds, but rather than 
setting them to work on questions of their own choosing, it directed projects 
that pursued a narrow range of questions linked to American Cold War ide-
ologies. Walt Rostow studied vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union (resulting in 
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his book Dynamics of Soviet Society), Clyde Kluckhohn oversaw a study in 
which researchers interviewed Soviet defectors, and psychologist Alex Bavelas 
worked on a proj ect apparently designed to subject the Soviets to disinforma-
tion (Blackmer 2002: 21). Using Ford Foundation funds, several cenis social 
scientists advanced economic development theories, with expectations that 
western development could divert underdeveloped countries from the attrac-
tions of socialism.
The Ford Foundation liked cenis’s hybrid approach to the classified and de-
classified harnessing of scholarship for the needs of state (see Ross 1998a: 492–
95). With Millikan’s return to the acad emy from the cia, Ford provided cenis 
with a million dollars of initial funds to plan and develop research projects on 
po liti cal and economic security and on international communication. Over the 
next nine years, Ford provided another million dollars for research on po liti-
cal and economic development issues (Blackmer 2002: 35, 67). Psychological 
warfare experts Jerome Brunder, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Edward 
Shils sat on the cenis International Communication Planning Committee, ad-
ministering Ford’s international communication grant (51).
Ithiel de Sola Pool and the cenis planning committee established four re-
search criteria for cenis- funded projects.  These  were (1) research designs 
exploring how elite leaders of vari ous cultures “learn about and respond to 
information from abroad that leads them to try and influence foreign policy”; 
(2) research contrasting how individuals from rural and urban settings reacted 
to news of international developments; (3) research studying how “reference 
groups” influence decision- making pro cesses; and (4) projects examining how 
communication “lead[s] to po liti cal action” (Blackmer 2002: 61).
In 1954, the cia relied on cenis social scientists to supply academic cover 
supporting justifications for the cia’s military coup in Guatemala. One declas-
sified cia report describes how the cia’s Operational Intelligence Support 
unit (ois)
worked intensively on the preparation of support materials for the American 
Del e ga tion at the Xth Inter- American Conference, Caracas, 1 March 1954. As the 
Conference became largely concerned with the question of communism in Gua-
temala, the task was considered as a phase of pbsuccess [the cia’s code name for 
its 1953–54 Guatemala coup] support. ois staf members produced a considerable 
volume of research and pre sen ta tion, including text and charts, and carried out 
the coordination of State ara and oir contributions with cia production, as well 
as most of the editing, typing and all of the work of reproduction and assembling 
of the main American documentary exhibit and reference paper,  under the title 
of “Communism in Guatemala (150 pages). Contributions to this study  were ob-
tained from cenis (external research), oci, orr, Staf C, and wh Division.” (cia 
1954: 8–9)
Through such arrangements, cenis ofered first- rate copying and clerical ser-
vices as scholars produced intellectual propaganda supporting the cia’s Guate-
malan coup, turning academics into outsourced operational support personnel. 
Yet the first public criticism of cenis’s linkage of academics and the cia would 
not come from American progressives; it came from the reactionary right.
William F. Buckley Exposes cenis’s cia Connection
In February 1957, a column published in National Review criticized cenis’s 
violations of the cia’s charter by advocating a foreign policy approach based 
on what it called “a permanent foreign aid program to give underdeveloped 
nations a ‘sense of progress’— without regard of course, to U.S. po liti cal or stra-
tegic interests.” The article questioned why the U.S. Senate had provided cenis 
$200,000 for producing A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (Millikan 
and Rostow 1957):
The Center for International Studies, according to per sis tent rumor, was set up 
and financed for the most part by the Central Intelligence Agency (through what 
is called a “cut- out”).  Unless this rumor is false, we have the following circle on 
our hands:
1) The Senate votes fund to cia. 2) cia defying a law (that prohibits cia’s op-
erating within the United States), uses some of the funds to create a domestic 
research institution, the mit Center, and the Center regularly publishes slanted 
books and articles, advocating partisan policies for the US Market. 3) The Center, 
putting itself forward as a bona fide scientific outfit, asks a Senate committee to 
give it further funds with which to conduct a study of foreign aid problems. 4) The 
Center obliges with a propaganda brochure.
Gentlemen of the Foreign Relations Committee, it looks to us as if you have 
been conned. Why not a few pertinent questions to Professors Max Millikan and 
W. W. Rostow, who authored the brochure, and to their backers? (National Review 
1957)
William  F. Buckley’s magazine’s attack on cia collusion highlights conser-
vatives’ distrust of the agency during the early Cold War. Yet such distrust 
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was far from universal, and five years earlier Buckley himself had worked as 
a cia operative in Mexico,  under E. Howard Hunt (Buckley 2007). Buckley’s 
indignation sharply contrasts with how comfortable Americans would  later be-
come with what he identified as the polluting efects of secrecy and cia influ-
ence on the production of academic knowledge. Yet Buckley misunderstood 
that Rostow and Millikan’s formulation of international development policies 
based on U.S. aid expressed not some sort of generous gift of American char-
ity, but a calculated arm of American anticommunist foreign policy and a key 
ele ment of U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns. The National Review’s concerns 
 were generally ignored, and this critique did not gain traction for another de cade, 
though the next attack on cia infiltration of academia would come from the 
left, not the right.
In 1962, cenis’s oversight Visiting Committee raised concerns that receipt of 
cia funds jeopardized perceptions of the center’s legitimacy. Three years  later, 
cenis was publicly accused of interfering in India’s domestic policy, and the 
center agreed that “over the next several years  either a policy of full disclosure 
should be worked out or the Center should move in the direction of further 
reducing its contractual commitments with the Agency” (Blackmer 2002: 194). 
The center’s public relationships with the cia ended in June 1966, but in what 
would be a well- established pattern, the shortfalls in cia funding  were con ve-
niently made up by a “multiyear Ford grant” that came “just in time to replace 
cia funding of work on international communism” and other ongoing projects 
(203). The Ford Foundation continued supporting what had been cia- funded 
projects.
Most critiques of cenis’s receipt of cia funds failed to understand that this 
money was but a small part of the military- intelligence complex’s funding of 
cenis. As Blackmer observed, “In the six years before 1963, the Center had 
received an average of $69,000 per year from government agencies other than the 
cia. In six years from 1963 to 1968, the average  rose to over $600,000 per year, 
primarily from agencies of the Department of Defense” (2002: 203). Further, the 
seamless substitution of Ford Foundation funds to continue the cia- initiated 
proj ect received no critical public scrutiny concerning what this revealed about 
the ways that Ford’s po liti cal orientation overlapped with the cia’s.
Public awareness of cenis’s military and intelligence connections increased 
with time. In October 1969, 150 student demonstrators amassed outside of 
cenis, protesting its military research; Millikan, Pool, Pye, and  others “ were 
tried by a mock revolutionary tribunal and found guilty of ‘crimes against hu-
manity’ ” (Nelkin 1972: 110–11). While indignation over academic’s complicity 
with the cia at cenis raged in the late 1960s,  there was only minor concern with 
the po liti cal implications of the social science that cenis- linked projects like 
Modjokuto produced. The Modjokuto Proj ect’s affiliation with cenis exempli-
fies how mainstream anthropology at times operated around the edges of cia- 
funded projects and how Cold War agendas that  were often beyond the focus 
of par tic u lar anthropologists’ interests.
Geertz, Modjokuto, and cenis
The Modjokuto Proj ect (1952–59) became known as the classic postwar multisite 
ethnography proj ect, sending teams of bright young fieldworkers to Indonesian 
villages to study traditional cultures coping with modernization, postcolonial 
in de pen dence, and emerging topics that captured the fancy of  these ethnogra-
phers. The idea for the Modjokuto Proj ect originated with Douglas Oliver, with 
 later input coming from Clyde Kluckhohn and Max Millikan.10 But Oliver’s 
contacts with governmental officials during Modjokuto’s planning stage remain 
unclear, and his 1948–49 ser vice as a State Department special assistant for Far 
Eastern afairs provided him with significant governmental contacts (Browman 
and Williams 2013: 453). When Cliford Geertz and other Modjokuto partici-
pants went to the field in 1952, the proj ect was funded by the Ford Foundation 
and administered through Harvard.11 By the time the fieldwork was completed, 
its administration had been relocated to cenis, where the agency’s former as-
sistant director of the Office of Research and Reports, Max Millikan, directed 
the center, and a host of Pentagon- and cia- linked scholars worked.
In 1995, Douglas Oliver explained to me that Modjokuto had been his idea 
and that Max Millikan had been involved in the proj ect’s planning and funding 
from its earliest stages. Indonesia had been selected for this cooperative inter-
disciplinary research proj ect in order to “fill a gap in the ethnographic rec ord” 
(Oliver interview 7/10/95). In 1995, Cliford Geertz told me that he understood 
Kluckhohn had played an impor tant part in designing Modjokuto and that 
Talcott Parsons may also have had a role. Geertz did not know why Indonesia 
had been selected, given that none of the principals involved in the proj ect  were 
Indonesian specialists (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95). Geertz’s “theory of 
what went on was that” Kluckhohn and Millikan
 were thinking of establishing something like the Rus sian Research Center except . . .  
the Center for International Studies at mit and [Kluckhohn] suggested that when 
the  actual Modjokuto Proj ect was  going — and this part is  actual fact — it became 
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the first sort of enterprise of cis [cenis]  really before cis existed. Now  whether 
Millikan was already on board as head of cis, or  whether cis was still on the 
drawing board I’m not sure when we left, but I do think the Ford money and all 
that — which is what supported us — was got[ten] by Clyde or maybe by Millikan 
that’s conceivable. . . .  But I’d never met Millikan [before  going to Indonesia], and 
I’m almost certain . . .  nor did any of the other members of the group — in fact I’m 
probably the only member of the group who knew him very well [ later]. But we 
 were sent out, and cis existed as a kind of “paper  thing,” but when we came back it 
existed as a real ity. By then the economists  were  there . . .  so it was formed in our 
absence. (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95)
 After returning from Indonesia, Geertz wrote his dissertation and worked on his 
book Agricultural Involution at cenis. He developed a friendship with Millikan 
(Hander 1991: 604, 605), describing him as “very supportive, but again, he had 
no intellectual input into it. His interests  were elsewhere, and of course he was 
involved in vari ous kinds of cia research. The places  were divided by  people 
[who] could go in certain doors and  people who  couldn’t.  Whether they  were clear 
or not” (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95; cf. Gilman 2002: 5). Geertz told me he did 
not recall who could and who could not go through  these doors, describing cenis 
as having “this sort of split personality of being just a bunch of economists 
mainly, and the odd anthropologists, myself, working on research on the three I’s, 
Indonesia, Italy, and India. And then  there was this other dimension of it, which 
was murky. I think that some of my colleagues  were — reasonably enough — and 
so was I, a  little bit dubious about that” (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95).12
Geertz had no knowledge of any work that Millikan might have done with 
Oliver before leaving for Indonesia, but when I told him that Oliver said Mil-
likan helped secure Modjokuto funds even before cenis existed (cenis began 
in 1952), he said: “That sounds right to me. That’s what I’d  really assumed. I 
 didn’t  really know this, but  there was a certain mild paranoia among us — not 
so much me, but some of the  people on the proj ect — about cis, and Millikan 
and so on, especially  after we got back.” According to Geertz, some  people “wor-
ried about its involvement in the cia and so on. I mean, they  weren’t  really 
deeply worried about it. Most of them stayed away from [cenis], in fact, once 
they got back they  didn’t want to be deeply involved” (Geertz phone interview 
7/19/95). Geertz explained that he did not feel the same need to stay away from 
cenis as his cohorts:
It’s just that they wanted to do their thesis and  didn’t want to become involved 
with cis as an institution. I  didn’t mind. I  didn’t have a  thing to do with the secret 
part — as I said — but I worked for them. I had a proj ect for a year, I worked for 
them — and it was Max who deci ded. I remember I went to see him and he said, 
“Yeah, OK.” It  wasn’t my idea that I should do this, it must have been [Benjamin] 
Higgens or somebody that they should hire me and then they said yes, and then I 
worked  there for a year. All that I did was write Agricultural Involution, I  didn’t do 
anything  else at all. (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95)
Although Geertz’s anthropological analy sis generally downplayed po liti cal 
forces, he understood how such forces framed his first Indonesian fieldwork 
opportunity. Geertz said that Indonesia in the early 1950s “was an impor tant 
part of the world, and it was one of the earliest states to get in de pen dence, and 
 there was a big communist movement and so on. [If Modjokuto had links to 
intelligence agencies,] it would have been totally unwitting,  because nobody 
ever said anything to us about gathering . . .  any kind of information that would 
have been of any use to the government” (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95). 
Geertz liked the economists at cenis and would talk with them, but he did not 
have an office at cenis and mostly wrote at his home. When Geertz said that he 
did not know what Millikan had done before coming to cenis, I told him that 
Millikan had been an mit economist  after the war, then assistant director at the 
cia. Geertz said he had not known this, but that cenis “had a split personality,” 
with  people like Norman Weiner mixing with Rostow and Millikan types. He 
thought that probably “half of the  people . . .  had nothing to do with the secret 
part of [cenis], and what the secret parts was, I have no idea, but it had a cia 
dimension all right” (Geertz phone interview 7/19/95).
The Ford Foundation’s Interest in Indonesia
The Modjokuto Proj ect was only a small part of the Ford Foundation’s spon-
sorship of research eforts to understand and control the economic fate of 
 Indonesia. As David Ransom wrote, in 1954 “Ford launched its eforts to make 
Indonesia a ‘modernizing country’ with field projects from mit and Cornell. . . . 
Working through [cenis] . . .  Ford sent out a team from mit to discover ‘the 
economic causes of stagnation in Indonesia.’ Part of this efort was Guy Pauker’s 
cenis study of Indonesian ‘po liti cal obstacles’ to economic development, ob-
stacles such as armed insurgency” (1975: 96). Ford also guided the production, 
interpretation, and consumption of knowledge about Indonesia by funding 
Cornell’s Academic Center for Indonesian Studies and establishing Cornell’s 
Modern Indonesia Proj ect in 1954.
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Though Geertz insisted that cenis’s economists did not impact his work, his 
analy sis aligned neatly with theirs. Geertz explained away the systemic pov-
erty and po liti cal brutality of Indonesia with models of “involution” steeped 
in cultural traditions. He found colonialism’s Pax Nederlandica a stabilizing 
influence, and he downplayed the devastating efects of colonialism and Cold 
War relations of de pen dency (Geertz 1963a: 80). He found the Javanese solu-
tion to the conditions of diminishing returns for agricultural intensification 
 under conditions of population growth was a strategy of what he called “shared 
poverty,” a concept that was an application of the sort of Parsonian po liti cal 
doctrines he had learned in Harvard’s Department of Social Relations (Gilman 
2002: 7). Geertz blamed Javanese poverty on ideology, not on the material forces 
of colonialism: for Geertz, the values and social constructs of poverty  were in-
de pen dent of poverty itself. Javanese poverty was caused by cultural values that 
gave primacy to sharing and communalism, values that inhibited external ef-
forts to modernize. Java was caught in a homeostatic feedback loop in which 
increases in production designed to modernize led to increased population 
and entrenched systems of shared poverty. Gilman  later argued that Geertz’s 
analy sis of peasant be hav ior paralleled American military policy in Vietnam; 
insofar as the United States “could be seen as justifying wars against insurgent 
peasantries on the grounds that their radicalism had to come from without, 
Geertz’s narrative of recent Indonesian economic and cultural history fit the 
ideological needs of  those justifying the Vietnam War” (13).13 Geertz’s  later in-
volvement with University of Chicago’s Committee for the Comparative Study 
of New Nations extended his early theoretical contributions to development- 
linked programs.14
Anthropologists’ critiques of the po liti cal orientation of Geertz’s work first 
appeared in the early 1970s, when some, such as John Moore, attacked the po-
liti cal message of Agricultural Involution as “an economic plan for the capital 
penetration of  every region in Indonesia” (1971: 40). Geertz’s Involution fol-
lowed Rostowian modernization logic, calling for Western administrators to 
interrupt the Javanese involuted economic stagnation. Despite Geertz’s insis-
tence that he was not impacted by cenis’s economic theoreticians, his model 
of traditional society and the solutions he endorsed aligned with the economic 
policies developed by Edward Shils, Guy Pauker, Millikan, Rostow, and  others 
at cenis. Geertz’s economic history of Java featured resilient traditional social 
structures that coexisted with external economic change.  Because he argued 
that national identity could be impervious to economic penetration and cap-
tivation, his work rebutted indigenous critics of global development strategies 
(see Knight 1982). The developing markets and entrepreneurs in Geertz’s Ped-
dlers and Princes (1963b) awaited one of Rostow’s or Millikan’s capital infusion 
development projects.
Geertz’s involvement with the Modjokuto Proj ect, the Ford Foundation, and 
cenis fits a dual use model of the half- unwitting scholar who was not directly 
concerned with the forces and politics of the Cold War, even while contribut-
ing to the intellectual discourse in ways that supported American hegemony. 
Geertz was not privy to cenis’s classified projects, but his lack of access to 
 classified materials did not diminish the fact that Millikan, Rostow, and the 
 others at cenis had access to his research. Geertz’s work was  shaped by the mi-
lieu of cenis. As Gideon Sjoberg observed, irrespective of an individual’s ties to 
classified work, the presence of cia funding for even some cenis projects “may 
well leave a subtle impact upon the research pro cess itself, especially where 
researchers are interested in attracting continued support from this agency. For 
example some projects may have been selected over  others  because they are 
congruent with the goals of the funding agency” (1967: 156).
Geertz’s memoir  After the Fact (1995) revealed too  little too late about the 
Cold War struggles he removed from the foreground or background of his clas-
sic thick descriptions of Bali. As Nancy Scheper- Hughes observed, “Geertz’s 
celebrated Balinese ‘cockfight’ scenario was developed within the larger context 
of a national po liti cal emergency that resulted in the massacre of almost three- 
quarters of a million Indonesians, though it took Geertz three de cades to men-
tion the killing that had engulfed his Javanese field site, now forever associated 
in our minds with  those semiotic fighting roosters” (1995: 437; see also Reyna 
1998). Geertz’s silence over Modjokuto’s links to cenis and his involvement 
in politicized social science projects had links to Parsons’s notion of power, 
particularly the denials of any universal commonality to the po liti cal economy 
of the  human condition. Instead, for Geertz, “All politics is quarrel, and power 
is the ordering such quarrel sorts out: that much is general. What is not general is 
the nature of the quarrel or the shape of the ordering” (1995: 39).
Cold War randthropology
Anthropologists served as con sul tants at the rand Corporation throughout 
the Cold War, producing work that included village studies in Thailand or 
Vietnam, analy sis of cultures of the Himalayas, research on Laotian traditions 
and innovations, studies of Japa nese social organizations, analy sis of authority 
structures in Soviet society, or linguistic simulation studies (see Phillips and 
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Wilson 1964; Pearce 1965; Hickey 1967b; Hays 1962; Halpern 1960; Kay 1969; 
Mead 1951).
Ruth Benedict was the only anthropologist, and the only  woman, who at-
tended rand’s First Conference of Social Scientists. This New York conference, 
held in 1947, was conceived by John Williams, a rand game theoretician, and 
Warren Weaver, social science chairman of the Rocke fel ler Foundation, “to get 
rand started on a social science program that would be useful to national se-
curity” (rand 1948: viii). A classified restricted transcript of the conference re-
corded candid conversations focusing on the range of Cold War– related research 
projects that rand might fund. Benedict discussed methods for studying Com-
munist Party members in the United States, diferences in cultural perceptions 
of atomic weapons, the extent of pro- Russian feelings in the United States, and 
other Cold War research topics. She sought to use anthropology for peace, but 
the resulting discussions show a general lack of participants’ interest in pursu-
ing  these goals (rand 1948: 16). Instead, the projects  under consideration had 
titles like “Psy chol ogy of Attack Be hav ior,” “Public Apprehension of Threats to 
Physical Security,” “Morale Policy in War time,” “Emotional Impact of Atomic 
Bombing,” and “Psychological Efects of Reconnaissance Satellite” (19–23).  There 
 were proposals outlining the construction of a “Belligerency Index,” numer-
ous counterintelligence programs, and new methods of tracking Rus sians, and 
while  there was much talk of peace, most proposals explored new ways to wage 
war.
Conference participants considered research ideas in  free- flowing discus-
sions of how social scientists could reshape the postwar world with methods de-
veloped during the recent war. The ethnocentric insouciance of the discussions 
is striking. Harold Lasswell discussed the cultural mitigation of aggression and 
prospects of a social science for the “management of peoples’ responses” (rand 
1948: 110). Benedict stressed the necessity of understanding cultural subtleties 
before attempting such changes, though she appeared to accept as a given that 
such work should be undertaken (111).
A proj ect called “Pro- Russian Feeling in U.S.” proposed using public opin-
ion surveys to track Americans’ pro- Russian sentiments. This proposed study 
would be secretly “carried out in cooperation with the fbi; public opinion 
surveys at regular intervals [would] study variations in the magnitude of the 
group in relation to current events” (rand 1948: 26). Some participants found 
potential methodological problems with this research, but no concerns  were 
raised about the ethical propriety of assisting the fbi in spying on Americans. 
Ernst Kris commented, “I find  here cooperation with the fbi, which is fine, but 
then also, public opinion surveys, which I  can’t by any stretch of the imagina-
tion combine with information coming from the fbi” (123). While Kris was 
confused about the fbi’s involvement, Herbert Goldhamer understood the fbi 
would not passively digest survey data collected by  others; it would use the 
pretext of a legitimate survey to spy on citizens. Goldhamer observed that “the 
fbi, or what ever agency keeps track of  these things, might specify individuals 
who fall in the group we are discussing. It might then be feasible to send out 
public opinion interviewers with an arranged list of questions who would inter-
view  these  people, supposedly at random” (123). The fate of this proposal is un-
known, but Clyde Kluckhohn’s involvement in the University of Michigan’s 
Survey Research Center proj ect interviewing Rus sian émigrés demonstrates 
that similar projects  were undertaken (see Diamond 1988; 1993: 412).
Research on Contemporary and Distant Cultures
In 1946, Ruth Benedict launched a cross- cultural anthropological seminar at 
Columbia University to teach the war time techniques developed by the Office 
of War Information to study  enemy cultures (R. Métraux 1980: 367). Benedict’s 
students  were enthralled with this approach, and Benedict’s $100,000 Office 
of Naval Research (onr) grant empowered Columbia University’s Research in 
Contemporary Cultures (rcc) proj ect to fund a large group of students and se-
nior scholars (R. Métraux 1980: 367). The rcc piggybacked on the institutional 
successes of the Institute for Intercultural Studies (ifis).15 The rcc research 
was unclassified and used interviews with foreign- born individuals living in 
the United States, combined with published resources (Cafrey 1989: 329–30).
Among the anthropologists employed by rcc  were Conrad Arensberg, Greg-
ory Bateson, Jane Belo, Ruth Bunzel, William Chen, Francis L. K. Hsu, Rosemary 
Spiro, and Eric Wolf (Peterson 2005: 47). At Cornell Medical School, neurolo-
gist Harold Wolf directed the rcc proj ect “Studies in  Human Ecology- China” 
(R. Métraux 1980: 362). Other projects studied the cultures of France, Czecho-
slo va kia, Poland, shtetls of Eastern Eu rope, Syria, pre- Soviet Rus sia, and prewar 
China. Margaret Mead and Geofrey Gorer directed the rcc Rus sian group 
(Mead 1959: 435; Mandler 2013: 223–53).
Mead  later admitted  there  were initial concerns about academic freedom 
when Benedict first gathered anthropologists for this proj ect, writing that 
every one knew “that a study of Rus sia was vitally impor tant. We knew, equally, 
that it could be done — if at all — only  under government auspices  because of 
the hazards, if not to the se nior  people, at least to any beginners who ventured 
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to show any interest in Soviet materials” (1959: 432). McCarthyism’s academic 
orthodoxy made it difficult to interpret rcc findings without considering the 
climate of doublethink permeating academic research during this period.
 There was a flurry of activity  after Benedict announced the receipt of the 
onr grant, as Mead and Benedict recruited ju nior and se nior scholars to build 
a prototype interdisciplinary proj ect to expand techniques pioneered at owi, 
oss, and other intelligence agencies. Mead wrote that they recruited “the gifted 
 people who had somehow managed in war time but who did not fit into the 
peacetime mold — the aberrant, the unsystematic, the  people with work habits 
too irregular ever to hold regular jobs” (1959: 434).16
The rcc strug gled to establish work space at Columbia. Once the ambitious 
proj ect was  under way, its sizable funds began to look inadequate, and in 1948 
Benedict applied for, and received, supplemental funds from rand (Mead 1959: 
434, 438). Mead worked to overcome the sort of hierarchical culture of rank that 
had predominated in war work. The large seminars had their own dynamics. As 
many as seventy- five  people participating, and “ every individual —  including 
the secretaries and the youn gest gradu ate student — was regarded as a full 
member of the group” (435). Mead thought of this proj ect as the spiritual de-
scendent of a Boasian seminar (436); yet, unlike in Boas’s seminars, participants 
focused not on esoteric features of language, culture, or mythos as a tool for un-
derstanding the psychic unity of humankind but on cultural features for ends 
linked to Cold War contexts. This shift enticed some anthropologists to refocus 
their intellectual depth of field from one of theoretical abstractions to a plane 
of interest aligned with the growing militarized state.
 After Ruth Benedict died in 1948, Mead took on most of Benedict’s rcc du-
ties. Much of this work was  later run through the Council for Intercultural 
Relations and the Institute for Intercultural Studies, organizations that over the 
years employed more than one hundred  people conducting cultural research 
(Peterson 2005: 47; R. Métraux 1980: 371). Rhoda Métraux wrote that  after Bene-
dict’s death, Mead recruited anthropologists, many of whom  after the war had 
“left government agencies, vowing never again to work within restrictions on 
open discussion and publication or to become involved in activities that might 
afect the lives of  others, for good or ill, without their knowledge or consent. I 
was one of  those who had to be convinced that  there would be no undisclosed 
uses of our research. Margaret did convince me” (1980: 368). Métraux’s initial 
concerns  were not without some basis. As described in chapter 8, her naive trust 
in  those she met though Mead led to her work on Harold Wolf ’s research on 
Chinese personality types — a proj ect that linked rcc to cia espionage eforts.
Margaret Mead’s Soviet Attitudes  toward Authority (1951), published by rand, 
simplistically characterized Soviet national character with references to authori-
tarianism and po liti cal police, ironically writing during a period in which the 
forces of American McCarthyism  were already undertaking Red- baiting at-
tacks on academic freedom.17 Other rcc projects had Cold War applications. 
Among the proposals Mead pitched to the National Institute of Health  were Mark 
Zborowski’s pain research proj ect and Martha Wolfenstein’s examination of “chil-
dren’s expectations and fears which are developing in response to the civilian de-
fense programs, the war news, the draft,  etc.” (mm, M17, MM to JE 1/31/51).
In late 1956, while overseeing cia- funded MK- Ultra research (see chapter 8), 
Harold G. Wolf wrote Margaret Mead, asking her for the ifis mailing list so 
that he could alert ifis- affiliated scholars to “the possibility for  future research 
funding” (mm C37, HW to MM 12/3/56). Wolf did not disclose that his Soci-
ety for the Investigation of  Human Ecol ogy was a cia front, and Mead pro-
vided access to the mailing list (mm C37, MM to HW 1/4/57). Mead and Wolf 
had been friends since at least the 1940s, and over the years she had ofered 
constructive comments on Wolf ’s research papers (e.g., mm C19, MM to HW 
1/2/48) and shared papers that she thought would be of interest to him, such 
as Daniel Gajdusek’s 1958 work on the “ ‘laughing death’ of New Guinea’ ” (mm 
C41, MM to HW 7/21/58).18
At ifis, Mead worked with Brookings Institution pollster and social psy-
chologist Donald N. Michael on the Man in Space proj ect. Man in Space re-
search tracked the spread of knowledge about satellites following the launch 
of Sputnik, tracking mea sur able shifts in the American public’s consciousness 
on topics ranging from popu lar understandings of satellites to how surprised 
Americans  were that the Soviets had launched the first satellite (55  percent  were 
surprised, 44   percent  were not) (Michael 1960: 576). For this proj ect, in the 
days  after the satellite’s launch, Mead asked Melville Jacobs to poll Seattleites for 
their reactions to Sputnik, instructing Jacobs to not disclose to research subjects 
any information about this proj ect (see Michael 1960: 573; mj 5, 20, MM to MJ 
10/6/57). Adopting techniques similar to  those used in British anthropologist 
Tom Harrisson’s mass research proj ect, Mead and Rhoda Métraux helped Mi-
chael gather and analyze  these data (Michael 1960: 575).
The Salzburg Seminars
Another way that American Cold War po liti cal forces drafted anthropologists 
to spread par tic u lar forms of Americanized democracy  after the war was as 
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participants in programs exposing foreign scholars to American intellectu-
als. The 1947 Salzburg Seminar in American Civilization symposium collected 
promising Eu ro pean student scholars at Salzburg’s Leopoldskron  Castle to fos-
ter postwar intellectual growth and the spirit of a specific form of American 
internationalism. The seminar was conceived of by Harvard gradu ate stu-
dents Clemens Heller and Richard Campbell and one of their professors, Scott 
Elledge.  After being refused funding by Harvard’s President James B. Conant, 
Heller and Campbell received a few thousand dollars from the university’s student 
government to finance the basic needs of the seminar;  later,  after the Seminar was 
established, in the early 1950s, the Rocke fel ler Foundation provided $30,000 a 
year (Rocke fel ler Foundation 1952: 417).
Margaret Mead was one of eleven American scholars who attended the first 
Salzburg Seminar. The first seminars  were low- budget operations. The first year, 
the organizers traveled throughout Eu rope interviewing “about 150 students” 
and with 92 students attending the conference (Mead 1947: 2). Attendees read 
classics of American lit er a ture and po liti cal history in an informal setting that 
allowed select Americans to cultivate contacts with  future leaders of postwar 
Eu rope. Conceived as an internationalist proj ect fostering intellectual growth 
and humanitarianism in a land still decimated by the war, the seminar was con-
trolled by the war’s victors.
The American presence at the seminar was significant. Not only was “Ameri-
can civilization” the central topic, but the seminar’s unsubtle po liti cal message 
was that it was time for Eu rope to learn intellectual lessons from the American 
victors (Mead 1947: 4). Repre sen ta tions of domestic American oppression  were 
generally absent from Salzburg; academic press reports emphasized Eu ro pean 
student participants’ surprise at the levels of academic freedom and dissent. 
An account of the screening of the film Grapes of Wrath stressed a student’s 
amazement at Americans’ willingness to show such a depiction of abject pov-
erty (H. N. Smith 1949: 35–36).19
The U.S. Army Intelligence Ser vice “dispatched agents to infiltrate [a Salzburg 
Seminar] session and report on the activities.” One army intelligence report, 
which summarized a spirited debate contrasting U.S. and Soviet economic and 
po liti cal systems, led to Clemens Heller being labeled as a “dangerous Red.” The 
State Department began proceedings to ban Heller from  future entry to Austria 
and canceling  future seminars, but calmer heads at State prevailed, and  these 
plans  were canceled (Ryback 2009).
Talcott Parsons participated in the second Salzburg Seminar, and the most 
notable po liti cal outcome of his attendance was that this trip marked the 
beginning of his eforts to bring accused Nazi collaborator Nicholas Poppe to 
the United States (Gerhardt 1996).20 Given Kluckhohn’s documented reporting 
to the fbi and cia during this period, his se lection as the seminar’s anthropolo-
gist during its third year (Gleason 1949) raises the possibility of intelligence 
agencies gathering dossiers on seminar participants. By the end of the 1950s, 
rumors  were circulating that the seminars had secret connections with the 
American intelligence community, though  these accusations are unsubstanti-
ated (see Wachman 2005: 44). But we do have documentation of the cia fund-
ing other international seminars at this point in time following similar patterns 
of organ ization.
During this period, the cia began providing funds that would total $135,000 
for similar international summer sessions at Harvard or ga nized by Henry Kiss-
inger (nyt 1967b). In 1950, Henry Kissinger, then a Harvard gradu ate student, 
began planning a ten- week seminar that would bring fifty young Eu ro pean pro-
fessionals to the university. This International Summer School program was 
run through Harvard’s Summer School, which a de cade and a half  later was 
 discovered to have secretly operated with funding supplied by Frank Wisner’s 
Office of Policy Coordination (opc) at the cia. As Heller, Campbell, and Elledge 
had traveled throughout Eu rope collecting top participants for the Salzburg 
Seminars, Kissinger traveled in Eu rope, interviewing prospective students to 
attend the International Summer School, in some instances making po liti cal 
contacts that would have  future uses.  After cia funding for the program was 
exposed, Kissinger insisted he had no knowledge of such support from the 
agency, but correspondence between Kissinger and William Elliott establishes 
his knowledge of cia links (Wilford 2008: 126).
Although the cia did not release any rec ords in response to my foia re-
quests relating to the Salzburg Seminars, it remains an open question  whether 
the cia or other governmental agencies had nondisclosed contacts or influence 
with the students or  others who attended. Given the cia’s interest in, and covert 
financial support of, Harvard’s International Summer School during this period, 
this remains a possibility, and we know that military intelligence and State De-
partment intelligence  were monitoring seminar participants. What ever the cia’s 
involvement or noninvolvement in the Salzburg Seminars, the seminar’s propa-
ganda value was clear, and anthropologists’ contributions to  these eforts became 
a natu ral Cold War addition. A March 29, 1962, memo from the  under secretary 
of state for po liti cal afairs advising dci John McCone on vari ous ways to infil-
trate and influence international organizations mentioned the Salzburg Seminars 
as a model that the cia could use for such eforts (cia 1959c: Annex B, 2).
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The Rise of Centers and Seminars
The rise of area study centers, international seminars, and research centers fo-
cusing on research problems framed by U.S. international concerns was  shaped 
by Cold War po liti cal developments, and  these centers and seminars  were 
birthed with an infusion of governmental and private foundation funds. As 
David Nugent’s work shows, the value of social science to military and corporate 
foundations interested in maintaining power over, and controlling markets in, 
foreign countries “resulted in an unusual willingness on their part to subsidize 
the production of that knowledge” (2010: 2). At the time, the ways  these funds 
supported American hegemony  were not always apparent to  those receiving 
the funds. It would not be  until press revelations of cia involvements became 
public in the 1960s that anthropologists began to consider the larger po liti cal 
context in which  these systems of knowledge production  were embedded.
This increasing availability of foundation funding was welcomed by anthro-
pologists, who seldom considered what obligations might accompany such gifts 
or how the gifts might shape avenues of inquiry or analy sis. But  whether or not 
such issues  were considered,  these funds brought their own transformations. 
To receive this financial support, anthropologists “had only to learn to formu-
late research problems in categories established by the foundations and govern-
ment agencies in the bureaucratic mold of rational procedure. The research 
proposal, and the thought pro cess required to successfully fulfill it, therefore 
superseded the older, more individual approaches to the pursuit of knowledge. 
The changes in anthropology constituted just one small part of a wider pro-
cess leading to the present situation in which government funding, tax- exempt 
foundations, and grant applications permeate all levels of American society, 
with their abstract formulas to which applications must  either conform or die” 
(Denich 1980: 173). The conflux of the rise of tax- exempt foundations named 
 after dead millionaires and anthropologists seeking research funds provided new 
life to Marx’s observation that “the more a dominant class is able to absorb the 
best  people from the dominated class, the more solid and dangerous is its rule” 
(Marx 1894: 736).
In part, the area study centers rapidly appearing on American campuses dur-
ing the early Cold War  were intellectual extensions of war time innovations made 
at the oss and other intelligence agencies (Winks 1987: 115). Bruce Cumings ob-
served how personal connections, skills, and mind- sets developed during the 
war influenced the interdisciplinary structural formation of area study centers; 
in addition, the centers frequently employed academics who maintained contacts 
with members of intelligence agencies in ways that mixed their academic pur-
suits with  those of the cia and other intelligence agencies (Cumings 1999: 173). 
Drawing on correspondence between Philip Mosely and Paul Langer from 1953, 
Cumings described how the Ford Foundation consulted with cia director Allen 
Dulles to establish how Ford- funded research projects could be selected in ways 
that coalesced with the cia’s needs (184). Cumings showed that Mosely was a 
“working linkage among Ford, the cia and the acls/ssrc” extending from the 
early 1950s into the early 1960s to help “shape postwar area studies” (185).
Saunders (1999), Wilford (2008), Diamond (1992), Ransom (1975), and 
 others document some of the ways that the cia influenced intellectuals during 
the Cold War, at times using agencies like the Ford Foundation, as well as cia 
front foundations, to steer intellectual movements (see chapters 7 and 8). The 
Ford Foundation played a vital support role, invigorating flaccid cia- linked 
social science projects that  were in need of support and legitimization. The pat-
tern shown in the Ford Foundation volunteering to make up for the shortfall 
of funds at cenis left by the cia’s 1966 withdrawal was repeated in other cia- 
exposed programs discussed in  later chapters.
As one of the Cold War’s classic large, multisite ethnographic research proj-
ects, the Modjokuto Proj ect demonstrated how large- scale projects required 
large, centralized funding sources. Such projects suggest similarities with how 
physics was transformed during the twentieth  century, as it became tied both 
directly and peripherally to weapons lab research in classic dual use ways that 
nurtured the curiosity of  those engaging in theoretical research and also pro-
duced findings that had implications for developing weapons systems.
Anthropologists and other scholars working at area study centers sometimes 
supported and sometimes scrutinized Cold War assertions of American hege-
mony, but even with occasional strong academic critiques,  these centers pro-
duced the levels of technical cultural and linguistic knowledge needed to train 
 those who supported American policy — and even the work of critics or po liti cally 
neutral scholars was cannibalized for military or intelligence ends (Condomi-
nas 1973; D. H. Price 2003b, 2012a).  These critiques of area study centers’ po liti-
cal alignments are almost as old as the programs themselves, with remarkably 
sophisticated critiques being made by anthropologist Jerome Rauch in his ar-
ticle “Area Institute Programs and African Studies” (1955). As an anthropol-
ogy gradu ate student at Columbia University, Rauch traced the roots of the 
Cold War’s area study centers to the Second World War, writing that “the war- 
emergency agencies placed  great emphasis on area organ ization,” producing 
information needed by agencies like the Office of Strategic Ser vices, the Foreign 
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Economic Administration, and the Office of War Information (Rauch  1955: 
409). Rauch described the Ethnogeographic Board’s coordination of the collec-
tion and distribution of ethnographic data to vari ous military and intelligence 
agencies during the Second World War. He stressed how the board’s confiden-
tial reports and rosters “formed the backbone” of postwar area study center 
rosters (410). Rauch connected the 1950s area studies approach directly to U.S. 
cold war military and intelligence needs.
Rauch understood “the mantle of world hegemony” as providing “the propel-
ling force  behind foreign area research” (1955: 413). Rauch quoted George Peter 
Murdock’s realpolitik observation that “we  shall have reason to believe that area 
research is prompted by pure science objectives when, for example,  there sud-
denly appear in our universities ten times as many area programs concerned 
with Madagascar or the Fan Chaco as with Rus sia or China” (413).
Rauch understood the government outsourced needed analy sis and training 
functions to area studies centers, a pro cess in which “the subordination of area 
research to government and business policy has at times assumed war- time 
‘crash proj ect’ undertones” (1955: 415). While Rauch critiqued this approach, 
he recognized that  others, like Karl Wittfogel, argued that just as the United 
States should dispense economic aid to underdeveloped nations only in ways 
that furthered the national interest, social science programs that  were aligned 
with furthering the national interest should also be funded as a priority (415; 
Wittfogel 1950).
Rauch critiqued the Wenner- Gren Foundation’s role in funding anthropology 
and area studies, in what must be the first published academic criticism that al-
leged Axel Wenner- Gren’s connection with Nazis.21 The directness of his critique 
of the largest funder of anthropological research was unusual for the 1950s.
Rauch argued that “the themes under lying current African research”  were 
aligned with Amer i ca’s quest for “raw materials and investment opportunities, 
strategic and military import, the status quo and/or colonialism” (1955: 422). 
He rejected prevailing views that colonialism in Africa had brought positive 
impacts to  those living  under colonial rule, and he derisively quoted comments 
by Bryce Wood at a Prince ton conference on Africa that called for American 
scholars to rethink their anticolonialist attitudes (423).
It is not surprising that Rauch’s critique of the dual use Cold War functions 
of area study centers did not garner praise: such interpretations  were decid-
edly unwelcome in 1955. In 2001, Rauch wrote me that the publication of his 
paper produced unexpected results: “I had no  great expectation that this analy-
sis would be received as front page news, but I was taken aback by the way it 
was totally rejected and assigned to oblivion. Over the years and to no avail I 
have submitted it to several bibliographic surveys hoping only that it would be 
listed” (JR to DHP 2/22/01).  After Rauch published his analy sis of area study 
centers, his adviser, Julian Steward, told him such forthright critiques  were a 
form of academic suicide and suggested that he leave the field, which he did 
(D. H. Price 2011c: 350).
Critiques of Cold War agendas during this period brought  career setbacks, 
and alignments with  these agendas brought rewards. While anthropologists 
like Jack Harris, Bernhard Stern, Gene Weltfish, and Richard Morgan strug gled 
to keep jobs or,  after sufering the attacks of McCarthyism, left academia en-
tirely to work as an insurance salesman or a chicken farmer, Clyde Kluckhohn’s 
 career  rose as a consequence of his alignment with nontransparent Cold War 
projects. Anthropologists who aligned their work with Cold War topics or re-
gions of concern found broad  career opportunities.
 These campus- linked area study centers, seminars, and other research cen-
ters  were not the only means of linking anthropologists to Cold War research 
projects. A wealth of governmental development projects focusing on global 
economic in equality and military- linked projects brought anthropologists into 
the orbits of the State Department, the cia, and other governmental agencies.
In this context, anthropology’s neglect of the critique by sociology, its intel-
lectual cousin, of the military- industrial complex through the writings of C. 
Wright Mills coalesced with the needs of state. The attacks on Mills at Harvard by 
Parsons and his followers produced dual use outcomes, as anthropology’s disci-
plinary elites drew attention away from power relations embedded in political- 
economic relations, even as anthropologists increasingly undertook fieldwork 
in socie ties of the “Third World,” where Amer i ca fought for the hearts, minds, 
and bodies of  those living on the Cold War’s proxy battlefield.
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Aid, Debt, and Other Cold War Weapons of the Strong
Assuming the role of a power ful victor in the postwar world, the U.S. State De-
partment asserted new global powers that brought opportunities for anthropol-
ogists interested in working for State or other civilian governmental agencies 
or as civilians working for military branches. One mid-1950s anthropologist 
working for the U.S. government described the activities of Mutual Security 
Agency anthropologists as ranging from helping “explain to American busi-
nessmen the diferences in cultures to be taken into consideration in planning 
aid and reorganization of foreign industries” to acting as advisers to R. L. Mc-
Namara on developments in Southeast Asia (MacGregor 1955: 423).
Anthropologists found a broad range of civilian governmental employment 
opportunities at home and abroad. In 1950, Edward Jandy left his anthropology 
professorship at Wayne State University to become cultural officer at the U.S. 
embassy in Tel Aviv (nbaaa 1950 4[3]: 3). In 1948, Philleo Nash, Harry S. Tru-
man’s presidential specialist on minority matters, helped draft Executive Order 
9981, which racially integrated the armed forces (MacGregor 1985: 309–14). T. 
Dale Stewart helped identify the remains of dead  U.S. soldiers for the army 
during the Korean War; Edward T. Hall and Glen Fisher taught cultural sensi-
tivity training courses at the State Department’s Foreign Ser vice Institute (fsi) 
(424). Civilian archaeologists worked on many military cultural resource man-
agement projects that  were at times linked to development or acquisition of 
American military bases.1
Responding to a request from John Bennett and Clyde Kluckhohn, in late 
1950, Harvard anthropologist John Pelzel produced a report on two Korean vil-
lages occupied by North Korean forces (Oppenheim 2008: 228). The American 
embassy in Lebanon developed a “special branch of the Foreign Ser vice Institute” 
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that employed anthropologist Kepler Lewis and linguist Charles Ferguson to 
provide “intensive training for younger foreign ser vice officers preparing for 
a  career in the Near East” (MacGregor 1955: 426). Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles appointed David Mandelbaum to the U.S. National Commission to 
unesco (baaa 1957 5[3–4]: 1). During the late 1940s, several anthropologists 
took positions at the fsi, where they continued in roles that had become famil-
iar for the discipline during the war. At fsi, Edward Kennard became a pro-
fessor of anthropology, Henry L. Smith directed the fsi’s School of Language 
Training, and George Trager took on a professorship of linguistics (nbaaa 1949 
3[1]: 5). And while  these and other anthropological contributions to civilian 
governmental tasks at the State Department and elsewhere  were considerable 
and widespread, many anthropologists considered this work as peripheral to 
the discipline’s core.
 After the war, Cora Du Bois moved from oss to the Department of State, 
where she was the chief of the department’s Intelligence Research Southeast 
Asia Branch from 1945 to 1949. The fbi investigated Du Bois as a pos si ble com-
munist  because of her anticolonialist views, her participation in progressive 
po liti cal movements, and her past employment by Owen Lattimore, American 
scholar of China accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being a Communist 
spy (see D. H. Price 2004b: 293–97). Du Bois’s exit from governmental employ-
ment illustrates the narrowness of po liti cal thought that was tolerated in gov-
ernmental ser vice during the postwar years.
During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, 
advertisements for military, intelligence, or State Department positions rou-
tinely appeared in the News Bulletin of the aaa (e.g., nbaaa 1952 6[6]: 4). One 
advertisement from 1952 described positions in the State Department’s Office 
of Intelligence Research, which was seeking anthropologists to conduct “in-
terpretive studies of areas, ethnic and linguistic groups”; the advertisement re-
quested that applicants provide their dissertation abstracts for governmental 
distribution (nbaaa 1961 5[2]: 5). Among  those anthropologists who answered 
the State Department’s call was John Embree, one of Amer i ca’s most knowl-
edgeable scholars of East Asia.
John Embree’s Vision for Anthropologists of State
 Because of his prewar fieldwork in Japan and his travels in Asia, John Embree’s 
ethnographic knowledge was in high demand by military and intelligence 
agencies during and  after the war (D. H. Price 2008a: 152–53, 173–76). In 1947, 
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Embree became the first cultural relations adviser at the U.S. embassy in Bang-
kok; a year  later he took a usis position at the American embassy in Saigon, 
then soon left to assume a position in Yale’s Southeast Asia Area Studies Program 
(nbaaa 1947 1[1]: 8; nbaaa 1948 2[1]: 12).
Embree’s governmental work led to a significant critique of governmental ap-
plied anthropology. He questioned the likelihood that anthropologists’ eforts 
could remain unentangled from the corrupting influences of governmental 
sponsors (nbaaa 1948 2[4]: 61). In recounting the problems facing anthropolo-
gists working as cultural officers abroad, Embree described the double binds 
anthropologists faced as they tried to spread “knowledge among nations for 
the ultimate good of all,” while their governmental sponsors expected them to 
spread knowledge in ways favoring U.S. geopo liti cal interests as defined “by the 
current government in Washington.” Embree warned his colleagues that “an 
anthropologist who serves as cultural officer is thus soon faced with a prob lem 
in professional ethics” (1949: 156).
Embree broadly critiqued the philosophical basis and implementation of post-
war applied anthropology. He attacked the commonplace rankings of cultures 
as  either  simple or complex, noting that before World War II Japan was widely 
described as a “progressive” nation, yet when the war broke out, many anthro-
pologists described Japa nese culture as “evil,” “pathological,” or “adolescent” 
(Embree 1950: 430). He ridiculed war time anthropologists who had tried “to 
show that Japa nese society was not only dif er ent from western  European — an 
acceptable anthropological proposition — but also tried to demonstrate that 
their peculiar culture made the Japa nese warlike and aggressive as individu-
als and expansionist as a nation. This was done by resort to ingenious theories 
concerning toilet training, Emperor worship and food habits” (430).
Embree described U.S. anthropologists’ work in Micronesia as demonstrat-
ing a paternalistic “white man’s burden” (1950: 430) attitude  toward Microne-
sians that was reminiscent “of French and British colonialists who have devoted 
their lives unselfishly to administration of the afairs of their  little brown bro-
th ers” (431). He critiqued George Murdock’s ethnocentrism, writing that Mur-
dock had brought the discipline “full circle,” back to the “views and sentiment 
of the nineteenth  century foreign investors, convert- seeking missionaries, and 
writers such as Kipling singing the praises of the docile brown man — when 
ruled by western man” (431).
Embree was outraged that anthropologists managed  people in ways that served 
administrators, instead of giving voice to the desires of studied peoples. He de-
nounced the “recent trend” of applied anthropology, declaring that international 
projects managed local populations in ways that met the needs of government 
administrators abroad, while industrial applied anthropologists sold out work-
ers to their managers at home. Embree argued that Amer i ca needed to “learn 
some self restraint if she is not to ruin the  people and cultures of the world.” 
He hoped American anthropologists would play a role in ofering “intellectual 
leadership” while remaining aware of the dangers of “falling in love with their 
own culture and their own professional folkways to such an extent as to lose 
sight of their primary object: to study the nature of man and his culture, of the 
relations between men and their cultures” (Embree 1950: 431–32).
Embree’s critique brought several responses that  were published in American 
Anthropologist. John Fischer, an anthropologist working for the Civil Adminis-
tration Unit of the Ponape Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, admitted that 
Embree’s piece “struck a very sympathetic note,” acknowledging that govern-
mental anthropologists must support the rule of administrators and reduce 
“trou ble” with the locals, and that most administrators essentially want to 
Americanize  those they administer. Fischer conceded that “an applied anthro-
pologist who devoted his major efort to opposing this general goal would, I 
believe, accomplish very  little except the eventual termination of his employ-
ment” (1951: 133). Yet Fischer defended  these practices, arguing that  these ap-
plied anthropologists  were not “simply a tool of the administration” (133).2 He 
stressed that an applied anthropologist working between the cultures of admin-
istrators and the culture he was hired to study must “be careful of passing judg-
ment on the ways of the inferior group (inferior in the social sense), he must 
also be careful about passing judgment on the ways and values of the superior 
group which employs him” (133). With such derogatory language, Fischer only 
dug deeper the hole begun by Embree; he appeared only a few quatrains away 
from channeling Kipling.
Fischer argued that “when a po liti cally and eco nom ically power ful society 
takes over a weaker society we may expect the weaker society to change more 
in conformity with the more power ful than the reverse.” Fischer claimed the 
directionality of  these changes existed not  because of diferences between mili-
tary might, but “partly  because the weaker society seeks to imitate the more 
power ful in order to become more power ful itself ” (1951: 133). Fischer claimed 
this situation would be made worse if the “superior culture” inhibited the “infe-
rior culture’s” emulation, but he acknowledged things would be dif er ent if the 
“inferior group” hired its own applied anthropologists (134). Fischer compared 
the role of applied anthropology to that of past waves of American missionaries 
sent to proselytize in the undeveloped world, writing that he hoped “perhaps in 
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the present age  there would be some public support for anthropological ‘mis-
sionaries,’ who would however try to help dependent peoples hold, develop, 
and realize their own systems of values in the face of alien domination instead 
of imposing on them a foreign system” (134).
Douglas Haring rejected Embree’s critiques, declaring that he upheld “the 
right of native tribes to adopt civilized ways, and the right of any ethical  human 
being to encourage such adoption, especially if by education and experience 
he is fitted to foresee the probable extinction of natives who fail to make the 
change. This does not for a moment grant the right of superior military or po-
liti cal power to enforce such acculturation merely in the interest of power poli-
tics. If this be ethnocentrism, I accept the onus” (1951: 137).
But Jules Henry embraced Embree’s critique, adding his own attack on the 
dominance of personality and culture studies that focused on “studies of the 
 enemy” and pointing out how frequently  these studies found  enemy cultures 
to be “rigid,” “hypochondriacal,” “paranoid,” “neurotic,” or sufering from “mass 
megalomania” (1951: 134). Henry declared that “a study of ‘ enemy’ personality 
that finds the  enemy [to have a] diseased mentality is hardly worthy of scientific 
consideration” (135).
In December 1950, Embree was killed by a drunk driver, and thus he was unable 
to respond to  these comments; his death left American anthropology without a 
clear voice that could critically straddle the gap between Ivy League academia 
and governmental anthropology. Embree’s critique of the po liti cal realities of 
Cold War applied anthropology remained largely dormant for the next de cade 
and a half, and the rising po liti cal chill of McCarthyism provided incentives for 
anthropologists to develop other arguments (D. H. Price 2013b).3 Within this 
silence, the ubiquity of the dysfunctions identified by Embree came to be seen 
as normal features of  these interactions. Increasing numbers of anthropologists 
and bureaucrats working on  these projects internalized  these contradictions in 
ways that helped camouflage ethical and po liti cal shortcomings as inevitable 
parts of the workplace environment.
As Cold War global patron- client relations developed, the Pentagon and 
State Department supported new economic assistance programs. Some of  these 
provided agricultural or technological assistance,  others provided military aid, 
and some supplied both. During the first sixteen years  after World War II, sev-
eral agencies ( under both State and Defense, with names like the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (tca), the Mutual Security Agency (msa), and 
Point IV) distributed this aid, and anthropologists provided a steady supply of 
 labor for  these programs. The birth, life, and death of  these short- lived postwar 
assistance programs can best be understood in the context of a larger adminis-
trative evolutionary framework stretching from the creation of the Institute of 
Inter- American Afairs (iiaa) in 1942 to the establishment of the United States 
Agency for International Development (usaid) in 1961.
usaid’s Prehistory: Alphabet Soup, tca, msa, and  Others
In 1942, the Institute of Inter- American Afairs (1942–55) began as a war time 
agency collecting regional intelligence and providing economic and technical 
assistance to poorer nations of North and South Amer i ca.4 In Eu rope, the Mar-
shall Plan was overseen by the Economic Cooperation Administration (eca), an 
agency directed by both the Department of Commerce and the State Depart-
ment, though the eca’s charge and operations  were temporally limited to the 
years 1948–52, as specified war restorations ended and new agencies took up 
variations on  these initial postwar projects. Many of  these economic assistance 
programs  were elements of American counterinsurgency operations, broadly 
defined as practices designed to prevent uprising and to support the legitimacy 
or powerbase of existing regimes (see Price 2010a: 162).
As the Cold War developed, two new agencies emerged. The Technical Coop-
eration Administration (1950–53) delivered humanitarian technical assistance 
programs (Point IV) without direct military aid, while the Mutual Security 
Agency (1951–53) mixed technical assistance with military aid. Both programs 
developed in de pen dently  until po liti cal forces favored the creation of a single 
agency (into which the remains of iiaa, msa, and tca  were merged): the For-
eign Operations Administration (foa, 1953–55). The foa provided technical 
assistance and “mutual security activities” to po liti cally aligned nations — a shift 
that explic itly transformed the supposedly neutral aid of Point IV into a soft 
power Cold War weapon. The foa needed  people with anthropological skill 
sets to help implement  these assistance programs, and anthropologists contrib-
uted to foa projects in India and the Philippines (MacGregor 1955: 424).
In 1955, the International Cooperation Administration (ica, 1955–61) was 
formed as an agency administering nonmilitary assistance projects. Finally, the 
creation of usaid in 1961 established an agency that merged humanitarian as-
sistance and development assistance with what would develop as a broad range 
of counterinsurgency programs (figure 5.1).
The institutional evolution of agencies housing  these Cold War aid programs 
reveals congressional and executive ambivalence over which types and pro-
grams to fund, as well as connections between aid and raw Cold War politics. 
114 | C H A P T E R  F I V E
F I G U R E   5 . 1 .   The evolution of United States’ Cold War aid organizations: Agency for 
International Development (usaid, 1961– present), Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration (eca, 1952), Foreign Operations Administration (foa, 1953–1955), Institute of 
Inter- American Afairs (iiaa, 1942–1955), International Cooperation Administration 
(ica, 1955–1961), Mutual Security Agency (msa, 1951–1953), Technical Cooperation 
Administration (tca, 1950–1953) (Illustration, Nora Jean Price).
Establishing the iiaa during the war presented few po liti cal problems, espe-
cially  because it was overseen by Nelson Rocke fel ler, one of the world’s richest 
men, who at times mixed his own long- term financial interests with the interests 
of the institute. Creating the msa and tca, as two separate agencies, enabled 
the United States to spread military power and the appearance of humanitarian 
goodwill. The lack of po liti cal backing for Point IV as a relatively more neutral 
po liti cal tool demonstrated Amer i ca’s low commitment to soft power projects 
and nonmilitary aid during the period. With time, this evolution through tran-
sitional forms (foa and ica) led to the establishment of usaid as an agency 
supporting passive military- and diplomatically linked counterinsurgency op-
erations that  were extensions of U.S. international po liti cal agendas.
Point iv
In his 1949 inaugural speech, President Harry S. Truman announced a four- point 
plan for his administration. First,  there would be continuing support for the 
United Nations; second, the United States would support the postwar global eco-
nomic recovery; third, the United States would exhibit solidarity with the North 
Atlantic alliance; and fourth, the United States would “embark on a bold new pro-
gram for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman 
1949). The last item in this four- point plan, the commitment to global develop-
ment aid, came to be known as “Point IV,” and anthropologists  were soon identi-
fied as impor tant agents in its development. As historian Peter Mandler noted, 
Point IV “portended both opportunity and danger. On the surface the tremen-
dous opportunities opened up by Point IV gave at last a point of direct entry into 
postwar international politics for anthropologists interested and expert in the 
less- developed world. However, by blurring the boundaries between multilateral 
un programmes and bilateral US programmes, Point IV also had the potential to 
draw anthropologists who  were  either uninterested in or overtly hostile to Amer-
i ca’s interests overseas into compromising situations” (Mandler 2013: 262).
In 1949, the aaa established the Committee on Anthropology and Point IV, 
chaired by Gordon Willey and composed of Gordon Bowles, Wendell Bennett, 
John Embree, George Foster, and Frederick Johnson (aa 1951 [3]: 447, 449). Wil-
ley wanted to position the discipline so that once Congress funded Point IV, “an 
anthropologist [would] be appointed to the staf of the General Man ag er of Point 
IV, and  others be attached to Technical Cooperation Missions in  those countries 
where  there  will be sizable Point IV operations, and that still  others be attached 
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to action field projects dealing with fundamental education, public health, mater-
nal and child welfare, nutrition, irrigation and reclamation, housing and general 
industrialization” (aa 1950 52[1]: 155). The Smithsonian’s Institute of Social An-
thropology, with its war time roots and governmental connections, was seen as 
the logical point to coordinate anthropological contributions to Point IV, and 
George Foster was to facilitate  these links (isa Series 1, Box 1 “Resolution”).
Willey worked as a liaison with the State Department, and in May 1950 he 
began writing “a general anthropological indoctrination manual” to be used by 
Foreign Ser vice personnel (aa 1951 [3]: 448). The manual used anthropological 
perspectives to ease difficulties in culture contact. A month before his death, 
John Embree was appointed to work with the nrc and Point IV to oversee the 
production of a Point IV training manual, a task that was  later taken on by Con-
rad Arensberg (aa 1951 [3]: 449; aa 1952 [2]: 285).5
Gordon Willey’s report, titled “Anthropology and the Point IV Program,” 
described the value of anthropology’s relativistic outlook for Point IV and 
outlined how anthropologists working as members of academic teams with 
economists, agricultural technicians, and other experts could implement de-
velopment programs abroad. Willey envisioned anthropologists working as 
intermediaries, helping translate “native” viewpoints to Western developers; he 
provided hypothetical examples of ways that “native beliefs in the super natu-
ral nature of disease and its treatment by . . .  medicine” or traditional beliefs 
about agriculture could be mitigated by anthropologists taking active roles in 
the development pro cess (isa 1, 1, 9/22/49). He acknowledged that some an-
thropologists would be critical of linking research with such an overtly po liti-
cal proj ect, conceding that “scientific research which is administratively united 
to the applications of the results of the research stands always in [a] very real 
danger of having its objective investigative function warped by the administra-
tive outlook and desires” (isa 1, 1, 9/22/49). Willey argued against dismantling 
the isa or transforming it into an agency that was primarily devoted to Point 
IV. Instead, he recommended that a board of anthropologists (and the aaa’s 
executive secretary) with diverse geographic areas of expertise consult with a 
chief Point IV anthropologist (isa 1, 1, 9/22/49).6
The State Department’s tca, established in 1950, oversaw Point IV’s develop-
ment. The tca did not sponsor military aid, instead focusing on programs to 
transfer technology or agricultural techniques to underdeveloped nations. Sepa-
rate from the tca, but with some overlapping functions, was the msa, established 
in the following year), which provided both military and technical assistance to 
underdeveloped nations that  were of strategic interest to the United States.
A 1952 Point IV job advertisement in the News Bulletin of the aaa described 
Point IV assistant program officer position openings in South Asia, the Near 
East, and Africa. The ad, which sought applicants trained in cultural anthropol-
ogy, linked Point IV to past governmental projects drawing on anthropological 
expertise; it stated that “qualification for  these positions requires previous field 
experience with  people of two or more cultures, experience in the applied social 
science field, for example community analysts with War Relocation Authority, 
or teaching at the assistant or associate professor level” (nbaaa 1952 6[3]: 4). 
In general, anthropologists who supported Point IV publicly characterized it 
as a po liti cally neutral program. Elliot Chapple claimed that it “asked nothing 
in return” from the countries it would aid, unlike other programs such as the 
msa, which “operated on the  simple princi ple that in return for its cooperation 
it expected military assistance and po liti cal allegiance in the strug gle against 
communism” (Chapple 1953: 2).
Point IV was terminated in 1953,  after having enacted only pi lot projects in 
Iran, Israel, and Pakistan. Anthropologists held key positions, with H. Naulor, 
R. Minges, and R. C. Albers working on tca Point IV projects in Iran and K. 
Orr working on the early stages of a planned proj ect assisting Bedu in Jordan 
(MacGregor 1955: 424).
Walt Rostow and Cold War Theories of  
Global Development
Point IV’s po liti cal difficulties with Congress arose in part  because its support-
ers lacked a clearly articulated ideological justification for  these projects. Walt 
Rostow’s modernization theory  later became a prominent persuasive ideologi-
cal tool used by Cold War academics and policy makers to rationalize  these 
kinds of Third World economic interventions. It mattered  little how flawed 
Rostow’s theory was; it provided a useful rationalization for establishing valu-
able patron- client relationships of dependence, but such arguments  were not 
well developed in the early 1950s.
The Center for International Studies supported Rostow as he wrote numer-
ous articles and contributed to nine books that endorsed the strategic philoso-
phy  behind  these economic aid programs. A mixture of cia, Ford Foundation, 
and Rocke fel ler Foundation funds financed the development of arguments 
for using foreign aid as an arm of  U.S. policy. Rostow’s Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non- Communist Manifesto (1960) provided rationalizations for 
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development policies linked to American counterinsurgency strategies. Ros-
tow argued that the United States could  counter the spread of international 
communism by identifying and replicating the same historical stages that had 
occurred within American capitalism. In Rostow’s world, nations’ successful 
economic development progressed through four universal stages of capital-
ism: a traditional stage, a take- of stage, the drive to technological maturity, 
and high mass consumption. Modernization theory’s unilinear evolutionary 
schema maintained that if underdeveloped countries could progress through 
the same historical stages of economic development as had occurred in the 
West — with foreign aid accelerating their technological development — then 
prosperity would follow. Rostow envisioned an evolutionary progression for 
underdeveloped nations, culminating in their achievement of a lifestyle of 
high mass consumption; or, as Marshall Sahlins put it, Rostow was “among the 
first to perceive that the culmination of  human social evolution was shopping” 
(2000c: 504).
Modernization theory provided the intellectual veneer needed by policy 
makers seeking to rationalize neo co lo nial ventures, and the accompanying 
international economic programs became key components of U.S. Cold War 
counterinsurgency strategy. Rostow was but one of many postwar American 
social theorists who focused on “modernization”;  others who did so included 
Edward Shils, David Apter, Lucian Pye, Cyril Black, and Daniel Lerner, and 
even Talcott Parsons’s adaptations of Weberian notions of traditional and  legal 
rational authority  were rooted in analyses of socie ties mired in traditions that 
inhibited modernity. Nils Gilman observed that eforts by Parsons, Millikan, 
and Rostow to reinvent Weber as an optimistic supporter of development capi-
talism required some academic sleight of hand. Gilman noted, “Just as Marx 
used the Hegelian dialectic to read the economic history of mid- nineteenth- 
century Britain, so the modernization theorists used Parsonian theory to 
understand the postwar changes in impoverished parts of the regions” (2003: 
94). Rostow argued that the economic prosperity or poverty of nations could 
not be reduced to economics, and that prosperity could be engineered by rich 
nations providing technological infusions along with accompanying ideologi-
cal overhauls. Rostow’s materialist infusions of hardware provided the poor 
with new technologies — often sold  under interest- bearing loans — while call-
ing for ideological shifts channeling Norman Vincent Peale, as cultures needed 
to think themselves into modernity and prosperity.
As former colonial states in Africa and Asia gained in de pen dence, the attrac-
tions of socialism and communism for  people ravaged by northern imperialism 
 were obvious, and Rostow recognized the threat that decolonialization rep-
resented to American hegemony. Rostow argued that in the 1950s, global de-
colonialization and the rapid expansion of Chinese and the Soviet economic 
aid programs in Asia and Africa undermined American authority in would-
be client states, developments that could lead to the spread of communism. 
 Because of the necessary parallels to Leninist theories of imperialism Rostow 
was reluctant to directly critique the historically crippling efects of colonial 
imperialism. However, he advocated large- scale  U.S. economic assistance in 
the form of technological infusion programs to modernize agricultural or in-
dustrial pro cesses, or to bring improved roads or sanitization facilities. Cold 
War anthropologists and other social scientists often worked as foot soldiers, 
interacting with local populations, solving logistical problems, or getting “local 
buy-in” for development projects. Yet many of  these programs  were of the type 
 later excoriated by John Perkins in Confessions of an Economic Hitman (2004) 
as undertakings that delivered minimal goods or ser vices and established debts 
that  were used to manipulate domestic policies in client states.
In May 1952, Millikan and Rostow sent dci Dulles a memorandum titled 
“Notes on Foreign Economic Policy,” which argued that developed nations 
should invest in development projects in order to create a “higher real income 
[to]  every  free world citizen” (foia cia mori id 30405, 5/21/54, 1).7 They advo-
cated capturing underdeveloped economies as dependent allies in the strug gle 
between capitalists and socialists. They believed underdeveloped nations could 
be converted into consumers or producers of goods in ways benefiting devel-
oped nations. They identified two fundamental “weaknesses” in the current 
system of economic relationships. First, underdeveloped nations cannot sustain 
growth. Second, industrial nations lack a source for inexpensively produced 
goods, which “in the  free world economy, properly handled, could be con-
verted into assets: the underdeveloped areas need the products and markets the 
industrialized areas can supply; the industrialized areas need the markets and 
products of the underdeveloped countries” (foia cia mori id 30405, 5/21/54, 
6–7). Millikan and Rostow believed that “in the short run communism must be 
contained militarily. In the long run we must rely on the development . . .  of an 
environment in which socie ties which directly or indirectly menace ours  will 
not evolve. We believe the achievement of a degree of steady economic growth 
is an essential part of such an environment” (foia cia mori id 30405, 5/21/54, 3). 
They argued that the United States had “a par tic u lar responsibility in this re-
gard in view of its twofold position as the largest creditor country and as leader 
of the  free world partnership” (foia cia mori id 30405, 5/21/54, 17).
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Rostow’s work informed cia approaches to counterinsurgency. On March 15, 
1960, he wrote dci Dulles a memo predicting that at the Paris Summit that 
was to take place that May, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would make 
 grand gestures of ofering international aid. Rostow advised Dulles that the 
United States needed to be prepared with contingency plans and listed advan-
tages to the United States producing its own aid initiatives (foia WWR to AD, 
cia- rdp80B01676R003700040046–0).
 There was nothing hidden about the po liti cal role Rostow envisioned mod-
ernization theory playing in Amer i ca’s Cold War strug gle against communism. 
While Rostow subtitled his magnum opus A Non- Communist Manifesto, the 
governmental agencies initiating programs based on modernization theory’s 
propositions (such as usaid)  were seldom viewed as implementing counterin-
surgency programs. Many development anthropologists have been uncomfortable 
acknowledging Rostow’s ideological end goal for world development, instead 
preferring visions of Third World self- sufficiency that ignore development pro-
grams’ legacies of debt and their failures to live up to envisioned outcomes.
The United States was not the only superpower funding Cold War economic 
development and educational and cultural exchanges; the Soviet Union and 
the  People’s Republic of China launched their own programs. The cia worried 
that communist- financed aid programs presented serious soft power threats 
to American international dominance (see discussion of Edward S. Hunter in 
chapter 7). In its secret working paper titled “Soviet Policy  toward the Under-
developed Countries” (1961), the cia analyzed Soviet eforts to win the hearts 
and minds of the underdeveloped world and voiced fears of an impending aid 
race. Summarizing the Soviet Union’s eforts to expand its global influence 
through economic development projects, the cia noted a 1954 Soviet Institute 
of Ethnography symposium that focused on African “cultural achievements 
and po liti cal and economic developments.” The Soviet Africanists at the sym-
posium argued that Western policy for Africa was mired in racist assumptions 
and sought economic exploitation, whereas  these Soviet scholars “advanced an 
interpretation of African developments based on a ‘long and original path of 
historical development,’ of a past golden age which was destroyed by Western 
po liti cal and economic intrusion, and in general attributing to Western influ-
ence all negative features of African life” (cia 1961: 24).
A cia secret intelligence report titled “Communist Cultural and Propaganda 
Activities in the Less Developed Countries” (1966a) described two Nepalese 
cultural agreements with the Soviet Union. One program called “for the ex-
change of delegations, publications, exhibits, films, and radio programs” on an 
annual basis;  under this program, Nepal received a Soviet per for mance ensem-
ble, an exhibit of Soviet stamps, one lecturer, an exhibit of photography, and the 
ser vices of radio experts and “the USSR would receive an 18- member cultural 
del e ga tion, 25 Nepalese students, three literacy experts, and an exhibit of pho-
tography,” as well as exchanges of books and musical recordings, with most of 
the incurred costs being funded by the host nation (cia 1966a: 8). The cia re-
port detailed a similar exchange program between Nepal and China and noted 
that many of  these programs created financial difficulties for poorer nations as 
they strug gled to reciprocate (cia 1966a: 8); in  these struggles, the cia found 
opportunities for the United States to capitalize on  these hardships. American 
programs such as Fulbright Scholar Program (which had no cia links), as well 
as programs with cia links, established relationships similar to  those with the 
Soviets, but without requiring  these poorer nations to provide funds.
Dual Use Aid: usaid as Assistance and Counterinsurgency
 After the relatively rapid succession of short- lived international aid organizations 
(e.g., eca, msa, tca, foa, ica), at times clumsily mixing technical assistance 
and military aid, the establishment of the United States Agency for International 
Development (usaid) in 1961 marked a new era in international assistance. The 
range of Cold War usaid projects spanned agricultural improvement, technol-
ogy infusion, postharvest production transportation plans, irrigation improve-
ment, rural education, rural electrification, and road improvements to democ-
racy reform operations or police training programs. The diversity of projects, 
themes, motivations, and outcomes of thousands of usaid projects negates the 
possibility of isolating  simple themes that connect all the Cold War usaid proj-
ects to which anthropologists contributed.
Many of usaid’s Cold War era projects supported the general tenets of coun-
terinsurgency in its broadest definition.  These projects used soft power to sup-
port po liti cal regimes aligned with U.S. geopo liti cal interests, efectively using 
aid to pacify potential challenges to U.S. clients’ po liti cal legitimacy. Economic 
assistance programs became impor tant parts of  these schemes. From the per-
spective of dual use science, the individual motivations or ideologies of  the 
participating anthropologists mattered  little ( there  were  free- market capital-
ists, Marxists, and theorists who  were  little interested in par tic u lar projects 
but wanted access to the field):  these projects served larger counterinsurgency 
goals. Many of  these dynamics shifted with time; as Steve Weissman observed, 
as the Cold War developed,  there  were shifts in the ways that funds for foreign 
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aid as “a tool for instant counterinsurgency” moved from coming directly from 
usaid and other branches of the U.S. government to coming from multilateral 
agencies like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (1974: 15). From 
usaid’s earliest days, anthropologists contributed to projects that expressed 
humanitarian motivations and altruistic desires to improve the lives of  others, 
yet many anthropologists working on  these projects ignored the po liti cal con-
texts in which the projects  were embedded, which included leveraging the clients’ 
significant debt resulting from  these projects.
A now declassified cia executive memorandum from 1962 described a six- 
week training program in which the cia added a usaid counterinsurgency 
training course consisting of two weeks focusing on area studies and a special 
two- day course titled “Communist Theory, Communist Threat in Developing 
Countries, Soviet Economic Potential, Communist Global Propaganda, Un-
conventional Warfare, and Communism and  Free  Labor.” The cia reported 
that approximately seven hundred usaid personnel received this counterin-
surgency training each year and that “usaid intends to coordinate with fbi to 
determine where the program can be drawn in more direct counterinsurgency 
terms.”  Middle- grade usaid personnel attended a twenty- one- week course at 
Johns Hopkins University’s Institute for International Development or a simi-
lar program at Boston University’s African Area Studies Program. Stressing 
the central importance of counterinsurgency for usaid, the memo continued: 
“Nearly all of the major usaid training programs are in a terminal stage and 
set to be replaced or reviewed. In what ever substantive continued form, coun-
terinsurgency training  will be appropriately emphasized.” The memorandum 
mentioned usaid’s counterinsurgency operations training of foreign nationals 
through the Inter- American Police Acad emy and other U.S. training programs 
(foia cia- rdp80B01676R000100100032–7, 6/21/62).8
The cia and usaid combined forces to run the Office of Public Safety (ops), 
training po liti cal figures and paramilitary units around the world (see Blum 
1995: 200–206); in Vietnam,  these police training sessions taught aggressive para-
military techniques. During the 1960s and 70s, usaid’s oversight of the ops po-
lice training programs linked usaid with cia personnel. During the Vietnam 
War, soldier, strategist, and Kennedy Administration advisor Roger Hilsman 
and British counterinsurgency expert Robert Thompson trained special branch 
police units to establish counterinsurgency operations designed to monitor and 
control communist activities in the Viet nam ese countryside (Valentine 1990: 
73–75). Specially trained “policing” units  were the key components of this pro-
gram, acting as counterinsurgency operations’ eyes and ears; usaid was the 
administrative body publicly responsible for the program, and the policing 
program was run as a cia operation.
Anthropologists  were an enticing prospect for usaid functionaries looking 
for someone to interface between usaid and rural communities. They  were 
hired by usaid to work on projects such as Latin American science exchanges 
and as staf advisers for programs like the newly established Community De-
velopment Division (aaafn 1962 3(2): 1). Many anthropologists viewed  these 
programs as altruistic means of assisting poorer nations, yet views within the cia 
recognized other uses. The humanitarian face of usaid was an efective public 
distraction from the other roles usaid played in supporting cia eforts to dis-
rupt certain po liti cal developments. Eva Golinger described the impact of  these 
usaid eforts to subvert foreign elections:
One of the first documented misuses of usaid funds was during the early 1960s 
in Brazil. The cia was heavily involved in attempts to thwart João Goulart from 
succeeding in the Brazilian presidency  because he was viewed as a leftist who 
supported “social and economic reforms” that in the eyes of the cia had “com-
munism” written all over them. The cia and usaid spent approximately $20 mil-
lion to support hundreds of anti- Goulart candidates for gubernatorial elections 
in 1962. usaid was used as a cover to invest heavily in the Brazilian  labor move-
ment. The funds  were filtered through the international branch of the aflcio, 
then American Institute for  Free  Labor Development (aifld), now known as the 
American Center for International  Labor Solidarity (acils), and  were controlled 
on the ground by the cia. In 1964, President Goulart was overthrown by a cia- 
backed coup that resulted in a brutal US- sponsored dictatorship that lasted nearly 
twenty years.
In the 1980s, as part of the move  toward “demo cratic intervention” models, the 
State Department established the usaid Office of Demo cratic Initiatives, with 
the goal of supporting and “strengthening demo cratic institutions.” From 1984 to 
1987, usaid utilized that office to filter more than $25 million into electoral pro-
cesses in Latin Amer i ca. Although ned  later assumed similar operations, usaid 
has  continued to use the office, now known as the Office of Transition Initiatives 
(oti), to intervene in nations involved in crises that “threaten democracy.” usaid 
and the ned also overlap in funding initiatives for the iri and the ndi both core 
ned grantees. A large portion of usaid and ned funds are channeled into elec-
toral intervention eforts and civil society penetration. In the case of Venezuela, 
more than $20 million has been invested by usaid and ned since 2001 to foment 
conflict and instability in the name of “promoting democracy.” (2006: 21–22)
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In Chile in 1963, the cia and usaid cofunded anti- communist social programs 
or ga nized by Jesuit priest Roger Vekeman, shifting po liti cal forces in an efort 
to undermine Chilean democracy in  favor of American hegemony (Blum 1995: 
207–8).
In Southeast Asia, usaid’s counterinsurgency projects included agricultural 
development programs promoting economic stability or rewarding groups that 
 were working with the Americans and South Viet nam ese authorities. The “Land 
to the Tiller” (lttt) law supported counterinsurgency goals by providing  free 
land to farmers who  were willing to live on and farm lands in military zones, 
with difering amounts of land available in dif er ent regions (Newberry 1971: 1), 
and more land available for  those who actively cultivated rice (see Newberry 
1971; Russell 1971). As a counterinsurgency operation, lttt ofered tangible re-
wards to soldiers and families of soldiers aligned with the Americans, though it 
inverted the forms of “land reform” advocated by their communist opponents.
Control Data Corporation surveys mea sured  whether or not the lttt pro-
gram was taking lands away from the families of soldiers who  were serving 
in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (arvn), who  were fighting alongside 
the Americans. Most arvn soldiers supported the program, and other data 
showed that few of  these soldiers came from landowning families.  These re-
ports contained statistical breakdowns of comments by arvn soldiers and also 
included profiles of sample statements of  those interviewed. Many respondents 
complained that even with  family serving in the army, they still did not qualify 
for land (Newberry 1971: 18). But the law was popu lar among arvn soldiers, as 
Newberry concluded,  because “the consensus seems to be that lttt is the type 
of law no poor man could oppose” (26).
In a 1969 briefing on usaid activities and programs in Vietnam, Joseph 
Mendenhall, the usaid assistant administrator for Vietnam, summarized us-
aid’s mission in the region by highlighting the crucial counterinsurgency sup-
port role for the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(cords) paramilitary program. Mendenhall described usaid’s objectives not 
in the humanitarian language generally used in public discussions but in stra-
tegic military terms. Mendenhall stated that usaid continued
to support prosecution of the war and to mitigate the efects of the war on the 
 people and the economy of Vietnam. In this field which is primarily the field of the 
military of course — ours is not the primary role; ours is the supporting role, but 
it is nevertheless an impor tant one. About twenty  percent of the funds that  we’re 
seeking in the Fiscal Year 1970 are for programs that are directly connected with 
the war efort, with the military conflict — that is refugees, medical care, pacifica-
tion and police. In addition, more than fifty  percent of the funding that  we’re seek-
ing in Fiscal Year ’70  will be spent on combating the inflationary pressure which 
is brought about as a result of the military conflict and the very heavy military 
expenditures in the Viet nam ese bud get.
The second objective is that we seek through economic and social development 
assistance to strengthen the non- communist po liti cal forces in South Vietnam. 
(1969: 1–2)
Mendenhall emphasized the importance of usaid’s mission as an ele ment of 
counterinsurgency strategy that was “necessary to improve living conditions 
in the poorer quarters in the urban areas to help prevent the communists from 
gaining a toehold  there” (3). He said that usaid’s goal was to essentially work 
itself out of a job as South Vietnam reached economic stability in in de pen dence, 
but he assured his internal audience that significant levels of foreign aid would 
be needed to maintain stability for a de cade  after an armistice (4). He summa-
rized usaid’s work to resettle the four million Viet nam ese who became home-
less during the war, especially  after the 1968 military ofensive, spending more 
than $60 million on vari ous refugee projects (4, 6).
The involvement of cords in village relocation programs linked with the 
Strategic Hamlet Program and other counterinsurgency operations was exten-
sive, with usaid providing $25 million a year for Vietnam in the late 1960s; 
the military provided about six thousand individuals working on cords, with 
usaid supplying one thousand cords advisers (Mendenhall 1969: 10). Along 
with a national id card program, the police’s role included “the campaign for 
eliminating the Viet- Cong po liti cal infra- structure at the village and hamlet 
level,” a polite phrase that allowed Mendenhall to gloss over the bloody tactics 
used by Viet nam ese cia operatives to “eliminate” such Vietcong operations, as 
well as eforts to block the flow of arms from the Vietcong (10).
Mendenhall described the discomfort of some usaid workers in rural prov-
inces as they came to understand the contradictions of having “two bosses,” one 
being the humanitarian calling of working on issues like public health, the other 
being cords’s military links, with cords necessarily trumping such conflict-
ing dual use needs (1969: 27). Mendenhall optimistically reported on the suc-
cesses and popularity of new high- yield rice va ri e ties, arguing that agricultural 
development in Vietnam was a mea sure of stability and ofered the promise of 
peace in the war- torn land (16–18). With the help of anthropologists and other 
aid workers, development, economic assistance, agrochemistry, debt, and de-
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pen dency became tools of waging war by other means, as wars in Asia and 
Africa became opportunities to expand development’s patronage of hope, with 
 little accounting for usaid’s serial failures. When it came to international de-
velopment schemes, failure was a marketable commodity that sold itself with 
built-in financing.
seadag: usaid’s Soft Power War Brain
In 1966, usaid established the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group 
(seadag), which funded conferences, publications, and research opportunities 
that helped scholars of Asia from a variety of disciplines to address Asian devel-
opment issues. This group’s parent organizations  were usaid and the Rocke fel-
ler Foundation– funded Asia Society (seadag 1969: vii). To stimulate research 
that would be of use to U.S. governmental development agencies, seadag fos-
tered communication between scholars and government officials. Its network 
of scholars and officials freely exchanged information relating to Southeast 
Asian development. The group avoided using the word “counterinsurgency” 
in its documents, though with the central importance of the period’s Southeast 
Asian wars, counterinsurgency was the reason for undertaking many of the 
development- related research projects funded by seadag.9
Each year, seadag or ga nized three topical seminars and reimbursed par-
ticipants for related expenses (seadag 1969: ix). With funds from Rocke fel ler 
and usaid, seadag seminars  were held in enticing locations (such as Hawaii) 
where academics could relax and usaid personnel could benefit from their 
expertise (see seadag 1969: ix).10 The United States Agency for International 
Development played a central role in setting the agenda for  these seminars 
and also directed “ad hoc meetings” when problems arose that needed specific 
consultation.
The relationships between seadag, the Asia Society, and usaid blurred in-
stitutional boundaries in ways that bypassed normal peer review pro cesses and 
connected university scholars with the needs of state. An overview of seadag 
activities in the late 1960s reported that “the Asia Society initiated an aid- 
funded program of research grants through seadag, and recommended to aid, 
 after a large number of proposals from vari ous sources had been screened by 
appropriate seminars and then by a Screening Committee of eminent schol-
ars from outside the seadag organizations structure — according to criteria of 
evaluation established by the Executive Committee. A final approval by aid of 
 these grants  will be made directly to researchers and  will be administered by 
the Asia Society” (seadag 1969: x). On the surface, this appeared like a normal 
academic conglomeration bringing together groups of scholars through a gen-
erous funding source, but the flow of funds, proposals, and screening occurred 
within a small circle of actors with shared po liti cal concerns.
Through  these procedures, seadag facilitated the distribution of peer- reviewed 
proposals, and while the three separate administrative bodies (usaid, Asia Soci-
ety, and seadag) each technically played a separate role, they functioned as 
one, and the conflicts of interests between them narrowed seadag’s range of 
vision and short- circuited an impartial peer review pro cess. This community of 
scholars linked public (usaid) and private (Rocke fel ler’s Asia Society) groups in-
terested in Southeast Asian research that could inform American policies in Asia. 
Some scholars applying for  these funds met at meetings sponsored by usaid or 
the Asia Society, where participants learned which research topics  were being 
funded. Although almost every one involved scrupulously avoided stating it as 
such, counterinsurgency was a thread connecting many of  these projects.
With the rise of Rostow’s modernization theory, the mea sur able outcomes 
for development often had  little to do with improving the lot of underdevel-
oped nations per se; development aid was a weapon against communism, a tool 
to be used against insurgents. In the context of the wars of Southeast Asia, aid 
became a tool of the power ful against the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). 
In the mid-1960s, anthropological research became increasingly connected to 
counterinsurgency theory. In his seadag paper titled “Po liti cal Consequences 
of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia” (1967), Guy Pauker described 
the Indonesian massacres of 1965–66 as arising from “overcrowded rural areas” 
due to recent rapid population growth, while “the peasant- cultivated area was 
enlarged by only 11   percent,” resulting in high population densities of about 
two thousand  people per square kilo meter (1967: 1–2). Pauker conceded that 
earlier work on agricultural involution by his protégé Cliford Geertz described 
a pro cess that “had probably already gone as far it could” (2). Pauker analyzed 
the successes of the pki (Indonesian Communist Party) in terms of taking ad-
vantage of  these economic and demographic crises by “inciting the poor and 
landless peasants” (2), and he used Geertzian and Parsonian theory to analyze 
the background of the pki’s insurgent tactics:
If the Javanese village — as Cliford Geertz describes it — lacked structural solidity 
and traditional resiliency and was therefore open to penetration by ideologically 
based structure originating in supra- village po liti cal life, the unilateral action of 
the pki and bti must have introduced or in any case sharpened social conflicts in 
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the village. A population which was delicately matching agricultural output with 
population growth by a complex pattern of land owner ship rotation systems, com-
munal work requirements, elaborate reciprocal  labor lending customs, sharply 
defined rights to work on one’s relatives’ land . . .  [etc.] — in short, the pattern of 
response to a worsening economic situation through a division of the economic 
pie into smaller and smaller pieces — which Cliford Geertz has so aptly called 
“shared poverty”— was bound to experience greatly enhanced tensions as the re-
sult of “unilateral action” and the ensuing violent clashes. (2–3)
Pauker theorized that the killing of several hundred thousand individuals in the 
uprisings of 1965–66 was caused by a “disruption of village solidarity” brought 
about by the pki and bti’s “unilateral action” (3). Geertz’s images of the social 
forces guiding village life  were used to explain the massacre, hypothesizing that 
 these individuals  were identified by villagers as “trou ble- makers” and labeled as 
“Communists.” When it was time to deal with them, the other villagers did so in 
what Pauker described as “the Javanese way,” which was, “as Geertz graphically 
puts it — is to ‘do all things quietly, subtly, politely, and communally — even 
starve,’  these individuals acted in stark contrast with local custom. [The pki- 
and bti- linked local insurgents] had therefore made themselves not just en-
emies of the more prosperous elements in the village, in a class- conflict sense, but 
enemies of the community as a  whole, whose ancient ways they  were disrupting. I 
suspect that  these considerations, more than genuinely ideological controversies, 
may have been the decisive  factor  behind the killings” (3). Embracing moderniza-
tion’s central talisman, namely, bioengineered rice va ri e ties, Pauker advocated for 
further reliance on high- yield rice to bring peace through increased food produc-
tion and theorized coming reductions in population levels.
Anthropologist Terry Rambo’s doctoral research in Ca- Mau on Viet nam ese 
peasant social systems was funded by seadag (see Rambo 1973). On the sur-
face, the published version of Rambo’s dissertation reads like a typical early-
1970s ecological anthropology dissertation. The lit er a ture he addressed cited 
Leslie White, Julian Steward, Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, Andrew Vayda, 
Roy Rappaport, Eric Wolf, Elman Ser vice, and other leading ecological anthro-
pologists of the period, yet his analy sis also had clear po liti cal applications to 
the Vietnam War. Rambo analyzed the evolution of social organ ization in the 
northern Red River region and the lower Mekong Delta, “with the Northerners 
constituting a closed corporate peasantry and the Southerners being an open 
peasantry” (1973: 362). Rambo argued  these variations in social structure fol-
lowed adaptations to dif er ent ecological niches: in the North, the fundamental 
unit of social structure was the “corporate village,” while in the South, it was the 
“nuclear  family.” Diferences in population density (lower in the South, higher 
in the North) followed dif er ent subsistence strategies (cash crop rice in the 
South, a more mixed economy in the North), and diferences in exchange types 
(vertical in the South, horizontal in the North) led to dif er ent levels of spe-
cialization (high in the South, lower in the North) and fundamentally dif er ent 
forms of social organ ization (Rambo 1973: 362).
Rambo speculated on  whether Edmund Leach’s pendulum model of gumsa 
and gumlao shifts explained  these dif er ent structures, or  whether some other 
form of cyclical evolution or linear evolutionary model was at work (1973: 363–69), 
with more applied reports to usaid and seadag exploring how  these shifts 
might relate to exposures to the Vietcong. Rambo and Neil Jamieson (1973: 35–46) 
used Florence Kluckhohn’s value orientation scale to mea sure communist- 
linked shifts in social structure. Rambo’s theoretical analy sis engaged with the 
ecological cultural evolutionary anthropology of his day, but he avoided ad-
dressing the po liti cal realities of war impacting the  people he studied, as well 
as the reasons that seadag and usaid funded his, and  others’, fieldwork. The 
ethnographic present created by Rambo was an ecological laboratory without 
po liti cally active sponsors or Viet nam ese deaths complicating his eforts to 
mea sure, model, and explain Viet nam ese social structure.
While much of the social science research funded by seadag was linked 
to development projects designed to bring stabilizing counterinsurgency ends 
(for example, anthropologist Jasper Ingersoll’s work on the Nam Pong Proj ect 
in northeast Thailand), seadag also funded more critical progressive or radi-
cal work, including that of antiwar critics (e.g., Ingersoll 1968; Scott 1975). By 
funding a range of po liti cal work, seadag exemplified the broad Cold War 
funding strategy successfully used by public and private organizations to gen-
erate knowledge, even extremely critical knowledge. In financing scholarship 
that could at least in part inform military and civilian policy in Southeast Asia, 
seadag got what it paid for, but it also sponsored critiques and radical analy sis 
not to the liking of many policy makers.
usaid and “The  Family Jewels”
When news of the cia’s “ Family Jewels” report was released in 1974 (see chap-
ter 1), the public first learned of the cia using usaid for a range of clandestine 
operations. The report included a folder (on pages  594–609) relating to the 
cia’s  Counter Intelligence Staf, Police Group (ci/pg). The ci/pg maintained a 
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“liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development 
(ops/aid) and its training fa cil i ty, the International Police Acad emy (ipa)” 
(cia 1973: 597). The cia coordinated daily information exchanges with USaid, 
including information on training programs and “arranging for ipa/ops aid 
briefings and tours for foreign police/security representative sponsored by cia 
Area Divisions” (597).
“The  Family Jewels” included a memo by cia counterintelligence specialist 
James Angleton explaining how usaid supported foreign cia operations. As 
Angleton wrote:
■■■■■ [redacted, but likely “The cia”] does not maintain direct contact or li-
aison with any law enforcement organ ization, local or federal at home or 
abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by 
■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ [likely “usaid”] has such contacts at home and 
abroad  because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security 
personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. 
■■■■■■■  has such contacts at home — local and federal level —  because its person-
nel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United 
States. Members of the ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■  have appeared as guest lecturers at 
such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, ipa, the U.S. Secret Ser vice, and 
the U.S. Trea sury Enforcement Division. (cia 1973: 599)
Angleton described Dan Mitrione as “a bona fide ops/aid officer assigned to 
the aid mission in Uruguay, and was never a cia employee or agent” (599). 
Mitrione was a usaid “policing” specialist who worked with the cia to teach 
South American anticommunists the arts of interrogation and torture,  until 
he was kidnapped and murdered by the Tupamaros while working on a usaid 
assignment in Uruguay, advising Uruguayan police on the use of torture tech-
niques when conducting interrogations. Mitrione was the shadowy archetypal 
American torturer, providing the basis for the Philip Michael Santore character 
in Costa- Gavras’s film State of Siege (1973) (Norman 2005).
Angleton also described a joint cia- usaid training program for foreign law 
enforcement personnel in which cia personnel taught counterterrorism tac-
tics, techniques for making booby traps, methods for neutralizing explosives, 
and so forth. Angleton indicated that the course had “26 participants from ten 
(10) foreign countries. Nine (9) are financed by aid, eight (8) by cia and nine 
(9) by their own governments” (cia 1973: 601). The cia estimated that about 
seven hundred foreign police officers received training each year in this cia/
usaid program (602). “The  Family Jewels” included portions of a chapter by 
James R. Schlesinger (“Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade”) in which he 
argued that foreign aid could be used for policy leverage (J. R. Schlesinger 1963, 
reproduced in cia 1973: 608).
Other cia sources detail how usaid worked with the cia during the Cold 
War. William R. Johnson, a cia veteran, described usaid missions as a “major 
source of information” providing intelligence directly from in- country sources 
(1976: 50; see also 63–64, 66). Victor Marchetti and John Marks described how 
during the 1960s and 1970s in Laos and Vietnam, the cia’s “Clandestine Ser-
vices had a fairly clear idea of how many local tribesmen  were in its pay, but the 
operators  were never quite certain of the total number of mercenaries they  were 
financing through the agency’s numerous support programs, some of which 
 were fronted for by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International 
Development, and, of course, the cia proprietary, Air Amer i ca” (1974: 87).
Several former cia employees  later described the agency’s close relationship 
with usaid in the 1960s and 1970s, with dci Helms testifying before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 that the cia had used usaid as cover for 
operations in Laos (Marchetti and Marks 1974: 90; Prados 1986: 292). Former 
cia agent Philip Agee (1975: 264) detailed how usaid functioned as a front 
for cia work in Ec ua dor in the 1960s. Marchetti and Marks described a cia 
employee who sometimes “posed as an official of the Agency for International 
Development to entrap unsuspecting [National Student Association] officers, 
revealing his ‘cover’ only  after extracting pledges of secrecy and even [National 
Student Association] commitments to cooperate with specific cia programs” 
(1974: 77).11 Ted Shackley, a cia operative, described how in the 1960s, the cia 
in Southeast Asia worked with the usaid on counterinsurgency operations, 
at times transferring cia funds to usaid for needed projects (Shackley and 
Finney 2005: 108–9). In other instances, Shackley took locals who had been 
hired by usaid to work on agricultural development projects and used them to 
gather intelligence for the cia; in one instance he relocated them from work-
ing on vegetable gardens to working as “trail watchers” gathering cia intel-
ligence (Corn 1994: 144–45). Sometimes, cia pi lots operating illegally in Laos 
 were paid through usaid contracts; by the early 1970s, usaid had provided 
Air Amer i ca with more than $83 million for chartered flights (Blum 1995: 142; 
Marchetti and Marks 1974: 168).
At times usaid was a channel used to secretly fund cia- supported programs. 
The CIA used usaid as cover when funding their agent Tony Poe in Laos, and 
cia operations in Laos depended on networks maintained by usaid (Branf-
man 1975: 57–58, 64). During the 1960s, Sam Wilson, chief of usaid’s Pacifica-
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tion Program in Vietnam, used his USaid position to coordinate elements of 
the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (also known as icex) 
assassination program linked to cords and the Phoenix Program (Trento 2001: 
339). In 1963, usaid began oversight of the cia’s Viet nam ese defector program 
(named Chieu Hoi, “open arms”), which combined field recruitment tech-
niques with po liti cal indoctrination (Valentine 1990: 51). While employed by 
usaid in the late 1960s, John Paul Vann, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant col o nel, 
helped oversee the U.S. military’s cords counterinsurgency program designed 
to pacify re sis tance in South Vietnam (Milne 2008: 2004). A 1967 address by 
cia officer Richard Bissell to the Council on Foreign Relations described the 
cia’s reliance on public and private institutions to provide “deep cover” for 
agency operations. Bissell described the use of nonsecret “exchange- of- persons 
programs” through which foreigners are exposed to American ideas. Among 
the organizations involved in  these open exchanges was usaid, and at times 
the cia was also secretly involved in  these exchanges. In a passage originally 
redacted by cia censors but restored in their published book, Marchetti and 
Marks explained, “On occasion, the agency [i.e., cia]  will sponsor the training 
of foreign officials at the facilities of another government agency. A favorite site 
is aid’s International Police Acad emy in Washington. The acad emy is operated 
by aid’s Public Safety (police) Division, which regularly supplies cover to cia 
operators all over the world. And the cia takes advantage of exchange pro-
grams to recruit agents” (1974: 81).
Frank Wisner, chief of the cia’s Office of Policy Coordination (the CIA’s co-
vert action division), at times used usaid to direct funds to foreign students 
attending universities in the United States,  under an operation through which 
the cia would  later establish contacts with students the agency hoped would 
return home and assume positions of power. William Corson, a retired marine 
lieutenant col o nel and a onetime deputy director of the Southeast Asia Intel-
ligence Force,  later claimed that many of  these students  were “ ‘recruited’ by 
blackmail and coercive techniques”— though further evidence of this claimed 
practice is lacking (1977: 310–11).
The Agency for International Development functioned in tandem with the cia 
so well that  after the cia was caught in 1967 secretly passing funds to the afl- cio 
in order to “create  counter- revolutionary  labor movements in  under- developed 
countries,” usaid publicly carried on what had previously been the cia’s covert 
role in this operation (Greider 1969, A1). The cia had formerly used the An-
drew Hamilton Fund (a cia front) to finance the Granary Fund, which acted as 
a conduit to pass money to Retail Clerks International to finance cia- backed 
international  labor programs, and usaid took up this cia work without dif-
ficulty. According to William Greider, writing for the Washington Post, “This 
‘union to  union’ diplomacy, ‘uninhibited by formal Governmental relations,’ 
as one aid official explained, is just the sort of  thing which the Central Intel-
ligence Agency used to pay for secretly — before the cia’s cover was blown [in 
1967] and it had to abandon its network of dummy foundations” (1969, A1). 
The cia, and  later usaid, backed  labor  unions not  because the capitalists it pro-
tected wanted  labor  unions but  because they  were a useful tool to agitate its 
communist enemies.
Gifts of Coercion
A half de cade  after the Church and Pike congressional investigations docu-
mented multiple connections between usaid and intelligence agencies,  Father 
George Cotter, a Maryknoll Catholic priest who had worked for years on hu-
manitarian projects in Latin Amer i ca and East Africa, described the interac-
tions between humanitarian development projects, usaid, and the cia that 
he had witnessed during the Cold War. Cotter observed that cia agents rarely 
visited missionaries in the field, instead establishing contact through the non-
governmental organizations with which missionaries worked. He described 
the connections between humanitarian- based missionaries, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, and intelligence agencies as “silken threads which grow into 
strings. With such strings, spies can fish out sensitive information about lead-
ers” in regions that  were of special interest to the cia and  others (Cotter 1981: 
324). Cotter wrote that his curiosity led him
to learn about sources of funds for mission work, I spent two years visiting private 
voluntary organizations (pvos) in Eu rope, Canada and the United States. Many 
directors of American organizations told me they had received government grants. 
 These grants enabled the pvos to fund certain types of church work. During  these 
years I also attended a course given by usaid on how to write proj ect proposals, 
and I studied usaid’s practices. Around this time I learned that its administrator, 
John Gilligan, had said that the agency had served as a sort of gradu ate school for 
cia agents. “At one time, many aid field offices  were infiltrated from top to bottom 
with cia  people,” he said. “It was pretty well known in the agency who they  were 
and what they  were up to. . . .  The idea was to plant operatives in  every kind of 
activity we had overseas, government, volunteer, religious,  every kind.” His state-
ments startled me. (321)
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 Father Cotter understood that  because some American humanitarian groups 
received funds from usaid, their reports made the groups they assisted legible 
to usaid, and through usaid, this information was passed along to the cia 
(321–22). He described usaid as “the cia’s  little sister” (323), and he worried that 
 those working on humanitarian and assistance projects  were being “plugged 
into an information network that starts with the U.S. government and to which 
the cia is connected” (322).
Cotter also understood that the cia valued missionaries  because, like anthro-
pologists, they tended to “spend years working with grass- roots  people and help-
ing the unfortunates among them, they win trust and confidence.  People  will 
tell them about their hopes and fears, about village happenings, and about what-
ever  there is of interest. They learn who are the most promising leaders, what are 
the region’s problems, and they are often given access to  people and areas closed 
to most outsiders. This is the information wanted by the cia, and wanted in 
steadily flowing streams” (Cotter 1981: 323–24). While groups such as Anthro-
pologists for Radical Po liti cal Action (see chapter  13) developed critiques of 
military- linked anthropological projects, at times singling out usaid projects 
directly linked to war zone counterinsurgency operations, during the Cold War, 
American anthropologists  were slow to develop such broad critiques of the ways 
that modernization theory, usaid, and other development projects directly 
and indirectly connected with the cia and Cold War politics.
Modernization theory provided a philosophical justification for hundreds of 
development projects in which anthropologists played supportive roles on the 
ground. This work seldom required anthropologists to critically evaluate the 
successes or failures of their projects: they simply needed to complete assigned 
work in a well- funded bureaucratic pro cess of institutional self- replicating reifi-
cation. Some applied anthropologists found themselves serving as cheerleaders 
of progress, or working as apologists for the failures of the Green Revolution, 
facilitating evacuations of indigenous peoples in the way of hydraulic projects, 
acting as brokers for overpriced irrigation or technology transfer projects, or 
advising the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or major corporations 
interested in “developing” new markets and sources of (or dumping ground 
for) goods in the Third World. Perhaps the most mea sur able outcome of mod-
ernization theory’s development projects was underdeveloped nations’ posture 
of alignment — through debt and policy control, not Rostow’s claimed goals of 
economic development (see Frank 1997; Ross 1998a; D. H. Price 2007a).
The national debts created by many of modernization theory’s development 
projects had a greater societal impact than the intended demographic, social, 
health, economic, or agricultural benefits. Development strategies built on debt 
damaged the autonomy and health of underdeveloped nations as the creditors 
set and manipulated national policies, ranging from setting food prices to de-
termining debtor nations’ military policies. As Eric Ross states in his analy sis 
of Cold War applied anthropology’s Vicos proj ect in Peru, that proj ect was “far 
more productive for the discipline (and its need for professional status) than it 
has been — and should have been — for  those it studied” (2011: 149).
While development, modernization, and usaid brought anthropologists 
working on international projects into the cia’s orbit of influence, the Cold War 
also brought other, more direct, connections between anthropologists and the 
cia, as some anthropologists made careers working within the cia.
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On Christmas Day, 1966, anthropologist Elizabeth Bacon wrote Ralph Beals a 
letter containing the following short historical overview:
Before World II, the  U.S. had  little in the way of intelligence for limited 
activities of the Army and Navy. Even the State Department had no resi-
dent representatives in some areas, relying on British or other consular and 
diplomatic officers to care for the occasional American traveler. With U.S. 
entry into World War II, U.S. interest became global. The State Department 
opened legations where it had had none before, and raided the universities 
for area specialists to staff the Washington office. The first attempt at or ga-
niz ing an information agency, coi (Coordinator of Information), proved too 
cumbersome, and was divided to form owi (Office of War Information), a 
propaganda agency, and oss (Office of Strategic Ser vices).
oss had five branches: r&a (Research and Analy sis); si (Secret Intelligence); 
and three cloak and dagger branches whose exploits have been widely 
 publicized, most recently by Allen Dulles’ new book. si, the fact- gathering 
branch, and r&a, the analy sis branch, worked together quite closely; they 
had no contacts with the cloak and dagger branches. At the end of the war, 
r&a was taken over by State, where it became oir (Office of Intelligence 
Research). si and the cloak and dagger branches formed the basis of cia 
(Central Intelligence Agency).
The dangers of subordinating fact- gathering to planners conditioned by ex-
perience and temperament to daredevil exploits are obvious. The imbalance 
was accentuated by the fact that most of the r&a  people did not remain with 
oir. A majority returned to academia;  others transferred to other govern-
mental departments where research was less subject to the vagaries of po liti-
cal crises. Not surprisingly, cia flowed in oir to fill the vacuum.
For example, it had been discovered during the war, in areas not involved in 
fighting, that much useful intelligence could be obtained openly more readily 
than secretly.  After the war, a new type of post was established in the State 
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Department, that of research attaché. This, as far as I know, worked well 
enough. No government would object to a research attaché any more than 
it would object to a military attaché. But when the Eisenhower administra-
tion came into office, with John Foster Dulles [as] Secretary of State, and 
adventure- minded brother Allen head of cia, this position was abolished 
“for economy reasons.” This, of course, meant turning over to cia the open 
fact- gathering activities which State was trying to develop. The present resi-
dent cia agent in Af ghan i stan is presumably  doing the work of research at-
taché. If he had that title,  there would be no prob lem. Instead, he operates 
 under three academic covers (one a front organ ization, the other two bona 
fide academic institutions), and proclaims himself an anthropologist at the 
top of his voice.
 . . .  With the vast expansion of intelligence activities during World War II, 
 there was an urgent need for personnel with real experience. The  people 
who had this background and  were able to use it effectively  were to a consid-
erable extent academics and other professionals. At the end of the war one 
might have expected a program to train professional operatives who, with 
varied covers, could  settle in a country and blend into the landscape. Instead, 
the emphasis seems to be on “quickie” operations, to get information on areas 
where the need is immediate, using the easiest cover that comes to mind.
 There have, of course, been training programs usually with the emphasis on 
language. You  will perhaps remember the number of special language train-
ing programs for “businessmen and government officials” that burgeoned 
among the universities  after World War II.  There are still plenty of intensive 
programs for “exotic” languages (vide the last acls Newsletter for next sum-
mer’s programs). It would be in ter est ing to discover what proportions of the 
students enrolled in such programs are casuals — that is, not gradu ate stu-
dents planning to specialize in an area or teach languages.
Before World War II,  there  were very few area programs in the U.S. The Army 
astp during the war gave  great impetus to area studies, and  after the war a 
number of area programs  were established in universities around the coun-
try. Also the Ford Foundation set up its program for Foreign Area Training. 
In some universities the area programs  were presumably set up on the initia-
tive of university personnel. In  others, it seems likely that cia provided the 
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initiative. I suspect this of one university, and consider it pos si ble that the 
ucla  Middle East Center may have this background.
 . . .  To sum up, cia is conducting its intelligence operations as if it  were a 
cloak and dagger organ ization in war time and seems never to have adjusted 
to the normal peacetime pattern of other countries, of trained professional 
agents located permanently at strategic locations. Instead, it seems to be 
 going in for “saturation coverage,” sending every one it can find into strategic 
areas. For years, the proliferation of cia and psychological warfare  people 
in Bangkok has been notorious. In Saigon  there are bars patronized only 
by cia operatives. And  these operatives are so obvious that every one knows 
who they are. I have heard the same stories of obviousness from parts of 
Africa. . . .  
Anthropological research is certainly being endangered by the activities of 
cia. (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66)
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Most of the knowledge of the outside world that the cia collects it collects by  
social- science research methods, that is, through reading newspapers, listening  
to radio broadcasts, and asking  people questions. Social research including area 
studies, history, anthropology, sociology, po liti cal science, and statistics provides  
both impor tant inputs and impor tant knowledge of methods of analy sis to the 
intelligence community. The cia, as its name implies, should be the central  
social research organ ization to enable the federal government to  
understand the socie ties and cultures of the world.
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S I X   C O L D  WA R  
A N T H R O P O L O G I S T S  AT  T H E  C I A
Careers Confirmed and Suspected
To understand how some American anthropologists came to work for the cia 
during the early Cold War, it is necessary to consider anthropologists’ war time 
experience and to disentangle what the Cold War became from what it appeared 
to be to  those living through its earliest days. From the present we can see dis-
tinct diferences between Amer i ca’s World War II fight against totalitarianism 
and Cold War Amer i ca’s increasing support for neo co lo nial ism, but for many 
who had served in military or intelligence capacities during the war, the nation’s 
shifts in postwar international po liti cal orientation was invisible.
For anthropologists who served in the Office of Strategic Ser vices, Office of 
War Information, G2, or other war time intelligence agencies,  later being ap-
proached by the cia for debriefings upon returning from fieldwork in foreign 
lands, or joining the agency, often seemed like a natu ral extension of war time 
work. While anthropologists’ interactions with the cia raise significant ethical 
questions  today, the steps that led postwar anthropologists to  these engage-
ments raised few concerns at the time. During the earliest transitions from hot 
to cold war, news of  these decisions by anthropologists and  others to join the 
cia often remained public.
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One New York Times article from 1950 announcing recipients of grant awards 
from the Guggenheim Fund listed “Dr. Edward Wyllys Andrews 4th, division 
chief, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington. Early Maya archaeology in 
northern Yucatan” as the recipient of one of three anthropological/archaeologi-
cal awards that year (nyt 1950: 15). In 1948, a “News of the Members” column 
in the News Bulletin of the aaa carried the following entry: “James Andrews 
left Cambridge late in December, 1947 to join the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Washington. For more than a year prior to that time he had been in charge of 
the Anthropometric Laboratory, Department of Anthropology, Harvard Uni-
versity, in which 50,000 separatees are being somatotyped for the Quartermaster 
Corps  under direction of E. A. Hooton” (nbaaa 1948 2[2]: 27).1 This same issue 
of the News Bulletin announced that Eugene Worman was leaving the Univer-
sity of Chicago for the cia (nbaaa 1948 2[2]: 30). In  later years, anthropologists 
who moved in and out of the cia did so quietly, without public announcements 
or fanfare. Some anthropologists moved between the agency and the acad emy; 
 others moved between the agency and private consulting or research positions.
Several archaeologists and cultural anthropologists established careers within 
the cia, ofering valuable skill sets ranging from aptitudes for envisioning 
complex systems from sample data sets to analytical linguistic skills that  were 
needed for translation or cryptographic work. Richard Hallock, an archaeolo-
gist trained at the University of Chicago, used skills he had developed in trans-
lating dead languages in his work on deciphering Soviet encrypted venona 
intercepts. During the 1950s, Waldo Dubberstein left a  career in archaeology to 
work as a cia intelligence analyst, though he  later became embroiled in scandal 
for his associations with former cia agent turned arms dealer Edwin P. Wilson, 
who was convicted in 1983 of arms smuggling, specifically, shipping twenty tons 
of plastic explosives to Libya (Ayres 1983).2
Archaeologist Richard Francis Strong Starr served in the Office of Naval In-
telligence during the war;  after the war, he became a research specialist on the 
 Middle East at the State Department and the cia (Saxon 1994). The cia ofered 
anthropologist Charlotte Gower job opportunities that  were rare for  women in 
the postwar years (Lepowsky 2000).3 William Sidney Stallings Jr. worked for 
years as a dendrochrologist at the Laboratory of Anthropology in Santa Fe,  later 
joining the cia’s Photographic Intelligence Division, where his group identified 
the Rus sian missiles at the heart of the Cuban missile crisis (Browman and Wil-
liams 2013: 425).
Sometimes, spousal cia connections brought travel or research opportunities. 
Marjory Cline, a longtime research editor at the National Geographic Society, 
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was married to cia employee Ray S. Cline and accompanied him on numerous 
assignments, including moves to  England (1958) and Taipei, where he became 
the new cia station chief. When Ray Cline took on the responsibility of  running 
Chiang Ching- kuo as a major cia asset, Marjorie Cline became Ching- kuo’s 
En glish tutor (Taylor 2000: 239). Ray Cline  later became the deputy director 
of intelligence at the cia (Quirk et al. 1986: i). During the Second World War, 
Derwood Lockard did intelligence work for oni and oss, and  after the war he 
extended this work at the cia. In 1954, he returned to the acad emy, working on 
 Middle Eastern ethnography and archaeology (D. H. Price 2008a: 221; Brow-
man and Williams 2013: 429). He worked on archaeological projects in Iran and 
Turkey and accompanied his wife, Barbara Lockard, on several  Middle Eastern 
archaeological projects; in 1967, he became associate director of Harvard’s Cen-
ter of  Middle East Studies, where he worked  until his retirement in the early 
1970s (Browman and Williams 2013: 429).
Anthropological research was sometimes used in cia training programs. In 
response to my foia request, the cia released a declassified program from a 
1963 midcareer training course that included sessions on current po liti cal and 
economic developments. One daylong pre sen ta tion was made by an anthropol-
ogist (identity redacted) in a session titled “American Problems in Understand-
ing Foreign Cultures,” described in the program bulletin as “an anthropological 
view of the newly developing countries with emphasis on their deep- seated 
cultural characteristics.” This anthropologist’s pre sen ta tion lasted from 9:00 am 
 until 3:30 pm, followed by discussion and a reception. The supplemental read-
ings accompanying this pre sen ta tion consisted of Ruth Benedict’s essay “The 
Growth of Culture” (1956), Margaret Mead’s article “The Underdeveloped and 
the Overdeveloped” (1962), and George Murdock’s “How Culture Changes,” 
(1956) as well as Brookings Institution publications on development (Brookings 
Institution 1962), Dan Kurzman’s Subversion of the Innocents (1963), Max Mil-
likan and Donald Blackmer’s book The Emerging Nations (1961), and Eugene 
Staley’s book The  Future of Undeveloped Countries (1961) (cia 1963c).
Staley, Millikan, Blackmer, and the Brookings Institution provided a baseline 
for Rostow- derived, cia- backed modernization schemes. Murdock’s sunny 
cultural evolutionary model provided a simplistic “ great man” view of culture 
change for cia trainees who would soon be looking for interlocutors in the un-
derdeveloped world. Mead’s article “The Underdeveloped and the Overdevel-
oped,” which had been published in Foreign Affairs, situated global in equality 
by downplaying determinants of global stratification, arguing that economic 
development could bring wealth to all, not simply exacerbate and continue 
internal and global stratification. Mead’s article also argued that “riches are no 
longer somebody’s disproportionate, though legitimate, share of a scarce sup-
ply; poverty is no longer the consequence of someone  else having a large pro-
portion of the existing supply” (1962: 81; cia 1963c).
Anthropologists at cia Desks
Several anthropologists established careers at cia desk jobs, working as ana-
lysts, or in other capacities within the agency’s bureaucracy. Most of  these ca-
reers developed as extensions of war time work.
The child of American missionaries, Eugene Clark Worman Jr. was born in 
and lived the first dozen years of his life in India. He studied anthropology as an 
undergraduate at Harvard, then did gradu ate research in Central Eu rope, India, 
and New Mexico. When the war interrupted his studies, he served at the U.S. 
Navy Division of Naval Intelligence tracking Japa nese naval and merchant 
marine positions. At the war’s end he completed his dissertation, “The Prob lem 
of a Neolithic Culture in India” (1946), and undertook nrc- funded research 
connecting Indian prehistory with the prehistory of other areas in the Near 
East and Far East (nbaaa 1947 1[3]: 5).
Worman took a visiting professorship at Chicago, filling in for Robert Braid-
wood while he conducted an excavation in Iraq, and in the summer of 1948, 
Worman joined the cia (nbaaa 1948 2[1]: 30). The cia drew upon Worman’s 
academic and anthropological skills. Beyond his analyst duties, Eugene Wor-
man also became the official historian of the cia’s Office of Current Intelli-
gence, writing the agency’s internal, five- volume unpublished, but completed 
in 1971, “History of the Office of Current Intelligence” (see Westerfield 200: 
126–27n18).4 Worman remained active in the aaa while working at the cia; 
in 1950–53, he served as the aaa’s representative to the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science and was appointed as the aaa’s delegate to the 
National Conference on Citizenship (nbaaa 1950 4[4]: 6; baaa 1952 2[3]: 2; aa 
1951 53[4]: 454; aa 1952 54[2]: 289; aa 1952 54[3]: 307).
Worman’s dual position, working within the cia while acting as an official 
representing the aaa on national committees, did not raise concerns within 
the association. His cia connections  were known within the aaa (see Worman 
to Stout 11/7/51; nbaaa 1952 6[4]: 12–13).5 The 1951 report of the Anthropo-
logical Society of Washington noted that Eugene Worman (then a full- time cia 
employee) or ga nized a speaker series held at the U.S. National Museum (Gil-
bert 1951: 309). Worman hosted George Murdock, who described his fieldwork 
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in Truk; Ralph Soleki, speaking on “ancient man in Northern Alaska”; Duncan 
Emrich on folklore; Frank Setzer on aboriginal Australia; Cornelius Osgood 
presented a paper titled “Koreans and Their Culture”; Schuyler Cammann, who 
spoke on “Tiber, the Land and Its  People”; and George Foster, who gave his 
“Ethnographic Impressions of Spain” (Gilbert 1951: 309).
James Madison Andrews IV worked as a Peabody Museum archaeologist 
before joining the oni during the war.  After a brief return to archaeology at the 
war’s end, he joined the cia in 1948 and worked at the agency  until retiring in 
1957.6 At the cia, Andrews directed the Office of Collection and Dissemination 
(ocd); as discussed in chapter 3, he was mentioned as one of the cia’s anthro-
pologists who could help facilitate communications between the agency and 
the aaa during the association’s membership roster proj ect in 1951 (aaap 6. 
WH to FJ 3/2/51; Darling 1990: 328; Montague 1992: 183). Andrews  rose to the 
position of assistant director of the cia, where he “was in charge of develop-
ment of programs for automated information retrieval. He received the Intel-
ligence Medal of Merit for his ser vice” (an Oct. 1988, 4; see also Browman and 
Williams 2013: 435).
As director at ocd, Andrews transformed the structural organ ization and 
functioning of the cia. While directing ocd, he was at the forefront of recog-
nizing the vital role that computers could play in or ga niz ing all variety of da-
tabases and rec ords, serving as “an enthusiastic advocate of the use of business 
machines for the indexing, retrieval, and analy sis of information” (Montague 
1992: 182). Agency historian Ludwell Montague credited Andrews with funda-
mentally reshaping how the cia undertook the collection and distribution of 
intelligence data, ending institutional practices wherein holders of  intelligence 
had certain control of its uses. According to Montague, “Andrews sought to in-
still in ocd personnel the idea that ocd existed only to serve the other compo-
nents of the cia, and the departmental agencies as well, insofar as practicable. 
They must forget about pretensions to superior coordinating authority and do 
their utmost to ser vice  every demand or request that came to them, no  matter 
what the source” (1992: 182). Andrews argued for building an in de pen dent 
ocd that would collect, cata log, and distribute intelligence data and academic 
sources from within the collection of documents he helped the agency amass. 
He convinced dci Walter Bedell Smith to ignore a recommendation made by 
nsc 50 (a 1949 document also known as The McNarney Report, recommend-
ing significant restructuring of the cia) and the Dulles Report to disband ocd 
and localize the collection and organ ization of intelligence data (Montague 
1992: 181).
Anthropologists did not always garner res pect from  others within the cia. 
In his memoir recalling his years at the agency, Dino Brugioni described dci 
Smith’s distaste for Andrews. According to Brugioni, Smith mistakenly thought 
Andrews was an ornithologist and considered him too much of an academic, 
who wrote “with a flowery flourish.” Brugioni continued: “Smith sent back one 
of Andrews’ papers with an attached note: ‘This is the biggest pile of unadulter-
ated crap I’ve ever read.’ He once remarked that he had hoped for an energetic 
go- getter in collection, but they had hired a ‘fucking birdwatcher’ ” (Brugioni 
2010:  38).
Harvard- trained archaeologist E. Wyllys Andrews IV, who had served the 
oss in Africa and Eu rope, joined the cia when it was first formed (Stirling 
1973: 295). Andrews  later claimed he stayed with the cia for only a few years 
and returned to archaeology for the remainder of his  career. One report of his 
cia years described him as working for the “cia for several years  after the war, 
working in Africa and the  Middle East, finally leaving the cia in 1955 to accept a 
position at [the  Middle American Research Institute] at Tulane” (Browman and 
Williams 2013: 410). Claims by scholars that they left cia careers and returned 
to life outside the agency are often met with skepticism and are difficult to eval-
uate conclusively.  There is a well- documented history of the cia using former 
employees, especially  those who travel to exotic locations or have contacts with 
persons of interest to the agency, for agency business (see Winks 1987; A. C. 
Mills 1991; Lawrence 1979). While the extent of Andrews’s connections with 
the cia  after he left the agency is unknown, one set of cia rec ords (released by 
foia researchers investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy) 
indicate that Professor Andrews was in contact with a cia employee in Mexico 
City in 1962, years  after he stated he ceased working for the agency (foia cia 
104–10419–10321). This released cia rec ord does not state the nature of this 
contact beyond describing Andrews as a “reputable American businessman in 
Mexico” who had been in contact with Richard C. Cain (the subject of the cia’s 
inquiry).7 While the nature of this contact remains unclear, it demonstrates the 
agency’s practice of recontacting individuals with past cia connections when 
agency needs arise at  later dates, a practice that raises questions about the pos-
sibility of such contacts with anthropologists who  were former cia employees.
cia Anthropologists in the World at Large
Frank Bessac served in the oss in China during the Second World War. When 
the oss was disbanded at the war’s end, Bessac moved to the War Department’s 
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Strategic Ser vices Unit,  later joining the Secret Intelligence Branch, where he 
was assigned duties as an intelligence officer in Shanghai (nara fbi 9/11/46). 
Bessac maintained that he first joined the cia in July 1947  after he was recruited 
by his old oss handler, Marge Kennedy.8 As part of Bessac’s spycraft training, 
Kennedy provided him with a protocol phrase and reply to identify fellow cia 
agents in the field. Kennedy and Bessac “agreed that in the fall of 1947 Frank 
would be a student in Peking’s Fujen University, and that would also be his cover. 
The Outfit [cia] would pay his return to China and keep him on the payroll” 
(Laird 2002: 42).
Bessac  later claimed he had misgivings about using his status as a student in 
China as his cia cover, telling his superiors that “he simply did not enjoy look-
ing at China through the lens of government employment” (Laird 2002: 52). He 
 later claimed he resigned from the cia in October 1947, but this assertion seems 
contradicted by many of his  later actions in China.
In 1948, Bessac traveled in Inner Mongolia and worked for the United Na-
tions Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and he continued to study in 
China with his Fulbright scholarship in the fall. Bessac’s travels to Inner Mon-
golia have obvious po liti cal interpretations given his admission of having 
already agreed to work as a paid cia contractor and the American intelligence 
community’s interest in gathering up- to- date intelligence on Chinese Commu-
nists’ rapid advances. While Bessac  later insisted that his travels and un work in 
Inner Mongolia had nothing to do with the cia, Sechin Jagchid, a Mongol with 
direct knowledge of U.S. intelligence activities in Inner Mongolia supporting 
Prince De during the late 1940s, dismissed Bessac’s claims, arguing that Bessac 
worked for a cia agent named Raymond Meitz in Inner Mongolia in 1948–49 
(see Jagchid 1999: 410).9
In the fall of 1949, waves of Americans  were evacuated from China as Mao’s 
soldiers seized control of rural and urban areas. Yet instead of joining his fellow 
expatriates’ exodus to ships leaving China’s eastern coastal cities, in September 
1949, Bessac headed west to the interior. Bessac flew to Tihwa, where he was 
met by Vice Consul Douglas Mackiernan. Bessac claimed this meeting with 
Mackiernan was pure chance. Mackiernan brought Bessac to the Tihwa Ameri-
can consul compound, where over the course of a few days they hurriedly 
burned consul documents and destroyed vehicles, radios, and other U.S. equip-
ment before the impending arrival of Chinese Communist troops.
Using State Department cover, the cia sent agent Douglas Mackiernan to the 
outer reaches of western China with top secret equipment designed to moni-
tor the Soviet Union’s eastern Kazakh region, searching for indications of the 
Soviets’ anticipated first nuclear bomb test. With this equipment, on August 29, 
1949, Mackiernan detected the Soviet Union’s first successful detonation of a 
nuclear weapon in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.
Using the cia’s secret identification pass- phrase protocol that Bessac had 
learned in his 1947 cia training, Mackiernan identified himself to Bessac as 
a cia operative. Bessac’s response confirmed his cia identity to Mackiernan, 
an act that complicated Bessac’s  later claims that he was not then a cia agent 
(Laird 2002: 109).10 Bessac’s 2006 account of how he joined the cia, resigned 
from the cia, traveled in China on a Fulbright scholarship, and then rejoined 
the agency only  after meeting up with Mackiernan strains credulity and raises 
questions about  whether this story was  later concocted to smooth over the 
ethical and  legal problems of a Fulbright scholar spying for the cia abroad.11 
As Bessac  later argued, when Mackiernan approached him with his secret cia 
code phrase, if he “was recruiting me again as an agent for the cia, asking me to 
take on a mission, he should have outlined the task, the conditions of employ-
ment, government employment, with payroll taxes and a pension, the  whole 
bit” (Bessac and Bessac 2006: 51). Bessac claimed that upon his reply, “Doug 
just asked, ‘Do you want to join Osman Bator (the  great Kazakh leader of Chi-
nese Turkestan) with me? Maybe we can be of assistance to him.’ That was all, 
but enough for me” (51).
 Because the cia operated on a strict “need to know basis,” Bessac’s knowl-
edge of the mission he undertook was limited, but he joined Mackiernan and 
Osman Bator and a group of White Rus sians and Mongols, packing gold, ma-
chine guns and an assortment of other light arms, ammunition, hand grenades, 
a shortwave radio, and Geiger counters on an overland trip to Tibet. Bessac loosely 
understood the group’s mission to be supportive of Tibetan nationalism in the 
face of what appeared to be an impending Chinese occupation. Mackiernan 
sewed a small fortune in gold wafers into his clothing and other hiding places, 
to be used to finance their mission as they traveled.
In January 1950, the Chinese press denounced Mackiernan as an American 
spy. The group avoided capture by Chinese forces during their eleven- month, 
fifteen- hundred- mile trek across the Kara Desert  toward Shegarkhung Lung, and 
then to Lhasa, Tibet. They entered Tibet in April 1950, and during an encoun-
ter with Tibetan border scouts Mackiernan was shot and killed, and another 
member of their party, Vasili Zvansov, was seriously wounded. This left Bessac 
cut of from the outside world, with limited mission knowledge and no under-
standing of the cia’s encoded radio contact protocols.  These Tibetan forces 
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captured Bessac and took him prisoner, but he was treated as an honored guest 
 after the Department of State contacted the Tibetan government.
Bessac, who remained in Tibet from April to July 1950, was one of only a few 
Westerners to visit Tibet before the Chinese occupation. He had an audience 
with the Dalai Lama and held closed- door discussions with Tibetan officials. The 
Tibetans  were desperate for U.S. military support in the face of an impending 
Chinese invasion. Bessac stressed that he was not an American governmental 
representative, but he also told his hosts that he would convey their concerns 
to U.S. officials  after returning home (Laird 2002: 224).
Bessac’s account of his trek in Life magazine stressed the high adventure of 
the journey, with no mention of the po liti cal dimensions of the mission or 
of Mackiernan being a cia agent. Bessac wrote that he was in western Asia “to 
study Mongolian anthropology,” claiming that he headed to Inner Mongolia 
from Chengtu  after recovering from eye surgery  because this was the region 
he considered “least likely to be bothered by the Communists” (Bessac 1950: 
131). His account provided scintillating details of  going days without  water, 
the ravages of an all- meat diet, ongoing sickness, monotonously trudging on-
ward in the freezing cold, Mackiernan’s killing, and Bessac’s audience with the 
Dalai Lama.
In 2006, the cia publicly recognized Douglas Mackiernan as the first cia 
agent killed in the line of duty. The agency revealed Mackiernan’s name in its 
“Book of Honor,” which listed, usually without publicly providing names, cia 
agents killed while serving the agency (Dujmovic 2008: 7).
 After returning to the United States, Bessac studied anthropology at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley,  later earning his doctorate at the University of 
Wisconsin, briefly teaching in Texas and Kansas before becoming a professor 
of anthropology at the University of Montana, where he remained from 1970 to 
1989. Throughout his life, Bessac insisted he had not traveled to China using a 
Fulbright scholarship as cover for cia activities.
 There are credibility problems with Bessac’s claim that he resigned from the 
cia in October 1947, so soon  after he joined. For instance, Bessac’s insistence 
that he had not traveled to China using a Fulbright scholarship as cover for cia 
activities contradicts the fact that the cia  later paid him for his entire ser vice in 
China and Tibet, and, more significantly, that he responded to his cia recogni-
tion code and agreed to undertake a risky cia mission.12
Former cia agent Frank Latrash rejected Bessac’s claim that he had not 
been a cia agent while studying  under a Fulbright fellowship. As described by 
Thomas Laird, the cia told Latrash in 1950 “that Frank Bessac was a contract cia 
agent using Fulbright cover. He claims that this is the very reason why Bessac is 
so insistent that he was not a cia agent — it was, and is illegal for the cia to use 
a Fulbright scholarship as cover for any agent” (2002: 103).
Louis Dupree
Louis Dupree began World War II in the Merchant Marine,  later joining the 
army’s Eleventh Airborne Division fighting in the Philippines. During the de-
cade following the war, he studied archaeology at Harvard, earning his bach-
elor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees. He first traveled to Af ghan i stan with an 
archaeological expedition in 1949, and over the next de cades he traveled and 
at times lived in Af ghan i stan, conducting cultural and archaeological research. 
Dupree conducted archaeological excavations in Af ghan i stan throughout the 
1950s, and his years of excavations and publications earned him the reputation 
of a central figure in Af ghan i stan anthropology.
Dupree maintained military ties  after the war, teaching at Air University 
and writing numerous publications for Air University’s Force’s Arctic, Desert, 
Tropic Information Center, and or ga nized the Society for Applied Anthropology’s 
1958 session on “Anthropology in the Armed Ser vices” (see chapter 3). During 
the de cades  after the war, he became the American anthropologist who spent the 
greatest amount of time in Af ghan i stan. His luxurious home in Kabul was a 
regular stop for Western visitors, and his daily regime of five  o’clock cocktails for all 
comers made him a central collector of expatriate gossip and po liti cal rumors. Du-
pree’s report “Anthropology in Af ghan i stan” (1976) for the American Universities 
Field Staf (aufs) described the previous de cades of anthropological work in 
Af ghan i stan, and his ethnographic map served as the source for numerous re-
printed governmental and military maps for years to come (L. Dupree 1976: 5).
Dupree published numerous scholarly reports and skillfully cultivated media 
coverage of his archaeological discoveries. His primary research affiliation was 
with the aufs, a research consortium that combined the resources of scholars 
from eleven universities, established with funds from the Crane Foundation,13 
with headquarters in Hanover, New Hampshire, and a field office in Kabul.14 cia 
documents establish that one of the ways aufs interfaced with the cia was to 
hold “private round  table meetings[s] on po liti cal developments,” with select in-
vitations issued to cia personnel (foia cia- rdp80B01676R004000060031–0, 
9/15/58). With the support of the aufs, Dupree maintained a home in Kabul 
from the 1950s  until 1978. Dupree also maintained affiliations with the Archae-
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ological Mission of the American Museum of Natu ral History in Af ghan i stan 
proj ect (jla, Box 10).
Anthropologist M. Jamil Hanifi has described his first meeting with Dupree, 
 after Hanifi left his native Af ghan i stan and arrived at Michigan State University 
to begin gradu ate work in po liti cal science in 1961. Dupree was a guest speaker 
in a class taught by Wesley Fischel in which Hanifi was enrolled (MJH to DHP 
11/5/05).15 Hanifi found it strange that when they first met, Dupree grilled 
him for information on Af ghan i stan’s intelligence ser vices, pointedly asking 
 whether Hanifi planned to  later work for the intelligence ser vice. Hanifi’s stud-
ies  were sponsored by the Afghan Ministry of Finance, and he told Dupree that 
he had no intention of working for the intelligence ser vice. Dupree then asked 
Hanifi to recommend a translator for him to use in Kabul, which he did. Accord-
ing to Hanifi, he “has vivid memories of Dupree  going around the country pho-
tographing Afghan defense installations and facilities” (MJH to DHP 11/4/050).
Anthropologist John Allison (2012)  later described how Dupree, while a 
visiting professor of anthropology at Indiana University, recruited Allison, 
with promises of well- funded fieldwork opportunities, to begin fieldwork in 
Af ghan i stan. As an anthropology gradu ate student, Allison traveled with Du-
pree in 1969 through Kandahar and Herat to Maimana, where they conducted 
archaeological excavations of a cave site. Allison and his wife traveled by Land 
Rover into remote regions of Af ghan i stan with Louis and Nancy Dupree, mem-
bers of the Kabul Museum and American archaeologists, and  others claiming 
archaeological expertise. According to Allison, “One had an interest in ceram-
ics, another seemed not especially interested in talking about his work; I  don’t 
recall their names. They  didn’t seem to participate in the excavation much, and 
 were often gone of in their Land Rovers” (2012).
A man claiming to be the team’s ceramics expert — who “liked to show of 
his martial arts skills”— got drunk one night and admitted “he was actually 
 there to do ground- proofing and local village investigations around the area 
to see if it was a pos si ble emergency landing place for a U-2, if necessary” (JA to 
DHP 11/12/07). Allison combined archaeological excavations with small ethno-
graphic surveys and photographic inventories  under the direction of Dupree. 
He  later conducted ethnographic linguistic field research among the Ashkun 
in the Hindu Kush, all with advice, introductions, and a field assistant (Mo-
hammad Alam Nuristani, a Kabul University anthropology gradu ate student) 
provided by Dupree (Allison 2012).
Nuristani provided invaluable assistance, helping Allison gain access to 
 people in this remote area; his solid knowledge of En glish, Dari, Pashto, and 
dialects of Kalasha gave Allison the sort of access that would have other wise 
been impossible for an American outsider. Allison found that
as a native speaker of the closely related Waigul  people, Mohammad Alam gave 
us trusted access to the  family homes, to the dif er ent special places, to work 
and to participate in gatherings and feasts. . . .  Alam gave me sensitive and pa-
tient guidance in some of my understandings of the meanings of Ashkun con-
cepts. He grasped the nature of ethnography and the cognitive nature of culture. 
He was from a leading  family in Waigul, but his ac cep tance in the urban society 
of Kabul depended upon his intelligence and upon this charm that led  those with 
power and influence to support his ambitions. His  family had  little power in Kabul. 
(2012)
With Nuristani’s assistance, Allison collected a significant body of ethnographic 
data. In June 1970, Dupree convinced Allison that he and his wife needed to 
leave Af ghan i stan  because of growing threats to Americans. Allison wanted to 
stay and complete the last six months of his planned eighteen- month study. He 
recalls that when he was finally persuaded to leave, he
left a full box of 7 inch reels of tapes with Dupree, who assured me he would get 
them to me safely. They included a lot of info on the demography of the Alingar 
River basin area of Nuristan, the eastern edge of the Hindu Kush, where no one 
had ever done research before, and only one other had passed through that area of 
the Titin Valley, Schyler Jones, in 1964, simply hiked through and over the top to 
Waigal Valley. The tapes  were never seen again. Dupree claimed he had them sent 
by diplomatic pouch. He might have done that, but [he] did not send them to me 
at Indiana University. Since, I have often wondered if that diplomatic pouch went 
to the cia in DC. (JA to DHP 11/12/07)
Without his field notes and tapes, Allison was unable to complete his disserta-
tion research.16  Because international shipping from Af ghan i stan in the early 
1970s was a precarious method for sending materials, Dupree told Allison he 
would ship his field notes using the secure U.S. embassy pouch. Dupree claimed 
he had no knowledge of why Allison never received  these invaluable field notes 
(Allison 2012).
Allison  later recalled that Dupree amassed a large collection of documents 
that would have  great value to American military and intelligence agencies:
Dupree and his co- operative colleagues used their access to Kabul government 
documents and files for US advantage; even when it was explicit that they  were 
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not to make use of such sensitive data as air photos and maps developed from 
them, they stole copies of the entire set of air photos and topographic maps for 
all of Af ghan i stan. . . .  He was part of the US Mission in Af ghan i stan long before 
the US was aware of Af ghan i stan. Charlie Wilson’s War came and went late during 
Dupree’s watch; and I think not without his participation. His ethics and mor-
als  were related to that foundation in the military Mission. Among his friends, 
he was always ethical and a Good Man, within that cultural world view and its 
priorities. . . .  He was not an evil man if judged by his own value system, or a bad 
anthropologist in the sense of producing valuable works. His Af ghan i stan is still 
the standing authority in US/nato on the history, archaeology and cultures of the 
Af ghan i stan that existed  until 1978. (Allison 2012)
Allison did not learn of Dupree’s reported cia connections  until reading Du-
pree’s obituary some years  after his death. This revelation helped Allison con-
nect the dots between Dupree’s life as an adventurer establishing connections 
throughout Af ghan i stan’s backcountry, and the expatriates’ and Afghan estab-
lishment’s salons and parties.17
Dupree’s years in Af ghan i stan suddenly ended on November 25, 1978, when 
he was apprehended and interrogated for five days by Afghan security  under 
general accusations that his work with the aufs was linked to American intel-
ligence agencies. Dupree was questioned about his relationship to Nuristani, and 
the information he provided appears to have led to Nuristani’s death (see Al-
lison 2012; L. Dupree 1980a: 12). His interrogators asked a series of questions 
about Nuristani’s time studying in the United States and about other Afghans 
Dupree had encountered at Indiana University over the years. Dupree provided 
many names to his interrogators — names of past students, landlords, and  others 
he had known over the years. Dupree  later recounted:
A new interrogator put a sheet of questions in front of me. I was about to write 
“I  don’t remember,” but reading the questions stopped me cold. “Suppose some-
one accused you of being a cia agent, what would you say?” Answer: “Bullshit!?” 
Question: “How would you justify your answer?” “Quite  simple. I  don’t work for the 
cia.” The interrogator said, “Come now,  you’ve got to give more reasons than that.” 
I said: “Why? Look, if  you’re  going to accuse me of being a cia agent,  don’t go 
through the routine. Just go ahead and accuse me, and go out into the streets and 
pick up three witnesses. Pay them 50 afghanis apiece and have them swear I hired 
them to work for the cia. They can say, yes, we gave them secret information. I 
mean, why bother with all this crap? I mean, if  you’re  really  going to accuse me of 
being cia, why waste your time and mine. Let’s both get some sleep.
Instead, he came back with: “Suppose you  were confronted with someone who 
said you worked for the cia? What would you say?” “Bullshit!” I wrote again, this 
time adding a short essay on the foreign community “covered wagon” in Kabul. 
(1980a: 12–13)
Dupree claimed that his activities naturally led many to suspect he had cia 
connections, but he dismissed  these suspicions as “folklore” among the expatriate 
community. He wrote that the “collective wisdom” was that he and his wife, 
Nancy,  were with the cia, and that this “folklore is passed on from one genera-
tion to the next. Nancy and I  can’t defend ourselves. We simply have to live with 
the folklore” (L. Dupree 1980a: 13). Dupree acknowledged that in light of the 
forms of research he undertook in Af ghan i stan, “at times the  whole program 
sounds suspicious even to me” (12).
 After a few days of Dupree’s detention and interrogation, Muhammad Alam 
Nuristani was brought before him. Nuristani had obviously been tortured. Du-
pree wrote that it looked “as though his hair had been burned. His face was totally 
misshapen, and his upper lip almost reached his chin” (1980a: 13). He had identi-
fied Dupree as a cia agent. Dupree wrote that Nuristani must have had no other 
choice given the torture to which he had been subjected. When interrogated be-
fore Dupree, he screamed, “Every body knows Dupree is cia. Every body knows!” 
Yet, according to Dupree, Nuristani admitted that Dupree had never tried to 
recruit him for the cia, and that he never undertook any clandestine work for 
Dupree or the cia (13). Obviously,  people  will admit to anything when they are 
tortured, so Nuristani’s identification of Dupree as a cia agent is meaningless.
Dupree was released  after six days and expelled from Af ghan i stan on No-
vember 30, 1978. Although he was unable to return to Af ghan i stan, he contin-
ued to work for the aufs (which he had worked with since 1959)  until 1983. 
Dupree maintained a presence in Pakistan, establishing contacts and networks 
with members of the Mujahideen, the Islamic fundamentalist group armed, 
trained, and financed by the cia, in their war against Soviet forces occupy-
ing Af ghan i stan. He remained interested in Af ghan i stan politics and sat on the 
Heritage Foundation– funded Committee for a  Free Af ghan i stan.  After his 1978 
expulsion from Af ghan i stan  under accusations of being a cia agent, his align-
ment with Department of State and cia po liti cal positions became increasingly 
apparent. His obituary in the New York Times listed his con sul tant work for 
Austria, Denmark,  England, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
States, including work with the State Department, the nsc, the cia, usaid, and 
the un (Narvaez 1989).
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Dupree denied being a cia operative in Af ghan i stan. Yet the accounts of 
John Allison and M. Jamil Hanifi, Dupree’s connections with the Afghan Stu-
dent Association, his role in leading an archaeological expedition with indi-
viduals claiming to be intelligence personnel using the expedition as a pretext 
for intelligence gathering, and public claims (in his obituary and by a member 
of Congress) that he was a con sul tant for the cia lend credence to claims he was 
a cia asset, though the extent of his cia activities remains unclear.
 After the coming to power of the Demo cratic Republic of Af ghan i stan in 
the spring of 1978, the cia increased its presence in Af ghan i stan. In Afghani-
stan — Washington’s Secret War, Phillip Bonosky described Louis Dupree as 
“the cia man in Kabul whose activities  there among the counterrevolutionaries 
made him persona non grata to the Afghan government, and he was forced to 
leave in 1978, but only as far as Peshawar where he resumed his work directing 
counterrevolutionary forces in an attempt to bring a happy ending to his book, 
Af ghan i stan, other wise so woefully unended” (2001: 184). Bonosky identified 
Dupree as one of the U.S. governmental sources who was planting false stories 
claiming that the Soviets  were using nerve gas in rural Af ghan i stan (217). In eu-
logizing Dupree  after his death in 1989, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey (R- NH) 
noted Dupree’s ser vice as a cia con sul tant (U.S. Senate 1989: S4649).18
Donald Wilber, Our Man in Iran
In 1930, while an undergraduate at Prince ton, Donald Wilber was hired as an 
artist to draw archaeological architectural features as part of a University of 
Chicago expedition to Egypt.  After working on  these Egyptian excavations 
for three seasons, in 1934 he drove from Egypt to Iran, where he did further 
architectural surveys and archaeological excavations. Wilber’s archaeological 
travels provided him with the skills, experience, and linguistic training that 
 later served him well as a cia operative. When he first traveled to Egypt, he was 
so fearful of locals that he wanted the protection of a pistol, but by the time he 
left, he “had learned not to feel uneasy or out of place in a foreign land, not to 
feel superior to  others, however  humble,  because of chances of birth and back-
ground” (Wilber 1986: 23).
Wilber’s gradu ate study in Prince ton focused on historic and prehistoric ar-
chitecture.  After the United States entered the Second World War, Wilber was 
assigned by the Office of Coordinator of Information (oci) to undertake intel-
ligence work, first at oci and  later at the oss. Wilber observed in his memoir 
that “ there  were very few Americans who knew [the  Middle East] at all well: 
missionaries, archaeologists, research scholars, oil men, and a scattering of 
businessmen, such as tobacco buyers in Turkey. So, the net gathered many of 
us, including missionaries whose pos si ble scruples about serving other than the 
Lord gave way before patriotism” (1986: 101).
Wilber ran oss operations in Iran, using cover provided by the Iran- 
American Relations Society and his position as the assistant to the director 
of the Asia Institute (Wilber 1986: 102). His chief war time activities involved 
monitoring the German and Soviet presence in the region. Mixing archaeologi-
cal discovery and espionage, during one of his oss missions monitoring Soviet 
troop movements in Azerbaijan, he surveyed Mongol tombs, where in one vil-
lage “his excitement at the discovery was tinged by fears that the village was also 
home to a nest of German agents” (Wilford 2013: 38). At the oss’s request he 
remained in Iran at the war’s end to track Soviet activities in the region.
 After the war, some of his oss contacts talked Wilber into joining the Central 
Intelligence Group, and he joined the cia at its inception, spending the next 
twenty- two years in the agency  until his mandatory retirement in 1969 (Wilber 
1986: 148–71, 151). Wilber’s academic specialty was the early Islamic architec-
ture of Iran. During his years with the cia, he authored academic publications 
on Ira nian po liti cal developments, archaeology, and architecture for academic 
and popu lar consumption, while producing an impressive number of internal 
cia reports and working on covert operations in Iran. Wilber’s Iran: Past and 
Present was a popu lar text that underwent nine revisions and has remained in 
print for de cades (Wilber 2014). Though Donald Wilber at times made dubious 
boastful claims about his importance and adventures, substantial documenta-
tion exists to establish his role in a number of impor tant cia operations.19
Wilber described how, while he was working covertly for the cia, he made 
“thirteen trips to Iran, one trip around the world, and  others that took me to 
Af ghan i stan, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon, Egypt,  England, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, 
Turkey, France, Italy and Ghana” (1986: 149–50).20 As a cia operative, his spe-
cialties  were “po liti cal action and psychological warfare,” and while in the cia 
he served as an active member of the board of directors of the Iran Foundation 
of New York City (150, 186). Wilber had vari ous job titles, including “Con sul tant 
and Expert, Intermittent; Con sul tant, Intermittent; Con sul tant, Covert; Con sul-
tant, Semi- Covert; and again Con sul tant Intermittent” and Area Operations Of-
ficer (149). He worked closely with CIA operatives Kermit Roo se velt and Miles 
Copeland in the early 1950s (Copeland 1989; Wilford 2013: 160–74, 228).
The cia sent Wilber to Af ghan i stan in 1951 using a cover story that he was 
a “writer on the  Middle East.” Details of Wilber’s mission remain an agency 
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secret, but his assignment appears to have involved monitoring or countering 
Soviet activities in Af ghan i stan (see Wilber 1986: 172). Wilber traveled through-
out Af ghan i stan, filling a notebook with reports on the conditions of roads and 
other infrastructure, noting the presence of military and police, and recording 
general po liti cal attitudes, attitudes  toward Soviet philosophy, economic activi-
ties, and the presence and activities of expatriates (172–86). Wilber’s methods 
 were at least partly opaque, his dual use cover giving his movements a plausible 
explanation as he spent his days making “the rounds of vari ous offices picking 
up books, notes on subjects I had requested, and information from just talking 
and talking” (177).
Back home, Wilber split his time between Prince ton and Washington, DC, 
where he spent three days a week working with Miles Copeland in Kermit Roo-
se velt’s cia group (Wilber 1986: 192). Wilber wrote that in 1957 he “became the 
founder and director of the  Middle East Research Associations, having per-
suaded some five of the most highly regarded scholars of the  Middle East to 
join. Of course I obtained prior [cia] approval. We got a few small jobs but  were 
too far ahead of the times, ahead of the demand for con sul tants that climaxed 
in the 1970s” (193; Wilford 2013: 228).
In the late 1950s, Wilber was one of the cia’s leading experts on the Islamic 
world, writing the cia reports “Islam in Iran,” “Islam in Pakistan,” and “Islam 
in Af ghan i stan”; he  later described  these reports as “more exhaustive than any 
published material” and said “they  were to serve as guidelines for working with 
Muslim groups” (Wilber 1986: 195). Wilber was the architect of Operation Ajax, 
a cia coup that Kermit Roo se velt implemented in 1953 against Ira nian presi-
dent Mossadegh; the operation installed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who 
reprivatized petroleum resources and represented American interests in the 
region. In 1954, Donald Wilber filed an internal cia report that was a first- 
person account of the cia’s overthrow of Mossadegh. Almost half a  century 
 later, the New York Times declassified the report  under foia and published it 
(nyt 2000). Wilber  later described his role “preparing propaganda material in 
Persian, directed against Mossadegh.21 It included cartoons, small wall posters, 
short articles. Given high priority, it poured of the Agency’s press and was 
rushed by air to Tehran” (Wilber 1986: 188–89).22
Wilber was extremely productive, writing, as he recalled, “at least 90,000 
words a year for the cia and about as many for my own purposes” (1986: 195). 
In the early 1960s, Wilber had cia assignments in India and Ceylon (196). In 
1963, he began working on Africa and wrote a cia draft titled “Guide to Sub-
version in Africa,” which he described as “breaking the types of subversion into 
separate categories.” Although this guide was never finished, it was used within 
the cia as a resource for planning the agency’s African psychological warfare 
campaigns (202).
Careers Traversing Acad emy and Agency
Many questions remain unanswered about anthropologists and other academ-
ics leaving positions at the cia to establish careers on university campuses. Most 
academics who leave positions at the cia and establish university careers main-
tain they have severed all ties with the agency (see, e.g., Siskiyou 2011), though 
the secrecy surrounding intelligence work inevitably raises doubts or suspi-
cions about such claims. Declassified reports published in the cia’s journal, 
Studies in Intelligence, clarify that the long history of cia reliance on university 
professors for recruiting, contract work, and ongoing reports makes such con-
tacts with former employees an ongoing design feature of university- agency 
symbiosis (Cook 1983).
Archaeologist Michael D. Coe’s memoir, Final Report: An Archaeologist Ex-
cavates His Past (2006), describes his transitions from the acad emy to years at 
the cia and his  later return to academia. Coe became interested in archaeology 
as a Harvard undergraduate visiting Mayan ruins in Yucatán on a  family vaca-
tion (Coe 2006: 54). At Harvard, Alfred Kidder, Douglas Oliver, and Alfred 
Tozzer introduced Coe to anthropology, and in 1949 he began excavating in 
British Honduras with British Mayanist Eric Thompson (54–57). In 1950, as 
Coe was preparing for his first year of gradu ate study in anthropology at Har-
vard, Amer i ca entered the Korean War. After Coe was rejected by the navy for 
medical reasons, Clyde Kluckhohn approached him and recruited him into the 
cia, where he became a case officer (64).
At cia training school he learned spycraft and intelligence skills. Despite the 
strict use of pseudonyms for all agent- students, Coe recognized a fellow cia 
operative as a former classmate from Fay School, the elite boarding school he 
had attended in his youth (Coe 2006: 73). The cia trained Coe in its practices 
and culture. In seclusion he learned how to “recruit agents, how to test them 
for reliability, how to elicit information without the subject knowing, and how 
to detect lying.  There was amazingly good instruction in modern history, and 
particularly the history of Marxism- Leninism, and its philosophical roots in 
the French Revolution and in the philosophy of Hegel. We  were never told the 
names of our teachers, but I’m positive they came to us from the best campuses 
in the land (much  later, when I had just joined the Yale faculty, I would rec-
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ognize one or two of  these instructors in the Sterling Library elevator!)” (74). 
Coe and his fellow students  were taught the skills of tailing  people, casing loca-
tions, passing messages, clandestine communications, and using dead drops 
and learned the details of security systems.
Coe was assigned to the cia’s Far Eastern Section, initially undertaking 
research assignments, by way of training, at the Library of Congress. He was a 
case officer in a cia operations group working with General Claire Chennault 
and Madame Chiang Kai- shek, covertly ofering support to guerrillas fighting 
Mao’s Communist forces in China. The CIA used an import- export business 
with offices in Taipei and Pittsburgh, known as Western Enterprises, Inc., as a 
front for  these operations. Coe was assigned to intelligence analy sis, rather than 
operations, though he ran a series of covert agents on the Chinese mainland.
In January 1952, the cia sent Coe to Taipei, where he helped train Chinese 
nationalists; he was soon sent to Kinmen, then Paich’üan, strategic islands of 
the coast of the Chinese mainland (Coe 2006: 75). On Paich’üan he used an 
interpreter and cia networks to establish links with the local nationalist intel-
ligence organ ization. His primary contact was a lieutenant who, according to 
Coe, passed along “reports gathered by the mainland agent network of the Min-
istry of Defense, and I would analyze  these and transmit anything new nightly 
to Taipei. On one wall of our quarters I had stapled up all of the 1:250,000 sheets 
of the northern Fuchien coast made in the U.S. Army Map Ser vice, with grease 
pencil notations on the Chicom order of  battle, continuously updated” (84).
Coe’s most reliable spy was a  woman in her thirties who lived near an airfield 
where Soviet migs landed. Pretending to fish at night, she secretly traveled out 
to Paich’üan to report to Coe (Coe 2006: 85). In 1953, the cia reassigned Coe 
to Taipei, where he studied Mandarin, carried out cia intelligence duties, and 
was put in charge of  running the agency’s training camp at the “T- Area” along 
the T’an- shui River (90).
Coe had a negative assessment of the impact of the cia’s anticommunist 
operations in China; he found “the infrequent raids against the Chinese main-
land had been  little more than minor annoyances to Mao, but they did bring one 
plus to the United States: they tied down along the southern Chinese coast several 
hundred thousand Communist troops that other wise would have gone to  Korea 
to fight the United Nations Forces. The true line that was drawn at the 38th paral-
lel might then have been far to the south; perhaps all of the peninsula would have 
ended up in the hands of ‘ Great Leader’ Kim Il- sung” (Coe 2006: 92).
Coe left the cia in early 1954, returning to the United States to pursue his 
doctorate at Harvard (Coe 2006: 92). His memoir’s discussion of his cia years 
ends with his reflection that this time in China “made me”; he notes that if one 
mentions “ ‘cia’ to the average academic, . . .  he or she would recoil in horror, 
yet the three years I spent with the Agency  were wonderful ones, and I have 
no regrets whatsoever” (93). The remainder of his memoir barely mentions the 
cia, and Coe’s compartmentalization and silence leave readers to assume he had 
no further contact with the agency  after he returned to Harvard to study ar-
chaeology. During the next half  century, while based at Harvard and Yale, Coe 
regularly conducted archaeological research in Mesoamerica (192–97).
cia Connections Primary, Secondary, Hypothetical
During the years I spent researching this book, I collected far more reports of 
claimed links between anthropologists and the cia than I have been able to 
verify, and a wealth of speculative information on such links has not been in-
cluded  here. In some instances I reasonably ruled out claimed anthropological 
links with the cia; in other instances such claimed links remain open possi-
bilities. Significant questions remain concerning pos si ble links between specific 
anthropologists and the cia that I have not included in this chapter  because 
the information I gathered did not conclusively establish such connections. 
Yet even without a larger collection, we have enough documented examples 
of vari ous types of cia articulations with anthropology to consider how  these 
interactions worked during the Cold War.
Questions about anthropologists’ direct and indirect involvements with the 
cia have persisted in the discipline for de cades. In an essay examining the 
po liti cal and familial background of Richard Critchfield, Timothy Mitchell 
raised questions about an ethnographer’s (in this case a self- trained pseudo- 
ethnographer)  family links to the cia. Mitchell identified Critchfield’s older 
brother James Critchfield as “the first director of cia clandestine operation in 
the Near East in 1959” (2002: 148). Mitchell acknowledged that it cannot be as-
sumed that both Critchfield bro th ers  were directly involved with the cia, but 
Mitchell established social connections, including links to Robert Mc Namara 
and  others who  were prominent in military intelligence circles, indicating some 
overlap between the bro th ers’ worlds (149). Mitchell showed how Richard 
Critchfield’s writing mirrored the cia’s Cold War narrative lens; for example, 
Critchfield’s
choice of villages, always portrayed as out- of- the- way places, followed the chang-
ing focus of U.S. imperial concerns, some of them at the time quite secretive. He 
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was in India and Nepal in 1959–62, the years coinciding with probably the larg-
est cia operation of the time: a secret program based in Nepal to train and arm 
Tibetan refugees to fight the Chinese occupation in Tibet. Critchfield’s visits to 
Nepal  were spaced between spells teaching journalism at the university in Nag-
pur, the birthplace and headquarters of the rising Hindu fascist movement. By the 
mid-1960s, an account of the cia program in Nepal reports, “cia officer James 
Critchfield described the guerrillas’ achievements inside Tibet as ‘minimal.’ ” (149)
Mitchell conceded the difficulties in determining  whether or not Richard Critch-
field was a cia operative, but he noted that “the importance of Critchfield’s con-
nections with Amer i ca’s ‘national security’ regime,  whether direct or indirect, lies 
elsewhere, in unraveling the po liti cal genealogy of such expertise on the  Middle 
East, and on the question of ‘the peasant’ in par tic u lar” (151). Mitchell described 
the cia’s infiltration of academic enterprises during the 1960s and theorized 
that such clandestine eforts to redirect scholarship may have influenced writ-
ings on  Middle Eastern culture such as  those of Critchfield or Henry Habib 
Ayrout, whose U.S. publication of The Egyptian Peasant (1963), Mitchell notes, 
coincided “with a renewed American interest in Egyptian afairs,” and  shaped 
elements of Critchfield’s narrative (151; see 47–52).
While Critchfield’s familial links to cia operations in the  Middle East pre-
sent unusual connections, much of the Cold War’s anthropological fieldwork 
occurred in regions of interest to the American national security apparatus, 
with ethnographers in de pen dently collecting information from local peoples 
whose views  were underreported yet often the core of national movements. 
Most of our documented knowledge linking academics with the cia appears as 
outlines rather than comprehensive, detailed portraits. The secrecy shrouding 
most of  these relationships is intentional, and while it is impor tant that scholars 
do not go beyond what can be documented, it is equally impor tant to not ig-
nore what can be known about them. Some sources establish ongoing interac-
tions between academics with agency ties, with scholars with onetime agency 
ties being recurrently contacted for information or facilitating the recruitment 
of students; yet such activities cannot be automatically assumed (see A. C. Mills 
1991; D. H. Price 2011e; Cook 1983).  These documented interactions raise ques-
tions about how common or widespread such ongoing contacts with the cia 
have been.
We are often left only with questions, shadows and other residuals of  these 
relationships; yet anthropology, perhaps more than other disciplines, is used 
to dealing with such traces of the phenomena we study, with archaeologists 
grasping spent residues of cultures lost in time and ethnographers straining 
to understand the ephemeral features of culture. Still, many questions remain, 
some of them as fundamental as what it means that the aaa representative 
(Worman) to the National Conference on Citizenship was known to be a full- 
time cia employee. Other questions pertaining to  these relationships hinge on 
grappling with the disciplinary meanings to be made from what can be estab-
lished about ongoing eforts by the cia and military agencies to secretly finance 
specific forms of anthropological research.
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The [African Studies] Association, which represented the combined strength of those 
concerned with Africa in this country, would be happy to aid you in any way it can.
M E L V I L L E  H E R S K O V I T S  | first president of the African Studies Association, to the  
Honorable Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency, February 20, 1958  
(qtd. in Martin and West 1999: 91–92)
S E V E N   H O W  C I A  F U N D I N G  F R O N T S  
 S H A P E D  A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L  
R E S E A R C H
A series of investigative press reports in 1967 revealed that beginning in the 
1950s the cia used funding fronts and “conduit” foundations to secretly finance 
academic research of interest to the agency. The cia avoided outside scrutiny 
of the research it funded by working with organizations, projects, or individuals 
that fulfilled one of three roles: as a front, a conduit, or a recipient.
The front, sometimes also called a “dummy foundation,” was frequently a 
cia- held “paper foundation” consisting of  little more than an address or post 
office box and a bank account holding cia funds. Sometimes  these fronts  were 
nonprofit foundations — even while failing to provide the irs with the docu-
mentation needed to support this claimed pretense (see  table 7.1). The cia used 
fronts to pass funds to conduits.
The conduit, sometimes referred to as a “pass- through,” was usually a legitimate 
preexisting foundation receiving funds from a cia front (see  table 7.2). Usually, 
someone from the cia contacted a se nior- level individual at the foundation and 
discussed how the agency wished its funds to be used. The cia representative 
discussed the funding of specific individuals or programs with designated in-
dividuals at the conduit and assured the delivery of cia funds to the desired 
proj ect  under the pretext of funding from the conduit.
The recipient was the individual or proj ect that received cia funds from 
 either a front or a conduit (see  table 7.3). In many instances recipients did not 
know they  were receiving cia funds.
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Elite social networks played impor tant roles in establishing fronts and con-
duits. As a Prince ton gradu ate who for years had practiced law at the New York 
firm of  Sullivan and  Cromwell, dci Allen Dulles had contacts he used to qui-
etly approach board members of nonprofits, and  others at the cia used similar 
elite networks to establish foundation contacts. With cia links to Ivy League 
universities,  there was no shortage of informal agency connections to non-
profit boards. In a 1967 Washington Post exposé, Richard Harwood described 
how “Samuel Hadley of the prestigious New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley, and McCloy allowed his  family’s Rubicon Foundation to be used as 
a conduit for cia funds” (1967d: E1); firm partner John J. McCloy was a for-
mer chair of the Car ne gie Corporation. Harwood traced connections between 
Wall Street firms and prominent law offices, where the cia quietly contacted 
individual board members and passed along cia funds or requests for specific 
funding directives. Harwood identified Eli Whitney Debevoise and Francis 
T. P. Plimpton of the law firm Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates as link-
ing the (cia- funded) American Council for the International Commission of 
Jurists, the (cia- funded) Foundation for Youth and Student Afairs, the United 
Nations, and the Rocke fel ler Foundation. The cia also used the foundations 
of a Texas oil tycoon (William P. Hobby Jr.) to secretly fund projects. Connec-
tions between moneyed families, private foundations, and the cia ran deep. 
According to Harwood, “The list of establishmentarians involved with the cia 
in its penetration of private institutions is lengthy and includes such other fig-
ures as Robert Manning, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, and McGeorge Bundy, 
who has had experience both inside and outside the Government. As a foreign 
policy adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Bundy in efect supervised 
the cia operation.  Today he is president of the Ford Foundation” (1967d: E1).
The New York Times revealed that Richard M. Hunt, assistant dean of Har-
vard University’s Gradu ate School of Arts, was the director of the Fund for In-
ternational Social and Economic Education (fisee), which received cia funds 
through the Brown and Pappas Foundations. Howard C. Thomas Jr., fisee’s 
executive director, had been the Saigon representative of the Asia Foundation, 
which at the time was a cia front (Sheehan 1967c). Hunt claimed he did not 
know fisee received $50,000 a year in cia money, saying that “money from the 
Brown organ ization was used to support work by his group in Latin Amer i ca, 
but ‘I’m not at liberty to disclose the nature of that specific proj ect’ ” (1).
The funding of par tic u lar projects  shaped disciplinary research agen-
das. Often research projects’ designs  were established prior to the receipt of 
laundered cia funds, yet the completion of  these projects was made pos si ble 
H O W  C I A  F U N D I N G  F R O N T S   S H A P E D  R E S E A R C H  | 167
through cia assistance, while other projects withered without such support. 
Foundations exposed in the press as cia conduits received surprisingly  little 
scrutiny; usually foundation spokespersons refused to answer press questions 
concerning cia contacts, and they refused to identify which projects received 
cia funding. When the Hobby Foundation was identified as a cia conduit, 
William Hobby refused to respond to questions relating to cia contacts or which 
projects received laundered cia funds (Kenworthy 1967a). But Hobby’s irs 
990- A filings informed news reports that in 1964 Hobby funded American 
Friends of the  Middle East ($75,000), the Fund for International and Social 
Education ($50,000), Radio  Free Eu rope ($40,000), the Committee of Corre-
spondence ($5,000), the Institute of International Education ($500), and Ber-
liner Verein ($100,000) (Kenworthy 1967a; see Wilford 2013: 113–32).
Vice President Hubert Humphrey was outraged to learn of the cia’s abuse 
of foundations to gain access to unwitting Americans, but many politicians de-
fended  these programs. Liberals like Robert Kennedy supported the cia’s use 
of fronts to influence groups like the National Student Association. Kennedy 
ignored the threats  these programs presented to academic freedom and argued 
that  these decisions  were “not made unilaterally by the cia but by the Executive 
Branch in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations” (Harwood 
1967d: E1).
At the African- American Institute, in 1953 Waldemar A. Nielsen began ac-
cepting cia funds — funds that continued for eight years, even while Nielsen 
knew “the inherent imprudence and impropriety” of  these actions (Harwood 
1967d). In spite of  these misgivings, once the funding began, the institute be-
came “like a drunk taking the first drink. . . .  It is easy to overindulge.” This 
indulgence continued  until, at the point when this secret relationship was re-
vealed, half of the institute’s funding came from the cia (Harwood 1967d).
Soon  after the Ramparts story on the National Student Association broke 
in 1967, other journalists revealed other cia-linked foundations. Tables 7.1, 7.2, 
and 7.3 list identified cia fronts, conduits, and recipients identified by the press 
 after, and including, the publication of Sol Stern’s 1967 Ramparts article.
Even  after press revelations of cia fronts, and despite the Church Commit-
tee’s findings that the cia’s influence on the funding of international research 
had been “massive,” the specific details of how this funding influenced Ameri-
can anthropologists’ research remain largely unexamined. But the passage of 
time increases archival resources and the availability of foia documents, al-
lowing consideration of how  these covert relationships worked.
 TA B L E   7 . 1   Thirty- Two Documented cia Fronts
F O U N D AT I O N C I TAT I O N
Appalachian Fund (Sheehan 1967c; Newsweek 1967)
Asia Foundation ( until 1967) (Turner 1967)
Beacon Fund (Stern 1967; cq 1967)
Borden Trust (Stern 1967; cq 1967)
Broad High Fund (cq 1967*)
James Carlisle Trust (cq 1967*; Newsweek 1967)
Chesapeake Fund (cq 1967*)
Edsel Fund (Stern 1967; cq 1967)
Foundation for Youth and Social Afairs (Farnsworth 1967; cq 1967*)
Gotham Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967; Saunders 2000: 354)
Andrew Hamilton Fund (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967; Saunders 1999: 354)
Heights Fund (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
 Human Ecol ogy Fund (aka sihe) (Marks 1979; 147-92)
In de pen dence Foundation Inc. (Harwood 1967e; cq 1967*)
International Development Foundation (Sheehan 1967b)
International Marketing Inst. (Sheehan 1967b)
Jones O’Donnell Foundation (Glass 1967)
Kentfield Fund (Stern 1967; Kenworthy 1967b; cq 1967)
Knickerbocker Foundation (cq 1967*)
Michigan Fund (see Saunders 1999: 354)
Monroe Fund (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Munich Institute (O’Connell 1990: 307)
Northcraft Educational Fund (cq 1967*)
Price Fund (Stern 1967; cq 1967)
San Jacinto Fund (Houston) (cq 1967)
San Miguel Fund (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Tower Fund (Sheehan 1967c; cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Vernon Fund (cq 1967*; Irwin and Burke 1967)
Charles Price Whitten Trust (cq 1967*; Newsweek 1967)
Warden Trust (cq  1967*)
Williford- Telford Fund (cq 1967*; Newsweek 1967)
Wynnewood Fund (cq 1967*; Newsweek 1967)
cq 1967* = Congressional Quarterly listed this as “Suspected cia ‘Dummies.’ ”
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 TA B L E   7 . 2   Twenty-Six Documented cia Conduits (aka Pass- Throughs)
F O U N D AT I O N C I TAT I O N
M. D. Anderson Foundation (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967; Saunders 1999: 354)
Baird Foundation (cq 1967; Saunders 2000: 354; Newsweek 1967)
J. Frederick Brown Foundation (Sheehan 1967b; Newsweek 1967)
Catherwood Foundation (cq 1967)
Dation (Miami) (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Cleveland H. Dodge Foundation Inc. (cq 1967)
Farfield Foundation Inc. (cq 1967; Harwood 1967e)
Florence Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Geschickter Fund for Medical Research (Marks 1979: 59)
Granary Fund (Boston) (Kenworthy 1967b; cq 1967; cf. Glass 1967)
Hobby Foundation (Kenworthy 1967a; cq 1967)
Hoblitzelle Foundation (cq 1967)
Kaplan Fund (Saunders 2000: 354; Newsweek 1967)
J. M. Kaplan Fund (Stern 1967; cq 1967)
Lucius N. Littouer Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967; cq 1967)
McGregor Fund (cq 1967)
Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation (Marks 1979: 59)
Marshall Foundation (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Mount Pleasant Fund (Kenworthy 1967b)
Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc. (Irwin and Burke 1967; cq  1967)
Jones- O’Donnell Foundation (cq 1967)
Pappas Charitable Trust (cq 1967)
Rabb (Sidney & Ester) Charitable 
Foundation
(cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Benjamin Rosenthal Foundation (cq 1967)
Rubicon Foundation (cq 1967; Ross 1976: 104)
Victoria Strauss Fund (Kenworthy 1967b; Sheehan  1967c)
What cia Fronts Funded
The cia used fronts to secretly finance the publication of books and articles 
propagating cia- supported views. One cia front, the Gotham Foundation, fi-
nanced projects related to po liti cal developments in postwar Japan. Gotham 
published Lawrence Battistini’s book The Postwar Student Strug gle in Japan 
(1956), and an early 1960s Gotham Foundation proj ect run by former Asia Foun-
dation employee Dr. Gaston Sigur translated Japa nese  labor publications into 
 TA B L E   7 . 3   Seventy- One Documented Recipients Funded by cia Fronts
F O U N D AT I O N C I TAT I O N
African American Institute (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967; Irwin and Burke 
1967)
African Research Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967)
American Anthropological Association (naaa rec ords)
American Committee for Émigrés in the 
Professions
(Irwin and Burke 1967)
American Council for the International 
Commission of Jurists
(cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees
(Harwood 1967b; W. A. Price 1967)
American Friends of the  Middle East (Sheehan 1967b; cq 1967; Irwin and Burke 
1967)
American Fund for  Free Jurists (Sheehan 1967a; Irwin and Burke 1967)
American Newspaper Guild (Sheehan 1967a; cq 1967)
American Federation of  Labor (de Vries 2012: 1075)
American Society of African Culture (Sheehan 1967b, 1967c; cq 1967; Newsweek 
1967)
Association of Hungarian Students in  
North Amer i ca
(Harwood 1967e; Irwin and Burke 1967)
Atwater Research Program in North Africa (Newsweek 1967)
Berliner Verein (Kenworthy 1967a)
Canadian Union of Students (cq 1967)
Center for Christian Demo cratic Action (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Committee for Self- Determination (Kenworthy 1967b; Irwin and Burke 1967)
Committee of Correspondence, Inc. (Kenworthy 1967a)
Commentary Magazine (Harwood 1967e)
Congress for Cultural Freedom (Newsweek 1967; Harwood 1967e)
Congre pou la Liberte de la Culture, Paris (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Dialogue Magazine (nyt 1967b, 1967c)
M. J. Desai (Kenworthy 1967b)
Escuela Interamerican de Education 
Demo cratica
(Irwin and Burke 1967)
Foreign Policy Research Institute (Sheehan 1967a; Kenworthy 1967a)
Frente Departmental de Camposinos de Puno (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Friends of India Committee (Kenworthy 1967b; Time 1967b)
Fund for International Social and Economic 
Education
(Sheehan 1967c; Kenworthy 1967a)
(continued)
 TA B L E   7 . 3   (continued)
F O U N D AT I O N C I TAT I O N
Thomas J. Gilligan Jr. (Kenworthy 1967b)
Billy Graham Spanish- American Crusade (Time 1967b)
Harvard Law School Fund (Time 1967b)
In de pen dent Research Ser vice (cq 1967)
Institute of International Education (Kenworthy 1967a; Newsweek 1967)
Institute of International  Labor Research (cq 1967; Newsweek 1967)
Institut d’Historie Sociale (Kenworthy 1967b)
Institute of Public Administration (Sheehan 1967a; Newsweek 1967)
International Center for Social Research (Irwin and Burke 1967)
International Commission of Jurists (Tolley 1994: xiii)
International Confederation of  Free Trade 
Unions
(cq 1967)
International Cooperative Development Fund (cq 1967)
International Development Foundation, Inc. (Sheehan 1967c; cq 1967)
International Federation of Petroleum and 
Chemical Workers
(cq 1967)
International Food and Drink Workers 
Federation
(Time 1967a)
International Marketing Institute (cq 1967)
International Student Conference (Shehan 1967a; Farnsworth 1967; cq 1967)
International Union of Socialist Youth (Irwin and Burke 1967)
 Kenya Federation of  Labor (Sheehan 1967c)
Kossuth Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967)
National Council of Churches (Time 1967a)
National Education Assn. (cq 1967)
National Student Association (Ramparts 1967; Sheehan 1967d; cq 1967)
Oficina Relacionadara Movimientos 
Estudiantiles Universitarias
(Irwin and Burke 1967)
Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (Kenworthy 1967b; Newsweek  1967)
Pan- American Foundation (Sheehan 1967c; cq 1967)
Pax Romana, North American Secretariat (Time 1967b; Irwin & Burke 1967)
P.E.N. (Harwood 1967e)
Praeger Press (nyt 1967c; Hersh 1974a)
Public Ser vices International (cq 1967)
Radio  Free Eu rope (Kenworthy 1967a; cq 1967)
Retail Clerks International Association (cq 1967)
Ser vice Educational Foundation (Irwin and Burke 1967)
En glish (Burks 2011: 53n25). Prince ton psychologists Hadley Cantril and Lloyd 
 Free used cia funds to establish the Prince ton Research Council, where they 
developed public opinion survey methods and administered surveys in the 
Eastern bloc during the 1960s (Crewdson and Treaster 1977: 37).
In his 2009 memoir, South African Special Branch  career intelligence veteran 
P. C. Swanepoel described his discovery in the early 1960s that the London- 
based “Transcription Center” (advertised in then cia- financed New Africa 
magazine) was a cia- backed operation providing news stories of interest to 
 those studying Africa. The Transcription Center, which published news stories 
and maintained contact with scholars and journalists working in Africa, was 
financed by a grant from the Farfield Foundation (Swanepoel 2007 226, 246). 
Among  those identified as having been interviewed (on African oral traditions) 
by the Transcription Center was anthropologist Godfrey Lienhardt (Swanepoel 
2007: 227; see Lienhardt et al. 1966).
The cia secretly funded the Congress for Cultural Freedom, including the 
financing of the British journal Encounter (see Saunders 1999; D. H. Price 2005; 
Fox, 1967; Warner 1995) and the Japa nese journal Jirū, which the cia used to 
 legitimize desired po liti cal reforms in Japan (Takeyama and Minear 2007: 19–21). 
Japan Cultural Forum received cia funds channeled through the Hoblitzelle 
Foundation (Takeyama and Minear 2007: 20). The African- American Insti-
tute’s Africa Special Report was financed by another cia front, the Andrew 
Hamilton Fund, which used cia funds to support conferences and other events 
(African- American Institute 1956–1959). Some cia fronts, such as the Andrew 
 TA B L E   7 . 3   (continued)
F O U N D AT I O N C I TAT I O N
Stanford Research Institute (Irwin and Burke 1967)
Synod of Bishops of the Rus sian Church 
Outside Rus sia
(Newsweek 1967)
University of Southern California (Sheehan 1967c)
United Auto Workers (Flint 1967)
United States Youth Council (cq 1967)
John Hay Whitney Trust (Kenworthy 1967b; Time 1967b)
Robert E. Witherspoon (Kenworthy 1967b)
World Assembly of Youth (Irwin and Burke 1967)
World Confederation of Organizations of the 
Teaching Profession
(cq 1967)
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Hamilton Fund, paid for scholars’ research expenses when they traveled to the 
underdeveloped world, such as Michigan State University historian James R. 
Hooker’s travels to London, Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi in 1959 (Henderson 
1989: vii; Lawrence 1979: 83–84).
Several presses published books financed entirely or in part with cia funds; 
 there was  little academic market for many of  these books, which would have 
faced difficulties being published without such underwriting. The Asia Foun-
dation funneled cia monies as grants to subsidize the publication of books 
at Franklin Press; the agency also “made editorial contributions” to books 
published by major publishing  houses such as Scribner’s Sons (including The 
Yenan’s Way [1951] by Eudocio Ravines “from a translation supplied by William 
F. Buckley, Jr. who was a cia agent for several years in the early 1950s”), Bal-
lantine Books, and G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Several well- known writers, including 
Peter Matthiessen and George Plimpton, received cia funds during this period 
(Crewdson and Treaster 1977: 37).
In February 1967, the New York Times disclosed that Praeger Press had pub-
lished books “at the cia’s suggestion” (nyt 1967c). Praeger’s first cia- backed 
publication was Milovan Djilas’s book critiquing Yugo slavian communism, The 
New Class (Djilas 1957; see Crewdson and Treaster 1977: 37). Frederick Praeger 
claimed to have published only “15 or 16” books that “dealt fundamentally with 
facts, history and analy sis of event of Communist- bloc countries or of nations 
susceptible of a fall to Communism,” telling the Times  these books  were vetted by 
specialists before publication, but he refused to answer questions about Prae-
ger’s cia relationship (nyt 1967c).1
E. Howard Hunt Jr.  later contradicted Frederick Praeger’s claims of limited 
cia involvement. Testifying in Senate hearings investigating Watergate cover- 
ups, Hunt described his years at the cia’s Domestic Operations Division, which 
operated out of cia covert field stations in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, 
Washington, DC, and elsewhere. Hunt had worked out of the National Press 
Building, using credentials of Continental Press, a cia front. Hunt told Seymour 
Hersh, “We funded much of the activities of the Frederick D. Praeger Publish-
ing Corporation in New York City. We funded, to a large extent, the activities 
of Fodor’s Travel Guide, distributed by the David McKay Corporation” (Hersh 
1974a: 4).2
The cia did not act alone in negotiating  these propaganda publishing ven-
tures at Praeger and other presses. At the  U.S. Information Agency (usia), 
Louis Fanget, Donald McNeill, and William W. Warner developed a pro cess in 
which first they “would think of a book that could explain what the Soviets had 
done to hurt the freedom of its  people; then they would ofer Frederick Praeger 
or other publishers an advance to commission an author and publish his work 
for foreign markets, even if the topic would not normally sell abroad” (Green 
1988: 69). Through such hidden moves the cia did more than fund preexisting 
academic views looking for support: it created propaganda that was passed of 
as scholarship and, in the pro cess, warped academic freedom and damaged the 
credibility of academic projects financed by  these funds.
The cia’s secret interference with academic publishing was not limited to 
the dozen or so books first claimed by Frederick Praeger in the Times. Instead, 
“thousands of books from Praeger and Franklin Press and other publishers 
flowed into dozens of countries. They  were  either donated by the usia posts 
abroad, or in some cases, sold through local retailers. Field officers liked  these 
results and admired the fact that a government agency could stimulate the ap-
pearance of so many good books. Frederick Praeger’s enterprise and energy 
contributed to the program’s success as did the willingness of Fanget, McNeill, 
and Warner to slash red tape” (Green 1988: 69).  After reading news reports of 
Frederick Praeger’s cia links, Marvin Harris speculated that this explained 
“why Praeger started then stopped publication of my friend Antonio Figueire-
do’s book on Portuguese Africa for which I had already written a preface. Prae-
ger claimed that he  couldn’t publish it  after he found out that Antonio worked 
for Narodny, the Rus sian bank in London. He said no one would believe Anto-
nio  because of this connection” (MH to DHP 11/9/94).
The New York Times identified several international academic journals as 
being secretly financed with cia funds: Africa Forum and Africa Report (both 
organs of the American Society of African Culture and the African- American 
Institute), Argumenten (Sweden), Combate (Latin Amer i ca), the East African 
 Legal Digest ( Kenya), Preuves (France), Forum (Austria), Der Monat (West 
Germany), El Mundo Nuevo (Latin Amer i ca), Thought and Quest (India), and 
the Asia Foundation’s Asian Student (Crewdson and Treaster 1977: 37). In 1967, 
Jason Epstein observed in an essay in the New York Review of Books that the 
cia’s covert support of specific forms of academic inquiry “was not a  matter 
of buying of and subverting individual writers and scholars, but of setting up 
an arbitrary and factitious system of values by which academic personnel  were 
advanced, magazine editors appointed, and scholars subsidized and published, 
not necessarily on their merits, though  these  were sometimes considerable, but 
 because of their allegiances. The fault of the cia was not that it corrupted the 
innocent but that it tried, in collusion with a group of insiders, to corner a  free 
market” (16).
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The New York Times  later identified American writer Edward S. Hunter as 
a “cia operative who employed the cover of a freelance author in search of a 
book . . .  who roamed Central Asia for years collecting material for a work on 
Af ghan i stan that eventually was published by the prestigious  house of Hod-
der and Stroughton of London” (Crewdson and Treaster 1977: 37).3 Hunter wrote 
articles and books, testified before Congress on communist brainwashing tech-
niques, and was an anticommunist “expert witness” for the House Un- American 
Activities Committee. His book The Past Present: A Year in Af ghan i stan  adopted 
an orientalist stance to provide an account of mid-1950s Af ghan i stan for the 
general public. He traveled to Af ghan i stan during Nikita Khrushchev’s tour of 
southern Asia in 1955, when the USSR announced it would give Af ghan i stan 
$100 million in economic development aid. Hunter viewed Khrushchev’s aid as 
a Soviet strategy to turn Af ghan i stan into the “keystone of a new psychological 
ofensive in the cold- hot war. If it could not be dislodged, even its loosening 
might topple the already wobbly  Free World arch that extended downwards to 
the sea, through Iran on the one side and Pakistan on the other” (Hunter 1959: 
15; cf. cia 1961: 30).
Hunter described waves of Soviet technicians working on vari ous techno-
logical infusion programs spread throughout the countryside. His accounts 
of the inferiority of Soviet machinery and aid projects carried dual messages 
as he  questioned the intentions and workable outcomes of the Soviet proj-
ects, while bluntly stressing how Amer i ca’s enemies  were gaining ground in a 
strug gle for the hearts, minds, and loyalties of Afghans (Hunter 1959: 242–43). 
Hunter described Americans working on small technical assistance programs, 
and he included details of an ica irrigation pump program. Personnel from 
ica  were skeptical about the long- term impacts of their pump proj ect, and 
Hunter wished the pumps had clear labels indicating this was a U.S.- sponsored 
proj ect (147).
The cia’s underwriting of Hunter’s book makes his focus on the presence of 
Soviet advisers throughout Af ghan i stan seem comical. In one passage Hunter 
complained about how upset he was when he “saw Soviet Rus sians mysteri-
ously moving about; nobody could tell me what they  were  doing. They  were 
‘advisors’ and ‘technicians’ on strange visits from elsewhere. What  were they 
 doing in that region was unstated. Indeed, their presence was denied. I watched 
a small party of them embarking on the King’s plane at Kandahar  after one of 
their periodical trips. The Afghan authorities who came to the airport airily de-
nied that the group entering the royal plane  were Communist Rus sians. Other 
Afghans took me aside  later and told me not to be fooled; they  were Red agents” 
(1959: 236). Hunter did not depict American ica operations as having similar 
double motives. As he presented the situation, the Soviets  were “mysteriously 
moving about,” while American aid was a generous expression of American 
compassion, and was simply a neutral observer.
The Asia Foundation, the aaa, and cia: 1956–1967
The Committee for  Free Asia (cfa) was established in 1951 and three years 
 later changed its name to the Asia Foundation (More house 1957: 52).  Under the 
leadership of Brayton Wilbur, the cfa operated the anticommunist Radio  Free 
Asia, produced pamphlets, and “mobilized church groups and garden clubs 
 behind a ‘Seeds for Democracy’ campaign in the Philippines” (Weissman and 
Shoch  1972: 3). The committee’s staf and board had significant military and 
intelligence connections (Weissman and Shoch 1972: 3–4).4 The committee also 
had links to the cia’s Radio  Free Eu rope program, and it undertook propa-
ganda radio broadcasts (beginning in Manila in 1951). It backed candidates in 
Philippine elections, funded scholarships and travel grants for Asian students, 
and ran a bookstore in Hong Kong where it “provided a front for US support 
for the Asian operations of a host of international organizations such as the 
World Assembly of Youth and the International Confederation of  Free Trade 
Unions” (Defty 2004: 207), both of which  were  later revealed to have cia ties 
(Saunders 1999: 142; Kelber 2004; Blum 1995: 109).
The cfa published the anticommunist monograph Land Reform: Commu-
nist China, Nationalist China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan (1953), which was mailed 
to libraries and journalists with a letter explaining that the volume “is not de-
signed to serve as a detailed analy sis of land reform, but as a ready daily reference 
for use by editors, news commentators and educators.”5 Supplying journalists 
with such predigested cia- sponsored analy sis was designed to shape American 
views on Asian land reform.
The cia trained Tibetan fighters (see McGranahan 2010), and the cfa 
funded anthropologist and missionary Robert Ekvall to act as a translator and 
culture broker for the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Thubten Jigme Norbus, dur-
ing his visit to the United States (Jackson 2004: 613).6 In 1953, the cfa became 
the Asia Foundation, with Robert Blum as its president. Blum had extensive 
intelligence experience; during World War II, Blum oversaw oss operations 
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland,  later becoming deputy 
director of the oss’s Eu ro pean Counterintelligence Clearing house (rbp, nara, 
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6/25/45).  After the war Blum took a position at the cia, which he left to direct 
the Asia Foundation.
Blum was a “protégé of cia Director Allen Dulles,” whose cia work in Asia in-
volved leading the U.S. Special Technical and Economic Mission (stem) in Viet-
nam in 1950–54, for which he was dubbed by General Jean De Latire, commander 
of the French expeditionary forces, “the most dangerous man in Indochina” (Cor-
son 1968: 36). Blum’s papers at Yale document his busy Asian travel schedule 
in his official capacity of Asia Foundation president. His travels allowed him to 
establish connections with academic and po liti cal figures, and he wrote detailed 
reports on the  people and organizations he encountered. Many of  these meetings 
produced memos fit for intelligence dossiers; he wrote monthly and quarterly 
internal Asia Foundation reports and memos recounting detailed embassy meet-
ings and summaries of po liti cal, economic, and academic developments.
 These reports contained profiles of individuals in Af ghan i stan, Burma, Cam-
bodia, Hong Kong, India, Indochina, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, 
South  Korea, Thailand, and other po liti cal hot spots of the 1950s and 1960s. They 
include accounts of Blum’s 1960 visit with Asian leaders (including Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk of Cambodia and President Suharto of Indonesia) and hundreds 
of scholars and local functionaries. Blum’s Asia Foundation rec ords include 
receipts for a range of interactions with impor tant intelligence and po liti cal 
functionaries such as lunches with then Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger or 
dinner with cia counterintelligence chief, James Angleton (rbp af Receipts 
Folder, 4/21/58 and 9/24/54).
Blum compiled dossiers on individuals he met in Asia and collected pho-
tographs (meticulously labeled) of individuals attending parties at embassies 
or Western hotels. For example, the dossiers on individuals encountered dur-
ing Blum’s November 1954 visit to Indonesia included a summary of his en-
counter with Cornell po liti cal scientist George McT. Kahin with the following 
paragraph:
Kahin said that the situation in Indonesia was not good and that the government 
was spending a lot of time talking about the international position of Indonesia 
as a member of the Colombo group in order to distract attention from domestic 
failure. He said that [Sukarno] was a revolutionary by training and experience 
and could not adapt well to the requirements of stable po liti cal life.  There was 
no evidence that [Sukarno] was a doctrinaire communist, but [Sukarno] had told 
Kahin that he admired greatly what the communists had done, for example, in 
bringing about unity and po liti cal stability in China and their ability to or ga nize 
their youth. Kahin does not think that  there is an early danger of a communist 
take- over but is worried that po liti cal disintegration is gradually setting in. (rbp 
af 11/10–13/54 Monthly Report, 6)
Blum’s voluminous reports contained evaluations of po liti cal developments, 
and although they  were designated for circulation only within the Asia Foun-
dation’s board,  because Blum was a cia asset, they would have circulated within 
the agency, where segments could be incorporated in classified intelligence re-
ports (rbp).
The foundation provided funds, opportunities, and contacts for foreign 
scholars;  these contacts, in turn, provided Blum and staf with links to their 
homelands. Anthropologist Swami Agehananda Bharati’s memoir The Ochre 
Robe (1970) described his impressions of the Asia Foundation. To the young 
Bharati it appeared as “one of  those rich American bodies which the Hindu 
sages might have likened to the wish- granting tree or the wish- fulfilling cow 
of mythological fame. It sponsors studies in Asian humanities, and it has its 
offices all over  free Asia, its headquarters in San Francisco. It gave much aid to 
the Mahāmukuta Buddhist Acad emy, and it was through the Acad emy that I 
became known to the Foundation. It was suggested that I should go on a lecture 
tour to Japan and I was very pleased with the suggestion” (Bharati 1970: 263). 
The Asia Foundation was Bharati’s gateway to Amer i ca, where he established 
his anthropological  career with foundation funds.
President Blum used his position to shape academic work. One example of 
how he accomplished this is seen in a March 20, 1957 letter to the or ga nizer of 
the upcoming conference seeking funds from the Foundation.7 Blum mailed 
the or ga nizer an unsolicited detailed “list of suggestions for participants,” and 
he disparaged some of the scholars previously suggested by the or ga nizer (RB 1, 
6, 3/20/57).  Because the Asia Foundation helped fund such conferences,  these 
“suggestions” carried significant weight and allowed cia- linked personnel to 
alter academic discourse. Blum’s correspondence has examples of similar inter-
actions in which he used his influence to shape represented views (RB 1, 6). When 
 these interactions and their secondary afterefects are multiplied out across all 
of the cia funding fronts, and the informal conversations between cia- linked 
personnel and non- cia linked foundation personnel, we can understand some 
of the returns the Agency received from its investments in funding fronts. By 
1957, the Asia Foundation had seventy employees at its San Francisco and New 
York offices, and another thirty- five in the field (More house 1957: 52–53).8 Dur-
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ing this period the foundation funded diverse projects, including bringing 
Burmese, Japa nese, and other Asian scholars to American universities; trans-
lating Boy Scout lit er a ture into Burmese and Korean; funding the East Asia 
Teacher Training Program at the University of California; helping the Camp 
Fire Girls mail plant seeds to  people in Asia; book- buying programs; spreading 
American business curriculum; producing Asian radio commentaries; and 
providing economic analy sis of Asian developments. The foundation funded 
vari ous programs at organizations, including the Car ne gie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace, the Association of Asian Studies, the Institute of East Asiatic 
Studies, the Nieman Foundation for Journalism, the Japan Society, the Univer-
sity of Michigan, the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors, and the 
Stanford Research Institute.9
The aaa: The cia’s Asia Foundation Subsidiary
In 1956, the Asia Foundation, in a program initiated by Robert Blum, began 
awarding the aaa an annual $2,500 grant to make “it easier for Asians to sub-
scribe to the American Anthropologist” and to “provide small sums to enable 
[Asian anthropologists] to come to scientific meetings if they are already in 
the USA” (aaap 13, 14, Sol Tax 7/29/59). As with the cia’s involvement in the 
aaa’s membership roster in 1951–52, the agency’s interest in this program ap-
pears to have been its desire to identify and contact individual anthropologists. 
With  these funds, supplemented by their own payment of one dollar, Asian 
anthropologists received a three- year aaa membership, including receipt of 
American Anthropologist (aaap 49, Mandelbaum memo 1/8/58).10
The aaa established a committee to review Asian anthropologists’ appli-
cations, and aaa publications advertised  these subsidized memberships.11 A 
letter from Blum to George Foster from December 1956 explained that grant 
recipients must be from an Asian country of origin located between Af ghan i-
stan and Japan, must be involved in teaching or studying anthropology at the 
gradu ate level, and must return to their homeland within two years of receiv-
ing  these funds; the foundation reserved the right to nominate grant recipients 
(aaap 48, RB to GF 12/26/56). The aaa’s rec ords are incomplete, but they in-
clude ledgers listing more than 413 identifiable individual recipients, and a few 
institutional recipients, between 1956 and 1967 (aaap 73).12
In April 1959, foundation president Blum sent aaa president Sol Tax a $2,500 
grant check, stressing that “the Foundation  will appreciate continuing receipt of 
brief reports describing the utilization of funds transmitted to the Association 
 under this grant”; with time, this reporting agreement came to mean the aaa 
sent lists identifying recipients, including contact information (aaap 13, 14; RB 
to ST 4/22/59).
By 1959, Japan and India dominated the program’s recipient lists; in 1961, 
Japan had 101 and India had 38 of the total 168 recipients of the foundation’s 
funds.  There  were also single- digit numbers of recipients from Pakistan, In-
donesia, Thailand,  Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Ceylon, the Andaman Is-
lands, and “other” (aaap 73, Boggs to Blum 1/27/61; Meggers to Mandelbaum 
10/30/59). The foundation gathered detailed information about  these recipients 
(aaap 73, Blum to Willey 2/20/61). While citing a need to complete account-
ing of the previous year’s grant, in November 1962, Louis Connick, Program 
Ser vice Division, Asia Foundation (and longtime cia operative; see  later dis-
cussion), wrote aaa executive secretary Stephen T. Boggs asking “for as much 
detail as pos si ble about the awardees themselves” (aaap 73, LC to SB 11/2/62). 
When Boggs replied without sending a list of recipients, Connick promptly 
responded that the foundation still expected “to receive the list of names and 
addresses of  those now receiving subscriptions paid for by The Asia Founda-
tion” (aaap 73, LC to SB 12/10/62). No explanation was provided concerning 
why the foundation needed the addresses of grant recipients. Connick wrote 
that he did “appreciate the difficulty involved in providing biographical details 
on each of the awardees beyond  those that  will be supplied in the new inter-
national directory mentioned in your letter. The data included therein  will, I’m 
sure, be sufficient for our needs” (aaap 73, LC to SB 12/10/62).
In 1963, Connick and Robert Schwantes asked to meet with Secretary Boggs 
to discuss a new program of travel grants to “assist Asian anthropologists at-
tending scholarly meetings in the United States.” The foundation required the 
aaa to provide it with the names and addresses of recipients (aaap 73, LC to 
SB 5/7/63). Foundation funds  were used by aaa Asian scholars to attend aca-
demic conferences and other anthropological events within the United States.13 
At times, foundation representatives recommended specific individuals to 
participate in its sponsored aaa membership program (aaap 73, Porterfield 
to Boggs 11/12/65).
In 1966, a year prior to the New York Times disclosure that the Asia Founda-
tion was a cia front, an article in the Washington Post with the headline “cia 
Front” reported, “Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia’s chief of state, believes 
the Central Intelligence Agency is using the Asia Foundation, the only US 
organ ization remaining in Cambodia. A monitored New China News Agency 
report quoted Sihanouk as saying his suspicions about the Asia Foundation, a 
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private aid group,  were substantiated by its ‘per sis tence’ in remaining in Cam-
bodia despite growing hostility from the government and  people” (Washington 
Post 1966). The foundation’s unusual aggressiveness in contacting scholars and 
its large amounts of research funds, with  little accountability, raised suspicions of 
cia ties.  Others speculated about pos si ble cia links. In 1966, ucla anthropolo-
gist Tom Kiefer wrote Ralph Beals with suspicions that the Asia Foundation 
was a cia front. Kiefer described how in early 1965 he repeatedly saw the foun-
dation listed as a funding source in articles, and  after sending an “exploratory 
letter” to the foundation, he received an encouraging letter and an application 
form. Kiefer wrote that he “became suspicious  because of the format of the 
application. No references  were required, no testimonials as to scholarly com-
petence. Etc. Rather, the form reminded me of a request for a security clearance 
(all past addresses, po liti cal organizations one belongs to,  etc.). I declined to 
send this in, but received a follow-up request from them two weeks  later ask-
ing that I complete the form and send it. I rather foolishly did so, before  doing 
any additional checking up on the organ ization” (rb 75, TK to RB 2/12/66). 
Kiefer discovered the Asia Foundation was not listed in directories disclosing 
the sources of foundation funds. He became alarmed when a friend learned 
from North Borneo contacts that a known cia operative had made inquiries 
about Kiefer. This upset Kiefer, who withdrew his grant application. He wrote 
Beals that other researchers reported “similar experiences of a suspicious na-
ture” (rb 75, TK to RB 2/12/66; a discussion of Elizabeth Bacon’s suspicions 
appears in chapter eleven). During the years before cia funding was exposed, 
several anthropologists received Asia Foundation funding, including Robert F. 
Spencer (bic 2014c), Agehananda Bharati (Bharati 1970: 263), and Wilton S. 
Dillon (aaafn 1966 7[7]: 8).14
Ramparts Revelations of cia Funding Fronts
A March 22, 1967, New York Times story disclosed that the Asia Foundation was 
a cia cover organ ization (Turner 1967). The story cited a recently published 
Ramparts article on cia infiltration of the National Student Association as the 
impetus for this report. The narrative in the Times closely followed the Asia 
Foundation’s press release that acknowledged, but downplayed the extent of, its 
cia ties. The foundation announced:
The Trustees wish to state that in the past they have also knowingly received con-
tributions from private foundations and trusts which have been recently named as 
having transmitted Central Intelligence Agency funds to private American orga-
nizations. The Trustees’ in de pen dent decision to accept funds from  these founda-
tions and trusts in no way afected the Foundation’s policies and programs. All 
contributions to the Foundation, from what ever source,  were accepted on the 
condition that the expenditure of such funds was to be left to the discretion of 
the Trustees without any interference and that the funds be used solely for the 
Foundation’s declared purposes. (aaap 73, Asia Foundation, Trustees Statement 
3/21/67)
Foundation spokesman John Bannigan refused to disclose the extent of cia funds 
received, nor would he confirm  whether the board was aware of  these funds. 
Although a number of prominent Americans (e.g., Paul Hofman, Grayson Kirk, 
Adlai Stevenson)  were identified by the New York Times as sitting on the foun-
dation’s board,  after the initial flurry of news interest in the story,  there was no 
real follow up by investigative journalists with  these individuals concerning the 
CIA role at the foundation.15
The Asia Foundation claimed that employees had “not been used or influenced 
in any way, directly or indirectly, by any contributor to the foundation” (Turner 
1967), but now- declassified documents establish this was not true. One 1966 
top secret memo between the cia and the 303 Committee bluntly described the 
Asia Foundation as “a Central Intelligence Agency propriety” and expressed 
concerns about Ramparts reporters inquiring into foundation funding sources 
in case the press discovered the cia was the Asia Foundation’s main funding 
source.16 Although the foundation lied to the public about the extent of its cia 
ties, the cia disclosed the truth to its oversight body, the 303 Committee:
The Asia Foundation (taf), a Central Intelligence Agency proprietary, was estab-
lished in 1954 to undertake cultural and educational activities on behalf of the 
United States Government in ways not open to official U.S. agencies. Over the past 
twelve years taf has accomplished its assigned mission with increasing efective-
ness and has, in the pro cess, become a widely- known institution, in Asia and the 
United States.
 . . .  In the long run, we feel [The Asia Foundation’s] vulnerability to press attack 
can be reduced and its viability as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Asia can 
be assured by relieving it of its total dependence upon covert funding support from 
this Agency. In the belief that taf contributes substantially to U.S. national inter-
ests in Asia, and can continue to contribute if its viability is sustained, cia requests 
the Committee’s study and attention to pos si ble alternative means of supporting it. 
(cia 1966b, emphasis added)
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This 1966 memo clarified the cia’s awareness of the vulnerabilities of the Asia 
Foundation and that the foundation had a “total dependence upon covert” cia 
funds.
Other declassified documents establish that the cia used the Asia Founda-
tion to fund projects of interest to the cia and other agencies. In the 303 Com-
mittee minutes of August 5, 1966, reference was made to comments by Walt 
Rostow “that the cia had many times taken up the slack [at the Asia Foun-
dation] when other agencies  were unable to come up with funds.”17 The Asia 
Foundation also ran a Books for Asian Students Program that shipped edu-
cational books to Asian students, listing 12,040 books and 5,859 journals sent 
to Af ghan i stan, 69,464 books and 21,229 journals to the  People’s Republic of 
China, and thousands of books sent to other Asian nations. The Books for Asian 
Students Program appears to have been part of the cia- operated Asian propa-
ganda program outlined in the cia’s top secret 1953 Draft Psychological Strat-
egy for Southeast Asia (foia cia- rdp80R01731R000700450031–6, pp.  17–18) 
 later described by Victor Marchetti and John Marks (1974: 200–201; aaap 73, 
Carlton Lowenberg to S. Boggs 9/23/66).
On April 12, 1967, dci Richard Helms ordered the cia to terminate covert 
funding of the Asia Foundation. The cia noted that the foundation’s recent ac-
knowl edg ment of cia funds “produced no serious threat to [Asia Foundation] 
operations in Asia, and the Trustees are now prepared to attempt to acquire the 
necessary support for [the Asia Foundation] to go on as a private institution, 
partially supported by overt U.S. Government grants” (http:// www . state . gov / r 
/ pa / ho / frus / johnsonlb / x / 9098 . htm 4/12/67). The cia worried that without the 
steady flow of covert cia funds, the Asia Foundation could close. The memo 
expressed the following concerns:
TAF’s present resources are sufficient to sustain operations through July 31, 1967, 
the end of the Foundation’s fiscal year. ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■  [4–
1/2 lines of text redacted] To meet  these obligations, and to allow taf management 
to plan rationally for fy 1968, immediate firm commitments must be acquired on 
 future levels and sources of support. This Agency is prepared to provide what-
ever assistance remains within its authority and competence to ofer. To under-
take further necessary action, however, the Agency requests that the Committee 
now designate the Agency or official to whom taf management should look for 
 future guidance and direction with res pect to United States Government inter-
ests. (http:// www . state . gov / r / pa / ho / frus / johnsonlb / x / 9098 . htm 4/12/67 [accessed 
3/9/12])
This memo raises questions of what roles the cia played in helping the Asia 
Foundation establish non- cia funds  after  these disclosures.
On June 26, 1967, the cia’s director of planning, programming, and bud geting 
terminated cia funding of the Asia Foundation (foia 0001088615, 6/26/67). 
Victor Marchetti, former special assistant to the cia’s deputy director,  later 
questioned the immediacy of the cia’s break, arguing that the foundation 
“clearly was one of the organizations which the cia was banned from financing 
and,  under the recommendations of the Katzenbach committee, the decision 
was made to end cia funding. A complete cut- of  after 1967, however, would 
have forced the foundation to shut down, so the agency made it the beneficiary 
of a large ‘severance payment’ in order to give it a  couple of years to develop 
alternative sources of funding” (Marchetti and Marks 1974: 200–201). Marchetti 
and Marks wrote that when the cia founded the foundation, with its
carefully chosen board of directors, the foundation was designed to promote aca-
demic and public interest in the East. Its sponsored scholarly research, supported 
conferences and symposia, and ran academic exchange programs, with the cia 
subsidy that reached $8 million dollars a year. While most of the foundation’s activi-
ties  were legitimate, the cia also used it, through penetrations among the officers 
and members, to fund anti- communist academicians in vari ous Asian countries, 
to disseminate throughout Asia a negative vision of mainland China, North Viet-
nam, and North  Korea, and to recruit foreign agents and new case officers. Although 
the foundation often served as a cover for clandestine operations, its main purpose 
was to promote the spread of ideas which  were anti- communist and pro- Amer-
i ca — sometimes subtly and sometimes stridently. (Marchetti and Marks 1974: 200, 
emphasis added)
This ac knowl edg ment from former cia personnel raised questions of  whether 
the lists of Asian anthropologists provided by the aaa to the foundation  were 
used by the cia in attempts to recruit analysts or agents or to assist in the “clan-
destine operations.”
A de cade  later, the New York Times described the Asia Foundation’s links to 
the cia in more direct terms than  those used in the initial disclosure, writing 
that “the foundation provided cover for at least one cia operative and carried 
out a variety of media- related ventures, including a program, begun in 1955, 
of selecting and paying the expenses of Asian journalists for a year of study 
in Harvard’s prestigious Nieman Fellowship program” (Crewdson and Treaster 
1977:37).
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Blum was not the Asia Foundation’s only  career cia employee. Louis Con-
nick, who collected the aaa’s lists of Asian anthropologists receiving member-
ships subsidized by the foundation, had a long cia  career. In 2008, Connick’s 
nephew Oakley Brooks published an article in the Christian Science Monitor 
that examined Connick’s cia links and described some of the ways he used his 
position as an apparently “charming humanitarian who ran aid programs in 
Indochina” during the 1970s, as a front while he “moonlighted for the cia” 
(Brooks 2008). According to Brooks:
While Lou led humanitarian eforts on almost  every continent, he ran aid and 
development programs for the Asia Foundation and the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development (usaid) in Laos at the height of the American military pres-
ence in Indochina. As part of  those postings, he worked for another organ ization 
 there — the Central Intelligence Agency.
His involvement with the cia seemed low- level, passing on information  here 
and  there about  people. He  didn’t talk about it much. Like a lot of lives lived on 
cold- war fronts, his remains shrouded in some mystery. That only fueled my desire 
to know more about Lou in Laos. As it happens, Lou’s past opened up an unex-
pected portal into my  family history as well as life in Laos, then and now.
It is unknown how many other Asia Foundation employees had cia careers 
or connections. But even with  these gaps,  there is a lot we do know. Revela-
tions from the Church and Pike Committee hearings, the disclosure of the cia’s 
“Family Jewels,” and the declassification of cia documents from this period 
identify the following elements of the Asia Foundation’s relationship with the 
cia and the aaa:
1. The Asia Foundation was a cia front throughout the first de cade that it sub-
sidized aaa memberships for Asian anthropologists.
2. The Asia Foundation during this period had a “total dependence upon covert 
funding support from” the cia (303 Committee memo, June 1966).
3. Contrary to the intentionally misleading claims in the foundation’s 1967 press 
release, several Asia Foundation employees had cia ties (Brooks 2008; Turner 1967).
4. The cia used the foundation to “recruit foreign agents,” and the foundation 
“served as a cover for clandestine operations” (Marchetti and Marks 1974: 200).
The Asia Foundation’s interest in the aaa was similar to the cia’s 1951 interest 
in the aaa’s comprehensive cross- indexed roster of its members (see chapter 3): 
both projects collected information on specific anthropologists that could help 
identify individuals working in areas of interest to the cia and that facilitated 
the cia’s ability to contact anthropologists for interviews, debriefings, or recruit-
ment — practices that we know from Ralph Beals’s 1966 aaa inquiries occurred 
regularly during this period (see chapter 11).
The aaa Reacts to New York Times Revelations
 After the Times story disclosed ties between the Asia Foundation and the cia, 
the aaa leadership privately questioned the connections between the cia, the 
Asia Foundation, and the association (Turner 1967). On April 29, 1967, Charles 
Frantz, the aaa’s executive secretary, wrote Turner McBaine, secretary of the 
Asia Foundation, that press coverage of the cia’s covert funding of the Asia 
Foundation necessitated inquiries into past contacts between the foundation 
and the aaa. Frantz wrote, “Since you granted this Association funds in the 
past to subsidize subscriptions for Asian anthropologists to our journal, the 
American Anthropologist, we would like to ask if C.I.A. have been involved in 
this program or subsidy. We would also appreciate a statement of the full activi-
ties the Foundation has carried on during the past with the use of cia or other 
intelligence or defense branches of the US government. Finally, may we be hon-
ored with copies of your annual and presumably complete financial statements 
during the past five years?” (aaap 73, CF to TM 4/29/67). In response, McBaine 
sent Frantz the foundation’s director of program ser vices’ statement claiming 
that cia funds had been “deposited in the general fund of the Foundation and 
 there intermixed with contributions from a number of other sources” (aaap 
73, TM to CF 6/1/67).
McBaine wrote that “ under  these circumstances, it would be impossible to 
determine the source of funds for any par tic u lar grant made by the Founda-
tion, including that to the American Anthropological Association” (aaap 73, 
TM to CF 6/1/67). This statement tried to normalize the foundation’s receipt of 
cia funds by listing the names of prominent Americans who had served on its 
board, a list that included Paul Hofman, Adlai Stevenson, Robert Blum, and 
Roger Lapham. The foundation’s statement declared:
The Trustees wish to state that in the past they have also knowingly received con-
tributions from private foundations and trusts which have been recently named as 
having transmitted Central Intelligence Agency funds to private American orga-
nizations. The Trustees’ in de pen dent decision to accept funds from  these founda-
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tions and trusts in no way afected the Foundation’s policies and programs. All 
contributions to the Foundation, from what ever source,  were accepted on the condi-
tion that the expenditure of such funds was to be left to the discretion of the Trust-
ees without any interference and that the funds be used solely for the Foundation’s 
declared purposes. (aaap 73, Asia Foundation, Trustees Statement, 3/21/67)
The Asia Foundation wanted to have it both ways: claiming that the board was 
in control, while also maintaining some distance for the board so it could avoid 
the fallout from the revelation. The foundation claimed its operations had not 
been corrupted by its reliance on cia funds even though its operation had been 
 under the supervision of board members with cia ties.
As the aaa board privately debated its response to  these revelations, Boggs 
was informed by the Asia Foundation that the aaa had fallen  behind in sub-
mitting reports identifying foundation fund recipients. It had been more than 
four years since the aaa had submitted the names, addresses, and other ma-
terials relating to funded recipients (aaap 73, LF to SB 12/4/67). Rather than 
being relieved that the aaa’s sloppy bookkeeping protected the identities of 
several years of Asia Foundation– funded anthropologists from cia scrutiny, 
aaa staf worried  whether the association could recoup uncollected subsidy 
funds if it broke from the foundation before receiving the more than $1,500 it 
was owed for four years of unreimbursed funds.
Frantz, the aaa executive secretary, replied to Lawrence  T. Forman, Pro-
gram Ser vices Division, Asia Foundation, writing that the timing of the aaa 
annual meeting made it difficult to respond at that time, but he would file a 
report as soon as he could; he added, however, “We  will not be able to give you 
all [grant recipients’] addresses and nationalities, since a number of the  people 
formerly receiving support through the Asia Foundation are now paying on 
their own, and it would not be pos si ble to pick them out of our membership 
files” (aaap 73, CF to LTF 12/15/67).
Three months  later, Frantz wrote Forman, complying with the foundation’s 
request for identifying information on subsidized members (aaap 73, CF to 
LTF 3/14/68). Far from appearing ready to sever all ties with the cia- funded 
agency, Frantz laid on compliments about how he was “confident that the Asia 
Foundation program has been most helpful” to vari ous Asian scholars. The 
aaa had overspent its bud geted Asia Foundation funds by $1,626, and Frantz 
requested that the foundation cover this debt. Frantz provided a glowing sum-
mary of all developments in Asian anthropological scholarship, ranging from 
the establishment of new journals to the upcoming Eighth International 
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences to be held in Japan, 
and he expressed his conviction that the Asia Foundation had “been most 
helpful in all  these matters” (aaap 73, CF to LTF 3/14/68).
Two weeks  later, anthropologist David Mandelbaum who was conducting 
research in India, wrote Frantz with news that the Indian government was 
closing down its Asia Foundation offices. Mandelbaum shared “the concern of 
the Executive Committee about accepting funds from any foundation which 
may possibly be associated with the cia” (aaap 73, DM to CF 3/28/68). On 
April 26, 1968, Forman wrote Frantz that he was “frankly, somewhat dismayed” 
to receive his letter of March 14, asking for more funds. Given that the foun-
dation was already in its eighth month of the bud getary year, the request for 
new funds and for funds to cover losses from the preceding year created some 
difficulties, but Forman was willing to work with the association by providing 
$2,000 to cover the aaa’s deficit ($1,626) and to provide a small supplement 
to pay for subscriptions to American Anthropologist for Asian scholars (aaap 
73, LTF to CF 4/26/68). Though the loss of cia funds placed the foundation at 
risk of collapse, it needed to retain what ever legitimacy it could, and a payment 
to the aaa during this transition was no doubt calculated as an investment 
in creating the public appearance that  there was nothing unusual about the 
foundation.18
Frantz appeared relieved when he thanked Forman for his ofer to send a pay-
ment, yet he did not commit the association to accepting the promised $2,000, 
instead writing that he would bring this to the board’s attention at the upcoming 
meeting on May 17 and 18. Frantz wrote that the aaa had received numerous
inquiries about the degree to which your activities and that of our members has 
been supported by Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence branches 
of the US Government. One of the most serious questions likely to arise from 
members of our Executive Board is with res pect to the sources of funds to the Asia 
Foundation for supporting this program of providing Asian anthropologists with 
subscriptions to our Journal. Since the Board meeting is very soon, I would ap-
preciate your telling me as full as pos si ble 1) the source of funds for the grants we 
have received heretofore and, 2) the present source of funds that would help carry 
this program into the  future. (aaap 73, CF to LTF 5/3/68)
Patricia Flanagan, director of the institutional relations for the Asia Foundation, 
claimed it was impossible to determine which funds  were used for par tic u lar 
programs. She assured Frantz that the foundation “does not accept funds from 
sources alleged to have any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, nor 
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has it ever been supported by other intelligence branches of the United States 
Government” (aaap 73, PF to CF 5/21/68).
The aaa Executive Committee deci ded at its spring 1968 meeting that Presi-
dent Irving Rouse and Frantz should determine  whether the association should 
accept Asia Foundation payments (aaap 73, 59th meeting of the  E.B. aaa, 
NYC, May 17–18, 1968).19 Frantz wrote to President Rouse, summarizing news 
reports of the cia’s funding of the Asia Foundation and adding that “nothing 
in our correspondence suggests that since the initial arrangement was made, 
some ten years ago, any officer of the American Anthropological Association 
was aware of  these sources of funds for The Asia Foundation. It appears clear 
therefore, that the aaa has unwittingly been receiving money from intelligence 
agencies to help distribute our Journal to Asian anthropologists at a cost of 
$1.00 per year” (aaap 73, CF to IR 6/6/68).
Frantz did not mention the foundation’s funding of travel grants for aaa 
Asian scholars in the United States or its desire to fund students who would be 
returning home to Asia soon, features that would be ideal for cia operative/
in for mant recruitment. But Frantz recommended to President Rouse “that this 
arrangement be terminated immediately, even though Asia Foundation is no 
longer receiving funds from such sources. You  will note in the letter of May 21, 
1968, from Patricia Flanagan that (third paragraph) it has not been the policy to 
publish the names of donors or amounts contributed to The Asia Foundation. 
The final sentence in that paragraph is deceptive, for while the Foundation may 
not have ever been supported directly by intelligence branches of the United 
States Government, all the evidence suggests that it was indirectly so sup-
ported” (aaap 73, CF to IR 6/6/68). Frantz added that if Rouse concurred that 
the aaa should terminate its relationship with the Asia Foundation, this could 
be done to coincide with the end of the fiscal year. Frantz noted that the associa-
tion could still draw upon the $1,626 ofered from the foundation to cover its 
debt, though the foundation might withdraw its ofer. Frantz clarified that “in 
financial terms, as you know, we are in no need of that $1,626.00” (aaap 73, CF 
to IR 6/6/68).
President Rouse replied (and sent a carbon copy to Du Bois) that he was 
inclined to accept Frantz’s recommendation, but that he would also like to 
hear from Cora Du Bois, who had been a member of the aaa committee that 
had “supervised” the applications for  these funds (aaap 73, IR to CF 6/10/68). 
Rouse recommended against accepting the ofered funds, arguing that the aaa 
could “aford to pass up this money from an apparently tainted source” (aaap 
73, IR to CF 6/10/68).
Du Bois wrote Rouse that she was not very concerned about the association’s 
receipt of cia funds. She did not appear to consider that the Asia Foundation 
had been trying to identify scholars who could be used to provide intelligence 
or work with the cia in other capacities. Du Bois wrote that she had
long been aware of allegations concerning the sources of at least some of the Asia 
Foundation fund. And I may add that the original committee on which my name 
appears to the best of my memory  really never functioned. I was not aware that the 
Asia Foundation was covering most of the cost of subscriptions to Asian scholars 
for the American Anthropologist. I consider this a useful and innocent ser vice. It 
was with some reluctance that I would penalize our Asian colleagues for our moral 
sensitivities. I am therefore not at all sure that I would go along with the suggestion 
for discontinuing that ser vice. (aaap 73, CDB to CF and IR 6/12/68)
In closing, she wrote that she would accept what ever decision Rouse made. 
President Rouse wanted more input from the board and delayed his final deci-
sion  until its fall meeting (aaap 73, IR to CF and CDB 6/18/68, 6/21/68). No 
doubt Du Bois’s years at oss and the State Department mitigated her negative 
reactions to the cia as an agency “supporting” academic endeavors;  these years 
also should have suggested the possibility that a cia front could use this infor-
mation for its own ends, but  these rec ords show no such concerns.
In November, the Asia Foundation approached the aaa asking for the 
names, affiliations, and addresses of sponsored Asian anthropologists — even 
before the aaa had deci ded  whether it would seek reimbursement for the out-
standing $1,626. While awaiting the final decision of the aaa’s Executive Board, 
Evelyn Wares of the Asia Foundation’s Programs Department wrote Frantz that 
“ whether or not you decide to renew our grant relationship, [the foundation] 
would like to receive from you for forwarding to our representatives in Asia a 
listing of the nationalities and Asian institutional affiliations or addresses of 
the nineteen individuals whose names  were circled on the copy of your report 
enclosed with our letter last April” (aaap 73, EW to CF 11/6/68).
While Rouse and Frantz had appeared ready to terminate the aaa’s con-
nections with the Asia Foundation (even assuming the outstanding debt), at 
its fall meeting the board rejected Rouse and Frantz’s proposal to refuse Asia 
Foundation funds. Finally, Edward Lehman, aaa director of administration, 
wrote Evelyn Wares that the board “approved the renewal of our current co-
operative grant program to supply the American Anthropologist to scholars in 
Asia.” Lehman expressed regrets that the aaa’s system did not store addresses 
of former subscribers, so the association could not send the nineteen missing 
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addresses. Lehman requested, and  later accepted, the full $2,000 payment from 
the foundation (aaap 73, EJL to EW 11/13/68).
As the aaa leadership privately considered its public response to news of 
the Asia Foundation’s cia links, the Indian government officially expelled the 
foundation and forbade it from funding projects within India’s borders. The 
aaa board did not report to its membership on internal debates concerning 
its response to the decade- long receipt of funds from a cia front (Lelyveld 
1968). Instead, the aaa continued to announce Asia Foundation projects in 
the aaa Fellow Newsletter (e.g., aaafn 1968 9[3]: 11). The Fellow Newsletter of 
May 1968 announced State Department funds  were filling the gap left when the 
cia ceased funding the Asia Foundation (aaafn 1968 9[5]: 15). While this an-
nouncement acknowledged the Asia Foundation’s program for funding Asian 
anthropologists, no mention was made of the foundation’s requests for contact 
information on program participants, nor did aaa publications discuss the 
Ramparts findings of how cia relationships with the nsa allowed the agency to 
influence that association’s business. Rather than fostering public discussions 
of this cia front’s aaa interface, the association’s leadership provided such lim-
ited information that it misled its membership about interactions with a cia- 
linked organ ization.
The aaa leadership began curtailing the association’s contact with the Asia 
Foundation. On June  27, 1969, Edward Lehman advised the foundation that 
the aaa was considering lowering subscription charges for foreign subscrib-
ers, and that  until the association had deci ded on this policy change, it would 
return the $291.60 remaining from the $2,000 Asia Foundation grant (and sub-
tracted $82.40 for copies and shipping of issues of American Anthropologist to 
the foundation as requested, leaving $209.20) (aaap 73, EL to Asia Foundation 
6/27/69). With the return of this $209.20, the aaa hoped to conclude its rela-
tionship with this cia- tainted organ ization. But The Asia Foundation, however, 
did not easily accept rejection; it continued requesting that the aaa renew this 
relationship  until August 1972. But the aaa did not restore this program even 
 after the foundation publicly declared it had severed its cia ties.
Known Knowns and Rumsfeldian “Known Unknowns”  
and “Unknown Unknowns”
 There are obvious difficulties in analyzing past interactions between unwitting 
anthropologists and cia funding fronts. Some of  these difficulties are designed; 
 others are of the usual sort encountered in any historical research: purged 
rec ords, incomplete document collections, loss of knowledgeable in for mants, 
the inherent challenges of studying secret classified activities, and a general reti-
cence by many to delve into such troublesome events. This limits contemporary 
understanding of how  these identifiable pieces of intelligence apparatus articu-
lated with cia analysts, bureaucrats, and spies. Still, we do know elements of 
how  these pro cesses functioned. Declassified documents, published reports, 
congressional testimony, participant accounts, and raw ratiocination help us 
reconstruct some of  these incompletely understood instances of anthropology 
unwittingly in harness with the needs of the state.
Surviving aaa archival rec ords and information from other archival col-
lections and foia requests help us answer some key questions, while other 
questions remain a mixture of Rumsfeldian “known unknowns” and “unknown 
unknowns” about two of the cia’s relationships with the aaa. But we actually 
do know a lot. We know that the cia approached the aaa in 1951 and estab-
lished a covert relationship with the board through which the aaa secretly 
gave the cia the raw information it had collected for its detailed roster, with the 
understanding that the cia would keep the information for its own uses. We 
know the cia wanted to identify anthropologists who  were working in regions 
of the underdeveloped world, and it was interested in establishing an agency 
liaison within the aaa.
We know that the Asia Foundation was established as a cia asset to help the 
agency interface with academics working in Asia. We know that the president 
of this cia asset (himself a cia careerist) approached the aaa in 1956, ofering 
to subsidize membership fees of Asian anthropologists; and we know that this 
cia asset doggedly sought the names and addresses of  those receiving  these 
ser vices. We also know that during this period, the cia sought contacts with 
academics, contacts that  were used for relationships ranging from onetime de-
briefings concerning activities in foreign nations to ongoing recruitment of cia 
operatives (see Corson 1977: 301–3; D. H. Price 2011e; Cook 1983).
The cia’s use of funding fronts at times damaged the credibility of scholars 
who received  these funds and undermined the academic freedom of all schol-
ars on American campuses. As Jason Epstein wrote in 1967, the cia’s secret use 
of foundations undermined  free academic inquiry, as “the cia and the Ford 
Foundation, among other agencies, had set up and  were financing an apparatus 
of intellectuals selected for their correct cold- war positions, as an alternative to 
what one might call a  free intellectual market where ideology was presumed to 
count for less than individual talent and achievement, and where doubts about 
established orthodoxies  were taken to be the beginning of all inquiry” (16).
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Some significant unknowns remain. It is not known which, if any, aaa mem-
bers may have secretly acted as cia liaisons during the early 1950s. We do not 
yet understand exactly what the Asia Foundation did with the information on 
specific Asian anthropologists it received from the aaa. We do not yet know 
which, if any, individual Asian anthropologists  were contacted by the cia. Most 
of  these unknowns remain intentionally unknown. One of the reasons we do not 
know more about the specifics of the cia’s covert funding of American schol-
ars, journalists, and  others is  because the Church and Pike Committees inten-
tionally chose not to release their identities in the Senate and House reports, as 
if knowing their identities would be bad for democracy and the  free pursuit of 
knowledge.
The Asia Foundation’s interface between the aaa and the cia compromised 
the discipline’s in de pen dence. Yet, this interface only made the discipline as 
legible and available to the cia as a twenty- eight- second Internet search  today 
would make any Asian anthropologist. But this episode’s key significance is 
found in what it reveals about larger patterns demonstrating social science’s 
articulation with Cold War Amer i ca’s militarized po liti cal economy.
In isolation, this could seem an almost coincidental interface between Amer-
ican anthropology and the cia, but when viewed in a larger context, it is seen 
as part of a widespread pattern linking hundreds of anthropologists and other 
regional specialists with Cold War intelligence agencies. When considered in 
light of the Church Committee’s findings that cia intrusions into international 
studies  were endemic during this period, perhaps the most unusual  thing about 
this episode is that the aaa ever became aware of the cia’s connection to the 
Asia Foundation.
Charles Frantz’s spring 1968 correspondence with Lawrence T. Forman clari-
fied the fundamental role that financial dependence played in linking the cia 
to professional associations and social scientists in general. The aaa wanted to 
remove the taint that followed from the cia’s funds through the Asia Founda-
tion to its membership. Even though, in 1968, the aaa was flush with money, 
it did not feel it had the freedom to break  free  until accounts  were settled. 
Even with President Rouse’s position that the aaa could “aford to pass up this 
money from an apparently tainted source,” the association still gave in to pres-
sures to accept  these funds,  there is  little hope of organizations resisting such 
pressures during more pressing financial times (aaap 73, IR to CF 6/10/68; 
cf. D. H. Price 2011f).
While the impacts on  those who unwittingly received cia funds  were not 
always obvious or dramatic, they  were nonetheless real.  These impacts “nothing 
so  simple as coercion, though coercion at some levels may have been involved, 
but something more like the inevitable relations between employer and em-
ployee in which the wishes of the former become implicit in the acts of the 
latter” (Epstein 1967: 20). Yet, knowledge and culpability, ignorance and in-
nocence are not always directly linked. Novelist Don DeLillo explores  these 
questions in The Names, whose central character realizes that the multinational 
insurance com pany where he works as a risk analyst is in fact a front producing 
classified reports for the cia. With this realization of his own unwitting cia 
work, he wonders if “ those who engaged knowingly  were less guilty than the 
 people who carried out their designs. The unwitting would be left to ponder 
their consequences, to work out the precise distinctions involved, the edges of 
culpability and regret” (DeLillo 1982: 317). As the next chapter shows, some-
times anthropologists’ research unwittingly contributed to cia projects that 
most would not have chosen to support, leaving the discipline to ponder where 
the borders of culpability, responsibility, and regret lie. 
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A N T H R O P O L O G I S T  C O L L A B O R AT O R S
MK- Ultra,  Human Ecol ogy, and Buying  
a Piece of Anthropology
In the mid-1970s, John Marks, a former State Department Foreign Ser vice em-
ployee, used foia to release thousands of pages of governmental documents 
describing covert cia programs known as MK- Delta and MK- Ultra (Marks 
1979; U.S. Senate 1977). Marks’s book The Search for the “Manchurian Candi-
date” (1979) summarized sixteen thousand pages of cia documents, many of 
which described secret MK- Ultra and MK- Delta projects searching for efec-
tive interrogation methods. Some of  these cia programs used fronts to spon-
sor witting and unwitting scientists to conduct research that would help the 
cia understand  whether efective forms of “mind control” or “brainwashing” 
could be developed for interrogation and interrogation- resistance programs. 
Some studies investigated  whether drugs, stress, or specific environmental con-
ditions could be used to “break” prisoners or induce confessions (Marks 1979; 
sihe 1960). Some of this research on coercion and interrogation informed the 
production of the cia’s Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation manual (1963), 
a foundational document for the agency’s interrogation and interrogation- 
resistance procedures (cia 1963b, 1983; McCoy 2006: 50–54).
A 1963 cia report describing MK- Ultra projects stressed the interdisciplinary 
development of the program, as the cia’s Technical Ser vice Division explored 
use of “radiation, electro- shock, vari ous fields of psy chol ogy, psychiatry, sociol-
ogy, and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary 
devices and materials” to control  human be hav ior (cia 1963d: 4). In a few cases, 
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the academics working on  these projects knew they  were funded by laundered 
cia funds, but in most instances they  were unaware of  these connections. The 
cia provided the following description of how the MK- Ultra program worked:
Annual grants of funds are made  under ostensible research foundation auspices 
to the specialists located in the public or quasi- public institutions. This approach 
conceals from the institution the interest of cia and permits the recipient to pro-
ceed with his investigation, publish his findings (excluding military implications), 
and account for his expenditures in a manner normal to his institution. A number 
of the grants have included funds for the construction and equipping of research 
facilities and for the employment of research assistants. Key individuals must qualify 
for top secret clearance and are made witting of Agency sponsorship. As a rule 
each specialist is managed unilaterally and is not witting of Agency support of 
parallel mkultra research in his field. The system in efect “buys a piece” of the 
specialist in order to enlist his aid in pursuing the intelligence implications of his 
research. His ser vices typically include systematic search of the scientific lit er a ture, 
procurement of materials, their propagation, and the application of test doses [of 
drugs] to animals and  under some circumstances to volunteer  human subjects.
The funding of sensitive mkultra projects by sterile grants in aid as noted in 
the preceding paragraph disclosed one of the principal controversial aspects of this 
program. (cia 1963d: 7–8, emphasis added)
In his book A Question of Torture, Alfred McCoy discussed several cia- funded 
MK- Ultra social science research projects producing knowledge to be quietly 
harvested by cia personnel who  were designing scientific means of conducting 
interrogation and torture (McCoy 2006: 43–46; cf. Prince 1995). According to 
McCoy, by using results from MK- Ultra’s research programs, “the cia distilled 
its findings in its seminal Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation handbook. 
For the next forty years, the Kubark manual would define the agency’s interro-
gation methods and training program throughout the Third World. Synthesizing 
the behavioral research done by contract academics, the manual spelled out 
a revolutionary two- phase form of torture that relied on sensory deprivation 
and self- inflicted pain for an efect that, for the first time in the two millennia 
of their cruel science, was more psychological than physical” (McCoy 2006: 
50).1 Stress research was a vital area of MK- Ultra’s search for efective means of 
coercive interrogation (40, 45–47, 50).
At the cia, Richard Helms authorized $25 million in funds for Dr. Sidney 
Gottlieb and the cia’s Technical Ser vices Division for MK- Ultra projects 
studying  human responses to drugs and environmental conditions that could 
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manipulate individuals to perform behaviors against their  will (McCoy 2006: 
28–29). Bluebird and Artichoke, two agency operations, studied the pos si ble 
uses of psychotropic drugs in interrogation.  These operations’ research meth-
ods included dosing unsuspecting  people with strong chemical agents like lsd, 
dmt, liquid concentrates of thc, or opiates (26–28; Marks 1979: 53–121).
Some research placed unwitting prisoner, civilian, or military research sub-
jects at risk, at times leaving individuals with permanent damage (see Wein-
stein 1990). McCoy observed that the cia’s “alliance with behavioral science 
seems marvelously synergistic, placing mind- control research at the apex of the 
academic agenda and providing patronage that elevated cooperative scientists, 
particularly psychologists, to the first rank of their profession” (2006: 31). The 
full range of the cia’s MK- Ultra projects is unknown, but a list of projects cob-
bled together from released foia documents indicates a collection of projects 
studying plea sure, pain, hypnosis, drugs, sex, stage magic, refugees, and other 
elements of culture and nature seen as useful to the cia’s eforts to interrogate 
or control the Other.
 Human Ecol ogy
Between 1955 and 1965, the cia relied on a funding front, operating  under the 
names the Society for the Investigation of  Human Ecol ogy (sihe; 1955–61) and 
the  Human Ecol ogy Fund (hef; 1961–65), to pass on cia MK- Ultra funds to 
unwitting social science and medical researchers  doing work that had applica-
tions for cia projects, including the agency’s Kubark Counterintelligence Interro-
gation manual (cia 1963b; D. H. Price 2007b, 2007c; Marks 1979; hef 1963; sihe 
1957, n.d.). The first of  these organizations, sihe, was established in New York 
City in 1955 by neurologist Harold Wolf, md. When sihe was reor ga nized as 
hef in 1961, operations shifted to Cornell University Medical School, with most 
sihe personnel remaining with the organ ization (hef 1963: 9).2 While noting 
this orga nizational shift from sihe to hef, for the remainder of this chapter I 
refer to both sihe and hef simply as “ Human Ecol ogy.”
Harold Wolf was a highly respected neurologist whose research focused 
on migraines and other forms of headache pain (Blau 2004).3 Wolf met Allen 
Dulles while he was treating Dulles’s son for a brain injury, and Dulles  later 
recruited Wolf to direct cia- funded research on persuasion and interrogation 
(Marks 1979: 148; D. H. Price 1998: 398–401). Using  Human Ecol ogy as a front, 
the cia wanted Wolf “to devise ways to use the broadest cultural and social 
pro cesses in  human ecol ogy for covert operations. He understood that  every 
country had unique customs for child rearing, military training and nearly 
 every other form of  human intercourse. From the cia’s point of view, he noted, 
this kind of so cio log i cal information could be applied mainly to indoctrinating 
and motivating  people” (Marks 1979: 148–49).
Wolf participated in early lsd research and coauthored an article with Louis 
Berlin, Thomas Guthrie, Arthur Weider, and Helen Goodell examining the ef-
fects of mescaline and lsd on creativity (Berlin et al. 1955). Wolf was joined at 
 Human Ecol ogy by Lawrence Hinkle, md, whose early  career focused on envi-
ronmental impacts on cardiovascular health (amws 2005: 3:753). In 1965, Hinkle 
described his work with Wolf at  Human Ecol ogy as studying “the mechanisms 
by which the individual man adapts to his par tic u lar environment, and the ef-
fect of  these adaptations upon his disease” (1965: 532). Hinkle and Wolf (1957) 
pioneered studies of workplace stress and the efects of stress on cardiovascular 
health and migraines, studies that brought fame and legitimacy of a sort that en-
ticed  Human Ecol ogy grant applicants. In the mid-1950s, Hinkle and Wolf began 
studying the role of controlled stress in “breaking” and “brainwashing” prisoners 
of war and communist enemies of state (see Hinkle and Wolf 1956). They studied 
coercive interrogation methods and published their findings in the article “Com-
munist Interrogation and Indoctrination of ‘Enemies of the State’ ” (Hinkle and 
Wolf 1956). They also produced a classified secret version of this paper for Allen 
Dulles at the cia (Rév 2002: 86). As secret reports  were passed along to the cia, 
Wolf continued to produce  Human Ecology– funded research publications on 
interrogation (Wolf 1960; hef 1963: 53).4 Wolf and Hinkle’s studies linking 
stress and disease produced dual use outcomes, with some reports adding to 
the medical lit er a ture and  others contributing to cia interrogation research.
John Marks described  Human Ecol ogy as a cia mechanism for putting 
“money into projects whose covert application was so unlikely that only an ex-
pert could see the possibilities” (1979: 159).5 Marks illustrated this point by de-
scribing a 1958  Human Ecol ogy grant that funded sociologist Muzafer Sherif ’s 
study of American inner- city youth gang members. Unbeknownst to Sherif, his 
data  were  later used by the cia to model the management of kgb defectors. 
Marks discovered that the cia learned from Sherif ’s work that “getting a juve-
nile delinquent [gang] defector was motivationally not all that much dif er ent 
from getting a Soviet one” (see Marks 1979: 159, cf. hef 1963: 29).
 There is no known paper trail establishing how Wolf or  others at  Human 
Ecol ogy reported scholars’ findings to cia sponsors, and one declassified in-
ternal cia memo from 1963 indicates the possibility that the reporting of such 
findings was slipshod. This memo stated that “a substantial portion of the 
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mkultra rec ord appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers,” in-
dicating the possibility that  Human Ecol ogy findings  were usually informally 
incorporated into the work of individuals working on Kubark- related projects 
(cia 1963d: 23).  Because the cia destroyed most MK- Ultra rec ords in 1973 
(Marks 1979: vii), fundamental questions remain concerning how  Human Ecol-
ogy research made its way into Kubark, but Kubark’s reliance on citations of 
 Human Ecology– funded scholars, as well as information from declassified cia 
documents establishing MK- Ultra’s goals and methods, indicate this research 
was incorporated in Kubark.
The 1961–1963 Report of the  Human Ecol ogy Fund (hef 1963) listed Barn-
aby C. Keeney (president, Brown University) as the director of the fund’s board.6 
James L. Monroe, who had overseen the U.S. Air Force’s comprehensive study 
of Korean War prisoners, was executive director from 1961 to 1963, followed by 
psychologist David Rhodes (Marks 1979: 156–57).7 With  these established lead-
ership figures, the public face of  Human Ecol ogy was a paragon of respectable 
research; the 1961 directory of the Encyclopedia of Associations described the 
foundation as one that “stimulates and supports studies of man’s adaptation to 
the complex aspects of his environment. Conducts investigations at universities 
and research centers in such subjects as psychic and physical brain function im-
pairments, sudden environmental change on the health and attitudes of a large 
immigrant population (conducted among Hungarian refugees), undergraduate 
adjustments, ethnopsychiatry, heteropsychic driving, psycho- social determi-
nants of drug reaction, hypnosis, psychological and physiological variations in 
personality and personality change, the scientist in the Soviet Union” (eoa 1961: 
291).  Human Ecol ogy funded anthropological and so cio log i cal projects study-
ing Cold War enemies, such as China or Rus sia, as well as research projects on 
pain, plea sure, sexuality, stress, and refugees (see D. H. Price 1998: 398–402). 
 Human Ecol ogy lied to some anthropologists concerning the potential uses 
of their research. In one instance, Cornell University “hired an anthropologist 
before learning that the cia security office would not give her clearance, [Har-
old] Wolf simply lied to her about where the money came from” (Marks 1979: 
150–51). Sidney Gottlieb envisioned  Human Ecol ogy enabling the cia to “keep 
in touch with that part of the scientific research community which  were in areas 
that we  were interested in and try to — usually its mode was to find somebody 
that was working in an area in which we  were interested and encourage him to 
continue in that area with some funding from us” (Weinstein 1990: 139).
 Table  8.1 shows reported  Human Ecology– funded projects arranged in 
ascending order of funding level. In 1962, the aaa Fellow Newsletter and the 
 TA B L E   8 . 1   Known Grants Funded by the cia Research Front Known as the 
 Human Ecol ogy Fund, 1960–1963 (Source: HEF 1963: 13–42)
G R A N T R E S E A R C H E R F I E L D
G R A N T  
A M O U N T
Acad emy of Science for East 
Africa
$500
Psychological Efects of 
Circumcision
Cansever, Gökçe Medicine $500
Aspects of Marquesan 
Be hav ior
Suggs, Robert C. Anthropology $700
Craniological Racial Analy sis Hartle, Janet A. Anthropology $948.75
Conceptual Development in 
Children & Young Adults
Watt, Norman F. Psy chol ogy $2,250




Internal Migration in Puerto 
Rico
Macisco, John J. Medicine $1,000
Self- Image and Reaction to 
Isolation
Warbasse, Anne Psy chol ogy $1,058
Role Conflict in Burma Guyot, James F. $1,190
Journal: Graphologische 
Schriftenreihe
Cossel, Beatrice V. Graphology $1,470
Three Workshops $1,500
Antecedents of Revolution Casuso, Gabriel Psy chol ogy $1,500
Hungarian Refugees in the 
Netherlands
Kuyer, H. J. M. $1,611
Book: The Psy chol ogy of 
Writing
Roman, Klara G. Psy chol ogy $2,000
Self- Instruction Language 
Program
Carroll, John B. Education $2,456
Fallout Shelters and Attitudes 
 Toward Nuclear War
Berrien, Kenneth F. Psy chol ogy $2,500
Creation and publication of: 
Bioelectrics Directory
Seels, Saul & 
Helen F.
Biology $2,500
Review of Research on Sleep Webb, Wilse B. Psy chol ogy $2,500
Psychophysiological Analog 
Information by Digital 
Computer
Zimmer, Herbert Psy chol ogy $2,505
(continued)
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G R A N T R E S E A R C H E R F I E L D
G R A N T 
A M O U N T
Child- Rearing Antecedents of 
De pen dency and Affiliation
Wardwell, Elinor S. Psy chol ogy $2,525
Comparative Study of Chinese 
Personality
Rodd, William G. $3,000
Aspects of Upper Class Culture 
among the Internationalized 
Elite of Japan
Stover, Leon Anthropology $3,000
Review and Newsletter: 
Transcultural Research in 
 Mental Health Problems
McGill University Psy chol ogy $3,000
Treatment of Psychiatric 
Disturbances by Yoruba 




Factors that Cause individuals 
to Seek Medical Aid
Groen, J. J. Medicine $4,500
A Restudy of Levittown,  
New York
Liell, John T. Sociology $4,525
Publications of International 
Resources in Clinical 
Psy chol ogy
Priester, H. & H. 
David
Psy chol ogy $5,000
Attitudes of Sierra Leone 
Students









Emerging Socio- Political Roles 
of Scientists & Managers in 
the USSR
Parry, Albert Rus sian studies $5,000
Volume on Soviet Psy chol ogy Bauer, Raymond/
APA
Psy chol ogy $5,000
Changing Patterns in the 
Chinese  Family
Huang, Lucy Jen Sociology $5,775




Psy chol ogy $6,020




Psy chol ogy $6,700
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G R A N T R E S E A R C H E R F I E L D
G R A N T 
A M O U N T
Computer Simulation of a 
 Simple Society
Browning, Iben Computer science $7,500
Studies of Small Group 
Be hav ior
Sherif, Muzafer Psy chol ogy $8,500
Experiments in Extrasensory 
Perception
Abrams, Stephen I. Psy chol ogy $8,579
Identification of Individuals 
Prone to Schizo phre nia
Mednick, 
Sarnof A.
Psy chol ogy $10,046




Psy chol ogy $12,900
 Mental Illness and Identity Hirvas, Juhani Sociology $16,479
Allardt, Erik Sociology
Psychiatric Rating Scales Samuel B. Lyerly Psy chol ogy $22,551
Preston S. Abbott Psy chol ogy
Mea sure ment of Motivation Eysenck, H. J. Psy chol ogy $26,030
Institute for Experimental 
Psychiatry
Orne, Martin T. Psy chol ogy $30,000
Neighborhood  Family Clinics 
(Harlem)
Berle, Beatrice Medicine $32,817
Study of the Ge ne tic Code Bledsoe, W. W. Mathematics $35,000
Physique and Psychological 
Functioning
Haronian, Frank Psy chol ogy $39,000
Artificial Intelligence Browning, Iben Computer science $40,000
Pattern Recognition Bledsoe, W. W. Psy chol ogy $45,000
Comparative Learning Be hav-





Psy chol ogy $47,832
Anthropological Identification 
of the Determinants of 
Chinese Be hav ior
Carr, William K. Anthropology $48,480
Implications of a Hypothesized 
Congruence between 
Personality Systems
Gittinger, David R. Psy chol ogy $50,000
Panoramic Research, Inc. $80,000
Cross- Cultural Generality of 
Meaning Systems
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African Studies Review carried  Human Ecol ogy funding announcements, solic-
iting grant applications on a “diversity of research problems and methodology 
within the behavioral sciences” (aaafn 1962 3[5]: 4–5; African Studies Review 
1962, vol. 5: 42). Wolf used his professional relationship with Margaret Mead 
to recruit anthropologists, gaining an ifis mailing list from her in 1956, writing 
that he wanted “to bring to the attention of the members the interests of the 
Society for the Investigation of  Human Ecol ogy and the possibility for  future 
research funding” (mm C37, HW to MM 12/3/56; mm 37, MM to HW 1/4/57).8 
In 1964, the Fellow Newsletter announced that anthropologist William Carr had 
“joined the staf of the  Human Ecol ogy Fund” and that the fund contributed 
to the financing of Raymond Prince and Francis Speed’s film  Were Ni! He is a 
madman, on Yoruba treatments of  mental disorders (aaafn 1964 5[5]: 6).9
 Human Ecol ogy financed a wide range of projects, including Frank Westie’s 
(1965) eforts to empirically test American variations in valuations and beliefs; 
Melvin DeFleur’s (1964) study of occupational roles as portrayed on tele vi sion; 
scientific studies of the shifts and variations in individuals’ attitudes over time 
(DeFleur and Westie 1963: 17; cf. Glander 2000: 164–65); Raymond Augustine 
Bauer’s trips to gather information for his book Some Views on Soviet Psy chol-
ogy (1962); Ronald Taft’s (1966) study of immigrant assimilation in Australia; 
psychologist Dr.  Joseph  C. Kennedy’s research into the educational needs of 
Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria;10 sociologist Richard Stephenson’s work on deviant 
be hav ior;11 and a 1960 conference in Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts that led to the 
publication of the book International Be hav ior: A Social- Psychological Analy sis 
(Kelman 1965). Sociologists Robert Ellis and Clayton Lane used  Human Ecol-
ogy funds to study the efects of social isolation, social strain, and depriva-
tion on low- income students entering high- status universities (Ellis and Lane 
1967: 237).  Human Ecol ogy funded American psychologists Harold Schlosberg, 
Neal E. Miller, and Carl Pfafman’s trip to tour psychological laboratories in 
the Soviet Union and Poland (Kimble 1979: 704). It also funded the travel of 
anthropologist Marvin Opler and an American del e ga tion attending the First 
International Congress of Social Psychiatry in London in 1964 (Opler 1965).
At the  Human Ecology– sponsored conference “Information and Control 
Pro cesses in Living Systems,” held in 1965, participants covered topics without 
direct connections to interrogation, yet the cia’s interrogation studies focused 
on controling pro cesses in very direct ways, and the agency’s theoretical ap-
proach was informed by such parallel, but not directly linked, thematic work 
(see Ramsey 1965). Other projects  were smaller in scale, with apparently intan-
gible outcomes.
 Human Ecol ogy provided funding for anthropologist Leon Stover’s proj-
ect titled “Aspects of Upper Class Culture among the Internationalized Elite 
of Japan.” Stover  later wrote me that his  Human Ecol ogy “research report was 
written up as a science fiction story published in Damon Knight, ed., Orbit 9.” 
Stover told me his grant had come “as an act of charity by a close friend who 
worked for the fund. It supplemented another small grant from the National 
Institute of  Mental Health” on a research proj ect that “was peripheral to my job 
as a visiting professor in the Department of Cultural Anthropology at Tokyo 
University (1963–1965)” (LS to DHP 11/28/94). Stover set his story in a futur-
istic Japan, where movies are not filmed using traditional cameras and actors 
but instead are the recorded visions of “a young catatonic” who is cajoled into 
envisioning scenes desired by film producers.12 The story uses this pro cess of 
“bionic moviemaking” to analyze postwar Japa nese attitudes  toward Japa nese 
citizens who have spent time abroad.
In his story, Stover scripted the remarks of a fictional anthropologist, Profes-
sor Iwahashi, as commentary on diferences between Japa nese and American 
social structure revealed in American  mental hospitals’ segregation of patients 
into “violent wards, general wards, or open wards.” In Japan, in contrast, as 
Professor Iwahashi describes it, “ mental patients enjoy unmitigated common-
ality. This equality  under one class of confinement is enabled by the fact that we 
Japa nese are so disciplined a race that even when we go mad, we go mad po-
litely, with no disobedience to authority, no unguarded lapse of consideration 
for  others, no unexpected breach of decorum, and no interruption of politesse” 
(Stover 1972: 197). Focusing on the high- context nature of Japa nese society, Sto-
ver argued that “it is in the social conduct of your  human relations that you are 
Japa nese, if in nothing  else” (200).
Stover viewed the secret to being truly Japa nese as found in the princi ple of 
ki ga tsuku, the practice of finding “out what the other person intends to do. It 
is a game of perception. But it is dif er ent from the one played by Westerners. 
Foreigners want always to know why  people do things. Foreigners want always 
to understand each other. Just as they come to Japan and try to understand the 
Japa nese  people” (1972: 201–2). Stover’s Japa nese narrator viewed his society as 
static, as a world where every one’s role “is fixed and identified like a piece on a 
chessboard. When we encounter another Japa nese we have only to guess what 
his next move  will be” (202).
Stover’s fictional narrative contained the theoretical strands of the era’s stan-
dard intercultural communications research.13 With MK- Ultra’s interest in psy-
chotropic drug research, some might speculate about  these images of catatonic 
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hallucinations or the social diferences in  mental hospitals, but  there is no evi-
dence of any such connection  here. Stover’s research instead best fits within the 
continuum of  Human Ecology– funded cross- cultural communications studies 
and the fund’s interest in “breakdowns.”  Human Ecol ogy funded many projects 
with no detectable connection to MK- Ultra projects, those projects appear to 
have only provided  Human Ecol ogy with the necessary appearance of legiti-
macy within the academic community. It is pos si ble that Stover’s work, along 
with several other projects, including cranial analy sis studies, studies of Puerto 
Rican migration and child rearing, and a study of Levittown, New York,  were 
funded to increase  Human Ecol ogy’s visibility and to gain access to scholars 
who might  later be approached as con sul tants.14
A Technical Ser vices staf member indicated that grants provided to scholars 
like Charles Osgood, B. F. Skinner,15 and Karl Rogers “ ‘bought legitimacy’ for 
the Society and made the recipients ‘grateful’. . . .  the money gave Agency employ-
ees at  Human Ecol ogy a reason to phone Skinner — or any other recipient — to 
pick his brain about a par tic u lar prob lem” (Marks 1979: 160).16  Human Ecol ogy 
sponsored Raymond Prince’s Nigerian transcultural psychological studies dur-
ing the late 1950s (see hef 1963: 50–51; Prince 1962a, 1962b). Prince’s Ifa: Yoruba 
Divination and Sacrifice (1964) provides an ethnographic account of Nigerian 
traditional rituals of sacrifice and divination. The January 1961 issue of the aaa 
Fellow Newsletter announced the three- month research proj ect by Prince and 
his coworkers, including Dorothea C. Leighton, Charles Savage, and anthro-
pologists Charles and Jane Hughes, as one “identifying and rating sociocultural 
factors that may be of significance to prevalence of symptoms, problems of 
identifying and evaluating types of psychiatric disorder in the Nigerian setting” 
(aaafn 1961 2[1]: 11). Prince  later speculated that this research was funded to 
establish connections in the field that would  later be used by the cia for the 
recruitment of foreign nationals and “to collect psychocultural data on cultures 
and countries of interest to the cia for psychological warfare purposes” (1995: 
407). His research contributed to MK- Ultra’s data on isolating cultural manifes-
tations of  mental illness. A cia document declassified and accessed by Prince 
in 1977 clarified that, unbeknownst to him, the cia believed his research would 
“add somewhat to our understanding of native Yoruba psychiatry including the 
use of drugs, many of which are unknown or not much used by Western prac-
ti tion ers. It  will also assist in the identification of promising young [deleted by 
cia censors] who may be of direct interest to the Agency. Prince  will be located 
in Nigeria thus carry ing out the plan of developing the  Human Ecol ogy Fund 
as a world- wide organ ization. Since Prince  will learn the Yoruba language this 
proj ect ofers a potential fa cil i ty for [deleted by cia censors] proj ect 95” (Prince 
1995: 412).17 In Prince’s case, the cia was interested in ethnographic fieldwork 
not only to access a distant cultural world but as a recruitment tool and to col-
lect new pharmacological samples.
 Human Ecol ogy funded projects to develop standardized psychological 
instruments whose dual uses potentially included gauging variations in individu-
als’ responses to interrogation. In the 1950s,  Human Ecol ogy funded an Educa-
tional Testing Ser vice (ets) proj ect examining the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scales (ets 1955: 90, 92), and it  later funded Eugene Gendlin and Jerome Ber-
lin’s study of subjects monitored by a polygraph (1961: 73n1).
Several studies examining childhood conceptual developments supplied in-
formation that appears to have informed Kubark’s conception of the childlike 
regressive state induced by “coercive interrogation” (cia 1963b). Research ex-
amining isolation and sleep deprivation, stress, handwriting, and links between 
personality types and drug interactions addressed topics central to the Kubark 
interrogation manual.  Human Ecol ogy received grants from the  U.S. Public 
Health Ser vice (myp-5699 and mh-08807) to produce the Handbook of Psychi-
atric Rating Scale (Lyerly and Abbott 1966),18 which compiled nineteen psy-
chiatric scales. The resulting product appeared to serve dual uses: producing 
knowledge that could be used by  mental health prac ti tion ers, while si mul ta-
neously producing a tool that would be of use to interrogation specialists gaug-
ing the impacts of interrogations.
But  Human Ecol ogy also funded studies on revolutions, refugees, Chinese per-
sonality types, Chinese  family structure, Soviet psy chol ogy, and cross- cultural 
communication, as well as vari ous studies that examined elements of psycho-
logical profiling.
 Human Ecol ogy, China, Hungary, and Elsewhere
The cia used Harold Wolf ’s presence at Cornell to investigate ways to take 
Chinese citizens living in the United States and, as Lawrence Hinkle put it, “steer 
them to [the cia], and make them into agents” (qtd. in Marks 1979: 149).  Human 
Ecol ogy sponsored Cornell projects investigating ways to train recruited Chi-
nese agents to resist Chinese brainwashing (150).
Rhoda Métraux assisted Wolf and Hinkle’s research on the manifestations of 
stress on Chinese individuals who  were unable to return to China (see Hinkle 
et al. 1957).  After Wolf learned that Métraux would not be granted cia research 
clearance, he lied to her about the nature of the proj ect (Marks 1979: 150–51). 
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Raymond Prince speculated that  Human Ecol ogy sought to “use their Chinese 
sample as a means to identify disgruntled refugees with suitable personality 
profiles who had fled the Communist regime 10 years earlier and might be per-
suaded to act as cia agents back in China” (1995: 411). Hinkle  later admitted that 
this proj ect’s secret purpose was to recruit skilled cia intelligence operatives 
who could return to China as spies. As an unwitting participant, Métraux col-
lected information on Chinese subjects’ per for mance  under stress, which con-
tributed to the cia’s eforts to train agents to resist Chinese forms of interroga-
tion (Marks 1979: 149–50).  Human Ecol ogy funded William Rodd’s research 
into Chinese cultural systems of prob lem solving, values, and logic (hef 1963: 
17), and William K. Carr was awarded $48,480 to work on a proj ect, “Anthropo-
logical Identification of the Determinants of Chinese Be hav ior” (aaafn 1964 5 
[5]: 6; Carr and Tullock 1965).19
One proj ect used unwitting social scientists to interview Hungarian refugees 
to gather intelligence for the cia (see Marks 1979: 153–54; Stephenson 1978; 
hef 1963: 30). In the mid-1950s,  Human Ecol ogy sponsored two conferences 
at which scholars examined the po liti cal, psychological, and cultural means 
through which Hungarian refugees retained their identities  under Soviet oc-
cupation (see sihe 1958). Stephenson described his discovery in 1977 that the 
Hungarian refugee research proj ect he had been involved with since the 1950s 
had been secretly funded by the cia’s MK- Ultra program. He had mixed re-
actions upon learning of this cia sponsorship,  later writing that he was both 
“ofended and resentful, if not actually angry,” that he had “been had”; he also 
noted, “In view of the nature of the so cio log i cal data and its undirected and 
unclassified status, the idea that the cia was involved and the Society was its 
‘cover’ assumed a cloak and dagger staging closer to comic opera than serious 
drama” (Stephenson 1978: 130).
 Human Ecol ogy and a Range of Kubark- Linked Research
The cia’s Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation (1963) was an instruction 
manual, not an academic treatise, and as with other manuals, it cites only a few 
academic sources. Though most sources remain unacknowledged, the work of 
some  Human Ecology– sponsored scholars appears in its pages, including Mar-
tin Orne’s research on hypnosis, work that provided the basis of Kubark’s dis-
cussion of the uses and limits of hypnosis in interrogation (cia 1963b: 78, 95–
98). Biderman and Zimmer’s research and published volume on nonvoluntary 
be hav ior funded by  Human Ecol ogy (Biderman and Zimmer 1961: ix) is quoted 
and cited extensively in Kubark (see cia 1963b: 77–80, 83, 86–87, 89–91, 99), as 
is Hinkle’s work on pain and the physiological state of interrogation subjects 
(cia 1963b: 83, 93). Kubark’s discussion of the uses of graphology in analyzing 
interrogation subjects drew on Karla G. Roman’s  Human Ecology– sponsored 
research (cia 1963b: 81; hef 1963: 38). Martin Orne and sociologist Albert D. 
Biderman’s  Human Ecology– sponsored research is cited in Kubark’s scant ref-
erence section. Kubark incorporated (without attribution) the essentials of 
anthropologist Mark Zborowski’s model of pain, explaining that “the sensa-
tion of pain seems to be roughly equal in all men, that is to say, all  people have 
approximately the same threshold at which they begin to feel pain, and when 
carefully graded stimuli are applied to them, their estimates of severity are ap-
proximately the same. . . .  Yet . . .  when men are very highly motivated . . .  they 
have been known to carry out rather complex tasks while enduring the most 
intense pain” (cia 1963b: 93; see Zborowski 1952, 1969; Zipperstein 2010; D. H. 
Price 2011d).
Kubark discussed the importance of interrogators’ learning to read the body 
language of interrogation subjects.  Human Ecol ogy funded early research on 
body language by anthropologist Edward Hall, whose studies aligned with cia 
research needs.20 Several pages of Kubark instructed interrogators how to read 
a subject’s body language with tips such as the following: “It is also helpful to 
watch the subject’s mouth, which is as a rule much more revealing than his eyes. 
Gestures and postures also tell a story. If a subject normally gesticulates broadly 
at times and is at other times physically relaxed but at some point sits stiffly 
motionless, his posture is likely to be the physical image of his  mental tension. 
The interrogator should make a  mental note of the topic that caused such a 
reaction” (cia 1963b: 55).
In 1977,  after public revelations of the agency’s role in directing  Human Ecol-
ogy research projects, Edward Hall discussed his unwitting receipt of cia funds 
that supported his writing of The Hidden Dimension (E. T. Hall 1966). Hall ac-
knowledged that his studies of body language would have been useful for the 
cia’s goals “ because the  whole  thing is designed to begin to teach  people to 
understand, to read other  people’s be hav ior. What  little I know about the [cia], 
I  wouldn’t want to have much to do with it. . . .  I  don’t mind training  people for 
the State Department, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for 
International Development — even the Army . . .  within that overall context, 
 here’s a group of  people out  there  doing dirty tricks. I  don’t know what you 
do about that” (qtd. in Greenfield 1977: 11).21 Greenfield added, “Hall doubts 
he would have taken the money, had he known it was coming from the cia: ‘I 
would want to know why  were they backing me? What  were they getting out of 
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this? I still  don’t know’ ” (11). Despite his  later personal objections, Hall’s work 
informed  Human Ecol ogy’s knowledge base.22
Albert Biderman received grants from  Human Ecol ogy and the air force 
to study former U.S. soldiers who had been prisoners of war in North  Korea 
and “Communist China” to test factors leading prisoners to confess (Biderman 
1960: 120n1).23 He found that “prisoners rarely conform to the injunction of 
silence in interrogation  because to do so is inconsistent with more compelling 
requirements they experience in the  actual situation; namely, the maintenance 
of a  viable social role and an esteemed self- image” (121). Biderman studied the 
difficulties prisoners had in simply remaining  silent while facing interrogation 
and found that silence often became a form of interaction with interrogators, 
especially interrogators who used a “ silent confirmation” trick where they re-
peatedly asked and answered questions whose answers  were already known as 
a way of tricking prisoners into mentally engaging with them. He found that 
stress mounted with each question prisoners refused to answer, and that stress 
was relieved by answering questions.
Biderman interviewed soldiers and amassed reports of torture, coercive in-
terrogation, and “brainwashing,” presenting  these in an air force report titled 
Communist Techniques of Coercive Interrogation and academic articles on in-
terrogation and forced indoctrination (Biderman 1956, 1960).  Human Ecol ogy 
funded Biderman’s book March to Calumny: The Story of American pows in the 
Korean War (1963). March to Calumny critiqued claims that American soldiers 
in the Korean War who broke  under Korean interrogation  were weak and also 
demonstrated that Korean War pows did not behave significantly diferently 
from soldiers in other recent wars.
 Human Ecol ogy funded a variety of so- called mind control studies, includ-
ing Edgar Schein’s (1961) study of Chinese eforts to brainwash American pris-
oners. Eysenck and colleagues conducted research on the hypnotic potential 
of the spinning hypno- disk (as seen in dozens of cheesy 1950s science fiction 
movies) (Eysenck, Willett, and Slater 1962). The 1977 Senate hearings on MK- 
Ultra programs detailed the cia’s failures in the 1950s and early 1960s to find 
esoteric means like hypnosis, psychedelics, “truth serums,” sensory deprivation 
tanks, or electroshock to break uncooperative interrogation subjects. John Git-
tinger testified that by 1963,  after years of experimentation, the cia realized that 
“brainwashing was largely a pro cess of isolating a  human being, keeping him 
out of contact, putting him  under long stress in relationship to interviewing 
and interrogation, and that they could produce any change that way without 
having to resort to any kind of esoteric means” (U.S. Senate 1977: 62). The cia 
understood that isolation and stress  were the keys to efective coercive interro-
gation, and it was during this shift away from exotic drugs and equipment that 
 Human Ecol ogy sponsored the stress research discussed below.
In 1964,  A. Arthur Sugerman and Frank Haronian published their article 
“Body Type and Sophistication of Body Concept,” which reviewed vari ous ef-
forts to correlate indexes of “body type” to psychological profiling features. The 
authors, whose study had been funded by  Human Ecol ogy, conceded that  there 
 were significant reliability problems with Sheldon’s somatotype research (other 
researchers had difficulty replicating his findings), yet they  were enamored 
with the prospect that some means of correlating body type with psychological 
profiling was pos si ble. Sugerman and Haronian discussed the possibility that 
 there may have been errors in the specific psychological and physical variables 
mea sured, and their study combined Sheldon somatotype mea sure ments with 
Parnell phenotype mea sure ments, concluding that both systems produced com-
parable results.
Haronian and Sugerman’s  Human Ecology– funded work from 1965 sought 
to test the validity of Sheldon’s work. Psychologist William Herbert Sheldon had 
developed his somatotype model as an attempt to correlate  human body types 
with psychological outlooks, believing that physical appearance held decipher-
able indications of inner psychic worlds or individual potentials. Though his 
somatological work produced explanatory models that  were no more accurate 
than the phrenology of a  century earlier, Sheldon had a following during the 
1940s and 1950s (see Rosenbaum 1995). Haronian and Sugerman (1965) con-
trasted Sheldon’s somatotype approach to classifying and interpreting  human 
body forms with Parnell’s phenotype scoring methodology.
Haronian and Sugerman conceded that Parnell’s methodology was less rigor-
ous and was susceptible to reliability errors, but they liked its advantage of not 
requiring subjects to disrobe and be photographed in the nude (1965: 135). Their 
evaluation of  these two systems of classifying body type found that they pro-
duced varied results. The authors did not attempt to correlate the systems’ body 
type classifications with psychometric data, leaving that for  future research.
Haronian and Sugerman’s eforts to read bodies fit with  Human Ecol ogy’s 
eforts to establish baseline standardized metrics that could also be used to un-
derstand interrogation subjects. With deep misunderstandings of the impacts 
of biology and culture on  human be hav ior,  Human Ecol ogy did not realize that 
the best outcome that Haronian and Sugerman’s model could hope to produce 
was an efficient way of consistently labeling and mea sur ing ste reo types, but 
their model did not achieve even this misguided end.
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 Human Ecol ogy’s Anthropological Research  
on Bereavement and Stress
It is unclear why  Human Ecol ogy sponsored several anthropological research 
projects investigating cultural impacts on grieving; it is pos si ble that Wolf or 
 others recognized that bereavement was a universal experience of intense 
stress and isolation mitigated by culture.  Human Ecol ogy funded medical an-
thropologist Barbara Gallatin Anderson’s study using American bereavement 
data to develop a cross- cultural framework for studying bereavement (An-
derson 1965: 181n1).24 Anderson interviewed  mental patients and determined 
that the death of someone close to them had been the single most stressful 
event of their lives (184). Several MK- Ultra projects investigated the efects 
of isolation on interrogation subjects as part of eforts to understand states of 
regression and psychic collapse of the sort “whose covert application was so 
unlikely that only an expert could see the possibilities” (Marks 1979: 159; cf. cia 
1963b: 83).
 Human Ecol ogy funded anthropologists Alan Howard and Robert Scott’s 
(1965–66) investigation of enculturation’s impacts on grieving pro cesses. Their 
work studied how cultural norms and behavioral practices caused isolation, 
which created dif er ent conditions of stress for grieving individuals. Scott drew 
on so cio log i cal lit er a ture to examine American ways of death, grieving, and 
alienation, while Howard applied his ethnographic knowledge to examine how 
Polynesian Rotuman Islanders  were socialized to experience isolation difer-
ently and how  these diferences translated to dif er ent cultural reactions to 
death. In 1994, Robert Scott wrote me, describing in some detail his and Alan 
Howard’s interactions with Harold Wolf and  Human Ecol ogy. Scott explained 
that he and Howard
had absolutely no idea that the  Human Ecol ogy Fund was a front for anything, 
least of all the cia. As far as I knew it was a small fund that was controlled by 
Harold Wolf and used to support projects of vari ous types concerning the study 
of stress and illness in humans. Its connection with the cia only came to my at-
tention some years  later when Jay Schulman . . .  of Columbia wrote an article ex-
posing the connection.25 Obviously if I had known of such a connection at the 
time I would never have accepted money from them. I should also explain that 
the money we got from them was used to support library research I was  doing 
at the Cornell Medical School on studies of stress and that the final product was a 
theoretical model for the study of stress in humans. . . .  
I was interested in studying stress and illness and the work of Harold Wolf, his 
colleague Larry Hinkle and  others was far closer to the mark. I therefore arranged 
to transfer my postdoc to a unit headed by Hinkle and with which Harold Wolf 
had an affiliation. The name of that unit was the  Human Ecol ogy Studies Program. 
At the time I was  there, Larry Hinkle was completing a study of stress among tele-
phone operators working for New Jersey (or was it New York) Bell Telephone com-
pany and he was also beginning a study of stress and heart disease among a group 
of executives for the New Jersey Bell Com pany. He invited me to participate in the 
analy sis for the first study and to advise him about the design of several of the in-
struments used in connection with that proj ect. At the same time, I was also work-
ing with Alan [Howard] on an article about stress and it was in connection with this 
work that I received support from the Fund. Or at least I think that is the reason 
why I acknowledged the Fund in our paper. I no longer have financial rec ords from 
that date and therefore do not have a file indicating the amount of support I got or 
for what period of time I received it. I do remember that  either Hinkle or Wolf or 
both suggested that I write a letter to the Fund requesting a modest level of support 
for our work (I  can’t remember the amount, but I am reasonably certain it came to 
no more than a few thousand dollars). As I recall, I used it to supplement my Russell 
Sage Foundation stipend, probably for summer income in order to finish the paper.
It  will be obvious to you from reading this that I knew Harold Wolf for a brief 
period of time during this period. As I recall, Wolf [died]  either in 1962 or 1963. 
From the manner in which the  matter was handled I gained the impression that he 
had available to him a small fund of money that could be used to support research 
and writing of the sort I was  doing and he gave me some for my work. At that time 
 there  were lots of small pots of money sitting around the medical school and  there 
was no reason to be suspicious about this one. Moreover, Wolf was a figure of  great 
distinction in Neurology and was well known outside of his field as well. For all 
of  these reasons I simply assumed that every thing was completely legitimate and 
was astounded when the connection between the Fund and the cia was disclosed.
 . . .  As I recall the only application I made was in the form of a letter. I should 
also mention that during the course of our collaboration Alan [Howard] and I 
co- authored a second paper on cultural variations in conceptions of death and 
 dying which was also published and in which  there is an ac knowl edg ment to the 
Fund. . . .  26 My association with the  Human Ecol ogy Studies Program came to an 
end early in 1964. (RAS to DHP 11/2/94)
Scott confirmed that Wolf and Hinkle shielded participants from knowledge of 
cia funding and interests.
212 | C H A P T E R  E I G H T
U N W I T T I N G  C I A  C O L L A B O R AT O R S  | 213
Howard and Scott’s article “Cultural Values and Attitudes  toward Death” 
(1965–66) reads like a typical synthetic lit er a ture review of the period, though 
the lit er a ture cited shows the influence of Wolf, Hinkle, and  Human Ecol ogy; 
references drew on Philip E. Kubzansky’s chapter in Biderman and Zimmer’s 
 Human Ecol ogy volume, The Manipulation of  Human Be hav ior — the volume 
most heavily cited in Kubark (Howard and Scott 1965–66: 163n11).27 Out of the 
universe of writings on death and bereavement, Howard and Scott’s se lection 
of Kubzansky’s prison research illustrates how  Human Ecol ogy’s environment 
 shaped sponsored studies. Howard and Scott’s views of isolation reflected 
 Human Ecol ogy’s focus on the isolation and vulnerability of prisoners. As they 
wrote in their article:
While a fear of death may stem from anx i eties about social isolation, it seems 
equally true that the pro cess of becoming socially isolated stimulates a concern 
about death. . . .  When social isolation is involuntary . . .  the individual experienc-
ing separation from  others may become obsessed with the idea of death. Ordinary 
values,  those previously associated with primary groups or with society in gen-
eral, may pale into insignificance when they are no longer shared with significant 
 others. . . .  the fear of death may come to outweigh the fear of  dying, and the per-
son may be motivated  toward ego- destructive be hav ior. (164)
For hidden cia sponsors, the focus on isolation and vulnerability transcended 
the circumstances of death and bereavement. This work had uses for  Human 
Ecol ogy’s secret sharers considering captive individuals facing other forms of 
total social isolation, who shared characteristics with  those experiencing the 
social isolation of mourning.
Howard and Scott’s Stress Model and Kubark’s  
Approach to Stress Mastery
 Human Ecol ogy’s grant supported Howard and Scott’s library research and 
the  later write-up of their findings. Scott was based at Cornell, where he had 
some contact with Hinkle, Wolf, and other  Human Ecol ogy personnel, while 
Howard wrote in California and never visited Cornell. Prior to 1961, they sub-
mitted a copy of their  Human Ecology– sponsored paper developing a “pro-
posed framework for the analy sis of stress in the  human organism” to Behavioral 
Science, and a copy of the paper was submitted to their sponsor (RS to DHP 
6/11/07; Howard and Scott 1965). Although the paper was submitted in 1961, it 
was not published in Behavioral Science  until 1965 (AH to DHP 6/5/07).
In 1977, John Gittinger testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Commit-
tee on  Human Resources that the cia’s funding of  Human Ecol ogy allowed it to 
be “run exactly like any other foundation,” which meant the cia had “access 
to any of the reports that they had put out, but  there  were no strings attached 
to anybody.  There  wasn’t any reason they  couldn’t publish anything that they 
put out” (U.S. Senate 1977: 59). This was the principal way that the findings of 
 Human Ecol ogy research  were channeled to  those at the cia who selectively 
harvested elements of this work for their own uses.
The scope of Scott and Howard’s work aligned with Wolf ’s ongoing research 
on stress and health, as well as Wolf ’s secret search for successful “coercive 
interrogation” methods. Both Scott and Howard had worked together on their 
cross- cultural stress model before they knew of  Human Ecol ogy, and Scott ar-
gued they would have undertaken this work even without this funding (RS to 
DHP 6/11/07).  Human Ecol ogy’s semiannual report described their research as 
developing an “equilibrium model . . .  based upon a view of man as a ‘prob lem 
solving’ organism continually confronted with situations requiring resolution 
to avoid stress and to preserve well- being” (hef 1963: 24). Understanding in-
dividuals’ eforts to “avoid stress” through cooperative “prob lem solving” was 
just one abstraction away from transforming an informative general model on 
stress into a useful interrogation tool for the cia.
Howard and Scott’s 1965 article on stress could be “reverse engineered” for 
information on how to weaken a person’s ability to adapt to stressful environ-
ments, such as  those present during an interrogation. Thus, when Howard and 
Scott wrote that “stress occurs if the individual does not have available to him 
the tools and knowledge to  either successfully deal with or avert challenges 
which arise in par tic u lar situations,” they  were si mul ta neously scientifically de-
scribing factors mitigating the experience of stress (their purpose), while also 
unwittingly outlining what environmental factors should be manipulated if one 
wanted to keep an individual  under stressful conditions (their hidden cia pa-
tron’s purpose) (Howard and Scott 1965: 143).
Howard and Scott reviewed lit er a ture that established how stress alters regu-
lar gastric functions and can cause or increase the severity of diseases. They de-
scribed how individuals cope with stressful situations through eforts to “main-
tain equilibrium in the face of difficult, and in some cases almost intolerable 
circumstances” (1965: 142). Howard and Scott’s “prob lem- solving” model for 
conceptualizing stress began with the recognition that individuals  under stress 
try to reduce their stress and return to a state of equilibrium. It posited that 
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“disequilibrium motivates the organism to attempt to solve the problems which 
produce the imbalance, and hence to engage in prob lem- solving activity” (145).
To apply Howard and Scott’s model to situations involving coercive inter-
rogation, interrogation subjects would be seen as trying to reduce the “imbal-
ance” of discomfort or pain and returning to a state of equilibrium by providing 
the interrogator with the requested information. Their model could be  adopted 
to view cooperation as the solution to the stressful problems faced by inter-
rogation subjects, and rational subjects would cooperate in order to return to 
noncoercive states of equilibrium. This philosophy aligned with a basic Kubark 
paradigm, which maintained the following:
The efectiveness of most of the non- coercive techniques depends upon their un-
settling efect. The interrogation situation is in itself disturbing to most  people en-
countering it for the first time. The aim is to enhance this efect, to disrupt radically 
the familiar emotional and psychological associations of the subject. When this 
aim is achieved, re sis tance is seriously impaired.  There is an interval — which may 
be extremely brief — of suspended animation, a kind of psychological shock or 
paralysis. It is caused by a traumatic or sub- traumatic experience which explodes, 
as it  were, the world that is familiar to the subject as well as his image of himself 
within that world. Experienced interrogators recognize this efect when it appears 
and know that at this moment the source is far more open to suggestion, far likelier 
to comply, than he was just before he experienced the shock. (cia 1963b: 65–66)
Thus a skilled interrogator “helps” subjects move  toward “compliance,”  after 
which subjects may return to a desired state of equilibrium.
Howard and Scott found that individuals  under stress had only three re-
sponse options. They could mount an “assertive response,” in which they con-
fronted the prob lem directly and enacted a solution by mobilizing what ever 
resources  were available; they could have a “divergent response,” in which they 
diverted “energies and resources away from the confronting prob lem,” often in 
the form of a withdrawal; or they could have an “inert response,” in which they 
reacted with paralysis and refused to respond (Howard and Scott 1965: 147). 
They concluded that the “assertive response” was the only  viable option for an 
organism responding to externally induced stress: if  these findings are trans-
posed onto an environment of coercive interrogation, this would mean that 
cooperation was the only  viable option for interrogation subjects.
In the context of MK- Ultra’s interest in developing successful interrogation 
methods,  these three responses took on other meanings. Interrogation subjects 
producing an “assertive response” would cooperate with interrogators and provide 
them with the desired information; subjects producing a “divergent response” 
might react to interrogation by mentally drifting away from the present di-
lemma (like Sam Lowry, at the end of Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil), or by fruitless 
eforts to redirect inquiries; and subjects producing an “inert response” with 
frozen states without external response — like that of the torture machine’s vic-
tims in Kafka’s Penal Colony (see D. H. Price 2010b).
Kubark described how interrogators use “manipulated techniques” that are 
“still keyed to the individual but brought to bear on himself ” that create stresses 
for the individual and push him  toward a state of “regression of the personality 
to what ever earlier and weaker level is required for the dissolution of re sis tance 
and the inculcation of dependence” (cia 1963b: 41). As presented in Kubark, 
successful interrogators get their subjects to view them as liberators helping 
them find a way to return to the desired state of release: “As regression proceeds, 
almost all resisters feel the growing internal stress that results from wanting si-
mul ta neously to conceal and to divulge. . . .  It is the business of the interrogator 
to provide the right rationalization at the right time.  Here too the importance 
of understanding the interrogatee is evident; the right rationalization must be 
an excuse or reason that is tailored to the source’s personality” (40–41). Kubark 
conceptualized the stress created in an interrogation environment as a useful 
tool to be manipulated by interrogators who understood their role of helping 
subjects find release from this stress: “The interrogator can benefit from the 
subject’s anxiety. As the interrogator becomes linked in the subject’s mind with 
the reward of lessened anxiety,  human contact, and meaningful activity, and 
thus with providing relief for growing discomfort, the questioner assumes a 
benevolent role” (90).  Under Howard and Scott’s learning theory model, the 
interrogator role becomes not that of the person delivering discomfort but of 
the individual acting as the gateway to obtaining mastery of a prob lem.
Howard and Scott found that once an individual  under stress conquers this 
stress through an assertive response, then “the state of the organism  will be 
superior to its state prior to the time it was confronted with the prob lem, and 
that should the same prob lem arise again ( after the organism has had an oppor-
tunity to replenish its resources) it  will be dealt with more efficiently than be-
fore” (1965: 149).  These findings suggest that interrogation subjects  will learn to 
produce the desired information “more efficiently than before.” But as Kubark 
warned, this could also mean that an individual who endured coercive inter-
rogation but did not produce information on the first try may well learn that he 
can survive without giving information (see cia 1963b: 42; 1983: H-5).
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Kubark “suggests that the specific coercive techniques employed should be 
chosen based on the personality of the subject. The ‘usual efect of coercion is 
regression.’ The subject  will become more ‘childlike as his/her adult defenses 
breakdown. While this is happening, the subject  will feel guiltier and the inter-
rogators should exploit this” (Gordon and Fleisher 2006: 187). Kubark’s philos-
ophy of choosing “specific coercive techniques” “based on the personality of the 
subject” explains why the  Human Ecol ogy Fund sponsored so many dif er ent 
eforts to develop standardized profiling tools that could be used to identify and 
exploit individual variations in personality.
Most of the noncoercive interrogation techniques described in Kubark focus 
on the specific tactics that interrogators can employ (e.g., using joint interroga-
tors — one the “good cop,” the other the “bad cop”; rapidly switching the language 
of interrogation; using “news from home” to the interrogator’s advantage), with 
 little direct information presented on the level of analy sis presented in Howard 
and Scott’s 1965 paper. Howard and Scott found that “if an organism is ulti-
mately to attain mastery over a prob lem, the prob lem must be solvable” (1965: 
146); in the world of Kubark interrogations, one corollary of this finding would 
be that if coercive interrogation subjects have no useful information, they are in 
a world of hurt, without any options available to gain relief.
Howard and Scott’s prob lem- solving model aligns with Kubark’s rationaliza-
tion of efective uses of coercive interrogation. Kubark explained:
The confusion technique is designed not only to obliterate the familiar but to replace 
it with the weird. Although this method can be employed by a single interrogator, 
it is better adapted to use by two or three. When the subject enters the room, the 
first interrogator asks a doubletalk question — one which seems straightforward 
but is essentially nonsensical.  Whether the interrogatee tries to answer or not, 
the second interrogator follows up (interrupting any attempted response) with a 
wholly unrelated and equally illogical query. Sometimes two or more questions 
are asked si mul ta neously. Pitch, tone, and volume of the interrogators’ voices are 
unrelated to the import of the questions. No pattern of questions and answers 
is permitted to develop, nor do the questions themselves relate logically to each 
other. In this strange atmosphere the subject finds that the pattern of speech and 
thought which he has learned to consider normal have been replaced by an eerie 
meaninglessness. The interrogatee may start laughing or refuse to take the situa-
tion seriously. But as the pro cess continues, day  after day if necessary, the subject 
begins to try to make sense of the situation, which becomes mentally intolerable. 
Now he is likely to make significant admissions, or even to pour out his story, just 
to stop the flow of babble which assails him. This technique may be especially ef-
fective with the orderly, obstinate type. (cia 1963b: 76)
One of Kubark’s techniques, called “Spinoza and Mortimer Snerd,” described 
how interrogators could gain cooperation by interrogating subjects for prolonged 
periods “about lofty topics that the source knows nothing about” (cia 1963b: 
75). The subject is forced to honestly say he or she does not know the answers to 
 these questions, and some mea sure of stress is generated and maintained. When 
the interrogator switches to known topics, the subject is given small rewards, and 
feelings of relief emerge when  these conditions are changed. Howard and Scott’s 
model was well suited to be adapted to such interrogation methods, as release 
from stress was Kubark’s hallmark of efective interrogation techniques.
Kubark described how prisoners come to be “helplessly dependent on their 
captors for the satisfaction of their many basic needs” and release of stress. 
Kubark taught that, “once a true confession is obtained, the classic cautions apply. 
The pressures are lifted, at least enough so that the subject can provide coun-
terintelligence information as accurately as pos si ble. In fact, the relief granted 
the subject at this time fits neatly into the interrogation plan. He is told that the 
changed treatment is a reward for truthfulness and as evidence that friendly 
 handling  will continue as long as he cooperates” (cia 1963b: 84). Translated 
into Howard and Scott’s stress model, this subject mastered the environment 
by using an “assertive response” that allowed him or her to return to the desired 
state of equilibrium.  There remain basic problems of knowing when a “true con-
fession” is actually a false confession — elicited simply to return to the desired 
state of equilibrium.
When comparing the theoretical explanations in Howard and Scott’s 1965 
stress article with Kubark’s under lying guiding paradigms,  there are clear over-
lapping models. But when reading both texts with hindsight, it remains unclear 
where an academic model of stress in de pen dently developing similar explana-
tions (from  those in Kubark) for stress release begins, and where MK- Ultra’s fo-
cused interest in  these questions ends. Given the destruction of documents and 
the nature of secret agencies, some specific elements of  these questions remain 
unanswerable, but we do know that MK- Ultra funded stress research and other 
projects at  Human Ecol ogy to gather data that could be used to refine inter-
rogation methods. Steven Kleinman (2006) summarized Kubark’s paradigms 
as relying on psychological assessment, screening, the creation and release of 
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controlled stress, isolation, and regression, all of which are used by interroga-
tors to “help” the interrogation subject “concede.”
The Impacts of Funding Fronts
Harold Wolf died in 1962, a year before the cia finished the Kubark manual; 
Hinkle remained at Cornell for de cades. Without fanfare, the  Human Ecol ogy 
Fund closed its doors on June 30, 1965 (aaafn 1967 7[4]: 8). A de cade  later, its 
cia ties  were exposed. In the end, psy chol ogy was the discipline that provided 
the most useful MK- Ultra- funded interrogation research, but anthropology 
also unwittingly contributed to  these programs.
It was no accident that the Senate’s 1977 hearings investigating MK- Ultra’s co- 
option of academic research did not probe into the details of  Human Ecol ogy’s few 
witting academicians who sought and coordinated academic research that aligned 
with the covert interests of the cia. When cia psychologist John Gittinger’s tes-
timony drifted into discussions of the individuals working within  Human Ecol-
ogy who knew of the cia’s secret sponsorship of unwitting researchers, Senator 
Edward Kennedy stopped Gittinger and told him that the committee was “not 
interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not [identify them]. 
That has to be worked out in arrangements between [dci] Admiral Turner and 
the individuals and the institutions. But  we’re interested in what the Foundation 
 really was and how it functioned and what its purpose was” (U.S. Senate 1977: 
59).28 The Senate’s decision to not delve further into the campus- cia articula-
tions leaves us with only outlines of how  these interactions worked.29 Though 
the Senate did not investigate the specific individuals involved in MK- Ultra’s 
academic links, John Marks documented how cardiologist Lawrence E. Hinkle 
Jr. and neurologist Harold G. Wolf became the heart and mind of  Human Ecol-
ogy’s cia inquiries.
In one sense, the details of  Human Ecol ogy’s use of cia funds to commission 
specific research are extraordinary; in another sense, they are not. Given congres-
sional and media revelations of the extent of covert cia funding of unwitting aca-
demics during this period, perhaps the most remarkable feature of this  Human 
Ecol ogy research is that we can trace the cia funds and what cia proj ect it was 
used for — not that it was financed by cia funds (U.S. Senate 1976:  182).
MK- Ultra’s covert use of  Human Ecol ogy to fund this stress research gave 
the cia what it wanted: access to selective pieces from an elegant analytical 
cross- cultural model explaining  human responses to stress. It did not  matter 
that the model was produced in public by scholars with dif er ent intentions; the 
cia had its own private uses for the work it funded. As Alan Howard clarified, 
the abuse of his and Scott’s work was facilitated by the cia’s secrecy and the 
unknown dual use dimensions of the proj ect:
I could liken our situation to the discovery of the potential of splitting atoms for 
the release of massive amounts of energy. That knowledge can be used to create 
energy sources to support the finest  human endeavors or to make atomic bombs. 
Unfortunately, such is the potential of most forms of  human knowledge; it can be 
used for good or evil. While  there is no  simple solution to this dilemma, it is im-
perative that scientists of  every ilk demand transparency in the funding of research 
and open access to information. The bad guys   will, of course, opt for deception 
whenever it suits their purposes, and we cannot control that, but exposing such 
deceptions, as you have so ably done, is vitally impor tant. (AH to DHP 6/7/07)
Howard, Scott, and most other scholars who received  Human Ecol ogy funds 
did nothing wrong. They undertook research designed to understand stress in an 
environment they had  every reason to believe was striving to improve health 
and the understanding of stress’s role in disease; that hidden sponsors had other 
uses for this work was not their fault.
But the same cannot be said of the cia. The agency’s ethical misconduct in 
using the  Human Ecol ogy Fund to conduct research hinged on lying to the 
scholars the cia funded about where grant money came from; lying about what 
their results would be used for; and, more fundamentally, designing and imple-
menting inhumane interrogation methods. But despite the ethical depravity of 
using unwitting outsourced scholars to gather data to be used for degenerate 
ends, the cia understood that open academic research conducted by scholars 
operating “freely” outside of the constraints of an agency like the cia produced 
high- quality work.
Military and intelligence agencies’ misappropriation of anthropological re-
search for their own ends creates serious problems for unwitting academic ser-
vants. Howard and Scott intended for their stress research to add to a lit er a ture 
concerned with improving health, yet their research was selectively funded and 
reviewed by  those who would use it for harm, not healing.
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In the 1950s . . .  fledgling anthropologists went into field situations  
innocent of counterinsurgency plots spawned in the emergent  
globalization system, and of the role that we might unconsciously play.  
Now too much is known about undercover plots to ignore or deny  
U.S. intervention in the field sites we choose.
 J U N E  N A S H  | 2007
N I N E   C O L D  WA R  F I E L D W O R K  W I T H I N  
T H E  I N T E L L I G E N C E  U N I V E R S E
Over the de cades, numerous anthropologists in the field have falsely come  under 
suspicion of being spies. Such accusations are thematically linked to why intel-
ligence agencies have occasionally sought to use anthropologists to collect in-
telligence.  These reasons include expertise in foreign cultures, familiarity with 
local languages, ease of traveling in remote areas, reliance on participant obser-
vational methods, and working in regions with colonialist histories that remain 
of interest to military and intelligence agencies of the global north.
False accusations of spying  were among the dangers facing anthropologists 
conducting fieldwork identified by Nancy Howell in Surviving Fieldwork, her 
monograph on dangers facing anthropologists in the field. Howell recounted 
archaeologist Bruce Schroeder’s arrest by the Syrian Border Patrol while he 
was surveying sites in Lebanon as an example of dangerous outcomes of  these 
widespread suspicions (1990: 97). Fifteen  percent of anthropologists surveyed 
by Howell reported accusations or suspicions that they  were spies; her research 
identified  these accusations by geographic regions — with the Pacific Islands 
and Asia being associated with the most accusations, though we may assume 
geopo liti cal developments can quickly alter such trends.1 While false accusa-
tions of spying have been an ongoing threat to anthropologists in the field, 
Howell acknowledged that “sometimes the suspicion is correct,” pointing out 
that Louis Leakey used his fieldwork to broadcast anti- insurrection propa-
ganda during Mau Mau uprisings in  Kenya (98).
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False accusations of spying can have devastating impacts. Former cia agent 
John Stockwell once recounted how  after a lecture on a university campus, one 
of the organizers of the event described how, when she began studying in Zam-
bia, she had been warned that an American scholar  there was known to be cia. 
Stockwell  later wrote, “Her story made me want to cry. As supervisor of cia 
 activities in Zambia during the time she was  there, I was intimately familiar 
with  every ‘asset’ the cia had in the country and the person she named was 
not one of them. Americans in Zambia mistrusted and avoided one another 
 because the cia had poisoned the environment. Frankly, my guess is that if 
Congress  were investigating this aspect of cia operations, they would find that 
most cia managers actually preferred that other Americans in the country not 
trust one another” (1991: 104).
Anthropologists occasionally benefited from mistaken beliefs that they are 
cia operatives. While conducting Malayan fieldwork in 1968, anthropologist 
Douglas Raybeck spent days in a rural police station collecting historical demo-
graphic data from birth and death rec ords.  After several days of this work, one 
of the police officers asked Raybeck how long he had worked with the cia. Ray-
beck protested vigorously against this suggestion, and he produced his pass-
port and letters of introduction from his dean at Cornell to demonstrate his 
academic legitimacy. The police officer looked at the documents but remained 
unconvinced, assuming that any cia plant would also be able to produce such 
papers. Raybeck  later learned that most of the Malayan governmental officials 
he had contact with assumed he was a cia operative collecting information on 
Chinese Communists  because, “ after all,  there I was staying in a small village 
only fifteen miles from the Thai border. . . .  This  whole misperception could 
have greatly altered my relationship to the villagers, made my work difficult or 
impossible, and possibly even endangered Karen and me. Fortunately the gov-
ernments of Malaysi and Klantan, as well as the villagers, thought the cia was 
a wonderful organ ization  because it was opposed to Communism” (Raybeck 
1996: 87–88). While Raybeck may have benefited from the misconception that 
he had cia ties, most anthropologists sufer when such misconceptions occur.
In 1982, Jon Kalb, an American geologist, was expelled from Ethiopia  after 
false rumors circulated that he was a cia agent. Ethiopia soon banned all for-
eign scientists, and fears that similar rumors could lead to research bans in 
other countries spread through the paleoarchaeological community (New Sci-
entist 1982: 552). Kalb argued that  these false claims grew from his past disputes 
with a colleague (New Scientist 1982: 552). Kalb believed  these claims first ap-
peared during the peer review pro cess for his 1977 nsf grant application, and 
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he filed more than a hundred foia requests seeking nsf rec ords.  After Kalb 
showed the nsf had been party to discussions in which Kalb’s colleagues and 
funding competitors raised rumors that he was secretly a cia operative, he won 
an out- of- court settlement from the nsf for damages (see Kalb 2001).
At times, cia operations intruded into fieldwork settings, spreading suspi-
cions of anthropologists in ways that impacted their interactions with locals. 
June Nash has written that when she began fieldwork in Bolivia in 1967, “Che 
Guevara was still fighting in the tropics of Santa Cruz,” and po liti cal tensions 
 were high (1979b: 4). Nash’s and anthropologist Doris Widerkehr’s interests in 
mining and  labor organizations led to accusations of their being cia agents 
of “Yanqui imperialism” (Nash, 1979a: 359–60). Nash published articles in local 
outlets demonstrating her allegiances with the miners’ struggles, but the po liti-
cal upheaval cast suspicion on her. She responded to accusations with a letter 
and a meeting with  union officials to explain her methodology and her analytical 
approach to Bolivian mining.  These incidents intensified during the po liti cal up-
heaval of October 1970, and Nash took precautions to protect her field notes and 
 family during this time, while student protesters blew up the doors of the usis 
building and burned its books. Crowds of protesters  were fired upon, and some 
protesters  were killed; Nash’s home was targeted by sniper fire (362).  Later, when 
one of her research audiotapes accidentally came to be played for  others ( after she 
had loaned out her tape recorder with a tape accidentally still in it), suspicions 
 were again raised.  After Nash explained what had happened, though, the  union 
believed her  because, “despite their hatred of the cia, they had a very high regard 
for the agency’s per for mance, and this blunder did not fit the image” (363).
It was common for American anthropologists during the Cold War to be 
falsely suspected of spying (e.g., Mars 2003; Verdery 1996: 7). Stuart Kirsch 
recounted how when he was  doing fieldwork in New Guinea in the mid-1980s, 
he encountered a university scientist trying to determine if rabies had entered the 
country with dogs accompanying refugees. The scientist wanted Kirsch to ask 
refugees about their dogs, but other work kept him from making inquiries. Years 
 later, a refugee told Kirsch that when he first arrived he was suspected of being 
a spy. Kirsch wrote, “Curious about this claim, I asked him  whether they had 
ever seen a spy. He said that an Australian spy visited the camp the year before 
I arrived. I asked him how they knew that the Australian visitor was a spy. He 
explained that it was obvious,  because the Australian man claimed to be a doc-
tor, but spent all of his time talking to  people about their dogs” (2006: 239n15).
In Nicaragua in the 1980s, Roger Lancaster found himself accused of being 
a cia operative one day while shopping for a chicken. A drunk man started 
raving that Lancaster was a cia agent, come to spy on Nicaragua. This man’s 
“proof ” was that when he spoke to Lancaster in En glish, he “pretended” to not 
understand, arguing, “Now why  else would he do that  unless he was trying to 
conceal his nationality? And why would he conceal his nationality  unless he 
 were trying to hide something? He must be cia. Arrest him!” But Lancaster 
was defended by the shop keep er’s wife — whom he had never met, but who 
surprised him by listing his credentials as a uc Berkeley anthropologist and 
even the specific topic of his dissertation, noting, “When he goes back [to the 
United States] he’s  going to tell the truth about Nicaragua, and our revolution, 
and it  will be good for us” (Lancaster 1992: 75–76).
While accusations of spying from locals are common motifs in ethnographic 
writings, anthropologists have rarely discussed being investigated by the fbi or 
the cia, although such investigations occasionally intersected with fieldwork 
during the Cold War. In 1958, a cia field agent stationed in East Africa became 
suspicious of anthropologist Leo Silberman, who claimed to have a grant from 
the Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace to study the “Somaliland- 
Ethiopia border disputes.” The fbi made inquiries at the University of Chicago’s 
anthropology department. Entries in a compilation of cia reports claimed, 
“L.S. has reputation for being glib, slick, quick- tongued, fast- talker, creates 
impressions which are not true” and indicated that Silberman “[has] a mar-
velous gift of gab, writes exceedingly well, and has considerable experience in 
Africa” (foia cia doc_0001152250, 4/3/58). In 1959, the fbi monitored Oscar 
Lewis’s research in Mexico and Cuba, while some  people in Mexico falsely ac-
cused him of being an fbi agent; the fbi also suspected that Lewis might be 
a communist  because they misread his work on poverty as having Marxist 
undertones (D. H. Price 2004b: 237–54).2 In 1957, Marvin Harris was expelled 
from Mozambique for researching practices of racial segregation. On the ad-
vice of a Ford Foundation representative, he shipped his field notes home to 
New York using the U.S. embassy pouch, only to  later discover that once his 
notes and data finally arrived, they had been repackaged and obviously combed 
through (D. H. Price 2002: 16). Stanley Diamond’s fbi file indicates that he con-
tacted the fbi in October 1960 to report that his car had been broken into on 
the streets of New York, and his field notes documenting his recent po liti cal and 
economic research in Central Africa  were taken (fbi 105–131338–4. 10/12/60). 
June Nash wrote that she learned years  later that in 1970 the “Dirección de In-
vestigaciones Criminales, the Bolivian equivalent of the U.S. fbi, had,  under 
 orders from the cia, investigated me” (Nash 2007: 165).
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But it was Stanley Diamond who most succinctly explored the circumstances 
of anthropologists being suspected of spying, writing that, “Logically enough, 
anthropologists are frequently taken as spies  because of the inquisitive nature 
of their work; their concern with local afairs in the remote places to which they 
go, their tendency to fade into the background of local custom in living up to 
the canons of participant observation. They have, also, a certain limited aca-
demic immunity; they travel freely, and what better cover could a secret agent 
desire.” But Diamond did not stop  there, drawing attention to the dual use dy-
namics supporting such fieldwork, noting that, “Of course anthropologists are 
spiritual double agents. That is, they are marginal to the commercial- industrial 
society that created them, but they eagerly explore the areas opened up to them 
by colonialism” (1974:89; see D.H. Price 1998: 419n1).
 Actual spies have at times posed as anthropologists conducting fieldwork, 
a practice that creates problems for real anthropologists. During the Second 
World War, Special Intelligence Ser vice (a now defunct US intelligence divi-
sion) agent William Clothier (who  later worked for the cia from 1952 to 1979) 
used archaeology as a cover, while working on a Harvard expedition, to spy in 
Peru (see D. H. Price 2008a: 210–11). Archaeologist Payson Sheets described 
how once, when traveling in El Salvador, he took a side trip to visit Ixtepeque, a 
Salvadoran obsidian source site. When he asked for directions in a small town 
along the way, the mayor told him that “two cia agents, masquerading as ar-
chaeologists, had been discovered and killed by guerillas the year before. One 
body had been fished out of the Motagua River and the other had not been 
found. Local  people  were ready to kill any other self- declared archaeologist who 
wandered into the area” (Sheets 2001: 3). In 1967, Ralph Beals described the kill-
ing of an archaeologist in Guatemala: “The murder was believed to have been 
committed by guerrillas who thought the victim was an agent of the Central 
Intelligence Agency” (1967: 18). Beals  later noted that the same issue of the New 
York Times that reported news of this murder published a front- page story in 
which he had been quoted as saying “ there was good reason to believe that the 
cia had used anthropologists as agents abroad or that cia agents had passed 
themselves of as anthropologists” (18; see Raymont 1966). Michael Lewis writes 
of Smithsonian administrator and conservationist David Challinor’s account of 
an unidentified “young man who the Smithsonian helped fly to India, suppos-
edly to do anthropological research, who unknown to them was also using a 
grant from the department of defense to interview refugees from Communist 
China- controlled Tibet” (M. Lewis 2002: 2325).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the cia focused concerted eforts on recruiting 
sociologists, anthropologists, historians, po liti cal scientists, and  others working 
in Africa. In 1965, Rene Lemarchand was approached by Miami’s cia station 
chief while on the campus of the University of Florida and asked to provide 
information on developments in Burundi politics: Lemarchand rejected  these 
advances in no uncertain terms (Blanchard and Scheinbaum 1977b). Sociolo-
gist Jay Mullen spied for the cia while living in Uganda, where he used his 
position as an instructor at Makerere University to gather intelligence about 
Idi Amin. Mullen  later bragged that his operatives planted bugs and wiretaps in 
Amin’s headquarters and in the homes of vari ous Rus sian and Chinese individ-
uals living in Uganda (Lawrence 1979: 86; see also Mullen 1979; Siskiyou 2011). 
Historian James R. Hooker was recruited by the cia in the 1950s, and during 
his years living in Africa he kept files on individuals he met in the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the 1950s and 1960s (Lawrence 1979: 84–85). 
When Hooker famously and disparagingly claimed that “anthropology could 
not escape its Eu ro pean origins; it remained a discipline peopled by whites who 
looked at darker, dependent persons,” he did not similarly reflect on the impact 
of his own position within the cia on his professional writings (see Hooker 
1963: 458).
Many interactions between the cia and anthropologists and other academ-
ics occurred on university campuses. Theodore Graves described cia eforts to 
recruit anthropologists at the University of Colorado and ucla, where cia rep-
resentatives roamed the campuses with promises of laundered “research” funds 
for anthropologists who would align their work with agency interests. Once 
Graves began teaching at the University of Colorado, he had annual visits from 
a cia employee ofering funding for gradu ate students willing to do fieldwork 
in “sensitive parts of the world.” Graves refused to cooperate, yet the cia repre-
sentative returned each year. Graves was told  these funds would be “channeled 
through ‘respectable’ agencies” to hide any cia connection.” He encountered 
scholars funded by  these cia grant programs while he was conducting field-
work in East Africa in 1967–68, and he learned that “one of the tenured faculty 
at ucla apparently recruited students for research in po liti cally sensitive areas 
of the world for many years, with secret financial support from our govern-
ment” (Graves 2004: 315).
In the wake of the Church Committee hearings’ revelations of cia activi-
ties on campus, Paul Doughty, chair of the University of Florida’s Department 
of Anthropology, reported that it had become routine for him and other an-
thropologists, upon returning from fieldwork abroad, to “receive debriefing 
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and personal information forms from the cia” asking for “personal informa-
tion about persons whom Doughty said he has been closely involved for many 
years.” Doughty ignored  these queries, and the cia eventually stopped con-
tacting him (Blanchard and Scheinbaum 1977a: 14–15). Other anthropologists 
presumably briefed the cia; the extent of such briefings remains unknown, but 
ongoing reports of such requests by  those who refused to cooperate suggest the 
likelihood that  others did comply with  these requests (Blanchard and Schein-
baum 1977b).
Anthropological field research sometimes facilitated intelligence operations 
by nonanthropologists. For example, in 1952, F. Trubee Davison, assistant di-
rector of the cia, planned to use his connections to the American Museum of 
Natu ral History to join a trip to Sarawak to collect artifacts and make an eth-
nographic film. But Davison’s cia links brought additional po liti cal attention 
to the trip. Declassified cia memos show agency interest in Davison gather-
ing firsthand information on “what appears to have been Communist terrorist 
activity [that has] taken place in recent months in the southwestern part of 
Sarawak in and around Kuching” (foia cia- rdp80R01731R000500020001–8, 
9/24/52).3 Davison, who had only recently stepped down from two de cades 
serving as museum president, wrote Allen Dulles, describing his plans to travel 
with his wife
 under the auspices of the American Museum of Natu ral History. In broad terms, 
the purpose is to obtain documentary motion pictures of the tribal life and collect 
artifacts used by the vari ous tribes. I am naturally concerned to know  whether or 
not the po liti cal conditions are suitable and safe.
Our contact in Sarawak is one Tom Harrisson, Government Ethnologist and 
Curator of the Sarawak Museum. I am enclosing a copy of a letter which has just 
been received by the head of the Department of Anthropology at the American 
Museum who is or ga niz ing our end of the trip. I thought you might be interested in 
seeing Mr. Harrisson’s letter. (foia cia- rdp80R01731R000500020005–4, 9/11/52)4
In June 1952, Harrisson reported delays in securing a  house boat  because of po-
liti cal troubles, explaining that “ there is now a state of emergency declared.” He 
noted that it was “not practical to plan very much for the moment” and that 
movements  were currently restricted. He wrote that the current situation was 
“not unpleasantly serious,” but he advised the museum to postpone its plans 
for the present (TH to Shapiro, foia cia- rdp80R01731R000500020005–4, 
8/23/52).
Field Agents
During the Cold War, the cia occasionally used archaeological projects as cover 
for collecting foreign intelligence. A onetime cia chief of station, Baghdad, Wil-
bur Eveland  later described the agency using archaeology covers in Iraq dur-
ing the 1950s, when “part of the cia station in Iraq operating  under diplomatic 
cover was so understafed that even its two secretaries arranged communications 
drops and safe- house meetings with agents. Wives of the few cia officers  under 
‘deep cover’ (education and archaeological) typed their reports and sequestered 
their children while their husbands met with in for mants at home” (1980: 46).
Engineer, philanthropist, and archaeological enthusiast John M. Dimick had 
no formal training in archaeology, but he was an active presence in major archae-
ological excavations in Guatemala, Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and elsewhere 
from 1946 into the late 1960s. His memoir, Episodes in Archaeology, described 
how observing excavations at the Herculaneum in 1939 kindled his passion for 
archaeology. This interest led to fund- raising and managerial roles in archaeolog-
ical excavations on three continents (Dimick 1968). But  there was more  going 
on than Dimick described in his memoir; as his November 29, 1983, Washing-
ton Post obituary disclosed, “Following ser vice in Spain during World War II, 
Dimick combined government assignments with archaeological interest while 
working in Latin America for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.”
In 1946, Dimick contacted United Fruit Com pany founder Sam Zemurray 
and persuaded him to provide $430,000 for three years of work on Mayan 
monumental archaeological remains in Guatemala (1968: 26). From 1946 to 
1960, Dimick directed the proj ect, hiring Alfred Kidder to undertake the initial 
surveys. Dimick selected Zaculeu for major restoration eforts, and the crew 
cleared and excavated the massive  temple complex (nbaaa1949 3[3]: 4).
Missing from Dimick’s account of Zemurray’s Guatemala is any depiction of 
a Yankee banana republic; instead, we have a description of Zemurray as a kind 
benefactor looking out for Guatemalans’ interests. Dimick praised his patron, 
writing that during his “own years in Guatemala the usual derogatory comment 
on the Fruit Com pany was invariably sweetened with stories of how it had con-
quered the Latin Americas by force. That is not only unjustified, but untrue. The 
conquistador was Zemurray. He with his wisdom, his love for the country as well 
as for self- benefit, was the power who employed the force of arms” (1968: 20).
In 1954, two years  after Nasser’s Officers Revolution in Egypt, Dimick di-
rected University of Pennsylvania excavations of the Apis embalming  house at 
Mit Rahineh (Dimick 1968: 66). Dimick and his wife, Teena, took an apartment 
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on the top floor of the Semiramis  Hotel in Cairo, where they  were near “the 
living quarters for King Saud of Saudi Arabia” (67). Dimick claimed his work 
with Arab colleagues in Egypt generated mutual aid and assistance, with “no 
subterfuge, no double talk” (81). Documents from the Eisenhower adminis-
tration’s negotiations with the Nasser administration during Dimick’s time in 
Egypt include notes from diplomatic meetings of American envoy Robert An-
derson (who traveled with several cia personnel in his party) and establish that 
Dimick provided briefings on the po liti cal climate of Egypt, including his own 
evaluations of Nasser and his administration. Rec ords from a U.S. Egypt Evalu-
ation Team meeting of May 19–20, 1955, report “an Egyptologist,” identified in 
Alterman’s endnotes as “Dimick,” “with experience in the cia and oss [who] 
opined that Abdel Nasser was ‘well intentioned and reasonably capable, within 
his limits. He does not know how to run a government. His advisers are totally 
incapable’ ” (Alterman 2002: 130, 163n130). Alterman wrote that, “although the 
precise details of the cia’s involvement with the Anderson mission remain clas-
sified, many years  later cia regional chief Kermit Roo se velt admitted to playing 
a leading role as an intermediary between Anderson and the Egyptians” (118). 
 These rec ords confirm Dimick’s  later claims of being a cia operative, yet the 
specific details of how his cia position articulated with his years of archaeo-
logical adventuring remain unclear. At a minimum, his presence in developing 
nations undergoing revolutions and counterrevolutions provided the cia with 
background reports on what he saw while working on archaeological projects; 
but he may also have played less passive roles,  either  running cia operatives, 
working as a cia currier, or performing other tasks for the agency.
Archaeologist Frank Hibben told New Yorker writer Douglas Preston that 
while he was on an expedition in the 1950s retracing the route of Roy Chap-
man Andrews’s Mongolian travels, he smuggled a device into Outer Mongo-
lia that was capable of remotely monitoring Chinese atomic bomb tests at Lop 
Nor (Preston 1995: 80–81). Hibben claimed Chinese troops chased and shot at 
him. While Hibben’s central role in the Sandia Cave scandal (in which Hib-
ben claimed to have excavated undisturbed 25,000 year old  human remains — a 
claim rejected by many other archaeologists), diminishes his general credibility, 
some evidence supports his claims. In response to my foia requests, the fbi 
released portions of Hibben’s fbi file, including a report indicating that the 
fbi conducted a background investigation on him for an unspecified sensitive 
proj ect administered through the Department of Energy, raising the possibility 
that this was the governmental agency that possibly hired him for this claimed 
operation in western China.
Fieldwork in a Time of Crisis
June Nash has written about her lack of po liti cal awareness during her initial 
Guatemalan fieldwork in 1953, referring to herself as naive. Her  later reflections 
capture the po liti cal orientation of the era, when she and her husband, Man-
ning Nash, “ were not concerned with paramilitary or guerrilla operations, nor 
did we feel that we had to justify our presence. Amer i ca had just won a war 
against Fascism, and had not yet embarked on our own imperial campaigns. 
The ethnographic frame was on the functioning of traditional socie ties and the 
structures that maintained coherence in the face of modernizing changes” 
(Nash 2007: 105–6).
For her dissertation fieldwork, Nash planned to study a community of tex-
tile factory workers and the contexts of modernization, ethnicity, village gov-
ernance, class, and education. But the po liti cal backdrop for this research came 
to dominate her experience. The Guatemalan election of 1950 brought Jacobo 
Árbenz to the presidency, and his land reform policies alarmed the U.S. State 
Department and the cia  because they threatened American corporate interests 
in Guatemala, especially large landowners like United Fruit.
Tensions mounted in May 1954 as a Czech o slo vak ian shipment of Soviet- 
manufactured arms arrived in Guatemala, and the U.S. government denounced 
the spread of Soviet influence in the Western Hemi sphere. As June and Manning 
Nash completed a year of fieldwork that summer, they heard rumors that Col-
o nel Carolos Castillo Armas was planning a revolt with five hundred soldiers 
to seize lands taken by Germans during the Second World War. Government 
security agents arrived in the town where the Nashes lived, asking questions 
about the U.S. researchers staying  there, but the locals lied and told the officials 
they had no such foreign researchers (Nash 2007: 108). On June 25, 1954, the 
cia toppled President Árbenz’s government, and  after a series of presidential 
successions, Armas was installed as the American- backed president, rolling 
back Árbenz’s nationalization proj ect. Nash  later wrote that,  after the coup,
rumors circulated about who was being jailed and who had fled. The jails  were 
filled with five thousand suspects when Richard Adams received a grant to study 
the penetration of Communist ideology in the countryside. He asked us to assist 
him, assigning Manning [Nash] and a number of Guatemalan students to the jail 
interviews and me to compile the results. Among the prisoners was a student who 
advised the team about the prisoners’ interpretation of the questionnaire. Con-
vinced that the interviews  were part of a scheme to distinguish militant Com-
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munists from  those who  were apo liti cal, the prisoners had worked out responses 
that minimized their involvement in the revolutionary government, and indeed, 
our summation of the interviews confirmed this. But the moderate views they 
expressed reflected a well- grounded support for the Arévalo- Árbenz government 
that was not based on fomenting a violent revolution. This was the allegation of 
the U.S. National Security Council when they approved plans for a coup against 
a government that had for the first time in Guatemalan history made strides in 
advancing rural education and health, and that had permitted demo cratic partici-
pation in  unions and cooperatives. (110)
The Nashes  were  later denounced as “communists” to the U.S. embassy by the 
factory weaving master, but an intervention by friends halted eforts to force 
their return to the United States (110).
In July 1954, June and Manning Nash  were unexpectedly visited at their Chi-
cago apartment by a cia agent. Without forethought on how to respond to such 
intrusive pressures, their answers to the agent’s request for specific information 
they had learned from the fieldwork  were a model for anthropologists con-
cerned with protecting  those they study. June Nash  later recalled that this cia 
agent “waited in the stifling heat of our basement apartment for Manning to rouse 
himself, only to be told that he could read what ever Manning might publish, but 
that he (Manning) had nothing to say. Although the agent had not tried to debrief 
me, it was then that I began to realize our research might fit into a larger domain 
of state intrigue that may even have influenced the funding of our research. The 
book, Machine Age Maya, probably had  little that would have interested the cia, 
then or even  later” (2007: 110–11). This awareness that research areas influenced 
funding came late, yet for many anthropologists such awareness was never voiced. 
And the interest or usefulness to the cia was not always apparent. As Asia 
Foundation president Russell Smith  later observed, often research projects that 
appeared to have  little importance or to be “frivolous” to cia interests turned 
out to be valuable, especially given the usefulness of firsthand information from 
regions of interest (foia cia 1/28/63, dtpillar vol. 3_0024, 2).
Using the pseudonym Stokes Newbold, Richard N. Adams published a re-
port on his interviews with Guatemalan prisoners in the journal Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change (isa 4, GF to RNA 5/10/51). Adams interviewed 
a sample of the fifteen hundred to two thousand pro- Árbenz Guatemalans who 
had been arrested and imprisoned in the Guatemala City Jail soon  after the 
coup. Manning and June Nash assisted with  these interviews (Newbold 1957: 
338n1). Adams observed that, “while interviewing jailed persons immediately 
 after a highly emotional revolution is obviously a most unsatisfactory method 
of obtaining data, it was considered more realistic to attempt the study in this 
way than  after the jailed population had been released and dispersed once more 
through the countryside” (342).  These interviews collected socioeconomic and 
demographic data on the prisoners. Adams found that Árbenz’s supporters had 
“more contact with outsiders and would as a result tend to be more literate 
than non- members” and would be more likely to come from municipal capitals 
(348); he also found higher- than- average literacy rates and that the population 
was largely rural, religiously active, and relatively eco nom ically well of (349, 
360; cf. S. C. Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983: 220).
 Because Adams’s report found that few of  those arrested appeared to be com-
munists or to know much about communism, it supposedly irritated many at 
the cia and the State Department (see S. C. Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983: 22), 
and any uses to which governmental agencies might have put it are unknown. 
This report significantly impacted Adams’s  later life and  career, as news of this 
collaboration with a State Department intelligence venture limited his access 
to work and travel in Central Amer i ca (RNA to DHP 10/1/96). But, as Marc 
Edelman observed, “During the rest of his long  career, Adams developed a pro-
nounced concern about research ethics and a strongly critical stance regarding 
US policy in Guatemala and the Guatemalan military’s abysmal  human rights 
rec ord, as did June Nash, who also participated in the survey” (2009: 252n23).
Indonesian Fieldwork on the Front Lines of the Cold War
During the Second World War, Raymond Kennedy worked at the oss Morale 
Operations Branch, helping design anti- Japanese propaganda operations in In-
donesia; he also worked with the oss’s secret Marigold Unit (Soley 1989: 161). 
As the war’s end approached, Kennedy expressed strong opposition to Amer i ca 
aligning its national interests with the colonial and neo co lo nial policies of Eu-
ro pean nations hoping to return to dominance in Asia. Kennedy’s anticolonial 
views  were not well received in the State Department. In his reports he bluntly 
expressed concerns. In one 1945 State Department memo discussing U.S. post-
war policy options, he argued that “American military operations in South-
east Asia involve potential danger to American prestige among the peoples of 
the area,  because the latter are bound, regardless of our protestations to the 
contrary, to link American military forces with the reentering Anglo- Dutch- 
French military and civil administrations” (Kennedy in G. Smith 1999: 2). He 
cautioned that “Amer i ca should take care to pursue a policy which  will ensure 
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that the ‘emerging nations’ of Southeast Asia  will be ideologically sympathetic 
to the United States” (rk 1, 2/22/45). The Atlantic Charter of 1941 was signed as 
a war statement designed to destabilize Axis occupations, but at the war’s end 
its declaration of self- determination for  people  under occupations undermined 
colonial and neo co lo nial claims of legitimacy. While many in the United States 
ignored  these contradictions at the war’s end, Kennedy argued for American 
policies that remained consistent with principles of liberation, anticolonialism, 
and self- determination (see Kennedy 1944, 1945a, 1945b; Kennedy and Katten-
burg 1948; D. H. Price 2013b).
Kennedy returned to Yale  after the war, but he continued working as an 
intelligence con sul tant at the Propaganda Intelligence Section of the Secret In-
telligence Branch,5 commuting to Washington, DC, on a regular basis.6 He read 
intelligence reports and made “suggestions concerning the form and content of 
reports, and [suggested] Intelligence guidance for field operations in Southeast 
Asia” (foia cia mori Doc id: 242537, RD to RCR 1/9/46). Given his contribu-
tions to postwar intelligence, it is likely that Kennedy continued consulting at 
the newly formed cia. No rec ords confirming such a relationship  were released 
in response to my foia requests, though this may reflect cia unwillingness to 
supply documents in response to foia requests more than it reveals  whether or 
not Kennedy had an ongoing relationship with the agency.
Kennedy took a sabbatical from Yale in 1949, using a $3,000 Viking Fund 
grant for fieldwork studying “acculturation in selected sections of Indonesia” 
(Viking Fund 1951: 39, 132). In Indonesia, Kennedy visited new villages  every 
few days, studying acculturation and focusing on topics ranging from folk 
knowledge to po liti cal divisions and orientations.
On April  27, 1950, Raymond Kennedy and Robert Doyle, a Time- Life cor-
respondent traveling with him,  were murdered in rural Indonesia (Gardner 
1997: 68). Kennedy had been en route to meet Paul M. Kattenburg, a State De-
partment employee who was a fellow oss alumnus, and Southeast Asian scholar 
(oss Society Newsletter, Fall 2004: 10–11).7 Kennedy had mentored Kattenburg 
in government and academic settings (Gardner 1997: 68), and they coauthored 
several scholarly works on Indonesian po liti cal developments. The Australian 
press reported that Kennedy and Doyle  were “shot by a gang of four or five 
Indonesians dressed in military uniform, according to stories told by villag-
ers who  were forced by the murderers to bury the bodies” (West Australian, 
April 29, 1950, 1).
Four de cades  later, Kattenburg remained unsure who murdered Kennedy and 
Doyle, writing that “we thought then that the Darul Islam, an early extremist 
Islamic movement, was responsible for the assassinations. It is also pos si ble that 
Kennedy and Doyle  were set up by criminals in Jakarta or simply victims of 
local thugs intent on capturing the several thousand U.S. dollars that many in 
West Java knew Kennedy had with him” (qtd. in Gardner 1997: 68). George 
Kahin and Cliford Geertz  later assumed Kennedy was killed  either by men 
working for Turk Westerling (Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling) or by Darul 
Islam (Kahin 1997: 39n3; cf. Geertz 2010: 213).8
Former oss analyst and State Department officer John F. Cady  later described 
Kennedy’s Indonesian trip not as ethnographic fieldwork but as Kennedy being 
“sent to Indonesia” to “keep abreast of developments  there” as part of a larger 
efort by the  U.S. government sending American experts “out to the field to 
examine the potentialities of par tic u lar situations and to explain what could 
happen” (qtd. in McKinzie 1974: 23–24).9 Robin Winks wrote that Kennedy con-
tinued his intelligence work “ after the war [when] the intelligence community 
called on Kennedy again, for his field notes, his photographs, and his po liti cal 
point of view, which had so cogently put the anticolonial position,  were valued 
as they had not been during the war” (1987: 50).
 After a four- month investigation in Indonesia, Alexander Marshack pub-
lished an exposé titled “The Unreported War in Indonesia” in American Mer-
cury. Marshack wrote that Kennedy had angered Dutch loyalists in Indonesia 
by publishing an article “condemning the activities of the Netherlands official” 
(1952: 39). Marshack determined that days before their deaths, “Doyle and Ken-
nedy registered in Bandung at the beautiful ultramodern Dutch- owned Savoy 
Homann  Hotel, which was at this time (though they did not know) the center 
of the nefis- ivg and Dutch intelligence organ ization for West Java. And hav-
ing registered they began circulating through the city asking questions” (1952: 
39). Kennedy’s questions  were not drawn from the 267 questions listed in his 
detailed ethnographic research questionnaire;  these  were more immediate po-
liti cal questions that “concerned the roots of the Westerling- nefis afair. Im-
mediately two Indonesians riding a blue sedan began tailing Doyle and Kennedy 
in their movements” (39). Marshack concluded:
The motive evidently was not robbery. It was po liti cal assassination of two Ameri-
cans. Significantly, villagers near the killing  were brusquely ordered by the Dutch 
troops to bury Kennedy and Doyle, forget them, and keep quiet. One  woman, hesi-
tantly, talked, and Indonesian military police went in and dug Doyle and Kennedy 
up. The identification papers, passport, and notes of Professor Kennedy had been 
taken. For he was the already well- known hated member of the twosome. Doyle 
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of Time- Life was newly arrived, had not yet filed his story, and was therefore un-
known to  those interested in Kennedy. And so Doyle’s notes  were found, complete, 
on his person. It was Kennedy they  were  after. (40)
Doyle’s notes showed that he had made inquiries in Bandung about Angka-
tan Perang Ratu Adil (apra). This paramilitary unit, which Westerling formed 
with sympathetic Dutch expatriates  after resigning from the Dutch armed forces, 
hoped to seize power from the coming Indonesian government and to restore 
Dutch rule.  After Westerling’s botched coup attempt, apra launched small- 
scale rural paramilitary operations against the new Indonesian state.
Most of the reporting on Doyle’s and Kennedy’s deaths ignored the po liti cal 
context of Americans collecting information on the “culture change” of a nation 
rapidly heading  toward what appeared to be widespread rural commitment to 
communism in the wake of its postcolonial freedom (e.g., Life 1950: 42).
Unresolved Questions about Kennedy’s Fieldwork
Three years  after Raymond Kennedy’s death, hraf published the first of three 
volumes of his Field Notes on Indonesia: South Celebes, 1949–1950 (1953b).  These 
volumes  were transcribed and edited by Harold Conklin, whose knowledge of 
Dutch and Indonesian was vital for the publication of the notebooks (Kennedy 
1953b: xiv; see also Kennedy 1953a, 1953c), which  were published by hraf as 
hraf coded texts — indexing Kennedy’s notebooks using HRAF’s cross cultural 
index system.10 In the introduction to Field Notes, Ruby Kennedy described 
how she and Raymond sailed to Indonesia from Norfolk,  Virginia, bringing a 
jeep, books, and other supplies (Kennedy 1953b: vii). Raymond Kennedy was 
a frenetic fieldworker, often working more than twelve hours a day and typ-
ing a dozen pages of field notes in a single eve ning. During eight months of 
fieldwork, he produced more than nine hundred pages of single- spaced typed 
notes, as well as detailed letters home that supplemented  these observations 
and analy sis (viii).
Kennedy planned to investigate at least three villages in six Indonesian cul-
ture areas, focusing on the impact of Islamic, Christian, and local religious tra-
ditions. He spent the last months of his life in eastern Indonesia and completed 
surveys in South Celebes, Flores, Ambon, Ceram, and Borneo. The South Ce-
lebes field notebook was published by hraf in 1953, with limited microfiche 
editions of the notebooks from his work in Flores, Ambon, Ceram, and Borneo 
released next.
Field Notes described changing Indonesian social relations, with notes on 
Kennedy’s random encounters. Kennedy hired local research assistants to ad-
minister a standardized questionnaire of 267 items, many of which focused on 
agricultural practices and  were adapted from a turn- of- the- century British sur-
vey. He intended to contrast contemporary responses with existing data for a 
longitudinal understanding of culture change.
The questionnaire’s sections on economy and po liti cal life included ques-
tions on technological changes, owner ship and distribution of automobiles, 
landownership, debt, wage  labor systems, shifts in po liti cal organ ization, the 
role of  family, and class relations in everyday life. The section on po liti cal di-
mensions included the following questions: “Are  there parties in the village, for 
instance, conservative, radical,  etc.?”; “Have  there been changes in the horizons 
of po liti cal thought?”; and “To what extent is  there knowledge of world politics? 
How have the  people obtained this?” Other questions explored the role of re-
ligion in politics, and still  others inquired about po liti cal parties’ organ ization 
and function (Kennedy 1953b: 235–37).
Field Notes contained information on social structure, sexual mores, rituals of 
life and death, and agricultural production, and it recounted local po liti cal ob-
servations. Kennedy evaluated the extent of socialist or communist thought in 
the new Indonesian state. He interviewed locals about po liti cal “radicals” and 
views of anticolonialism, and he gathered information on the relative strength 
of vari ous military factions (1953b: 216–17).11 Kennedy recounted discussions 
with Riekerk, a civil servant, who believed that the first elections selected “no-
bles,” while current voting patterns brought more egalitarian trends, yet “the 
influence of the nobles is still strong” (26). One note stated, “The school is the 
only new institution in the kampong now, and this is the real revolutionary 
 factor. Riekerk is a Socialist and I get the idea that many Dutch in the State of 
East Indonesia ser vice are left wing. Van Heekeren is also quite liberal. I won-
der what the percentage would be” (26).
Kennedy interviewed an “Indo” engineer named Resink, whom he described 
as “a radical.” Kennedy filled several pages of notes with Resink’s views, such as 
his opinion that Indonesian society was divided between “a small upper, rich 
class” and the “Sjahrir”— a “socialistic” group (221–22). Resink viewed Sukarno 
as “an opportunist” who would align with what ever interests would maintain 
his power. Resink described the nature of Indonesian identity politics and the 
nuances of local shifts in identity from an old ethos aspiring to be “100  percent 
Dutch” to a new positive longing “to become completely Indonesian” (222). 
Kennedy reported:
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Resink feels that the danger  today is that the United States, big business, and the 
Dutch and  others  will join with the bourgeois Republic of Indonesia group and 
sell out the masses. If this happens, the latter  will revolt in a few years. They  will 
ask themselves, “Are we better of or not?” And if the answer is not,  there  will be 
trou ble. He said  there are plenty of Communists  here and although they are not 
strong they are ready. They are mainly Chinese trained by Rus sia. They come via 
southeast Asia or through Holland. They are largely students. Also, some of the 
Indonesian students go to Czecho slo va kia to study and to get  orders  there from 
Moscow. If they are able to ask the  people  later on if they are any better of,  there 
 will be revolution. All is set. Resink’s plan is state socialism and development of, 
for example, bauxite in Riouw,  water power in Asahan (for aluminum especially), 
and textiles in Java. He agreed that if Indonesia goes socialist the United States 
 under big business and propaganda pressure  will tag them “communistic.” This 
means Amer i ca  will not help. The  thing to do then  will be to turn to Rus sia, and 
the United States, thus caught,  will have to give help even though Indonesia is 
socialist. This looks like good hard- headed thinking. Certainly the United States 
 won’t help a socialist state  unless forced to by fear of Rus sia. Rahim says that the 
United States is now gypping Indonesia; what happens is that the United States 
gets rubber (and at a cheaper price than other lands, and insists on this or it  won’t 
give exchange), and then forces Indonesia to take a certain percentage of automo-
biles, instead of machinery, which is  really needed. This even applies to busses. The 
cars are used by the bureaucrats alone, and are hence useless. As for Marshall aid, it 
has now stopped. This was foolish, he said, and when it is restored it  will probably 
again be channeled via Holland. This is bad  because the Dutch have been shame-
lessly milking Indonesia since the war and  will probably continue. Thus, for ex-
ample, they  won’t sell yarn, which the folks  here could use to weave for themselves 
and make cheap textiles. Instead they insist that Indonesia buy textiles from them 
which they can sell at a high price. He is violent on the subject of big business and 
says that  unless the United States realizes that Indonesia needs socialism, they  will 
have Rus sia and/or revolution  there. He also says the United States is being very 
foolish to spread propaganda (U.S.I.S.) about the virtues of United States capital-
ism everywhere, and how all  people must be like Americans. Such freedom can be 
aforded only in the United States and the latter must get the idea that poor lands 
must have a dif er ent system. (Can he be a crypto- communist? The line Resink 
takes could be a Communist one indirectly, and he is clearly trying to get me to 
tell it. He says the United States believes only Americans, and that is why I am 
impor tant. On the other hand he may be merely a sincere sociologist.) Anyway it 
is in ter est ing to see that my point (in the Linton symposium) on former colonies 
[in R. Linton, editor, The Science of Man in the World Crisis to the efect that all 
poor lands must have state enterprise as  there is no private capital and outside 
capital means outside control], is followed to the letter by this seemingly keen lad. 
This is very in ter est ing talk, and maybe I’ll write something regarding it. (223–24)
Kennedy’s ethnographic skills produced rare repre sen ta tions of the po liti cal con-
sciousness of villagers in dif er ent regions of Indonesia. As an old oss hand, Ken-
nedy understood the value that such ethnographic details from a region poised 
to move  toward communism provided to American intelligence agencies.
While documents establish Kennedy’s work with the oss, his postwar in-
telligence work, his po liti cal writings on postcolonial Indonesia, the extent to 
which his ethnographic field notes focused on the emerging po liti cal shifts of 
post- Dutch Indonesia, and the informed speculations of Winks, Cady, and 
 others that he was working with the cia at the time of his death, we are left 
without documentation establishing links to the cia or other intelligence agen-
cies at the time of his murder (see McKinzie 1974: 34; Winks 1987: 50).
Although I found no documents firmly establishing that Kennedy’s fieldwork 
was linked to the cia at the time of his murder, I identified a cia operative, 
funded by the same anthropological research foundation, who was carry ing out 
ethnographic research in Indonesia similar to Kennedy’s just months  after his 
murder.
Lloyd Millegan, Replacement Ethnographer?
I first learned of Lloyd S. Millegan’s Indonesian research in the 1951 Viking Fund 
annual report listing him as receiving a predoctoral 1950 fellowship for field-
work “to aid anthropological studies in Indonesia since in de pen dence, and 
prospects for  future studies” (Viking Fund 1951: 157). His proj ect was the only 
listed grant without a university affiliation, instead listing his affiliation as “Fair-
fax,  Virginia.” When I consulted Viking Fund rec ords, I learned that Millegan’s 
cv listed years of cia employment.
During the war, Millegan worked at oss for Joseph Ralston Hayden, an ad-
viser to General Douglas MacArthur (see jrh; Gehrke 1976: 204, 216). Millegan 
worked on several intelligence and insurgency operations, and during the final 
months of the war he developed recommendations for the U.S. plan “for the 
cultural reorganization of the Philippines” (jrh, 42–27).12
The Viking Fund sponsored Millegan’s “Survey of Anthropological Studies in 
Indonesia since In de pen dence and Prospects for  Future Studies,” and Millegan 
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expressed interest in undertaking “similar surveys in Burma, Thailand, Malaya 
and Indonesia’ ” (lsm, cv 9/6/50). Millegan’s Viking Fund grant application 
listed his employment in the cia as a research analyst and chief of the Southeast 
Asia Branch, from 1946 to 1950. The application described his research plan as 
follows:
I am scheduled to leave the United States for Indonesia on 30 September to under-
take a survey trip for Pacific Books, Inc. to determine the feasibility of establish-
ing a bookstore or chain of bookstores in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian 
countries. During the two months I expect to be in Indonesia I  will be traveling 
widely and  will visit most of the educational and research institutions in the area. 
The nature of my visit  will ofer a unique opportunity to undertake the proposed 
survey. I would contemplate making a detailed report which would be available 
for publication and as a guide to  those interested in anthropological studies in In-
donesia. I plan to return to the United States early in December for a short period 
and contemplate returning to the area to undertake further survey work in Burma, 
Thailand, Malaya and Indochina. (lsm, 9/6/50 application)
Millegan listed “other personnel involved” as including his consultations with 
John Embree, Dr. and Mrs. Edward S. C. Handy, and “officials of the Viking 
Fund.”
Millegan requested $3,000 to cover a year of research in Burma, Indochina, 
Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand (lsm, 9/6/50 application). Pacific Books, Inc. 
covered Millegan’s travel to Indonesia. Millegan listed John Embree (Yale), 
Dr. Edward S. C. Handy of Oakland,  Virginia, and Mr. David Bernstein as per-
sonal references. The same day that Millegan’s application was marked as received, 
Paul Fejos sent an internal Viking Fund memo to Mr. R. C. Hunt recommending 
that his application for a predoctoral fellowship be approved for $1,500. Millegan 
had no anthropological training and no academic affiliation, and his proj ect 
had no identified anthropological content, yet Fejos found “the candidate and 
aims are worthy of Viking Fund aid” (lsm, PF to RCH 9/8/50). That same day, 
an award letter and check for $1,500  were sent to Millegan, authorizing Viking 
Fund grant number 508 (lsm, PF to LM 9/8/50).
One week  after Fejos approved Millegan’s grant application, the Viking Fund 
received its first letter of recommendation supporting his application. David 
Bernstein, of the Federal Security Agency, praised Millegan, noting their work 
together at the oss. Bernstein wrote that Millegan would “make a real contribu-
tion to anthropological studies. He is intimately familiar with the Indonesian 
scene and has had many opportunities to establish and strengthen his personal 
contacts, as well as the possibilities for rapid acquisition of information  there” 
(lsm, DB to PF 9/15/50). Edward Handy’s recommendation letter stated that 
“war ser vice and subsequent work with the Central Intelligence Agency have 
given [Millegan] a wide acquaintanceship with the  whole region of Indonesia 
and Southeast Asia probably unexcelled by any American at the present time” 
(lsm, SCH to PF 9/16/50).13 John Embree wrote that he had known Millegan 
for “several years” and knew him to be “able and reliable,” though he noted, 
“Mr.  Millegan has no formal training in anthropology.” Embree believed 
Millegan would produce a good report on the “current situation in Indonesia” 
(lsm, JE to PF 11/19/50).
Millegan’s résumé, application, and recommendations clearly informed the 
Viking Fund that it was financing a recent cia employee. Fejos acted outside 
of normal Viking Fund protocols by immediately approving a predoctoral fel-
lowship for an individual with no demonstrable plans to enroll in any gradu-
ate program and no links to any academic institution.14 Millegan was not an 
anthropologist. He had no anthropological training. He had no plans to pursue 
gradu ate work in anthropology. It seems likely that Fejos’s support for Mil-
legan’s application was guided by information not recorded in Millegan’s file. 
While the details of how Millegan came to be funded are unclear, the cia may 
have directly encouraged the Viking Fund to support him.
Viking Fund founder Axel Wenner- Gren’s postwar problems with the fbi 
and the State Department (problems involving his reported ties to German war 
interests) likely made the Viking Fund  eager to cooperate with a cia request, if 
personnel  were discreetly contacted about funding Millegan’s “research” in In-
donesia.15 It is also pos si ble that the fbi’s extensive investigations of Paul Fejos’s 
wife, Inga Arvad, as a suspected Nazi agent may have led Fejos to assist an ap-
parent cia operation.16  There are no rec ords of contacts between Viking Fund 
personnel and the cia on this  matter.
Exactly what Lloyd Millegan did while in Indonesia is unclear. His son, Kris 
Millegan, confirmed that his  father traveled to Java in 1950. In a telephone in-
terview (km 9/28/10), Kris Millegan told me that his  father’s cia assignment 
was to establish an American bookstore in Indonesia, which was to function as 
a cia front organ ization where he would run operatives collecting intelligence 
in the countryside that would monitor shifting po liti cal attitudes, especially 
 those relating to the spread of communism (km 9/28/10).
Millegan’s research plan hinged on gleaning information from American and 
Dutch anthropologists who had conducted fieldwork in Indonesia. In Septem-
ber 1950, before leaving for Indonesia, Millegan met with John Embree and 
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Harold Conklin at Yale, and with William Thomas at the Viking Fund, each of 
whom provided him with contact information for Indonesia’s top anthropolo-
gists (“including, Vand der Hoop, Von Vaal Basil, Hooykas, Cense, Grader and 
 others”). Once he was in Indonesia, Millegan discovered that  these anthropolo-
gists had left the country (LSM, 6/15/51).
Millegan traveled to Indonesia in October 1950, where he set up his Pacific 
Book store in Java and began establishing connections with vari ous  people 
(km 9/28/10). He also worked at an Indonesian museum, where a librarian told 
him he “would find very  little information on current work  because of this 
exodus of the Dutch Anthropologists,” but he wrote that he “collected all the 
material I could and secured some information concerning Indonesians who 
may be continuing some work in Anthropology.” He found that, “in general, 
it appears that anthropological research is at a low ebb in Indonesia and  will 
continue  until some younger Indonesians have been stimulated in developing 
an interest in this field” (lsm, 6/15/51).
Millegan contracted dysentery, which prevented him from concluding his 
planned research. When the news of his parents’ death in a plane crash reached 
him in December 1950, he returned to the United States. Millegan went back to 
Indonesia in early 1951, but in his reports to the Viking Fund he wrote that he 
did not accomplish the research he had hoped to undertake.17
On June 15, 1951, Millegan sent the Viking Fund his brief “Preliminary Re-
port: Survey of Anthropological Studies in Indonesia since In de pen dence and 
Prospect for  Future Studies.” This report mirrored established cia methods for 
harnessing the field research of  others, a pro cess in which the cia contacted 
academic experts on the foreign area of interest and  these scholars briefed cia 
operatives before  these operatives traveled abroad (see sii 1983). Millegan used 
his status as a Viking Fund– sponsored “anthropologist” to gain the confidence 
of, and access to, Indonesian scholars.
In 1951, the Viking Fund changed its name to the Wenner- Gren Founda-
tion. Once back stateside, Lloyd Millegan and his wife, Eudora, had dinner and 
other social interactions with William L. Thomas, the Wenner- Gren assistant 
director of research. Correspondence mentions  family dinners and includes 
indications of a friendly social relationship. Millegan  later wrote Thomas on 
behalf of Frank Sakran, who was working on an upcoming Arab State Exposi-
tion, inquiring  whether Sakran could receive Wenner- Gren funds for this work 
(lsm, LM to WT 11/14/52). In other correspondence, Millegan mentioned a 
“Dr. Eckel,” a likely reference to Far East scholar, oss, and cia employee Paul 
Eckel (lsm, LM to WT 9/30/50; see Albright and Kunstel 1990).18 Thomas wrote 
Millegan, asking for information on anthropologist H. R. Van Heekeren’s work 
in Indonesia (lsm, WT to LM 9/4/51). In  later correspondence, Millegan in-
quired about contacts with museum anthropologists and archaeologists work-
ing in the  Middle East, and Thomas passed along the names of Froelich Rainey, 
Schuyler Camman, and Carleton Coon (lsm, WT to LM 9/20/52). Millegan’s 
Wenner- Gren file documented several years of correspondence as the founda-
tion strug gled to collect Millegan’s final report on his Indonesian fieldwork.
Millegan’s Wenner- Gren file contains a 1955 pamphlet for a global mission-
ary program launched by Millegan called Missions Unlimited. This pamphlet 
described his cia work and other activities  under the heading “Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Washington, D.C. 1956–51”: “As an Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence 
Officer and Branch Chief in this agency assisted in the organ ization and devel-
opment of a research unit, composed of twelve professionals and three clericals, 
conducting research on all of the Southeast Asian countries east of India and 
Pakistan, together with the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and 
all the smaller Pacific Islands. As Chief of this unit participated in the research 
program for all of Asia” (lsm, 1955 pamphlet). The pamphlet acknowledged 
Millegan was in the cia during the period that he traveled to Indonesia with 
Viking funding. His file also listed his work as president of the Pacific Book and 
Supply Corporation (New York City and Djakarta, 1951–52) (lsm).
Pacific Book and Supply
It was unusual for the Viking Fund to sponsor a research proposal seeking to 
establish a bookstore in another country. Pacific Book and Supply was first in-
corporated in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1946, by Lloyd Millegan (president) 
and officers of the corporation: Henry  H. Douglas (vice president), Guy  J. 
Millegan (secretary and trea surer), and Harry C. Shriever (fbi 100–346660–2, 
12/23/46).19
In September 1946, the fbi investigated Pacific Book, with suspicions that 
its interests in publishing books relating to Asia indicated links to international 
communism.20 The fbi learned that Pacific Book had accepted five manu-
scripts for publication and noted links to the East West Association, the China 
American Council of Commerce and Industry, and the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations (ipr); ipr  later became a target of fbi investigations for links between 
American academics and communism. The fbi reported that “a number of 
visitors have called at the Pacific Book office, among whom are a number of Chi-
nese military officers and one individual known as Sam Halpern.” At that time 
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Halpern was conducting  U.S. military intelligence work, often working with 
Edward Lansdale in Asia. Halpern would  later work on the cia’s Bay of Pigs 
operations in Cuba. The fbi noted Millegan’s and Douglas’s connections to 
Kenneth Langdon of the Department of State (fbi 100–3466601, 9/18/46).21 In 
1951, Publishers Weekly listed Lloyd Millegan as the “President of Pacific Book 
and Supply . . .  now living in Djakarta” and identified Cass Canfield, Harold H. 
Stern, and Edgar Allen Prichard as corporation directors and Alvin Grauer as 
the corporation man ag er.22
Pacific Book’s director, Edgar Allen Prichard, was the mayor of Fairfax, 
 Virginia, a prominent Washington, DC,  lawyer, and a veteran of the oss. Can-
field, Grauer, and Franklyn Forkert each established permanent careers in 
publishing. Cass Canfield’s war time intelligence work included posts at the Of-
fice of War Information and the Board of Economic Warfare. Canfield was the 
president and publisher at Harper and Row, a founder of the journal Foreign 
Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, with long- standing 
cia ties. In 1972, Canfield played a role in the cia’s eforts to censor Alfred 
McCoy’s book The Politics of Heroin.  After McCoy completed the manuscript 
in 1972  under contract with Harper and Row, he was told by Harper and Row 
president, Winthrop Knowlton that the cia sent Cord Meyer Jr.  to visit his 
old friend Canfield, hoping to convince him that McCoy’s book represented a 
national security threat (see McCoy 1991: xvi). In The Cultural Cold War, Fran-
ces Saunders mentioned a range of passive and active relationships Canfield 
maintained with the cia, describing Canfield as having “enjoyed prolific links 
to the world of intelligence, both as a former psychological warfare officer, and 
as a close personal friend of Allen Dulles, whose memoirs The Craft of Intelli-
gence he published in 1963” (1999: 136). Canfield directed Bantam Books, Gros-
set and Dunlap, and Harper Bro th ers, but he also worked with cia personnel 
on publishing projects, including facilitating Richard Crossman’s cia- backed 
book detailing the stories of disillusioned former communists, Lost Illusion, 
and Arthur Koestler et al.’s book The God That Failed (Saunders 1999: 64; 136). 
Canfield sat on the board of the Farfield Foundation, a cia funding front 
directed by cia agent Frank Platt (Saunders 1999: 136); the Board also included 
William  A.  M. Burden, Godfrey  S. Rocke fel ler, Whitelaw Reid, and Charles 
Fleischmann (see Swanepoel 2007: 143). As a cia conduit, the Farfield Founda-
tion directed cia funds to the Council on Cultural Freedom and other organi-
zations the cia hoped to nurture and influence (see Saunders 1999).
In 1951, Pacific Book produced an eighty- five- page cata log listing and describ-
ing about a thousand titles in the com pany’s inventory. The cata log’s introduction 
stressed  these books’ importance to Indonesia’s development. Cata log copy 
claimed that with the assistance of the U.S. office the com pany provided books 
“that  will help in the  great work of raising Indonesia to her rightful place among 
the nations of the world” (Indira 1951: iv).
Pacific Book stocked a diverse se lection of titles, including collections on the 
sciences, engineering, technical agricultural, and medicine, as well as current 
and classic works of lit er a ture, history, and po liti cal science. This was not just 
a collection of pro- American books pressing cia conceptions of anticommu-
nism and democracy; it was a mix of technical books and historical and po-
liti cal analy sis, including critical works like Owen Lattimore et al.’s 1950 Pivot 
of Asia and anticolonialism collections, such as volumes of Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
writings.  There  were also books more obviously aligned with cia ideology, 
including John Foster Dulles’s China and Amer i ca (1946), Kermit Roo se velt’s 
Arabs, Oil and History (1949), T. Cuyler Young’s (1951) Near East Culture and 
Society, and Dwight Eisenhower’s select speeches. The cata log included a mix-
ture of books on Islamic civilization, ranging from the work of orientalists Har-
old Lamb, H. A. R. Gibb, Harry St. John Bridger Philby, and Philip Hitti to the 
writings of Ibn Khaldun.  There  were books by  Will Durant, Aristotle, Bertrand 
Russell, Pitirim Sorokin, Sigmund Freud, Herbert Spencer, Ashley Montagu, 
Lewis Mumford, Robert Frost, Walt Whitman, Hortense Powdermaker, John 
Steinbeck, Gertrude Stein, Cora Du Bois, Kingsley Davis, Anna Louise Strong, 
Carleton Coon, Mark Twain, and Margaret Mead.
The com pany’s cata log had a predominance of books on engineering and 
economics, and technological books aligned with the infrastructure needs of 
new nations, supporting the needs of the coming Rostowian push for modern-
ization. The specific se lection of titles stocked by Pacific Book may have been 
of  little importance depending on functional uses of the front. If Pacific Book 
and Supply primarily served as an outpost for cia intelligence collection and 
shipping functions in Indonesia, the book titles stocked may have had  little 
significance.
At Pacific Book in 1951, Millegan became the exclusive Indonesian distribu-
tor for Time- Life International publications (Publishers Weekly 1951, 160: 2251). 
Publishers Weekly described Millegan’s Viking Fund– financed trip to Indone-
sia as an “exploratory trip to southeast Asia to test the immediate market and 
perfect his plans for an American com pany which would purchase books di-
rectly in Amer i ca and sell to its own customers abroad” (Publishers Weekly 1952 
162: 242). At the time of Millegan’s resignation, Publishers Weekly announced 
Franklyn Forkert was “in Indonesia representing the Pacific Book and Sup-
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ply Corporation and working with Indira, an Indonesian firm, on the sales of 
American trade and technical books and American education supplies” (Pub-
lishers Weekly 1952, 162: 242).23
Enticements of the Field
While  there are several documented instances of anthropologist- spies, few an-
thropologists have historically used their professional credentials and fieldwork 
as covers for espionage. Yet, archaeologists and cultural anthropologists have 
been accused of engaging in spying, and rumors of field- based espionage have 
long circulated within the field. Rumors of links to the cia and other intelli-
gence agencies create dangers for  those  under suspicion and for  others working 
in the field; even scholarly examinations of historical interactions between an-
thropologists and spies make many in the discipline uneasy. Some anthropolo-
gists worry that documenting past disciplinary connections to the cia could 
increase suspicion of contemporary anthropologists and archaeologists.
Anthropology articulates with the world it studies through fieldwork.  Whether 
on large, or ga nized archaeological expeditions or small- scale, self- funded re-
search trips undertaken on dilapidated buses or by bush taxi to remote villages, 
anthropologists during the Cold War frequently traveled to regions of interest 
to the cia and Pentagon planners at rates higher than  those in most other pro-
fessions, and the discipline had a mixture of real and  imagined interfaces with 
military and intelligence agencies. Fieldwork scattered hundreds of individual 
anthropologists in the backwater villages of a world  imagined by the Pentagon 
to soon be the front lines of a global battleground with international commu-
nism, and the unobtrusive, often undirected queries of anthropologists seeking 
knowledge about topics like postmarital residence patterns or language drift 
brought many legitimate anthropologists and occasionally provided cover for 
a few anthropologist- spies. Participant observation’s approach to cultural un-
derstanding gave ethnographers the sort of cultural knowledge that made the 
discipline attractive to intelligence agencies wanting to understand the hearts 
and minds of  those living in lands of geopo liti cal interest.24
While many anthropologists privately discussed being approached by gov-
ernmental officials asking for briefings upon their return from fieldwork, and 
some (like Marvin Harris, discussed earlier in this chapter, and John Allison, 
discussed in chapter  6) described suspicions that their field notes may have 
been read or taken by governmental agencies,  there has been  little scholarly 
discussion of  these possibilities. Some of  these activities appear to have continued 
 after the end of the Cold War. In 1995, an American anthropologist writing 
 under the pseudonym “Brooks Duncan” described being approached in the 
1990s by fbi, cia, and State Department personnel requesting information on 
his research in Rus sia. When Duncan refused to cooperate, he was harassed by 
fbi agents;  later his research notes dis appeared when “the Pan Am bag (sup-
plied to me at the airport by Pan Am for repacking) containing all my scholarly 
documents, lists of contacts and writings and syllabi materials dis appeared en 
route to my research in Rus sia and was never found” (Duncan 1995: 9). When 
he sought help from colleagues, se nior professors and civil liberties groups ad-
vised him to “do nothing  unless I felt like sacrificing my  career. They expressed 
their belief that wherever I applied for a job, someone on the faculty would 
make things difficult for me” (9).
Even in instances where individuals had witting cia links that sent them 
out into the world to gather information or establish networks (cases like John 
Dimick or the claims of Frank Hibben), they created inverted- duplicitous forms 
of dual use anthropology. And given the secrecy surrounding cia operations, we 
are left with more questions than answers regarding many of  these interactions. 
With the passage of time, scholars  will gain access to more archival rec ords and 
documents  under the Freedom of Information Act, which  will shed more light 
on such interactions between anthropologists and intelligence agencies.
Many questions remain about Kennedy, Millegan, and  others discussed in 
this chapter. Though several scholars assert that Kennedy was gathering in-
formation for the U.S. government and was linked to the cia at the time of his 
death, documentation of this relationship has not been released by the cia or 
found in accessible archives. Likewise,  there is no documentation establishing 
that Lloyd Millegan was sent to conduct faux ethnographic research as a direct 
replacement for the slain Raymond Kennedy. But even with gaps in our knowl-
edge, we can view Kennedy’s ethnographic proj ect — like all ethnographic 
research in Indonesia during this period — as easily fitting into cia agent Mil-
legan’s research plan (as financed by the Viking Fund) of combing existing eth-
nographic research, looking for information of interest to be synthesized into 
reports. Such reports have dual audiences and dual uses, and  there  were likely 
other reports for other audiences drawing on  these same data.
While ethnographic reports from the field  were of interest to the cia and the 
Pentagon for vari ous reasons, it was the promise of using specific cultural knowl-
edge to inform counterinsurgency operations — as a desired means of controlling 
other populations through some  imagined deep cultural competence — that 
kept interest in ethnographic research alive in military and intelligence circles. 
246 | C H A P T E R  N I N E
C O L D  WA R  F I E L D W O R K  | 247
Unlike eforts to use the eyes and ears of anthropologists to gather reports of 
developments in distant lands where they conducted fieldwork as a means of 
gathering specific intelligence, intelligence programs linked to counterinsur-
gency operations drew more frequently on the funding reports or published 
academic works of anthropologists writing up the findings of their research 
long  after they had returned home from their fieldwork.
All social research worthy of the name raises the question of who  
will use the results, and for what purposes. This is an old question among  
physical and biological scientists, and it  will not [die] down. In the social  
sciences it carries more explosive implications, as when gangsters make  
use of studies of an American community to enrich themselves. This  
has happened more often than some social scientists realize.
D O U G L A S  H A R I N G  | 1951
T E N   C O L D  WA R  A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L 
C O U N T E R I N S U R G E N C Y  D R E A M S
During the Cold War the cia, Pentagon, and State Department recurrently 
used anthropological knowledge for psychological warfare and counterinsur-
gency operations.1 While ethnographic knowledge had obvious uses, military 
and intelligence agencies encountered difficulties or ga niz ing and retrieving the 
ethnographic data they sought. One of the more creative eforts to coordinate 
the retrieval of ethnographic information involved military adaptations of the 
 Human Relations Area Files (hraf) indexing system as a counterinsurgency 
tool.
hraf’s bureaucratic approach to cross- cultural research began with the es-
tablishment of the “Cross- Cultural Survey” by Yale’s Institute of  Human Rela-
tions (ihr) in 1937. During the Second World War, Lieutenant Commander 
George Murdock expanded ihr’s cross- cultural files to directly meet the needs 
of the Office of Naval Intelligence for purposes in part linked to counterinsur-
gency objectives. Murdock helped standardize the production of reports on 
cultural traits to help military planners better anticipate the cultural variations 
that U.S. forces would encounter on the Pacific Front (May 1971; Murdock 1961: 
xii; D. H. Price 2008a: 91–96).
Murdock directed the rapid production of a series of classified Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations Civil Afairs Handbooks at ihr on Micronesian 
cultures.  After the war, when ihr became hraf, it continued governmental 
contracts to fill “the need by government policy makers for reliable informa-
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tion on strategic areas [that] was fully as  great as during World War II” (hraf 
1959: 14, 23; D. H. Price 2008a).  These postwar funding opportunities expanded 
hraf’s coverage. This dual use research strategy met both the strategic needs of 
the U.S. government and the scientific needs of hraf’s theorists as “much of the 
work done for the government would also serve the purpose of building basic 
files on the sample of the world’s peoples” (hraf 1959: 23).
The hraf indexing system provided an ingenious solution to problems of 
retrieving a wide variety of textual knowledge in a world without computer 
search capabilities. By generating a massive universal index of the categories 
listed in Murdock’s Outline of Cultural Materials (1961), hraf facilitated retriev-
ing information on cultural traits in in de pen dently produced primary texts. 
Murdock’s system of cross- indexing texts generated by  others was the foun-
dation of hraf research. The data indexed and sorted by hraf ranged from 
abstract theoretical analy sis of postmarriage residential patterns in matrilineal 
socie ties, to the distribution of certain religious beliefs, to (with the expansion of 
categories by a military- intelligence unit) sorting cultural knowledge to assist 
counterinsurgency operations.
Dual Use hraf
During the 1950s, hraf received significant governmental funding for com-
piling culture studies of regions of geopo liti cal Cold War interest.2 An hraf 
report from 1959 noted, “From 1950 to 1955 vari ous government agencies sup-
ported work on Southeast Asia, Siberia, Czecho slo va kia and Iran. In 1954 the 
Army ofered hraf one of the largest single government contracts for social 
science research ever made. Originally for two years and two and three- quarter 
million dollars, it was extended for an additional two years at a total cost of 
nearly four million dollars” (hraf 1959: 24). With this $4 million military con-
tract, hraf compiled bibliographies, translated foreign texts, and produced 
a series of “handbooks on more than fifty countries in the Soviet Orbit, the 
 Middle East, and Asia” (24). Between 1958 and 1960, the hraf Survey of World 
Cultures Series published volumes on Poland, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Cam-
bodia, China, the USSR, and Laos, nations of Cold War geopo liti cal importance. 
Funds for this work  were provided by the cia- linked Rubicon Foundation 
(Ford 1970: 15; Harwood 1967b).3
This dual use role required hraf to hire personnel who could bridge gaps 
spanning military- intelligence worlds and the acad emy. In 1954, retired admiral 
Edward Lender Woodyard, a decorated naval strategist, was appointed to a new 
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position as hraf vice president. Donald H. Hunt initially directed a new hraf 
office in Washington, DC, but soon Col o nel Cary B. Hutchinson was appointed 
as director in order to “rewrite the [hraf- subcontracted] monographs into 
country handbooks,” tailoring  these texts to meet the needs of military spon-
sors (hraf 1959: 24). To oversee  these military contracts, hraf hired Milton D. 
Graham, whose previous Defense Department work had prepared him to 
supervise the handbook program, and Graham outsourced handbook sections 
to more than four hundred scholars at fifteen U.S. universities.4
This military sponsorship shifted hraf’s data collection decisions on geo-
graphic areas of focus during the 1950s. During the four- year period in which 
hraf received $4 million in army funds, it produced “63 unclassified mono-
graphs on 50 dif er ent countries,” along with thirty- four classified country hand-
books (of  these classified handbooks, twenty- four  were “written in Washington 
and  10  in New Haven”); hraf produced annotated biographies on forty 
countries, as well as “20 volumes published by hraf Press” (hraf 1959: 24). 
With the production of almost one hundred military handbooks (and forty 
annotated bibliographies for military consumption),  these military projects 
dominated, at a ratio of five to one. Some military country handbooks  were 
rewritten, reedited, and republished as part of hraf’s Country Survey Series 
(hraf 1959: 26).
In 1958, a governmental committee investigating the national support for be-
havioral sciences issued a report to Vice President Richard Nixon advocating 
the formation of an advisory panel to determine which social science projects 
should receive federal funds.5 The report recommended federal support to 
establish an “electronic data storage and retrieval mechanism for the  Human 
Relations Area Files, a compendium of categorized information on several 
hundred socie ties of the world” (hraf 1959: 31; cf. Bauer et al. 1958: 225; Solovey 
2013: 95–96).6 The report supported hraf playing a direct role in “formulating 
sound theory” that had potential to influence public policy (Bauer et al. 1958: 
222). In the late 1950s, hraf envisioned itself as serving the geopo liti cal policy 
makers, and it considered developing a “six- million- word” encyclopedia on 
cultures of Asia and or ga niz ing “the wealth of material in the files on strategic 
areas of the  Middle East and Southeast Asia” into publications that could ofer 
“guidance” to policy makers (hraf 1959:  37).
Military- linked personnel  were hired at hraf’s Washington office to help se-
cure military funds, and although some military funds went to the production 
of Pentagon- related or State Department– related resources,  these funds also 
produced purely theoretical anthropological work not directly related to mili-
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tary sponsorship. Military funds allowed hraf to amass data and code texts, 
leading to unrelated theoretical work examining social structure and other top-
ics of interest to academics. The dual use nature of this work meant that the 
military got what it wanted, and funds  were also available for unrelated theo-
retical work of anthropologists’ choosing without military interference in the 
individual projects selected by anthropologists using hraf materials.
hraf and the u.s. Army Handbook Program
With a steady flow of military- intelligence funding, hraf grew rapidly dur-
ing the 1950s. Between military, intelligence, and State Department funding, 
hraf received about $200,000 a year during the early 1950s, and “the Navy, 
the Army, the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency each contributed 
$50,000 a year to support research on four major areas: Southeast Asia, Eu rope, 
Northeast Asia, and the Near and  Middle East” (Ford 1970: 13). In 1954, hraf 
began producing volumes for the Army Handbook Program, subcontracting 
each volume to authors using nonclassified materials from academic libraries 
across the country.  After contractors completed their drafts, classified materials 
 were added by army personnel in a pro cess where “the manuscripts prepared at 
hraf and at the subcontracted universities  were sent to a branch office estab-
lished at American University, Washington, D.C. where classified information 
was added to the unclassified material, and the final handbooks  were prepared 
for submission to the Army” (14–15).
The parceling out of Army Handbooks to scholars working with academic 
library materials was an ideal arrangement for hraf  because it relieved “uni-
versities and hraf from being hampered in any way by security precautions. 
It also served as a direct link with the Army and was therefore in a position to 
fashion the final products to Army specifications” (Ford 1970: 15).  These funds 
allowed hraf to translate a broad collection of foreign language ethnographies 
and to publish several volumes in the Survey of World Cultures Series (15).
During the 1950s, more than 85  percent of hraf’s funds came from govern-
ment contracts with the  U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy, while membership 
dues, gifts, and grants totaled less than 15  percent of hraf’s funds (see  table 10.1) 
(hraf 1959: 39). A 1959 hraf report indicated that some of the gifts and grants 
had ties to the cia, including grant funds from the Rubicon Foundation (re-
vealed as a cia front in 1967 [see Harwood 1967c]) and a gift from cia operative 
and anthropologist Donald Wilber, whose many years of cia work included his 
role as a key architect of the agency’s Iran coup in 1953 (Wilber 1954).
The writing for the Army Handbooks was outsourced by hraf to gradu ate 
students and professors at Indiana, Chicago, Stanford, Cornell, the University 
of California, New York University, the University of Washington, American 
University, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Yale, and the American Geo graph i cal 
Society. Contributors included Henry Kissinger, Lawrence Krader, Kingsley 
Davis, Andre Gunder Frank, June Nash, Karl Wittfogel, and Nicholas Poppe 
(Ford 1970:28–29). Given the formulaic pre sen ta tion of information in the 
handbooks, the writers’ diverse po liti cal perspectives are more of a histori-
cal mea sure of the ubiquitous presence of such projects during this period 
than a reflection of any par tic u lar orientation of the  simple narratives of the 
handbooks.
In 1996, Andre Gunder Frank wrote me that his contribution, as a Chicago 
gradu ate student, consisted of nothing more than a few days of library work 
writing cultural descriptions for hraf’s Slavic Peoples Proj ect, and that he gave 
 little thought to what he was producing mostly  because academically it was on 
the level of a high school textbook (AGF to DHP 7/16/96). He was recruited 
 TA B L E   1 0 . 1   Revenue Sources for the  Human Relations Area Files, 1949–1959 
(Source: HRAF 1959: 39)
M E M B E R S H I P  D U E S
Member Universities .......................................................................................................$350,000
G I F T S  A N D  G R A N T S
Car ne gie Corporation ......................................................................................................$162,500
Ford Foundation .............................................................................................................. $125,000
National Science Foundation ........................................................................................... $17,000
Rubicon Foundation ......................................................................................................... $27,000
Viking Fund (Wenner- Gren) .............................................................................................$5,000
Standard Oil Com pany ...................................................................................................... $4,000
National Acad emy of Sciences ...........................................................................................$2,700
Overbrook Foundation ....................................................................................................... $2,500
Donald Wilber .....................................................................................................................$1,000
Committee for Promotion of Advanced Slavic Studies .....................................................$800
G O V E R N M E N T  C O N T R A C T S
Department of the Army ............................................................................................ $4,058,000
Department of the Air Force .......................................................................................... $50,000
Department of the Navy .................................................................................................$210,000
Other Departments .......................................................................................................... $50,000
_________
T O TA L     $5,066,000
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to the proj ect “by Bert Hoselitz,  after he ran out of money to pay me at [the 
Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change], and this 
came along as a grad student research support possibility. . . .  I personally did 
not know what was  going on, except that one day a col o nel from the Army In-
telligence Ser vice [or the Army Psychological Warfare Division] came to check 
us out. Chicago subcontracted the 6 projects from Yale which contracted the 
hraf directly from the army” (AGF to DHP 7/16/96). Another Chicago gradu-
ate student, June Nash, was also recruited by Bert Hoselitz for an hraf Army 
Handbook. Nash wrote me that Hoselitz had hired “a staf of mostly Eu ro pe ans. 
This included a Czech economist who was supposed to do the piece I did. He 
sat on it for a year, receiving monthly checks, then one month before publica-
tion was due, he deci ded the data was too biased to use. So I was called in 
in July and had to produce the report by August, which I did working like a 
Stakhanovite much to the disgust of the other scholars. It was the only [hraf] 
monograph or ms. I did. I  didn’t get much of an orientation, including issues of 
classification” (JN to DHP ca. 6/14/95).
Similar forms of contract piecework have employed gradu ate students in 
American universities for generations, and given the  simple encyclopedia- like 
entries  these gradu ate students produced,  there is no po liti cal intrigue in the 
specifics of what they wrote. The mundane ac cep tance of anthropologists mak-
ing cultures legible for the Pentagon and  others is one mea sure of how normal 
such military- linked relationships  were during this period. Anthropologists 
 were comfortable producing  these  simple narratives to which layers of clas-
sified intelligence could  later be added. It was a  simple exchange in which the 
anthropologists fed the Pentagon, the Pentagon fed the anthropologists, and 
the anthropologists went of to do their own work. Yet  there remain questions 
about how such relationships steered the discipline.
Special Operations Research Office, American University
In 1956, a private nonprofit research center producing reports on a variety of top-
ics for the U.S. Army, known as the Special Operations Research Office (soro), 
was established at American University. During its eight years of operation, soro 
produced “approximately 50 book- length studies of countries in Eu rope, Asia, 
the  Middle East, Africa and Latin Amer i ca,” as well as studies in “Sub- Saharan 
Africa and Latin Amer i ca” (aaafn 1963 4(5): 5).7 While soro acknowledged 
military funding for  these ethnographic research projects, most of the anthro-
pologists associated with the office stressed the normal anthropological functions 
of analyzing elements of foreign cultures and downplayed soro’s counterinsur-
gency projects.
Herbert Vreeland recruited anthropologists, writing in the pages of the aaa 
Fellows Newsletter ( under his  middle name, “Harold”) that soro’s “studies are 
designed to satisfy a military requirement for readily available background infor-
mation on the society and culture of foreign countries. However, the studies have 
been in increasing demand by a wide variety of organizations — both govern-
mental and non- governmental for the same purpose” (aaafn 1963 4[5]: 5–6).8
Interdisciplinary teams wrote soro reports, with anthropologists and other 
social scientists and area studies and military experts. Originally the reports 
 were classified documents, but by 1963, soro produced nonclassified docu-
ments to be widely distributed and used in a variety of military and nonmilitary 
agencies (aaafn 1963 4[5]: 5–6).
While hraf relied heavily on university- based anthropologists and other so-
cial science contractors to write country reports, soro hired more than a dozen 
staf anthropologists, whose research tasks  were directly linked to soro’s inter-
 TA B L E   1 0 . 2   Anthropologists Working for soro between 1956 and 1969
N A M E S O R O  Y E A R S S O U R C E
George W. Baker 1957–59 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
William K. Carr 1967–69 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Antoinette K. Emrich 1968–69 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Edwin E. Erickson 1963 (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 Roster)
Judith Lynne Hanna 1966–69 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
George L. Harris 1963 (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 Roster)
Milton Jacobs 1961–63 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Irving Kaplan 1963 (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 Roster)
Howard Keva Kaufman 1964–66 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
John D. LeNoir 1965–66 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Thomas E. Lux 1963 (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 Roster)
Bela C. Maday 1963 (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 Roster)
Felix Moos 1964–65 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Hugo Nutini 1964–65 (LOC 1969)
Keith F. Otterbein 1963–64 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Peter B. Riddleberger 1963–65 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Herbert H. Vreeland, III 1957–67 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
Irving A. Wallach 1957–58 (Rohde 2007: 284–93)
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ests in counterinsurgency (see  table 10.2). The job announcements in the aaa 
Fellows Newsletter described the job duties in normative research terms and 
listed salaries that exceeded  those of entry- level professorships. But the security 
dominating the workplace required all soro employees to undergo background 
screenings to achieve a “secret” security clearance, which precluded hiring in-
dividuals outside of a narrow range of po liti cal affiliations (Rohde 2007: 51).
Over a dozen anthropologists  were hired by soro during the early 1960s. 
Among  those holding doctoral degrees  were Felix Moos, William Carr, Bela 
Maday, Howard Kaufman, and Herbert H. Vreeland III, while other staf an-
thropologists held master’s and bachelor’s degrees in anthropology. A cadre of 
sociologists, po liti cal scientists, and military personnel at times worked as “an-
thropologists” on counterinsurgency projects (soro Box 1, 3/8/63 soro Roster; 
Rohde 2013; Lippincott and Dame 1964: i).
In 1963, soro opened a field office at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 
following year it established facilities in Seoul, South  Korea, and in the Panama 
Canal Zone, where it conducted “social science research on problems of un-
derstanding afecting or supporting foreign  people and socie ties, especially in 
Latin Amer i ca, who  were involved in or threatened by insurgency and subver-
sion” (Shrader 2008: 200).
A conception of culture emerged from soro reports expressing what would 
become recurrent Pentagon misunderstandings about anthropology’s ability to 
contribute elements of cultural engineering to military campaigns. Its Proj ect 
Prosyms Pakistan tried to construct culturally appropriate counterinsurgency 
propaganda messages for pos si ble use in Pakistan (Rohde 2013: 42–46). Several 
soro projects envisioned using anthropology to control local populations in 
order to advance American military interests.9 James R. Price and Paul Jure-
idini’s soro report “Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and Other Psychological Phe-
nomena and Their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in 
the Congo” (1964) fantasized about weaponizing ethnographic knowledge to 
manipulate native populations in absurd ways. This report drew on academic 
anthropological lit er a ture, including the work of E. E. Evans- Pritchard, Meyers 
Forte, Louis Leakey, Jomo Kenyata, John Middleton, George Murdock, C. G. 
Seligman, and Monica Wilson. Price and Jureidini examined claims that magic 
was “efective in conditioning dissident elements and their followers to do  battle 
with Government troops. Rebel tribesmen are said to have been persuaded that 
they can be made magically impervious to Congolese army firepower. Their 
fear of the government has thus been diminished and, conversely, fear of the 
rebels has grown within army ranks” (J. R. Price and Jureidini 1964: 1). The 
report considered  whether knowledge of magical beliefs could be used by out-
siders to control superstitious natives.
Price and Jureidini claimed that magic- based counterinsurgency campaigns 
might be potentially so power ful that they could backfire, and that by strength-
ening and reinforcing local super natu ral beliefs, they could accidentally unleash 
po liti cal forces that would be difficult to anticipate or control. They recom-
mended exposing native emic truths of “magical invulnerability” to the etic 
realities of guns and bullets, writing that “ there is  every reason to believe that 
disciplined troops, proficient in marksmanship, and led by competent officers, 
can handily dispel most notions of magical invulnerability” (Price and Jureidini 
1964: 11).  These  were enticing claims for military and civilian strategists facing 
historically long odds of success in intractable counterinsurgency campaigns.
Interdisciplinary teams undertook a wide range of soro projects. Judith 
Lynne Hanna and her husband, soro po liti cal scientist William Hanna, coau-
thored Urban Dynamics in Black Africa: An Interdisciplinary Approach (1971). 
Milton Jacobs worked on communications in Thailand (Jacobs, Farzanegan, and 
Askenasy 1966). William Carr, Howard Kaufman, Robert Suggs, Herbert Vree-
land III, and Peter Riddleberger studied Third World insurgent movements 
(see Molnar et al. 1963; Molnar et al. 1963).10 From 1964 to 1966, Raoul Naroll, 
working  under a $55,000 soro “Special Projects” grant, studied “Deterrence 
in History” (soro Box 1 Final Report of the Subcommittee on Behavioral Sci-
ences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, p. 31; Naroll 1974). In 1965 and 1966, 
Naroll, working  under a $75,000 Department of Navy grant, studied “Intel-
ligence Data Validation” (soro Box  1 Final Report of the Subcommittee on 
Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 41). Felix Moos stud-
ied “Cross- Cultural Relationships between Foreigners and American Military 
Commanders in  Korea” (soro Box  1 Final Report of the Subcommittee on 
Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 39).11 The 1964 “Brief 
Review of Selected Aspects of the San Blas Cuna Indians” calculated the likely 
impacts of improving health care as a flank of counterinsurgency operations.12 
The primary sources for this report  were hraf and soro files, and the section 
on ethnohistory drew on Richard N. Adams’s 1957 survey of Panama, Nicara-
gua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Lippincott and Dame 1964: 1, 3; 
Adams 1957).
In 1965, anthropologist Milton Jacobs received a $61,000 grant to conduct 
research at the soro Panama Field Office (soro Box  1 Final Report of the 
Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 40). 
In 1964, Gerald Hickey received a $92,000 Proj ect Agile grant from the Ad-
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vanced Research Projects Administration (arpa) for research on “Motiva-
tional Studies” (soro Box 1 Final Report of the Subcommittee on Behavioral 
Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 43). Hickey also received arpa 
funds ($53,000 in 1964, $26,000 in 1965) for work on a proj ect titled “Advisor- 
Counterpart Communications” (soro Box 1 Final Report of the Subcommittee 
on Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 47). Proj ect Agile 
drew on arap funds to pay Charles Osgood $95,000 a year, for three years, to 
work on his proj ect “Communication, Cooperation and Negotiation in Cultur-
ally Heterogeneous Groups” (soro Box 1 Final Report of the Subcommittee on 
Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 44).
James Price’s Counterinsurgency Information and Analy sis Center (cinfac) 
(and soro) report titled “Irrigation as a  Factor in the Economic Development 
of Thailand” (1964) described the basic workings of Thai irrigation systems 
within a “counterinsurgency analy sis” framework, focusing on how Thai land 
tenure systems created stability and weakened insurgents’ eforts by vesting 
farmers in a functioning socioeconomic system (J. R. Price 1964: 6).
In September 1964, the National Acad emy of Sciences/National Research 
Council invited ten scholars, including anthropologists Charles Wagley and 
Leonard Doob, to join an advisory committee that was charged with assisting 
the  Human Factors and Operations Research Division in an unnamed proj ect 
that was estimated to have a bud get of about $600,000 per year (soro Box 1, 
nas memo 9/22/64). Although Proj ect Camelot was never mentioned by name, 
the letter requesting  these scholars’ participation described goals that would be 
at the core of Camelot:
1. Identifying and, where pos si ble, mea sur ing indicators of internal war poten-
tial, and analyzing the dynamics of their interrelationships.
2. Determining the efects of vari ous courses of governmental action upon the 
social pro cesses in the indigenous culture to which the action is directed.
3. Improving the estimation of internal war potential and devising means of 
reducing that potential. (soro Box 1, nas memo 9/22/64)
In an October 9, 1964, letter addressed to “Fellow SOROns,” soro director 
Theodore Vallance summarized soro’s activities, including the development 
of Proj ect Camelot. Among the activities by SOROns was the “loan” of anthro-
pologists Ed Erickson and Bela Maday to Peace Corps training activities held 
at Brandeis University, assisting in the training of [Peace Corps Volunteers] 
preparing to be sent to Bolivia (soro Box 1, Vallance memo 10/9/64).13
Proj ect Camelot
In August 1964,  U.S. Army leadership called for the formation of a research 
proj ect to “test in one country the feasibility of designing and developing, for 
strategic planning and other Army use, an advanced system of early warning 
of internal conflict or its increased likelihood in foreign nations, together with 
concepts for early Army reaction systems requirements” (Deitchman 1976: 139). 
This program was assigned to soro as Proj ect Camelot (142).
Camelot was conceived as a broad program that would fund social science 
projects undertaking a variety of tasks, such as predicting outbreaks of vio-
lence or episodes of insurgency. Prior to Camelot, soro con sul tants conducted 
reviews of social science lit er a ture to develop “800 hypotheses about internal 
war” (Deitchman 1976: 143).  These theories focused on causal variables, includ-
ing economic inequities, rapid economic growth, elements of “social mobility,” 
reactions to “oppressive governments,” toleration of alienation, responses to 
totalitarianism, and so forth (Deitchman 1976: 143). Some of the social science 
research at soro tried to generate social engineering– friendly formulas to pre-
dict or prevent po liti cal uprisings.
Rex Hooper, a former missionary and a Brooklyn College sociologist with 
Latin American expertise, was hired by soro to direct Proj ect Camelot. 
Camelot was initially an unclassified proj ect, and most of its analy sis was to 
be conducted by in de pen dent subcontractor scholars at U.S. and international 
universities. In October 1964, Vallance and Hooper pitched Camelot to schol-
ars and administrators at ssrc, mit, Harvard, Columbia, and Prince ton and at 
the Russell Sage and Ford Foundations (soro Box 1, Vallance memo 10/9/64). 
Camelot was conceived of as operating on an annual bud get of about $1 million 
for its first three to four years (soro Box 1, Vallance memo 10/9/64).
The first stage of Proj ect Camelot was to take place during the winter and 
spring of 1964–65 with U.S.- based “library research on theories of conflict, rev-
olutionary warfare, and pro cesses of change in diverse social systems” covering 
a broad range of historical and national settings (Deitchman 1976: 145). Among 
 these first planned historical studies identified by soro  were studies of mid- 
twentieth- century revolutions in Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, Colom-
bia, Guatemala, Egypt, Iran, South  Korea, and Greece, as well as revolutionary 
 in de pen dence movements in Algeria, Turkey, Thailand, Paraguay, Ec ua dor, 
Venezuela, Nigeria, Mexico, France, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, 
Brazil, Bolivia, and the Congo, and even the Québécois separatist movement, 
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while “Chile was not mentioned as one of the possibilities, although it figured 
very much in the news  later” (145; Solovey 2001:  181).
Chilean- born anthropologist Hugo Nutini was hired by soro in December 
1964, while a professor of anthropology at the University of Pittsburg. Between 
January and April 1965, Nutini regularly attended “Camelot Monday meetings” 
in Washington, DC, as a con sul tant. He was compensated with a payment of 
seventy- five dollars (plus transportation and a per diem) for each meeting (rb 
75, HGN to RB 9/17/66). In April 1965, Nutini traveled to Chile, where he mis-
represented his research to Chilean colleagues, telling them it was sponsored 
by the National Science Foundation. Nutini falsely claimed to colleagues that 
Robert K. Merton, Kingsley Davis, Seymour Lipset, and other prestigious social 
scientists  were joining the proj ect.  After meeting with Nutini, Alvaro Bunster 
of the University of Chile became suspicious that Nutini was involved in some 
sort of U.S. spy program.
Nutini asked Hopper for a letter to present to the American embassy in San-
tiago notifying it of his status, but Hopper refused. Nutini  later wrote Ralph 
Beals that he told Hopper he “would deny any knowledge of Army sponsorship 
of the proj ect if the situation got sticky. To this they agreed, and nothing was 
further discussed. I do not remember what I said to [Chilean sociologist Raúl] 
Urzua on the 29 of April, but I can tell you confidentially that he knew every-
thing about Camelot from the very beginning” (rb 75, HGN to RB 9/17/66).
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung was conducting research in Chile 
when Nutini approached scholars  there. In December 1964, soro had invited 
Galtung to participate in an August 1965 Camelot conference, but Galtung de-
clined.14  After Nutini tried recruiting Chilean social scientists with misrepre-
sen ta tions of a program already known to Galtung, Galtung exposed Nutini’s 
activities to the Latin American Faculty of Social Science, which stirred up out-
rage in the leftist press and with left- wing members of the Chilean Senate. On 
June 12, 1965, a Chilean Communist newspaper broke the Camelot story with a 
headline warning, “Yankees Study Invasion of Chile: Proj ect Camelot Financed 
by U.S. Army” (Deitchman 1976: 157).
The resulting damage and distrust among South American scholars  toward 
their  U.S. colleagues  were widespread; as Marshall Sahlins observed, “As a 
tactic of fomenting Latin American unrest and anti– North American senti-
ment, Camelot would be the envy of any Communist conspiracy. We have heard 
of the self- fulfilling prophecy;  here was the self- fulfilling research proposal” 
(2000b: 263).
 Later, a report by Library of Congress staf for the Congressional Subcom-
mittee on Science, Research and Development indicated that Nutini lied about 
the sponsorship and scope of Camelot research to Chilean social scientists. This 
report found Nutini’s misrepre sen ta tions  were premeditated and had taken 
some preparation, and that he had “erased from the working papers he brought 
with him all references to dod sponsorship and represented the proj ect as 
being funded by the National Science Foundation” (loc 1969: 132). Nutini  later 
claimed he never said Camelot had nsf funding and that he “was instructed by 
Camelot officials to say, if asked, that the Proj ect was sponsored by American 
Government agencies, without giving any details, and that was exactly what I 
did” (rb 76, Nutini to Beals 9/17/66).15 The U.S. ambassador to Chile was broad-
sided by  these revelations, and, as Joy Rohde (2013) argues, the fallout and clash 
between the State Department and the Pentagon exacerbated already tense re-
lations between them, and this had more to do with the termination of Camelot 
than with any protests launched by academics. As Rohde notes, Camelot col-
lapsed not  because of anthropologists’ or Chileans’ rage but  because the De-
partment of State used what might have been a minor scandal to confront the 
Defense Department in an ongoing strug gle over which department should 
determine foreign policy. Rohde overstates the impact of this, however, claim-
ing that the termination of Camelot “had  little to with its intellectual content” 
(2013: 72), as if the exposed counterinsurgency operation was not at the heart of 
the trou ble it caused the Johnson administration.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara terminated Camelot the second week 
of July 1965, just as Congress prepared to hold hearings on the program (Eder 
1965). Theodore Vallance, director of soro, testified to the House Foreign Af-
fairs Subcommittee that Nutini was the only Camelot social scientist ever sent 
abroad before the program was terminated (Eder 1965). President Johnson’s 
August 1965 memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, responding to the Camelot 
scandal, said  little more than that he did not want the U.S. to be embarrassed 
again and proclaimed, “No Government sponsorship of foreign area research 
should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would 
adversely afect United States foreign relations” (Johnson qtd. in Horo witz 1967: 
17). The State Department’s Foreign Afairs Research Council subsequently 
reviewed hundreds of projects to evaluate “the propriety of Government- 
sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy” (naaa 1969 
10[1]: 11).
 After Harold Pincus published articles critiquing Camelot, George Murdock 
met with Seymour Deitchman at Murdock’s office at the National Acad emy of 
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Sciences/National Research Council to discuss the fallout from  these revelations 
for other social science research projects.16 According to Deitchman, “Out of 
the discussions with Murdock arose the idea of establishing an nas/nrc Com-
mittee on Social Sciences, to examine dod’s needs and its role, and to see what 
might be done to improve the situation. The ddr&e [Department of Defense, 
Research & Engineering] accepted the idea, and in fact felt it would be worth-
while enough that he initiated a request to the nas to establish the committee” 
(1976: 203–4).17
In 1965, soro launched Proj ect Colony in Peru and Proj ect Simpatico in Co-
lombia. Both projects repeated elements of Camelot’s basic research design, and 
both used U.S. anthropologists working with local governmental authorities. 
Proj ect Colony relied on “observation and analy sis of Peruvian army eforts to as-
sist the economic development and integration of the Indians in the trans- Andean 
highlands into the Peruvian economy and society. The results of the study  were 
also intended to assist the U.S. Amy to develop its ‘civic action’ doctrines for 
military assistance to the armies of developing nations” (Deitchman 1976: 185). 
Proj ect Simpatico used social science surveys to mea sure rural attitudes about 
the government and rebel groups.  There  were plans to expand Proj ect Colony 
into Bolivia, but  after Camelot’s disastrous publicity, the American ambassador 
to Bolivia canceled them, even though the Bolivian government remained sup-
portive of the proj ect (186). During the summer of 1965, soro became involved 
in protracted  legal disagreements with Peruvian workers, and American Uni-
versity settled with five individuals, paying a total of $9,294 for lost wages on a 
Proj ect Colony contract (soro, Box 2 contracts/ legal; Pincus 1966).
Proj ect Simpatico was codirected by anthropologist Howard Kaufman and 
used anthropologists and psychologists to design research questionnaires to study 
po liti cal attitudes in rural Colombia. Using structured questionnaires and stan-
dardized “thematic apperception tests,” Simpatico probed rural Colombian vil-
lagers’ attitudes concerning current po liti cal conditions, the government, rural 
bandits, the military, and other social forces believed to be contributing to 
po liti cal instability in the country. As elected Colombian officials tried to use 
Proj ect Simpatico to gather information in an upcoming po liti cal election, a 
scandal developed in Colombia and the United States when news of this proj ect 
became public, and the program was terminated (see Deitchman 1976: 187; rb 
75, Executive Board Minutes 5/20–21/66).
On June 27, 1966, Stephen Boggs, executive secretary of the aaa, testified 
 before the U.S. Senate Hearings for the Subcommittee on Government Re-
search that “an absolutely impassable barrier must be established between 
the intelligence agencies of the United States Government and the universi-
ties, private foundations and international voluntary organizations engaged in 
research” (Eder 1966b: 5). This public stance by academics wishing to distance 
themselves from intelligence work further dashed soro hopes for rehabilitation, 
and in July 1966 soro closed down its operations, while some soro personnel 
and projects continued at American University at the Center for Research in 
Social Systems (cress).
 These revelations about soro’s use of anthropologists and other social sci-
entists brought suspicions on many American researchers working in Latin 
Amer i ca and elsewhere. American anthropologists sufered from new forms 
of guilt by disciplinary association, and some researchers found it difficult to 
obtain research visas for fieldwork in Latin Amer i ca and other regions of the 
underdeveloped world.
The m- vico System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy
Hoping to efficiently link existing ethnographic lit er a ture with the needs of mil-
itary and intelligence counterinsurgency projects, soro developed The m- vico 
System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy. The m- vico System  adopted hraf’s 
cross- indexing and classification system to include new categories of counter-
insurgency data (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65; Conley 1966). The m- vico System 
is a 230- page report, 187 pages of which are photocopied reproductions of hraf 
documents crudely sandwiched into the main text. Immediately following the 
title page are eight pages of unaltered photocopies of the fourth edition of Mur-
dock’s Outline of Cultural Materials (ocm)  table of contents (a brief listing of 
the 88 primary classifications, and hundreds of secondary categories of traits 
indexed by hraf), which are followed by a three- page listing of soro’s addi-
tional 22 primary trait classifications and a total of 123 secondary cultural traits 
of interest to military and intelligence personnel engaged in counterinsurgency 
(see Murdock 1961). The text of m- vico followed hraf’s indexing methods, 
with “the Matrix of the outline consists of 80 major divisions or sections, num-
bered from 10 through 89, and 623 minor divisions or categories, numbered by 
adding digits from 1 to 9 to the numbers on the sections  under which they fall” 
(J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 2). The ocm categories end at number 88, 
and soro added an eighty- ninth division to hraf’s matrix  under the heading 
“United States Policy Orientation”; this section contained soro’s added “minor 
divisions or categories” that used hraf- derived categories to cata log cultural 
data of interest to soro’s counterinsurgency theorists.
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It is unclear what year James R. Price, Barbara Reason Butler, Doris M. Con-
dit, Bert Cooper, Michael Conley, and Richard H. Moore produced The m- vico 
System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy for soro, but a consideration of the 
years when the authors  were at soro indicates it was produced between 1964 
and 1965 (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65).18 The only two copies of The m- vico 
System that I located (one in the Pentagon Library, the other in the George-
town University Library) are undated, but several elements indicate a date in 
the mid-1960s. We know that soro was terminated in 1966, the discussion of 
using The m- vico System at cinfac, and the known soro employment dates 
of authors suggest it was produced sometime during 1964–65.19
The m- vico categories mimicked hraf’s index and could be revised over 
time as new sources  were analyzed (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 3–4). The 
format of m- vico copied the index format of ocm, with its index divided into 
the four categories giving it its name, with Matrix sections on “Vulnerabilities,” 
“Insurgency,” “Counterinsurgency,” and “Outcomes.” The focus on  these sec-
tions was identified as follows:
Vulnerabilities. This section has been designed to or ga nize information indicating 
the vulnerabilities of a par tic u lar country to subversion of any type. Geo graph i cal, 
demographic, po liti cal, economic, military, and psychological conditions are iden-
tified in this section, whose categories are preceded by the initial “V,” and whose 
numerical codes are selected from  those of the Matrix.
Insurgency. The content of this section of a file is indicated by the po liti cal or 
social temperature in a given country. The information categories in this section 
are or ga nized sequentially to permit  either partial or complete activation, category 
by category, as may be indicated by the progression of events. The categories range 
from po liti cal, economic, or social unrest through organ ization of underground 
activities on through progressive degrees of or ga nized vio lence. All numbered cat-
egories in this section are preceded by the initial “I.”
Counterinsurgency. This section organizes information about anti- subversive 
activities ranging from pre- insurgent preventive or reformist po liti cal, social, and 
economic activities on through police, military, and other types of response to 
or ga nized vio lence. Information categories in this section are identified by the ini-
tial “C.”
Outcome. This section covers the settlement of active insurgencies. It organizes 
information about military, po liti cal, economic, and social consequences of a par-
tic u lar insurgency, as well as about the outlook for the  future. Categories in this 
section are preceded by the initial “O.” (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 4–5)
A 6- page narrative explanation of the m- vico System of Counterinsurgency 
Taxonomy detailed how m- vico  adopted and expanded hraf’s methodology; 
the remaining portions of the report are a verbatim reprinting of 159 pages 
photocopied from ocm, with ocm text  running from page xi of the preface to 
the end of the index of complete itemized hraf traits on page 144, ending with 
trait 888, “Status and Treatment of the Aged.” A 65- page section on “m- vico 
Information Categories” extends ocm’s trait list, starting with the new category, 
“United States Policy Orientation,” and including detailed narrative descrip-
tions following the format used in the preceding 150 pages of ocm text, for a 
total of 123 cultural traits (see tables 10.3 and 10.4). The report concluded with a 
photocopied reproduction of the unaltered index to ocm.20
The matrix developed in m- vico mimicked the general structure of Mur-
dock’s Outline of Cultural Materials, but instead of compiling a database for 
testing purely theoretical cross- cultural hypothesis, it was designed to or ga nize 
cultural data to be used by American military or intelligence personnel in sup-
pressing uprisings. The authors of m- vico appear intoxicated by social engi-
neering dreams. As they promise readers:
Although sets of files  will be compiled about specific countries, the system  will 
also permit the establishment of one entire set of information categories not keyed 
to any area or country, but which  will include non- area- oriented research about 
functional aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
The m- vico outline has been structured to permit its users to maintain active 
information categories to the extent indicated by the degree of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency in areas  under study. Expansion of the degree of subversion or 
insurgency in a given area can thus be matched by activating the subsequent infor-
mation categories keyed to the normal progression of insurgent movements. The 
flexibility of this system can be seen in the organ ization of its components. (J. R. 
Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 2)
The m- vico matrix or ga nized data relating to specific regional counterinsur-
gency eforts, and it strove to compile a retrievable database for cinfac social 
scientists formulating theories of counterinsurgency designed to aid in suppress-
ing insurgent movements arising in cultures around the globe. Identifying core 
themes of numerous projects at cinfac and soro, the introduction expressed 
hopes that “the accumulation of specialized information about revolutions and 
their antidotes could eventually result in the beginnings of a possibility for the 
formulation of a genuinely creative theory of revolutionary be hav ior” (J.  R. 
Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 6).
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What emerged from this patchwork of standard hraf organ ization of cul-
tural traits realigned with a militarized focus was a tool not only for the retrieval 
of cultural information of use to military personnel engaging in counterinsur-
gency operations, but also one that is even more useful to us in the present: 
m- vico survives as a cultural artifact informing us of resilient institutional 
ways of viewing culture as a counterinsurgency tool. Rather than interpreting 
 TA B L E   1 0 . 3   Examples of sample cultural trait entries from hraf’s  
Outline of Cultural Materials (563 Ethnic Stratification) and The m- vico  
System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy (C-184 Resettlement Programs)
5 6 3  E T H N I C  S T R AT I F I C AT I O N — alien and immigration subgroups; racial and national 
minorities; cultural diferences between and characteristics of ethnic and minority 
groups; social and po liti cal status of ethnic subgroups; race prejudice and discrimination; 
assimilation and irredentism; race crossing and amalgamation; racial hybrids and their 
status;  etc. see also:
Racial affinities  .......................................... 144 Ethnocentrism ............................................186
Ethnic composition  Ingroup antagonisms .................................578
 of the population  .................................. 162 Naturalization .............................................641
Immigration ............................................... 167 Reservations................................................657
Acculturation 77  Religious persecutions.............................. 798 
Degree of subcultural  Race theories ..............................................829
 diferentiation ........................................ 184 (Murdock 1961:  77)
C - 1 8 4  R E S E T T L E M E N T  P R O G R A M S — gathering of scattered civil population into settlements 
for greater security from insurgent attack and to bar pos si ble support to the insurgent (e.g. 
strategic hamlets, protected villages, denial of food, medical, and other essential supplies to 
insurgent); improvements of living conditions; better use of land resources; screening of set-
tlers; prior planning and specific steps undertaken before  actual movement; the settlement 
of refugees;  etc. See also:
Land reform ............................................... 423 Reform programs ....................................... 185
State enterprise ...........................................474 Or ga nized resettlement .............................166
State regulation ..........................................656 War time adjustments. ...............................722
Monopolies ................................................. 655 Care of refugees ..........................................727
Cooperative work groups .........................476 Living standards ..........................................511
Public works ............................................... 653 Settlement patterns .................................... 361
Military participation in  (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: 205) 
 resettlement C-173
 TA B L E   1 0 . 4   Comparison of the cultural trait format of hraf’s Outline of Cul-
tural Materials (Murdock 1961: vii) with m- vico (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65).
The following are sample index entries from hraf’s Outline of Cultural Materials:
59   family
 591 Residence
 592 House hold
 593  Family Relationships
 594 Nuclear  Family
 595 Polygamy
 596 Extended Families
 597 Adoption
60  kinship
 601 Kinship Terminology
 602 Kin Relationships
 603 Grandparents and Grandchildren
 604 Avuncular and Nepotic Relatives
 605 Cousins
 606 Parents- in- Law and Children- in- Law
 607 Siblings- in- Law
 608 Artificial Kin Relationships
 609 Be hav ior  toward Nonrelatives
61  kin groups






 617 Bilinear Kin Groups
 618 Clans
 619 Tribe and Nation
The following are sample index entries from m- vico:
I-10  political aspects of  insurgency
 I-101 Political Organizations
 I-102 Political Aims and Techniques
 I-103 Dissident Po liti cal Leadership
 I-104 Role of Indigenous Communist Party
 I-105 Organ ization and Orientation of the Populace
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The m- vico System was a misuse of hraf’s ocm, it was a logical extension of 
hraf’s historical military roots merging with the deep institutional needs for 
disarticulated cultural knowledge by a military seeking to weaponize culture.
The structure of The m- vico System shows soro layering its own counterin-
surgency data atop existing hraf information. The proj ect envisioned its “se-
lection and adaptation of completed hraf files as points of departure for a 
buildup of counterinsurgency information files [that]  will result in  great econ-
omies of time, efort, and money required for background research in areas 
and culture if the research must be started from scratch” (J. R. Price et al. ca. 
1964–65: intro. 3). m- vico’s adaptations transformed hraf academic data into 
a touchstone of American counterinsurgency.
This was  going to be a tool used “to respond to customer requests for infor-
mation and analy sis” at soro’s cinfac (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 1), 
 TA B L E   1 0 . 4   (continued)
 I-106 Incidence of Penetration and Infiltration Tactics by Dissident 
Elements
 I-107 Relationships and Interaction Within and Among Po liti cal Insurgent 
Groups
I-18  operations of covert  organ ization
 I-181 Functions of the Covert Organ ization
 I-182 Covert Psychological Operations
 I-183 Activities in Controlled Areas and Bases
 I-184 Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations
 I-185 Antiproperty Operations
 I-186 Antipersonnel Operations
 I-187 Escape and Evasion
C-10  mobilization of national counterinsurgency  efforts
 C-101 Government Response to the Emergency
 C-102 Special Administrative Or ga ni za tion below the National Level
 C-103 Pro- government Po liti cal and Social Organizations
 C-104 Organ ization for National Intelligence/Counterintelligence and 
Espionage Efort
 C-105 Special Police Organizations
 C-106 Judiciary
 C-107 Paramilitary Organizations
 C-108 Significant Indigenous Personages in the National Mobilization Efort
 C-109 Domestic Information and Propaganda Agencies
and integrate anthropological notions of social structure by building a collec-
tion that would “concentrate upon that which is structural and hence relatively 
slow to change, and  will not include the type of information upon which cur-
rent intelligence estimates are based” (intro. 1). The introduction to the report 
stated that m- vico’s taxonomical system came from extensive soro research 
into more than fifty case studies of insurgency operations from around the world.
With m- vico’s additions to hraf trait categories, soro extended the dual 
use pro cesses already occurring with hraf’s production of area handbooks. 
In de pen dent scholars produced basic declassified, publicly available handbooks 
containing widely available information on cultural, economic, po liti cal, 
geographic, and historical features of individual nation- states as piecework 
contractors, while  others assembled classified versions of  these resources used 
internally by hraf’s military sponsors.
Merging soro and hraf data within the m- vico matrix sought to trans-
form hraf into a global counterinsurgency matrix; and soro’s plans of adding 
its own content, presumably a mixture of classified and nonclassified materials, 
to hraf sought new levels of ethnographically informed counterinsurgency. 
(J.  R. Price et  al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 4). The report’s authors stated: “When 
completed hraf files are used as the Matrix for a Center file [e.g., the cinfac 
file], the inclusion of seeming superfluous material poses no prob lem. When 
Center files do not have hraf material to draw upon, obviously priorities must 
be established to govern the se lection of material to complete the information 
categories in the Matrix” (intro. 5). As an example of how existing hraf files 
and m- vico files would merge with cinfac’s files, the authors explained how 
exiting hraf materials on Cuba would be supplemented with “vico sections” 
that would “be separately or ga nized for, say, the Castro revolution against Ba-
tista, and the currently smoldering anti- Castro agitation” (intro. 6). This proj ect 
envisioned a hybrid conjoining of academic and intelligence analy sis in ways 
seeking to convert a broad sample of the ethnographic rec ord into a counterin-
surgency weapon to be used by the U.S. military against the populations studied 
by the unwitting anthropologists who  were collecting the linked ethnographic 
data.
The details of The m- vico System’s demise are unclear, but it appears to have 
been abandoned soon  after its initial formation. The two m- vico reports that 
I located (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65; Conley ca. 1966) portray an ambitious 
proj ect in its early stages that never got of the ground. Yet the importance of 
m- vico is not what it accomplished; it is the clarity of its expression of a mili-
tarized vision for anthropology that wedded hraf’s approach to the collection 
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and analy sis of ethnographic data (an approach that itself was well financed 
by military- intelligence funds) with an aggressive Cold War counterinsurgency 
proj ect.
Life  after soro
The Camelot scandal launched soro’s demise, but military eforts to anthropo-
logically inform counterinsurgency continued. Several soro anthropologists 
continued counterinsurgency work, some within soro’s institutionally linked 
American University cress and cinfac groups. Felix Moos approached Proj-
ect Themis with a research proposal whose “subject was considered too sensi-
tive to risk the pos si ble consequences of the kind of  free access and movement 
that university researchers would demand, and the idea was dropped” (Deitch-
man 1976: 336). Other anthropologists, such as Howard Kaufman (see Rohde 
2007: 256), worked as private contractors, and some anthropologists worked 
for cinfac, arpa, rand, or other sponsors issuing counterinsurgency- related 
contracts. In 1966, anthropologist Terry Rambo combined anthropological, 
psychological, military, and po liti cal science approaches to counterinsurgency 
in his contributions to the U.S. Army Handbook of Counterinsurgency Guide-
lines for Area Commanders: An Analy sis of Criteria (Havron, Wittenburg, and 
Rambo 1966). The handbook’s analy sis of successful counterinsurgency tactics 
drew on diverse writings, including  those of Raoul Naroll, Mao Tse- tung, Rich-
ard Critchfield, Gerald Hickey, Roger Hilsman, Walt Rostow, and Richard N. 
Adams. In 1967, arpa provided $3.9 million for behavioral science research 
“related to military operations in Southeast Asia” (acgpbs 1968: 64). Stillman 
Bradfield and William  F. Whyte’s Peruvian development studies  were spon-
sored by arpa. When controversy arose over Whyte’s Pentagon funding, he al-
layed concerns by switching his funding source to aid (rb 75, Executive Board 
Minutes 5/20/66).
Other governmental agencies maintained interest in  these anthropologi-
cally informed counterinsurgency projects. Documents released in response 
to my foia requests for cia Camelot rec ords included a memo from May 17, 
1967, requesting that Lord, Rosenthal, and Dodson’s cress report “Commu-
nist Theory and Practice in Subversive Insurgencies” be reviewed to deter-
mine if it should “be released for open publication” (Lord, Rosenthal, and 
Dodson 1965; cia, memo to asst dci 5/17/67). This cia memo stated the 
paper was based on “overt” sources, and  there was no objection to the report’s 
publication.21
 After soro closed in July 1966, many of its operations moved to American 
University’s cress, which  housed the army’s cinfac (Shrader 2008: 200).22 
The Pentagon then relied on cinfac for the “collecting, storing, retrieving, and 
analyzing ‘information on peoples and cultures of the world as they apply to 
insurgency setting’ ” (200). Several cinfac reports developed synthetic theo-
retical understandings of counterinsurgency dynamics. As Salemink observed, 
cinfac’s Customs and Taboos of Selected Tribes Residing along the Western Border 
of the Republic of Vietnam (Fallah 1967) interpreted tribal beliefs in ways that 
 were  imagined to help military commanders to “force Montagnards into po-
liti cal and military compliance” (Salemink 2003: 229). Minority Groups in the 
Republic of Vietnam (Schrock et al. 1966), was produced as part of cinfac’s 
Ethnographic Study Series. It was a synthesis of information from hundreds of 
academic articles and books, combined to produce a 1,163- page compendium 
of ethnographic information on tribal and ethnic groups in a format designed 
to assist military and intelligence personnel interacting with members of  these 
groups in Vietnam. The first eight hundred pages described cultural features 
of the most prevalent eigh teen tribal groups of Vietnam.23 A detailed index al-
lowed users to locate relevant information on customs, social structure, history, 
settlement patterns, and other cultural information in the field, as if problems 
facing military leaders could be solved with an eight- hundred- page cookbook 
(Schrock et al. 1966: vi).
Using a format similar to that of George Murdock’s World War II Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations reports,  these reports plugged in specific infor-
mation on tribal groups using a mostly uniform format that allowed field users 
to quickly access information. Each ethnic or “tribal” group’s chapter was di-
vided into the standardized subheadings shown in  table 10.5. Oscar Salemink 
connected the format and material of cinfac’s Montagnard Tribal Groups in 
the Republic of South Viet- Nam directly with Gerald Hickey and John Mus-
grave’s hraf book Ethnic Groups of Southeast Asia (1964), observing that “the 
notes and bibliographies of the vari ous volumes not only referred to the same 
sources, but to each other as well, indicating a cross- fertilization of academic 
and military ethnographies” (2003: 231).
 These cinfac publications’s bibliographies blended academic and military 
lit er a ture.24 Hickey, Thomas, LeBar, et al.  were key sources used in most chap-
ters of Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, but the work also drew on 
interviews with missionaries, such as one with the Reverend Charles E. Long, 
a Mennonite missionary, conducted by members of the U.S. Special Warfare 
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School (Schrock et al. 1966: 718). David Thomas, of the Summer Institute of 
Linguistics, authored a monograph on “Mon- Khmer Subgroupings in Viet-
nam,” that was cited throughout the book; given the overlapping methods, ap-
proaches, and larger goals of contact between missionary and military groups 
to foreign cultures, the orga nizational approach used by the sil had natu ral ap-
plications for American counterinsurgency operatives (see D. Thomas 1962).25
Sections 10 through 12 of Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam used 
ethnographic knowledge to recommend uses of cultural knowledge for coun-
terinsurgency operations. The listed civic action projects read like an overview 
of usaid rural Vietnam projects from this period and included programs to 
improve livestock quality and agricultural yields, programs for rural electrifica-
tion and rural roads, education programs, and sanitation projects. The book 
 TA B L E   1 0 . 5   General Or ga ni za tion Format for Minority Groups in the Republic of 
Vietnam* (Source: Schrock et al. 1966)
Section I Introduction
Section II Tribal Background
Section III Individual Characteristics
Section IV Social Structure
Section V Customs and Taboos
Section VI Religion
Section VII Economic Or ga ni za tion
Section VIII Po liti cal Or ga ni za tion
Section IX Communications Techniques
Section X Civic Action Considerations
Section XI Paramilitary Capabilities
Section XII Suggestions for Personnel Working with [tribal group]
Footnotes and Bibliography
*The chapters on the Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao, and Indians and Pakistanis do not fol-
low this orga nizational pattern and instead focus on more recent history, using the following 
orga nizational structure:
Section I Introduction
Section II Early History and Status during the Indochina War
Section III Status during the Diem Regime
Section IV Status since the Diem Regime
Footnotes and Bibliography
stressed the importance of projects producing results that  were “observable, 
mea sur able, or tangible” so that U.S. forces could receive credit over their in-
surgent opponents (Schrock et al. 1966: 40).
A section on paramilitary capabilities described the fighting capacities of dif-
fer ent tribal groups, reporting group reputations as trackers and scouts, ventur-
ing estimates of a tribe’s likelihood of fighting against or capitulating to armed 
aggressors, and assessing individual tribes’ abilities “to absorb military instruc-
tion” (Schrock et al. 1966: 4). Reviews of indigenous fighting capacities mixed 
romantic assessments of local culture with cautionary reminders of the deadly 
capacities of tribal members.
Chapters provided general recommendations such as that when making 
“first contact” with tribal groups, military personnel should seek an audience 
with local leaders and develop relationships of trust and res pect. In most chap-
ters, instructions for interactions followed a similar routine in which readers 
are told to not enter villages where religious ceremonies  were taking place, advis-
ing them to identify and avoid sacred objects and to not mock villagers’ beliefs 
(see, e.g., Schrock et al. 1966: 204).
But as with other military manuals, the impact of the information was 
mixed, with some ignoring the information and  others adapting behaviors ac-
cordingly. With time, the Pentagon moved away from producing outsourced 
counterinsurgency information at American University’s centralized campus 
and increasingly used contractors who  were not linked to universities. The Pen-
tagon also increased eforts to gain knowledge from social science professors 
with fieldwork expertise in Southeast Asia who  were teaching at universities 
across the United States, a shift in strategy that  later generated divisiveness 
within American anthropology.
Dual Use Knowledge Production in a Land Dreaming  
of Counterinsurgency Controls
Questions remain concerning hraf’s relationships with the cia and other in-
telligence agencies. I failed to locate copies of several Pentagon sponsored hraf 
documents that I found referenced.  These include the hraf- published Army 
Psychological Warfare Country Plan for Vietnam (1954), which I have found cited 
in other works but could not locate in civilian or military libraries, and have not 
succeeded in acquiring with foia requests (soro 1960:63).26 When I filed an 
foia request in 1994 for all cia rec ords on hraf, the cia’s response stated that 
while the cia could neither confirm nor deny “a confidential or covert relation-
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ship” between it and hraf, to the extent that cia rec ords “might concern such 
information it is denied pursuant to foia exemption (b)(1) and (b)(3)” (cia to 
DHP 2/24/94). Over the course of several years, hraf president Melvin Ember 
made a series of misleading statements to me and  others concerning hraf’s his-
torical relationship with the cia. In response to my queries concerning hraf’s 
historical ties to the cia, Ember first wrote me that he was unaware of any such 
connections; then, when I informed him of my foia inquiries into the histori-
cal cia- hraf relationship, he wrote me on July 18, 1995, that he had only “inad-
vertently discovered yesterday that the cia was an Associate Member of hraf 
from 1979  until 1983” (ME to DHP 7/18/95). Ember  later misrepresented his 
written correspondence with me to Richard Shweder. But Shweder confirmed 
that Ember must have known about  these cia connections  because Shweder 
knew of them from his past term as an hraf board member (see Shweder 2010: 
5; for corrections to Shweder’s errors, see: Common Knowledge 2010: 365).27 
As Shweder confirmed, in 1995 Ember had initially misrepresented hraf’s re-
lationship with the cia to me; Ember told Shweder in 2009 that “the board of 
course knew about [the cia being an associate member of hraf],  because all 
members have to be approved by the board” (Shweder 2010: 5). I received no 
reply from Ember when I wrote him, asking for a response to Robin Winks’s 
statement that: “hraf was drawn upon by the CIA at least through 1967, it was 
widely believed that a full [hraf] file had been deposited at the agency’s new 
headquarters in Langley,  Virginia” (see Winks 1987:45).
This vision of The m- vico System expressed the military’s desire for simplis-
tic means of using cultural knowledge for the subjugation of other cultures. 
The  Human Relations Area Files’s cata loging of the ethnographic rec ord had 
historic military roots, and hraf’s penchant for simplifying uniformity and a 
drive to cata log and standardize the world led the Pentagon to become a sig-
nificant funder of hraf during the early Cold War. It is unclear what hraf did 
or did not know about soro’s adaptation of the ocm and hraf methodologies 
for m- vico’s counterinsurgent ends.28
If the creation of hraf represented, as Tobin argues, “a radical experiment in 
technological rationality,” then soro’s bootlegged expansion of hraf’s meth-
odologies linked this rationality to Pentagon desires for a mechanical theory of 
counterinsurgency (Tobin 1990: 482). Outline of Cultural Materials provided 
the skeletal structure for this hybrid proj ect, as m- vico haphazardly mixed 
hraf’s drive to discover truths devoid of overshadowing po liti cal contexts of 
knowledge production with the military’s po liti cal mission to subvert indig-
enous uprisings without regard to anthropologists’ usual ethical abhorrence to 
using ethnography for counterinsurgency. It was all crude and clunky, but it fit 
in the larger machinery of American Cold War inquiry.
American military culture’s reliance on interchangeable parts and its deep 
reliance on engineering models predisposed military strategists to look to an-
thropology as a discipline ready- made to supply the military with the needed 
“culture piece” to be plugged into military operations.  These vari ous projects at 
soro, cinfac, and cress articulated what would become recurrent military 
desires of harnessing anthropology — in ways betraying fundamental misun-
derstandings of culture and anthropology — as an  imagined tool that could 
somehow repair things that had been broken by po liti cal or military forces, as if 
cultural knowledge could smooth over the harsh realities of killings, invasions, 
or occupations. Setting aside the po liti cal and ethical issues raised by anthro-
pological contributions to military operations, the impossibility of adapting 
cultural knowledge for the types of interchangeable armed counterinsurgency 
operations  imagined by soro and cinfac should have raised serious questions 
from the anthropologists affiliated with  these projects. Yet the economic con-
tingencies of  these relationships precluded the internal development of such 
internal critiques.
Camelot was a multidimensional failure. It failed to inform the U.S. ambassa-
dor to Chile (Ralph Dungan) of its activities. But, most significantly, it failed to 
seriously consider the ethical and po liti cal meanings of using cultural knowl-
edge for counterinsurgency. News of Camelot spread quickly, and given the role 
this news played in getting members of the aaa to formalize professional eth-
ics, this publicity had a more significant impact on anthropology than Camelot 
could ever have had on transforming the cultures it sought to study. But news of 
Camelot also created problems for anthropologists for years to come.
Joy Rohde  later blamed academic critics for failing to stop Pentagon so-
cial science projects of the sort developed at soro and cress, arguing that 
by not keeping  these militarized projects on campus and not correcting their 
flawed assumptions and methods,  these academic critics helped derivative 
research grow without the critical supervision it would have received  under 
some  imagined watchful professorial eye. Rohde claimed that “instead of tam-
ing the military- industrial- academic complex, divestiture fueled the growth of 
an insular network of think tanks and consulting agencies that would serve 
the national security state well into the 1980s” (2013: 121). But Rohde’s critique 
identifies a fundamental contradiction that she ignores. While acknowledging 
that “a researcher’s duty was, above all, to fulfill his client agency’s needs with-
out being too critical of its policies” (132), she blames academics for removing 
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themselves from such inherently corrupting structures, instead leaving the work 
to of- campus contractors, who created problems that “only intensified as con-
tract work was removed from academic settings” (133). But the quality of this 
 later of- campus contract work was no better than that of work produced for 
soro and cress on the campus of American University — regardless of loca-
tion, both produced the sort of low- quality social engineering work the Penta-
gon sponsors desired.
Most American anthropologists understood soro’s Proj ect Camelot and 
other soro- cress campus- based projects as threatening academic freedom on 
campuses and in the discipline as a whole — threatening their own access to the 
field and also threatening the  people they studied. While  later revelations of 
anthropological contributions to counterinsurgency would divide generations 
of anthropologists, details about Proj ect Camelot brought the condemnation 
and concern of the majority of the anthropological community.
On the advisor question, it seemed impossible  
to hope that thousands of men could be found each year  
who would perform like Lawrence of Arabia.
 S E Y M O U R  D E I T C H M A N  | arpa, 1976
E L E V E N   T H E  A A A  C O N F R O N T S  
M I L I TA R Y  A N D  I N T E L L I G E N C E  U S E S  O F 
D I S C I P L I N A R Y  K N O W L E D G E
Amer i ca’s twentieth- century wars periodically impacted the annual meetings 
of the American Anthropological Association in ways that mixed disciplinary, 
ethical, po liti cal, and economic concerns. Council meetings, the annual busi-
ness meeting of the aaa, became the association’s central venue for discussing 
issues pertinent to anthropology’s engagement with specific wars, at times func-
tioning as a disciplinary town hall, at other times as an intellectual boxing ring.
 After the First World War and during the Second World War, the aaa coun-
cil meetings hosted discussions on anthropological contributions to warfare 
(see Stocking 1968; D. H. Price 2000, 2008a). Cold War council meetings at times 
brought resolutions concerning anthropological interactions with military and 
intelligence organizations. The Korean War found the aaa advocating for in-
creased funding for language study — while maintaining silence when Gene 
Weltfish was fired from Columbia while speaking out against the war (D. H. 
Price 2004b: 109–35). While aaa members served in the Korean War, fulfill-
ing a variety of tasks, the association and the annual council meetings  were 
not used to stage calls for supporting an anthropological war time mobiliza-
tion as they did during World War II, nor were  these meetings a stage for the 
sort of protests that would come in the following de cades. As the Vietnam War 
lengthened, the aaa council meetings increasingly became staging grounds for 
anthropologists’ critiques of American militarism.
Two features of the association’s bylaws played impor tant roles in the council 
meetings. First,  until the organ ization’s constitution was amended in early 1970, 
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the association had a two- tier division of membership  under which only “fel-
lows” had voting rights at the council meetings (naaa 1970 11[1]: 1; naaa 1970 
11[3]: 1). Although anyone could join the aaa as a member, section 3 of the by-
laws defined a “fellow” as someone who had published “significant” anthropo-
logical contributions; had a ba, ma, or PhD in anthropology and was “actively 
engaged in anthropology”; had a doctorate in an “allied field and [was] engaged 
in anthropology,” or was a lifetime member of the aaa (aaafn 1961 2[1]: 3).1 
Second, section 4 of the bylaws required that “new legislation may be proposed 
by the Executive Board or by five per cent of the Fellows in good standing, 
and must be circulated to the Council at least 30 days in advance of the annual 
meeting if it is to be acted upon at that time” (aaafn 1961 2[1]: 6).
In 1961, Margaret Mead became the first anthropologist to use the council 
meeting to push the membership to critically address issues of militarization. 
Mead ofered a resolution, unanimously approved, “calling for anthropological 
contributions to the search for disarmament and peace” (aaafn 1961 2[1]: 1–3). 
Robert Suggs and William Carr complained that Mead distorted notions of war 
and peace in relation to disarmament, arguing that anthropologists had contrib-
uted to the Second World War without the association attempting to limit such 
work (see aaafn 1962 3[7]: 3).2 They maintained that anthropologists should not 
be held responsible for the uses of their work, arguing that “scientists are respon-
sible for what they produce, in terms of scientific standards, but once the produc-
tion is public domain, its use or abuse cannot be controlled nor can the scientist 
be held responsible for results of such use or abuse” (aaafn 1963 4[8]: 1).3
While this early debate on anthropology, war, and peace indicated disciplin-
ary fissures, borders, and arguments to come, aaa publications of the early 
1960s still ran advertisements for counterinsurgency- related positions without 
member objections.  These advertisements  were from military- linked contrac-
tors like Operations Research Incorporated (aaafn 1964 5[6]: 8) or the army’s 
Special Warfare School, seeking a psychological operations (psyops) anthro-
pologist (aaafn 1965 [1]: 8).  Until news of Proj ect Camelot broke, such adver-
tisements did not draw or ga nized negative comments from members.
Camelot within the aaa: Ralph Beals’s Inquiry  
and the Road to an aaa Ethics Code
 After news of Proj ect Camelot broke in late October 1965, Harold Conklin, 
Marvin Harris, Dell Hymes, Robert Murphy, and Eric Wolf mailed a statement 
titled “Government Involvement and the  Future of Anthropological Field 
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Research” to anthropology departments across the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico. The statement warned that despite President Johnson’s assurances that 
damaging programs like Camelot would not continue, “the general climate of 
relations between the government and professional anthropological research 
is such that the possibility of continuing truly in de pen dent work is seriously 
threatened.” Anthropologists  were experiencing increasing problems conduct-
ing fieldwork due to fears of governmental links, and the statement by Conklin 
and  others called for anthropologists to learn more about the impacts of gov-
ernmental research programs on anthropology (mhp 22; aaafn 1965 6[10]: 
1–2). This statement circulated widely, and the po liti cal stance staked out by 
 these five anthropologists found support from the majority of aaa members in 
ways that  future debates over the militarization of anthropology for the wars of 
Southeast Asia would not.
President Alexander Spoehr of the aaa met with the State Department’s 
deputy director of intelligence and research, George Denney, to discuss anthro-
pologists’ concerns raised by Camelot. Camelot also dominated the 1965 aaa 
council meeting, with the Conklin group’s handbill framing the council’s dis-
cussions about using anthropology for counterinsurgency. An  adopted resolu-
tion charged the Executive Board with gathering information on sponsors and 
anthropologists relating to “access to foreign areas, governmental clearance, at 
home and abroad, the  people with whom we work, and the sponsoring agencies” 
(aaafn 1965 6[10]: 1). Rec ords from an executive session of the board at the 
1965 aaa meetings included concerns over reports that American anthropolo-
gists in Latin Amer i ca  were suspected of being spies, and how “anti- American 
sentiment in the social sciences in all disciplines was rife everywhere and in-
creasing” (rb 75, 11/17–21/65, 9).4
In early 1966, the aaa Executive Board appointed Ralph Beals to “lead the 
efort to implement the resolution on overseas research and ethics  adopted by 
the Council last November 20th” (aaafn 1966 7[2]: 1). With financial assis-
tance from the Wenner- Gren Foundation, Beals was released from his teaching 
responsibilities at ucla during the spring term in order to work on an aaa 
report exploring po liti cal and ethical issues raised by governmental uses of an-
thropological research (rb 76; aaafn 1966 7[7]: 3).
Beals had served on the aaa’s Executive Committee in the 1940s. He had 
years of experience working with governmental agencies on a range of public 
policy programs. He had worked for the Institute of Social Anthropology in 
the 1940s and served as an adviser to the U.S. del e ga tion attending the Ameri-
can Indianist Conference in 1939. Beals’s professional background prepared 
U S E S  O F  D I S C I P L I N A R Y  K N O W L E D G E  | 279
him for his work on the committee; coming from a radical California  family, 
his po liti cal background brought a sophisticated critique of power.5
Beals chaired the aaa’s ad hoc Committee on Research Problems and Ethics, 
a group that consisted of him and the association’s Executive Board (see aaafn 
1966 7[3]: 1). Operating essentially as a one- person committee, Beals used this 
freedom to quickly compile information and draft a detailed report that would 
have likely taken a committee of ten  people years to negotiate. The resulting 
report would be commonly known as the Beals Report, but its full title is, 
“Background Information on Problems of Anthropological Research and Eth-
ics” (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 9–13).
Beals collected anecdotal accounts of the cia’s infiltration of U.S. foundations 
and college programs at Michigan State University and elsewhere. He and aaa 
Executive Secretary Stephen T. Boggs contacted and interviewed two dozen an-
thropologists, representing vari ous geographic areas, and asked them to serve 
as resources for their region of expertise, calling them the “volunteer chairmen 
of world areas” (e.g., Irwin and Burke 1967; rb 75; rb 76) (see  table 11.1). Some 
of  these anthropologists declined his invitation, and only a few made signifi-
cant contributions to the proj ect. They collected information on fieldwork 
problems they had experienced relating to U.S. government activities (aaafn 
1966 7[3]: 1).
Elizabeth Bacon
 After Beals’s proj ect was announced by the aaa, several anthropologists wrote 
him, sharing information on encounters with military and intelligence agen-
cies. John Hitchcock wrote that a fellow anthropologist working in Nepal told 
him that Nepalese governmental officials suspected anthropologists  were en-
gaging in espionage (rb 77, JH to RB 3/25/66). Peter Kunstadter described his 
involvement with two Department of Defense contracts: “The first was for hold-
ing a [1965] conference on the subjects of tribes, minorities, and central govern-
ments in Southeast Asia. The second was a [1965] contract for ethnological and 
ecological field research in Thailand.” Kunstadter wrote that he had retained 
complete academic freedom and had produced no secret reports, and that all 
his work was publicly available (rb 75, PK to RB 4/5/66).6
The most in- depth correspondence relating to Beals’s inquiry — a correspon-
dence that stretched beyond the time frame of the Beals Report — was with an-
thropologist Elizabeth Bacon.  Because most of this correspondence occurred 
while Beals was finishing, or  after he had completed, his report for the aaa, 
Bacon’s impact on the report was limited. However, Bacon’s descriptions of the 
methods used by intelligence agencies to contact anthropologists are included 
in the report and also influenced Beals’s book Politics of Social Research (1969).
Elizabeth Bacon was a well- respected scholar; educated at the Sorbonne and 
Smith College in the 1920s and Yale in the 1930s, she earned her PhD at Berke-
ley in 1951. She was an itinerant academic, teaching at a variety of universities, 
including ucla (1948–49), Washington University (1949–54), Cornell (1955–
56), and Hofstra (1965–66), and  later becoming a professor, then emeritus pro-
fessor, at Michigan State University.
Bacon began fieldwork in Iran and Kazakhstan in the 1930s, and her war 
years in the oss provided her with intelligence contacts, and knowledge about 
 TA B L E   1 1 . 1   Ralph Beals’s List of Anthropologists Invited to Serve as Volunteer 
Chairmen for World Areas (Source: RB75 and RB76)
A N T H R O P O L O G I S T A R E A  O F  E X P E R T I S E
Richard N. Adams Central Amer i ca
Robert M. Adams Iraq
Ethel M. Albert South Amer i ca
Jacques Amyot Southeast Asia
Conrad M. Arensberg India
Gerald D. Berreman Himalayas
James B. Christensen East and West Africa
Elizabeth Colson Central Africa




Louis B. Dupree  Middle East (Af ghan i stan)
Lloyd Fallers East Africa
Morton H. Fried Taiwan
Cliford Geertz Indonesia and North Africa
Joel Halpern Yugo slavia
Robert F. Murphy Brazil
Laura Nader Mexico
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intelligence agencies.  Because of her oss connections and her regular travels 
in south central Asia, she was contacted by the cia multiple times, and she was 
aware of cia personnel operating in her areas of research. She provided Beals 
with detailed accounts of how the cia contacted and used anthropologists 
working in regions of interest to the agency.
Bacon wrote that Af ghan i stan, Iran, and Pakistan had long been “spy con-
scious,” adding that ethnographers  were “particularly suspect.” She described 
the American academic presence in post– World War II Af ghan i stan, where a 
museum archaeological expedition included “an ethnographer and cia agent.” 
She wrote that the cia agent “found that he could not operate on his own, and a 
year  later returned to Kabul  under an institutional cover. He stayed four years, 
and returned  later for a year on research grants to spell his successor while the 
latter was on leave” (rb 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).
Bacon wrote that in Af ghan i stan “an anthropologist went out as a cia agent 
in 1959 and has been  there of and on ever since. He works for a cover organ-
ization, is ‘on leave’ from a university where he once taught, and is research 
associate of a very reputable museum” (rb 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).7 Anthropolo-
gists had become so synonymous with spying that when aid began operat-
ing in Af ghan i stan, Bacon recommended not calling the aid social scientists 
“anthropologists”  because they would be assumed to be spies; when she was 
ignored, “the Afghan officials on the proj ect ruled against employing an an-
thropologist” (rb 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).
Bacon reported that the cia monitored anthropological research in Af ghan-
i stan and Iran. Anthropologists working in de pen dently from the cia  were at 
times contacted by the agency. When an “anthropologist returns from Bona fide 
field work, done without chores for cia or any other intelligence agency, he is 
likely to be approached for an interview. . . .  On two occasions, when emerg-
ing from the country where I had been working, I reported to American con-
sular officials situations which I felt afected the amity of relations between the 
United States and the country involved. In both cases, my comments  were acted 
on” (rb 75, EB to RB 10/10/66).
Bacon warned Beals that the cia would be aware of his aaa report when it 
was released, noting that the
cia regularly sends a recruiter to the annual meetings of the aaa.8 (The recruiter 
this year — and perhaps the top man himself —  will undoubtedly listen to your 
report with  great interest.)  There are individuals on the faculties of certain univer-
sities who, I think, do some recruiting among their own students, perhaps guiding 
the student’s interest  toward a research proj ect which would be useful to cia. More 
often, however, it is my impression that when word gets about that an anthropologist 
is considering research in certain areas, someone connected with cia pounces. 
If cia already has someone in the locality, an attempt is made to deflect the pro-
spective field worker to another locality. An individual or committee evaluates the 
desirability of the proj ect from the cia point of view; if it approves, assistance of 
vari ous kinds is ofered: helpful leads to officials in the prospective host country; 
funds to supplement bona fide research grants (in some cases the foundation grant 
may be only enough to obscure the source of most of the funds); cover affiliation 
with a reputable academic institution or with some other institution. At one time 
a cia operative (not an anthropologist) had for his cover the position of regional 
officer for the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation was presumably unaware of 
this, although I think cia had planted a man on the New York staf of the founda-
tion. The Fulbright committee for the  Middle East in Washington includes at 
least two cia  people. (rb 75, EB to RB 11/8/66)
Bacon described four distinct types of anthropologists conducting fieldwork 
with cia ties: (1) anthropologists primarily interested in pursuing legitimate 
field research questions, with legitimate ties to universities and foundations, 
who agree in de pen dently to gather information needed by the cia (Bacon said 
 these individuals undertook cia work due to patriotism or a “sense of adven-
ture”); (2)  those  doing research who are “tempted by the cia ofer of funds”; (3) 
anthropologists who want to undertake fieldwork in a specific country and use 
cia connections to become established in this country; and (4) thrill seekers 
who “enjoy the excitement and romance of engaging in espionage” (rb 75, EB 
to RB 11/8/66).
She observed that “many anthropologists” did not know what was “ going 
on around them.” She described one incident where a student completing his 
gradu ate work was recruited into the cia by two of his professor’s “favorite 
former students. He did not know that his professor abhorred the idea of using 
anthropology as a cover for espionage. His professor did not know that the two 
favorites worked for cia” (RB 75, EB to RB 11/8/66).
Writing before the investigative journalistic exposés of Ramparts, the New 
York Times, and other media revealed cia infiltration of foundations (see chap-
ters  1 and  7), Bacon presented an accurate account of how such operations 
worked. She described how private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, 
worked hand in hand with the cia to sponsor area studies research of specific 
interest to the agency, writing that she knew of
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a university area program for an area in which cia was interested, but could find 
no links between cia and that program. Recently I brought this up in conversation 
with someone who has been a part of the university program and who is knowl-
edgeable in the  matter of intelligence. He said that two of the top  people in the 
program, who had in the past “been burned” by cia (what ever that means), had 
wanted to insert into the terms of a Ford university grant a clause barring any cia 
participation, and that the Ford Foundation had refused to accept the clause. This 
was before the Ford Foreign Area Program man in Pakistan got caught out. The 
separation of the Foreign Area Program from the Ford Foundation — the person-
nel moved a few blocks down Madison Ave nue to a new office and “Ford Founda-
tion” was dropped from the name — occurred just  after the Pakistan debacle. Does 
this mean that the Ford Foundation is still engaging in fun and games? The move 
of McGeorge Bundy from the White House to head the Ford Foundation is of 
some interest. In Washington, Bundy’s chief bailiwick was the Security Council, 
which means that he had very close ties with cia.
The point I am driving at is that a grant from even such a seemingly solid foun-
dation as Ford could be suspect, although a Ford grant does not necessarily imply 
cia commitment. And even if the area program  were indirectly financed by cia 
through some foundation, this does not mean that all members of the institution 
staf are knowingly working for cia. It would be perfectly pos si ble for an anthro-
pologist on the staf of the Department of Anthropology at ucla teaching courses 
on the  Middle East, to be unaware of what was  going on — at least in the begin-
ning. How soon he became aware of the situation would depend on his sophistica-
tion in such matters. What he did then would depend on how much opportunity 
he had had to develop a code of ethics in this  matter, and how strong the ethical 
drive was.
It is probable that a majority of anthropologists and other academics who do 
field work “for cia” are  doing the kind of research they would do in any event, and 
some are financed for work they would not other wise be able to do. Their only con-
tribution to cia is to report on what they have observed. Some of them, however, 
undoubtedly do more. (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66)
According to Bacon, the cia’s presence in Iran was so ubiquitous that the agency 
even played a role in parceling out regions of Iran for fieldwork — hoping to 
achieve a good distribution of data on the countryside; she assumed the Ira-
ni ans knew about this arrangement and monitored  these researchers. She ob-
served that “normally when an anthropologist wants to do field work in a coun-
try, he seeks out every one he can find who has had experience in the area and 
gets all the information he can about the situation  there. If one tries that for 
Iran, one bumps into cia at  every turn” (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66).
Bacon told of a cia administrator calling on her when she was a professor at 
Washington University, using the name of a colleague by way of an introduc-
tion. He quizzed her about her background, and when Bacon asked why the 
administrator was so interested, he replied that he hoped she could provide the 
cia with information when she returned from her next trip. Bacon wrote: “On 
my announcement that while I might give relevant information to someone in 
the State Department I would not trou ble cia, he wished me happy shopping 
and we parted. Had I realized at the time the growing extent of the cia ten-
tacles, I might have led him on and learned more. But I think that this is all that 
cia expects of the average anthropologist  going into the field, although it is al-
ways ready to recruit  people for special jobs” (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). Bacon 
explained that while the recent revelations about cia infiltration of American 
society had provided valuable information, her “two years in the Research and 
Analy sis Branch of oss served as a post- gradu ate course in espionage. . . .  The 
cultural divergence between  those who returned to academia and  those who 
remained in Washington was so gradual that it was a long time before I realized 
what was happening in cia. But once I did realize this, I had the background 
to check details. American Men of Science and Fellow Newsletter can be very 
illuminating if you know what you are looking for” (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66).
In a letter to Beals, Bacon expressed concerns that ucla’s Near East Studies 
Center might be operating with a cia contract (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). Beals 
followed up this correspondence with queries made to Carl York, of ucla’s 
 Office of Extramural Support, who made a “categorical denial” that ucla had 
any classified contracts with the cia or other intelligence agencies (rb 75, RB to 
CY 12/29/66; rb 75, CY to RB 1/4/67).
Bacon described being “ofered cia funds for field work”  after “a friend in 
oir asked me outright if I could use a specified sum from cia and I said no 
thank you” (rb 75, EB to RB 1/19/67). She wrote that one of the indirect ways 
military and intelligence agencies recruited anthropologists into intelligence 
work was through hraf contract work:
You undoubtedly know that the hraf Handbook Series was financed by Psycho-
logical Warfare. The original outline provided by Washington included a  couple 
of chapters that would have caused trou ble but I think that all handbook editors 
omitted  these. Every one employed on the proj ect, including many foreign nation-
als, knew that they  were working on an Army subcontract and many proj ect direc-
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tors quite properly informed the Ambassadors of countries whose nationals  were 
being employed. Since the work was open and straightforward,  there was not diffi-
culty. . . .  What may be less well known is that at the end of the proj ect, forms  were 
sent out for distribution to American citizens on the staf asking if they would be 
interested in employment with Psychological Warfare. Thus the program was used 
as a recruitment device. How successful this was, I have no idea. I do not know of 
anyone who responded. (rb 75, EB to RB 1/19/67)
In February 1967, Bacon wrote Beals about two anthropologists working in Af-
ghan i stan whom she believed  were cia operatives, and she provided a five- 
page analy sis listing six organizations she believed to be cia fronts funding 
anthropological research. The organizations identified by Bacon  were Ameri-
can Friends of the  Middle East, the American University Field Staf (aufs), the 
Asia Foundation, the Iran Foundation, the Field Foundation, and Operations 
and Policy Research, Inc. (rb 75, EB to RB 2/6/67).
Bacon wrote that American Friends of the  Middle East “joins with the Asia 
Foundation in giving financial assistance to a student organ ization which the 
head of the cia network for the area was using within a year of the organ-
ization’s founding.” She described the aufs as “one of the most obvious covers 
thought up by cia,” adding that their staf member “in Af ghan i stan for the last 
eight years has been an anthropologist, who proclaims himself as such at  every 
step.” She wrote that she knew “the Asia Foundation was used as a cover for 
one cia agent anthropologist. A se nior sociologist, acting as a con sul tant to 
the foundation, did field work in a region not his own in West Pakistan during 
two periods when the Ford Foundation cia man was busy at gradu ate school.” 
Bacon described the Iran Foundation as “headed by the head of the cia net-
work for Iran, Af ghan i stan, Pakistan. Uses medical work as cover. Set up modern 
hospital school in Shiraz, Iran and is now active in helping establish a medical 
school at University of Ahwaz (both areas of cia interest).” The foundation 
tracked research by scholars studying Iran and tried “to screen potential field 
workers according to their abilities and to prevent their getting in each other’s 
way in the field.  Because one can do  little in Iran without proper accreditation, 
their control of Persian officials to be approached is impor tant. Presumably 
anyone who has been vetted by cia gets full treatment in facilitating research. 
If cia wishes to give financial assistance to a field worker, I think this is done 
through other channels. The chairman of the board of the foundation is on the 
Fulbright committee in Washington” (rb 75, EB to RB “Cover Or ga ni za tion 
memo,” 2/6/67). Bacon had  little information on the Field Foundation, writing 
that she had only been told by  others that it was a cia cover. She also had no 
direct evidence that Operations and Policy Research, Inc., had cia ties, but 
that organ ization aroused her suspicions, and she speculated it was conducting 
psychological warfare operations (RB 75 EB to RB 2/6/67).9
Bacon described “new clues” revealing how private foundations with no direct 
ties to the government funded research projects, at times making inquiries in 
concert with American intelligence needs. She wrote Beals that she had recently
received a copy of a report on an impor tant international research program. The 
list of members of the American committee included the name of an anthropolo-
gist who I thought had been “retired” to academia by cia. Obviously my interpre-
tation of retirement was incorrect. On checking this anthropologist in American 
Men of Science, I found a  really impressive rec ord which completely masked his 
nearly twenty years’ ser vice in intelligence — first in mid [Military Intelligence Di-
vision], then in cia. Clearly he had been set up to use his academic position for 
high level activities. On this committee he could exert influence in favoring proj-
ects and individuals sponsored by cia.
Spotting his name reminded [me] that I had been told recently of the appoint-
ment of another cia alumnus to a committee which awards grants for work in a 
certain area.
Even more recently I received the annual report of the Social Science Research 
Council. In reading over the lists of committee members, I noticed that in the 
committees for strategic areas  there was usually one name of interest in this con-
text. In some cases I know that the individual had a cia background; in one case, I 
had been told that the individual was high up in cia; in several cases the individual 
hailed from a university area program where I know  there have been cia ties. 
Indeed, as the result of a careful study of some of the key committees, I concluded 
that the center of gravity for cia research on one area had shifted from one uni-
versity to another.
Among grantees, I spotted two  people whom I know have cia ties, and a third 
who was with British intelligence before he came to the United States. His grant 
was for research in an area in which cia is interested.
This study of committee members gave me a new understanding of how cia oper-
ates in academia. Most members of the committee are undoubtedly clean.  Those 
individuals acting for cia have solid academic reputations in their field of specializa-
tion. Some of them have never been employed by a governmental intelligence organ-
ization  either in Washington or in the field. One I know of has probably played along 
with cia out of ambition. That he has cia ties I know. Years ago a cia regional officer 
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called on me at his suggestion and he cooled noticeably  toward me  after I told the cia 
man that I did not want to have anything to do with cia. (rb 75, EB to RB 4/10/67, 
emphasis added)
Bacon recognized that the addition of a single individual working in concert 
with the cia to a se lection committee could allow the agency to direct fund-
ing  toward projects likely to collect information of use to the cia or achieving 
other agency- desired outcomes.
Evaluating Bacon’s Claims
Bacon believed she had identified how the cia used private foundations to fund 
research of interest to the agency through pro cesses in which former cia em-
ployees working for foundations or on grant se lection committees influenced 
the se lection of anthropological research. She claimed to have found opportu-
nity, motive, and mechanisms for the cia’s intrusion into anthropology. It is 
difficult to read some of her pronouncements on the depth of cia intrusion 
without wondering if she was just being paranoid; yet, several of her theorized 
connections can be verified.  Because of revelations in the press and in congres-
sional hearings in the de cades  after Bacon made  these claims, we can evaluate 
the veracity of her comment that she had identified six foundations as cia fronts.
Of the six foundations identified by Bacon in 1966, three  were  later verified 
as cia fronts (American Friends of the  Middle East in 1966, the Asia Founda-
tion in 1967, and Operations and Policy Research, Inc., in 1967).10 The other 
three foundations claimed by Bacon to have cia connections (the aufs, the 
Iran Foundation, and the Field Foundation)  were not  later documented to be 
cia fronts, though aufs and the Iran Foundation both had individuals linked 
to them who had reported cia connections: Louis Dupree worked with aufs 
for more than a de cade, and cia agent Donald Wilber was a member of the Iran 
Foundation’s Board of Directors (Wilber 1986: 150, 186). Some have claimed cia 
connections for the Field Foundation (most prominently, Alan Ogden in his 
1977 testimony before the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations), and while this 
remains a possibility,  these claims remain unconfirmed and have established no 
documented links (see U.S. Senate 1977: 55).11
Beals questioned Bacon about her suspicions of the aufs, in large part 
 because the Crane Foundation (established by Crane Plumbing) had begun 
funding the organ ization two de cades prior to the creation of the cia (rb 75, 
RB to EB 2/20/67).12 Bacon wrote that when reading Crane Foundation reports, 
she noticed many names of supposedly “retired” cia personnel appearing in 
the reports of committees and grant awardees (rb 75, EB to RB 4/10/67).
Bacon described how she was once invited to contribute to a book on Af-
ghan i stan in which “the other American contributors [ were] affiliated with cia. 
My first reaction was to avoid guilt by association then I deci ded that I  couldn’t 
spend my  whole life  running away from things, and agreed to write the chap-
ter” (rb 75, EB to RB 12/25/66). She did not identify the book or the contribu-
tors, but it was an hraf- published volume edited by cia agent Donald Wilber 
(see chapter 6).13
While Bacon’s letters to Beals detailed how the cia established contacts with 
anthropologists, Beals’s report did not name any of the organizations identified 
by Bacon as having cia links, nor did he describe how former oss personnel 
working in academic settings helped steer funding to individuals and projects 
of interest to the cia. Beals’s final report contained less direct critiques indicat-
ing that unseen, undocumented links between anthropological research likely 
existed.
The Beals Report and Growing  
Anthropological Demilitarization
In May 1966, Ralph Beals and former aaa executive secretary Stephen T. Boggs 
met with Steven Ebbin, chief of staf to Senator Fred R. Harris (D- OK). Beals’s 
notes indicated that Ebbin said, in an of- the- rec ord capacity, that it was his “opin-
ion that  little is done with any of the research, domestic or foreign. He cited a 
new man in education who asked about prior research, and asked to see it. No 
one could believe that he actually wished to see prior research, but when he in-
sisted, he was taken to a ware house in southwest Washington where  great piles 
of research reports  were stacked on the floor which have never been looked at 
 after their completion” (rb 76, acna Notes 5/25/66). Ebbin said that few  people 
in government knew what to do with research.
On June 27, 1966, Boggs and Beals testified before Senate hearings, chaired 
by Harris, on federal support for social science research and training. Boggs 
stressed the importance of governmental funding for social science research 
but supported Harris’s position that “any cia involvement in university re-
search projects abroad damages irreparably the efectiveness of such research 
and makes us liable to the charge that research is pressured by our government 
for desired findings” (aaafn 1966 7[7]: 2). Boggs described how some in the 
underdeveloped world viewed American social science projects as primarily 
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meeting the needs of the United States rather than the needs of their country. 
He argued that revelations that Michigan State University was training cia op-
eratives working in Vietnam, and that mit conducted cia- funded research fed 
fears that other social science research projects had cia links. He wrote that 
anthropologists did not want “to become the heir of the colonial administra-
tor’s legacy of mistrust. Nothing would more surely doom the opportunity of 
carry ing out any kind of social science research abroad. To avoid this, an abso-
lutely impassable barrier must be established between the intelligence agencies 
of the U.S. Government and the universities, private foundations, and interna-
tional voluntary organizations engaged in research” (aaafn 1966 7[7]: 3).
In July 1966, the aaa’s Executive Board  adopted Ralph Beals’s “Statement on 
Government Involvement in Research” as the association’s interim statement.14 
This report clarified that “except in times of clear and present national emer-
gency, universities should not undertake activities which are unrelated to their 
normal teaching, research, and public ser vice functions, or which can more 
appropriately be performed by other types of organizations” (aaafn 1966 7[8]: 1). 
It condemned clandestine research and research that did not disclose spon-
sorship and declared that the “gathering of information and data which can 
never be made available to the public does not constitute scientific research and 
should not be so represented” (aaafn 1966 7[8]: 1–2).
In November 1966, Ralph Beals submitted his “Statement on Problems of 
Anthropological Research and Ethics” (spare) to the aaa Council, where it 
was amended during a “spirited discussion” and  adopted, by a vote of 727 to 59, 
and  later mailed to fellows as a referendum (aaafn 1967 8[4]: 1; aaa1967).15 At 
this council meeting David and Kathleen Aberle ushered in a new era of meet-
ings by introducing an antiwar resolution as a new business item. This was not 
the sort of generic statement against harmful weapons that Margaret Mead had 
introduced a few years earlier; the Aberles’ resolution opposed U.S. involve-
ment in the Vietnam War and was  adopted by a significant majority (aaafn 
1966 7[10]: 2).
The Beals Report focused on three primary areas: “anthropology and gov-
ernment,” “sponsorships of anthropological research,” and “research in for-
eign areas.” It observed that soro’s and Proj ect Camelot’s use of anthropology 
had pressed aaa members to take action on  these issues, but it stressed  there 
 were broader issues linking anthropologists to governmental agencies that also 
needed consideration by the association (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 3).
The Executive Board worried that links to governmental agencies would 
limit American anthropologists’ safety and their ability to conduct fieldwork 
in other countries (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 3). In the Executive Board’s discussion of 
Beals’s draft report, Harold Conklin “suggested that the existence, and if pos si-
ble the names, of foundations which had served as cover for the cia should be 
included in the report,” but the final document contained no such information 
(rb 75, Executive Board Minutes 5/20–21/66, 9).
Beals received much feedback from aaa members, with assistance from an-
thropologists he had written, and extensive interviews on “several university 
campuses.”  These interviews did not produce a uniform response. Some anthro-
pologists  were outraged by the rise of anthropological contacts with intelligence 
agencies;  others believed the decision to work with military or intelligence 
agencies should be a  matter of personal choice (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 4).
Beals identified several governmental projects employing anthropologists 
that did not compromise fundamentals of research ethics or po liti cal power 
relations. His report criticized university- based anthropologists who failed to 
understand how their work could connect to military and intelligence agencies. 
While many anthropologists viewed their research as simply being the “pursuit 
of knowledge solely for its own sake,” the report stressed that this work had pol-
icy applications, warning that ignoring  these issues “plagued basic researchers 
in such fields as atomic physics” (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 6). The Beals Report found 
that private agencies that contracted social science research with governmental 
agencies, “especially the Department of Defense,” had recurrent problems with 
improper methodologies, excessive costs, government misrepre sen ta tion of the 
competence of personnel, deceiving the public about the purpose of research 
or the source of funds, and punishing whistle- blowers or dissenters on projects 
(aaafn 1967 8[1]: 8).
Beals described growing suspicions that anthropologists  were “engaged in 
non- anthropological activities, or that the information they are collecting  will 
be used for non- scientific and harmful ends” (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 11).16 According 
to Beals, cia agents had “posed as anthropologists or asserted that they  were 
 doing anthropological research, when in fact they  were neither qualified as an-
thropologists nor competent to do basic anthropological studies” (aaafn 1967 
8[1]: 11). In other cases,  actual anthropologists  were using fieldwork as a cover 
for espionage, collecting intelligence for the cia,  either as direct cia employ-
ees or by “accepting grants from certain foundations with questionable sources 
of income, or through employment by certain private research organizations” 
(aaafn 1967 8[1]: 11).
Beals’s report detailed instances of younger anthropologists who,  after failing 
to secure grants for a par tic u lar research proj ect,  were “approached by obscure 
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foundations or have been ofered supplementary support from such sources, 
only to discover  later that they  were expected to provide intelligence informa-
tion, usually to the Central Intelligence Agency” (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 11). Other an-
thropologists reportedly willingly entered into such working relationships, though 
the report acknowledged that  little verification of such interactions was available.
Anthropologists reported being approached by U.S. embassy officials while 
conducting research abroad, or sometimes by intelligence personnel  after return-
ing to the United States, with requests to provide the government with infor-
mation gathered while conducting fieldwork. Some anthropologists complied 
with  these requests, but  others refused to cooperate (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 11). Some 
anthropologists who worked for intelligence agencies during World War II  later 
encountered difficulties when applying for research visas, and some universi-
ties denied employment to professors with past links to intelligence agencies 
(aaafn 1967 8[1]: 12). Suspicions that anthropologists might have cia connec-
tions created conditions where researchers funded by any form of governmen-
tal funds  were sometimes viewed with suspicion.
Proj ect Camelot popu lar ized notions of anthropologist- spies. Beals’s report 
included the account of an anthropologist who, during the course of conduct-
ing two years of fieldwork, “was accused variously of being a Castroite, a Chinese 
communist, a Rus sian communist, a cia agent, a fbi agent, a spy for the host 
nation’s taxing agencies, and a Protestant missionary.” The punch line was that 
“only the last caused him serious difficulties, and such an identification given 
anthropologists generally seems to be the most impor tant field prob lem in 
much of South and Central Amer i ca” (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 12).
The report did not issue specific recommendations, instead calling for con-
certed work on  these problems. But within the context of the Aberles’ resolution 
 adopted at the aaa Council meeting where Beals’s report was delivered, grow-
ing numbers within the aaa condemned all anthropological contributions to 
military- intelligence activities in ways that mixed po liti cal and ethical critiques 
of anthropological engagements.
In March 1967, the aaa fellows voted to adopt spare, which articulated the 
values and findings from the Beals Report (aaa 1967). This statement was not 
a formal ethics code, but it expressed commitment to standards of ethical prac-
tice championing the freedom of research, clarifying that anthropologists must 
disclose “their professional qualifications and associations, their sponsorship 
and source of funds, and the nature and objectives of the research being under-
taken.” In response to Proj ect Camelot, the statement proclaimed, “Constraint, 
deception, and secrecy have no place in science. Actions which compromise 
the intellectual integrity and autonomy of research scholars and institutions 
not only weaken  those international understandings essential to our discipline, 
but in so  doing they also threaten any contribution anthropology might make 
to our own society and to the general interests of  human welfare” (aaa 1967).
The aaa’s condemnation of covert research made spare’s adoption national 
news, with the Washington Post and other newspapers covering the vote as a 
significant step in limiting military access to academic knowledge (Reistrup 
1967). As an ethics statement, spare lacked several features. It was more con-
cerned about the damage that might be done to anthropology’s disciplinary 
reputation than with the well- being of studied populations. The word “harm” 
appeared nowhere in the statement, and the only use of “damage” appeared in 
a warning about damages to anthropology’s international reputation by false 
anthropologists (aaa 1967).
In the Fellow Newsletter, the aaa leadership sought to alleviate member con-
cerns about anthropologists’ links to intelligence agencies with assurances that 
the new chair of the National Research Council, Division of Behavioral Sci-
ences, was investigating this prob lem (aaafn 1967 8[2]: 1). But this new chair 
was George Murdock, whose disqualifications for this task included secretly 
acting in the past as an fbi informer attacking other anthropologists he be-
lieved to be communists. Murdock also had long- standing ties to the hraf, 
whose primary sources of funding  were the very governmental agencies (in-
cluding the cia and Defense Department) that raised  these concerns (D. H. 
Price 2004b: 70–89). While Murdock’s role as an fbi informer was unknown 
at the time, his letters to the Fellow Newsletter attacking the Aberles’ antiwar 
resolution and hraf’s receipt of Pentagon funds made no secret of the po liti cal 
positions he would champion in this nrc role (aaafn 1967 8[2]: 7–9).
For the next half year, the Fellow Newsletter published letters that argued 
passionately for and against the Aberles’ antiwar resolution. Many opponents 
argued that it was beyond the proper scope of a professional association to take 
stances on po liti cal issues (aaafn 1967 8[2]: 7–9).17 David Aberle responded to 
 these arguments, stating, “The question is not  whether the Association should 
be po liti cal; it has made itself po liti cal. The only question is what kind of po-
liti cal positions it should adopt” (aaafn 1967 8[5]: 7). Lloyd Cabbot Briggs, an 
oss veteran, scofed at the rage over Camelot and concerns over cia funding 
(aaafn 8[6]: 8).18 Betokening Goodwin’s law, Sally and Lewis Binford ridiculed 
claims that the association should not become involved in militarized po liti cal 
decisions, claiming  these positions “are unpleasantly reminiscent of the ‘good’ 
German scientists during the 1930’s who hoped to keep their profession distinct 
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from its po liti cal and social matrix” (aaafn 1967 8[6]: 9). Finally,  after months 
of heated debate, a note published by the Fellow Newsletter editor announced, 
in all capitals: “correspondence on the anti- war resolution is now 
closed” (aaafn 1967 8[6]: 11).
In July 1967, Thomas L. Hughes, chair of the Foreign Afairs Research Coun-
cil and the Department of State’s director of intelligence and research, assured 
the aaa Executive Board that the State Department did not want to engage in 
research that would undermine relationships with foreign countries. Hughes 
stressed that most of the academic research supported by the department was 
of a general, basic science type, unrelated to specific po liti cal projects (aaafn 
1968 9[6]: 9). The federal government’s Foreign Area Research Coordination 
Group issued its “Guidelines for Foreign Area Research” in December 1967, ad-
dressing concerns raised by Proj ect Camelot.  These guidelines established that 
the government should not undertake actions that would undermine the integ-
rity of American academics, that academics should acknowledge governmental 
research support, and that government research should be published. Research 
should preferably be unclassified, but the report acknowledged that in some cases 
classified research would be conducted by academics (aaafn 1968 9[5]: 4–7).
In 1967, the aaa amended its bylaws to require resolutions presented at 
council meetings to “be submitted to the Executive Board at least one week in 
advance of the annual meeting if they are to be placed on the agenda. A copy 
of the agenda  shall be furnished to all Fellows at the time of registration at the 
annual meeting or 24 hours before the Council Meeting” (aaafn 1968 9[1]: 
1). The year 1967 was a watershed for young aaa activists awakening to the 
possibilities of or ga niz ing the discipline to strug gle against American foreign poli-
cies and abuses of anthropological knowledge.  There  were eforts to or ga nize a 
forum for radical anthropological critiques. Karen Brodkin  later recalled that 
she and a “cohort of grad students from Michigan attend[ed] the 1967 meetings 
in DC with a plan to create a radical caucus. We had a  couple of pretty well- 
attended eve ning meetings in  hotel conference rooms.  There  were other eforts 
in other years and while they  didn’t leave much of a paper trail, they  were places 
where grad students especially began to form the po liti cal networks that under-
lay the upcoming generation of left anthropology” (2008: 4).
Thai Affair Prequel
Even as the Executive Board finalized the report titled “Background Informa-
tion on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics,” arpa expanded 
eforts to use ethnographic research for counterinsurgency projects. In one 
such efort arpa sought the assistance of University of Washington sociologist 
Pierre  L. van den Berghe for a study of Congo tribal groups.19 However, van 
den Berghe immediately wrote the aaa and members of the press express-
ing concerns that arpa was trying “to enlist him in intelligence activities for 
the suppression of Congo tribes in the conflict that was then in its final stages 
 there. Only a firm denial by arpa that a contract existed or was contemplated 
allowed the  matter to come to rest” (Deitchman 1976: 300). Van den Berghe 
alerted Ralph Beals of arpa’s eforts to recruit him, and he critically responded 
to arpa that he was “morally obligated to publicize” this recruitment efort, 
adding that he was “deeply distressed at the continued misuse of social sci-
ence research for purposes which conflict with the generally accepted norms 
of international relations as expressed in international law and in the United 
Nations Charter. Beyond the ethical issues involved, the be hav ior of some of 
our colleagues is making the pursuit of cross- cultural studies increasingly dif-
ficult for most of us. We have a collective responsibility in trying to put an end 
to this kind of academic colonialism” (rb, PVDB to RB 10/4/66; see D. H. Price 
2012c: 6).
Around this time, a group of anthropologists working in Thailand  were in de-
pen dently raising their own concerns with the director of a new arpa program 
appropriating anthropological knowledge. On Halloween 1966, University of 
Washington anthropologist Charles  F. Keyes wrote to the director of arpa’s 
Remote Area Conflict Program (racp) on behalf of himself, Everett Hawkins, 
Millard Long, Michael Moerman, Gayle Ness, Lauriston Sharp, and Robert Til-
man, expressing alarm over racp’s eforts to use anthropological knowledge 
(rb 75, CFK to arpa 10/31/66). Keyes warned Seymour Deitchman that some 
of his “colleagues have even referred to this proj ect as a potential Southeast 
Asian Camelot.” Keyes’s group requested a briefing from arpa before the up-
coming aaa annual meeting. Deitchman  later wrote that Keyes, Moerman, 
Herbert Phillips, and Sharp “wanted an explanation, and if they  didn’t get one, 
or  weren’t satisfied with the one they did get, they would go to Congress and 
the press” (1976: 300).
Ten days  later, Keyes expressed concerns to Moerman about racp’s impact 
on anthropologists’ research. Keyes had heard that racp’s Rural Security Sys-
tems Study planned to gather information on  every village in Nkahon Phanom 
Province with “the establishment of villa ger ‘reporters’ in each village to chan-
nel information into a central office in Bangkok, and a general analy sis of the 
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‘ counter- insurgency’ situation in the province.” Keyes understood that about 
fifty social scientists would be hired by contractors at Stanford Research In-
stitute, Abt Associates, and the Atlantic Research Corporation (rb 75, CFK to 
MM 11/10/66).20
Keyes wrote to the six anthropologists he had represented in his letter to 
arpa and reported on his recent conversation with Seymour Deitchman, in 
which Deitchman tried to allay Keyes’s concerns without denying the program’s 
counterinsurgency goals. Deitchman’s explanations ofered only clarifications of 
minor diferences in detail, such as insisting  there would be “no system of in for-
mants in each village,” while not denying the program’s broad use of village in for-
mants and informers. Some of Keyes’s concerns remained, but he felt that rather 
than withdraw from this flawed proj ect, more good could be accomplished by an-
thropological engagement and eforts to steer the program in a better direction.21
Deitchman wanted to discuss the program with Keyes and his colleagues, and 
Keyes wrote to the group that he had told Deitchman of his wish to not make 
public their work  until the proj ect “was at least restructured along sounder 
lines.” Keyes was reassured by arpa’s initial reactions to his concerns, and he 
hoped this would continue “in this vein since a public airing might produce a 
backlash effect in the scholarly community” (rb 75 CFK to EH et al. 11/15/66, 
emphasis added). Keyes’s belief that they could help transform arpa by work-
ing with it quashed his initial desire to blow the whistle on the program. But his 
prediction that public knowledge of arpa’s program would bring a backlash 
would  later prove to be tragically prophetic.
Deitchman told the Keyes group that the Thai Rural Security Systems Pro-
gram was in its early stages, and he assured them that this proj ect was in no way 
linked to Camelot. While administratively it was true that this Thai program 
had no orga nizational ties to Camelot, the counterinsurgent goals had strong 
thematic links. As a Pentagon spokesperson explained to Congress, the Thai 
counterinsurgency program sought to “gather and collate critical information 
on the local geography,” to create “files on insurgent incidents and operations,” 
to “provide assistance in analyzing the efectiveness of vari ous counterinsur-
gency programs,” and “to plan  future ci [counterinsurgency] programs” (De-
partment of Defense, in Deitchman 1976: 301).
Deitchman wrote that  these would-be anthropological critics “ were reas-
sured” (1976: 302). He pitched the benevolence of arpa’s counterinsurgency 
program in northern Thailand, stressing the Rostowian progress of the proj ect 
and claiming that, with one visit with Keyes and the other anthropologist- 
critics, he had turned them into allies. He wrote:
Having reached this happy conclusion to a delicate confrontation, I then asked 
 whether, since they  were among the recognized American experts on Thai culture 
and history, they would be willing to help us do a better job by helping in the re-
search. The responses varied. One said that if the work  were  later to be criticized, 
he would not want to be associated with it but would rather be  free to join the 
critics (although he  later sent us a copy, which was very helpful of his yet- to- be- 
published Ph.D. thesis on life in Thai village society).  Others promised benevolent 
neutrality. (303)
Keyes believed that by engaging in “dialogue with arpa,” he could “minimize 
the ill- efects of such projects,” though he worried that he might be too naive 
about the changes he could accomplish (rb 75CFK to EH et al. 11/15/66). This 
correspondence was darkly prophetic. Four years  later, Keyes’s concerns about 
his naïveté regarding efecting change and angry eruptions in the discipline fol-
lowing public knowledge of their contact with arpa would  later bear fruit in 
the aaa’s biggest showdown over the militarization of anthropology.
But even as Moerman, Keyes, and Phillips hoped to steer arpa’s use of anthro-
pological data to help rather than harm  people,  there was a rising tide within 
the aaa advocating for complete disengagement from military and intelligence 
agencies.
aaa Eruptions over aaa Military Advertisements
Even as aaa members increasingly or ga nized opposition to military and in-
telligence uses of anthropology, the association’s official publications carried 
advertisements for such jobs. A 1967 advertisement for  Human Sciences Re-
search, Inc., of McLean,  Virginia, sought anthropologists with gradu ate- level 
expertise in cultures of Asia and the  Middle East (aaafn 1967 8[2]: 12). An 
advertisement the following year angered a large group of association members 
to take action.
The back pages of the August 1968 issue of American Anthropologist carried a 
full- page employment advertisement, paid for by the U.S. Navy, with the head-
ing “Research Anthropologist for Vietnam.” The ad sought anthropologists to 
work on a psyops proj ect in Saigon, where they would study “ enemy propa-
ganda,” “analyze the susceptibilities” and determine “ enemy vulnerabilities” of 
target audiences, and make recommendations. The advertisement specified 
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“qualified professional anthropologists” with “at least three years of progres-
sively responsible experience in anthropological research.” The position paid 
well, with a base advertised salary of “$14,409 plus 25% foreign post diferen-
tial” and $1,250 to $3,700 a year for dependents.
The next issue of American Anthropologist carried a note from the editor, 
Ward Goodenough, explaining that the aaa had received complaints concern-
ing the navy pysop ad in the previous issue. He wrote that despite widespread 
moral objections to the war in Vietnam held by members of the association, 
in the absence of any policy banning such ads, aaa publications would con-
tinue to publish paid advertisements from the navy and other military branches 
(Goodenough 1968: vi).
The roots of the formalization of the association’s first code of ethics  were 
established in 1968 in a series of meetings of the aaa’s ad hoc Committee on 
Organizations. The committee called for the writing of a formal ethics state-
ment and recommended that a forum on ethics be held at the association’s next 
annual meeting. This push to establish an ethics code influenced elections, as 
election for seats on the 1968 Executive Board became referendums on the as-
sociation’s stance on the Vietnam War.
David Aberle’s campaign statement for an open Executive Board seat de-
clared that the board “seems to regard activities in support of U.S. Government 
policies as ser vice and activities in opposition to  those policies as politics. One 
of my chief concerns is for the Association to rethink this indefensible position, 
with a view to deciding its responsibilities to science, the public, the peoples it 
studies, the problems of our times, and the U.S. Government and other govern-
ments with which members of the profession and the Association have rela-
tions” (aaafn 1968 9[8]: 3). On the basis of this radical campaign stance, David 
Aberle was elected to the board.
Attendance at the 1968 aaa meeting was low, most likely  because its loca-
tion in Seattle was distant from many departments (naaa 1969 10[1]: 1). This 
was the last meeting before the association’s voting rules changed so resolu-
tions no longer needed to be submitted a week before the council meeting. But 
even  under the old rules, the council meeting  adopted two resolutions that had 
been submitted in advance (naaa 1969 10[1]: 1).22 The Wenner- Gren Founda-
tion funded seventy “student delegates” to attend the annual meeting.  These 
delegates attended sessions, held their own meetings, and issued a “combined 
student statement” to the aaa, called for voting rights within the association 
and for more attention to professional ethics (aaafn 1969 10[1]: 1).
A loosely or ga nized group of anthropologists calling themselves a “Commit-
tee of Concerned Anthropologists” or ga nized a mail campaign to gather signa-
tures and funds for a counteradvertisement to be published in the back pages of 
American Anthropologist (aaafn 1969 10[3]: 2). A war of words over  whether 
the association should accept military advertisements filled the letters sections 
of the Fellow Newsletter (e.g., aaafn 1969 10[3]: 3; 1969 10[6]: 2).
The February 1969 issue of American Anthropologist contained a paid ad 
protesting the navy’s August 1968 advertisement. To address issues raised by 
military ads in aaa publications and rising concerns over military and intel-
ligence agencies seeking anthropological knowledge, the aaa Executive Board 
appointed an ad hoc Committee on Ethics, composed of cochairs David Schnei-
der and David Aberle, Richard N. Adams, Joseph Jorgenson, William Shack, and 
Eric Wolf. As its first act, the committee issued a policy statement concerning 
the ac cep tance of military advertisements for association publications. The 
statement proclaimed, “The aaa  will not accept advertisements or notices for 
positions involving research or other activities the products of which cannot be 
made available to the entire scholarly community through accepted academic 
channels of communication” (aaafn 1969 10[3]: 1). The Committee on Ethics 
would review  future advertisements that presented pos si ble problems.
During a January 1969 weekend meeting in Chicago, the aaa ad hoc Com-
mittee on Ethics rapidly composed a working draft of a code of ethics and sent 
it to the Executive Board the following week. This draft, which drew heavily 
on Beals’s “Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and Ethics,” 
incorporated ethical principles identified by the American Psychological As-
sociation, the American So cio log i cal Association, and the Society for Applied 
Anthropology. The ad hoc committee recommended to the board that the 
membership elect a standing Committee on Ethics immediately (aaafn 1969 
10[4]: 3).
The ad hoc committee’s report described the composition of a standing com-
mittee in some detail and specified the range of issues it would address. The 
four general categories  were “relations with  those studied,” “responsibilities to the 
discipline,” “responsibilities to students,” and “relations with sponsors” (aaafn 
1969 10[4]: 4–5). Some language in this report remained in the Principles of 
Professional Responsibility that was adapted by the membership two years  later.
The report of the ad hoc Committee on Ethics generated strong opposition 
from a vocal minority of anthropologists, who argued in the Fellow Newsletter 
that the proposed code attempted to “legislate a socio- ideological system” that 
was akin to the sort of controlling mechanism used in Nazi Germany, a totalitar-
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ian tactic, similar to tactics in Orwell’s Animal Farm; some derisively referred 
to the ethics committee as the “Censorship Committee” or the “Ethical Surveil-
lance Committee.”23 This hyperbole reflected some anthropologists’ concerns 
that the association would use the code to police research, but it also prefigured 
some of the ways that ethics would  later be used to bolster po liti cal positions. 
 These concerns also expressed many anthropologists’ conception of science in 
an era in which prac ti tion ers of that most humanistic of sciences took umbrage 
at suggestions that anthropologists should be answerable for the impacts of the 
discipline’s search for truth (Wolf 1964:88).
Collisions of Ethics and Politics
The aaa’s leadership historically viewed the association as an apo liti cal profes-
sional organ ization, though what this generally meant was that it helped or ga nize 
anthropological support for governmental programs (social programs, military 
programs,  etc.), while hesitating to oppose government policies or programs, 
as if alignment with power was an apo liti cal stance.  After the association coor-
dinated anthropological contributions to the Second World War, it experienced 
schisms during the 1960s — which widened during the early 1970s — as the an-
nual council meetings became staging grounds for critical po liti cal discourse 
on anthropology and American militarism.
The 1960s opened with Margaret Mead leading a movement within the aaa 
opposing rising militarism; early in the 1970s, she was backed into a corner, 
defending anthropological counterinsurgency against a sizable faction of the 
discipline. While the generation of anthropologists who had served during 
World War II  were less categorically opposed to anthropologists’ contributions 
to counterinsurgency operations in Thailand than their younger colleagues, 
when news spread of Proj ect Camelot’s intentions to use anthropologists for 
counterinsurgency in South Amer i ca, anthropologists young and old alike ex-
pressed their anger and opposition. Camelot touched a raw nerve in the disci-
pline, as it exposed anthropology as a potentially manipulative instrument for 
American po liti cal gain. But just half a de cade  later, some anthropologists con-
sidered counterinsurgency as a peaceful alternative to, not just a component 
of, warfare.
Ralph Beals’s eforts to describe relationships between military and intelli-
gence agencies and anthropologists identified patterns of ongoing attempts to 
exploit cultural knowledge in ways that raised significant po liti cal and ethical 
questions. Beals’s report prepared the association to oppose secret research and 
some forms of counterinsurgency, and it laid the groundwork for spare and 
the coming Principles of Professional Responsibility. As his correspondence 
with Elizabeth Bacon rec ords, Beals collected a good deal of information 
specifying how the cia and the Pentagon contacted anthropologists or used 
anthropological knowledge, but he did not include  these details in his final re-
port. This correspondence provides an impor tant view of how cia eforts to 
directly and indirectly connect with and use anthropologists worked during 
the early Cold War. Bacon’s account of the ways that cia personnel contacted 
and attempted to debrief anthropologists returning from fieldwork fits with the 
reports of  others, and while Bacon rejected ofers to provide information to the 
cia, other anthropologists during the Cold War held hopes of better informing 
cia analy sis.
But it was counterinsurgency, rather than spying or the more subtle articula-
tions of academia’s soft interfaces with the military- intelligence establishment, 
that most violently opened the fissures between anthropologists’ passionate, if 
unarticulated, visions of anthropology. While the 1968 advertisements in Amer-
ican Anthropologist released volleys of anger opposing the association’s alignment 
with the war in Vietnam, just a few years  later, many of  those who had opposed 
 these ads would side with the anthropologists assisting counterinsurgency op-
erations in Thailand.
The early exchanges between Seymour Deitchman and Charles Keyes show 
how supporters of counterinsurgency made humanitarian claims of stability, 
liberation, and peace, while avoiding the uncomfortable truth that  these means 
of implementing “stability”  were warfare by other means. While Keyes showed 
clear awareness of such critiques in this early correspondence, claims that an-
thropologists’ assistance could lessen harm became a power ful enticement in 
the military’s eforts to recruit anthropologists. Assurances that counterinsur-
gency was not a weapon of soft power but a tool for assisting  those impacted by 
war  were an efective argument for some anthropologists during the Vietnam 
War. As the next chapter shows, the contingencies supporting anthropological 
contributions to counterinsurgency helped convince some anthropologists to 
join  these eforts and to overlook the lack of impact their research or recom-
mendations had on the well- being of  those they studied.
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“The old formula for successful counterinsurgency used to be  
10 troops for  every guerrilla,” one American specialist remarked,  
“now the formula is 10 anthropologists for  every guerrilla.”
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T W E L V E   A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L L Y  
I N F O R M E D  C O U N T E R I N S U R G E N C Y  
I N  S O U T H E A S T  A S I A
From the cia’s earliest days in Vietnam, the agency knew the importance of un-
derstanding the local culture’s mores. Edward Lansdale, Graham Greene’s model 
for cia agent Alden Pyle in The Quiet American, incorporated anthropological 
knowledge into his cia counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines and 
Vietnam. In his memoir, In the Midst of War, Lansdale described using local 
superstitions of vampires that roamed the jungles at night as a force multiplier 
when he trained operatives to kill insurgents and leave their bodies punctured 
with holes to suggest that vampires had drained their blood (1972: 72–73).
In Vietnam, Lansdale developed counterinsurgency operations that mixed 
hard power techniques of assassination and or ga nized strategic military as-
saults with diverse soft power methods such as dispersing economic aid and 
drawing on existing local Catholic organizations as counterinsurgency tools. 
The Pentagon Papers described Lansdale’s work for President Ngo Dinh Diem 
as relying on the “three withs,” consisting of a counterinsurgency approach in 
which Lansdale and his cia operatives would “ ‘eat, sleep, and work with the 
 people’ — some 1400 to 1800 ‘cadre’ undertook: census and surveys of the physical 
needs of villages; building schools, maternity hospitals, information halls; re-
pairing and enlarging local roads; digging wells and irrigation canals; teaching 
personal and public hygiene; distributing medicine; teaching children by day, 
and anti- illiteracy classes by night; forming village militia; conducting po liti-
cal meetings; and publicizing agrarian reform legislation” (U.S. Department of 
Defense 1972: 306).
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Anthony Poshepny, a cia agent more commonly known as Tony Poe, who 
is sometimes credited as an inspiration for elements of Francis Ford Coppola’s 
Col o nel Kurtz in Apocalypse Now, enacted Lansdale’s approach to culturally 
centered counterinsurgency (Branfman 1975: 56–58;  M. Isaacs 1999).1 Poe’s 
knowledge of Meo culture and his willingness to work within local cultural 
confines made him an invaluable cia asset in Laos during Amer i ca’s secret war, 
though his tendency to follow local customs over cia rules (e.g., marrying a 
Laotian “chieftain’s  daugh ter”  after a village raid, complete with a dowry of one 
hundred  water bufalo and seventy- five goats) repeatedly  violated agency pro-
cedures, while his eforts to “go native” earned him the res pect and support of 
some locals (M. Isaacs 1999).
 Because of the influences of cia operatives like Poe, Lansdale, and  others, the 
agency and the Pentagon increasingly understood the need for nuanced cul-
tural knowledge when conducting counterinsurgency and military operations in 
Southeast Asia. This desire for cultural knowledge to be used for conquest and 
control led to a series of problematic interactions with anthropologists — dual 
use interactions that often found anthropologists trying to lessen harm to the 
indigenous groups they lived with and studied, while military and intelligence 
agencies pursued their own goals.
Several American anthropologists worked in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand 
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. William Smalley, who earned a PhD at Co-
lumbia University in the 1950s, mixed anthropological research with missionary 
work in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand (Smalley 1994). Forensic anthropologist 
Robert B. Pickering identified remains of American soldiers at the U.S. Army 
Central Identification Laboratory in Thailand (bic 2014d). Terry Rambo stud-
ied Viet nam ese farming communities with seadag and usaid funds (Rambo 
1973). But the American anthropologist who most prominently worked in Viet-
nam before and throughout the war was Gerald Hickey.
Gerald Hickey, the Not-So-Quiet American
In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, a rapidly increasing flow of American 
social scientists from the disciplines of sociology, po liti cal science, anthropol-
ogy, and geography  were drawn to the problems of the Vietnam War, and with 
 these scholars came a stream of seemingly endless, futile theoretical approaches 
to the problems of Amer i ca’s war (Marquis 2000). From 1955 to 1959, Michigan 
State University had a secret $25 million cia contract, bringing cia personnel 
to campus, where agency personnel and professors trained Viet nam ese officials 
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(see Hinckle, Scheer, and Stern 1966). Anthropologist Gerald Hickey began 
working for the Michigan State University Group (msug) while in Vietnam 
in 1954, and in 1956 he attended msug meetings in which cia personnel  were 
Michigan State advisers to Saigon law enforcement personnel. Hickey  later con-
ducted msug work in Saigon with anthropologist Frederick Wickert (Hickey 
2002: 3, 18–19, 23–24, 57–60), and msug designed curriculum for Vietnam’s 
National Institute of Administration to train civil servants, police, and security 
personnel, programs that included cia employee Louis Boudrias (Ernst 1998: 
64). The msug training taught the Viet nam ese Bureau of Investigation updated 
fingerprinting techniques and in 1957 advised the Central Identification Bureau 
on its new national identity card program (72). John Ernst, historian of msug’s 
role in  these military and intelligence training programs, wrote that the appli-
cations of this training  were clear, and “Diem approved of using repressive tac-
tics to purge po liti cal rivals and communists from South Vietnam and enlisted 
Michigan State’s aid in  doing so” (66).
The initial work by msug involved eforts to help refugees fleeing to the South 
following the 1954 Geneva Accords (Ernst 1998: 29–30). Following Diem’s 1956 
call for msug to research highland peoples, it developed a line of analy sis that 
“compared the situation of the highland peoples to that of the American In-
dians during the nineteenth  century” (30). This comparison was not just an 
evocative meta phor to generate sympathetic comparisons; it was a reference 
to be used in developing a po liti cal managerial strategy, as Wesley Fishel at 
msug “wrote the United States Bureau of Indian Afairs requesting lit er a ture 
on agency policies. He noted that ‘From the Western and Viet nam ese points of 
view, the Montagnards are primitive in res pect to their social and economic way 
of life and religious beliefs” (31).
Diem cared  little about msug’s recommendations and supported refugee re-
settlement programs in the highlands with the assistance of msug personnel 
as part of a defensive guerrilla action proj ect. But Michigan State’s “role in the 
refugee resettlement program [was] complex. The msug tried to act as a posi-
tive force, and most of the Field Administration Division’s recommendations 
 were utilized with solid results, but  because numerous organizations and fac-
tors  were involved in the resettlement program, the university’s overall impact 
is difficult to mea sure” (Ernst 1998: 35).  Later, when the university’s collusion 
with the cia was exposed in 1966, msu president John  A. Hannah claimed 
the university “did not have a spy operation within its Vietnam Proj ect. It did 
not have cia  people operating  under cover provided by the University, or in 
secret from the Vietnam government” (82). Hannah’s statement stressed this 
was not a spy operation per se; it was a training operation. The university had 
become a cia- financed training camp where paramilitary operatives learned 
the harsh tactics they deployed in Vietnam. Michigan State  wasn’t spying (or an 
interrogator, a death squad overseer,  etc.); it trained spies. Even  after cia funds 
ceased, msug continued working on counterinsurgency projects, including 
“internal security of strategic hamlets, registration and identification of  family 
groups, and controls of the movement of both population and material” (msug 
1962: 51). The Pike Commission  later evaluated  these “public safety” training 
programs run by aid and cia personnel and concluded that between the early 
1950s and  1973, up to five thousand foreign police officers from around the 
world  were trained by the cia through programs like the one at Michigan State 
(Pike Report 1977: 228–29).
From the late 1950s throughout the years of Amer i ca’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War, no other American anthropologist had more fieldwork experi-
ence with the cultures of Vietnam than Gerald Hickey. Hickey first conducted 
fieldwork in Vietnam in 1956 and 1957, at which time he met many of the in-
dividuals who would figure prominently in his  future research. Hickey was 
in Vietnam when director Joseph Mankiewicz filmed the original Hollywood 
production of The Quiet American (1958), based on Greene’s novel, and he ap-
peared as an extra in a scene shot with Michael Redgrave (Hickey 2002: 48). 
 After earning his doctorate at the University of Chicago in 1959, Hickey became 
a research associate at Michigan State University, working with msug (Elliot 
2010: 25). Hickey spent much of the war in Vietnam, working for rand and 
other agencies interfacing with U.S. military and intelligence personnel.
Between January and April 1962, Hickey and John Donnell conducted eth-
nographic research in resettled communities near Saigon, studying “social, eco-
nomic, and certain po liti cal aspects of the strategic hamlet program as seen from 
the peasants’ point of view,” for a rand report on the Strategic Hamlet Program 
(Donnell and Hickey 1962: iii). This program was a counterinsurgency opera-
tion that relocated entire villages in areas where U.S. military personnel could 
more easily reduce their contacts with the Vietcong. While the stated goal of 
 these new hamlets was to move villagers from the “path” of insurgents, func-
tionally, the new hamlets  were locked- down encampments that maintained il-
lusions of open- door  free movement (complete with deadly fortified barriers) 
while isolating and controlling hamlet populations.
The Strategic Hamlet Program targeted village members suspected of being 
Vietcong supporters and installed village informers who reported to U.S. mili-
tary and intelligence personnel on subversive activities (Donnell and Hickey 
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1962: 2–3). As Donnell and Hickey described it, the “program involves the po-
liti cal and social organ ization of the inhabitants in a way that permits close 
surveillance of their po liti cal activities, of their social participation in such 
government- controlled mass movements as the Republican Youth, and the 
contribution to  labor projects for community development. Once  these pro-
grams are established, the system is further designed to serve as a basis for 
wider programs of rural economic reconstruction, including agricultural credit 
and extension ser vices” (2–3).
Strategic hamlets created panoptical microcosms that moved villagers from 
regions of Vietcong movements and redesigned village economic and social 
dynamics. As inducements for families to leave their traditional village homes, 
villagers  were given small pieces of land to build homes within the perimeter of 
the strategic hamlet compounds and promised access to farmlands outside the 
compounds. In some instances farmers  were left outside  these compounds to 
collect intelligence (Donnell and Hickey 1962: 6–7).2
Hickey did not oppose the Strategic Hamlet Program. He believed that for 
counterinsurgency to succeed, the military needed to increase the total control of 
(and reinforcements flowing into)  these artificial village environments. Hickey 
understood that controlling physical space was as impor tant as controlling cul-
tural space, and that “the reorganization of a hamlet’s social and administra-
tive organs is regarded by all officials as at least as impor tant as the construc-
tion of physical defense facilities” (Donnell and Hickey 1962: 7). Units known 
as Rural Reconstruction Teams supervised the reorganization of villages and 
helped install social, agricultural, and economic programs that provided aid 
but also increased the contingencies of control over and de pen dency of villagers 
(see Donnell and Hickey 1962: 7; Millhauser 2008).  These Rural Reconstruction 
Teams also tried “to learn about families with pro– Viet Cong sentiment who 
should be regrouped near a military post for easier surveillance” (Donnell and 
Hickey 1962: 7).  Under a system of mandatory corvée, farmers built the new 
hamlet compounds, sometimes being forced to contribute between forty- five 
and ninety days of  labor. This created conflicts with some villagers, as did the 
loss of valuable farmlands to build the new hamlets among  those already living 
in the settlement region (10–11). Some farmers  were forced to “contribute” the 
entirety of their most marketable crop, bamboo, to the strategic hamlet’s forti-
fications — a demand that at times created years of debt (11).
The scale of the Strategic Hamlet dream was massive. In 1962, the U.S. mili-
tary planned to install twelve thousand strategic hamlets in a six- month period 
(Donnell and Hickey 1962: 3). Such increasingly large visions of total control 
appear as logical and inevitable developments once militaries depend on coun-
terinsurgency for military goals.  These contrived “hamlets” installed “council of 
elders” advisory units composed of wealthy and influential community mem-
bers whom American planners hoped could be manipulated to steer public 
opinions and policies (8). Rural Reconstruction Teams began their work by 
conducting a census, an act that Donnell and Hickey found “often prompts 
some pro- Communist individuals to flee the hamlet” (7). Hickey envisioned 
strategic hamlets bringing uniformity and control, and severing connections 
with preexisting cultural life, supplanting order and control in ways that fit the 
needs of the U.S. military and kept inhabitants legible to them (see Scott 1998: 
37–40).
Donnell and Hickey’s report provided U.S. policy makers and military and 
intelligence agencies with an ethnographic view of why the Strategic Hamlet 
Program would fail. The report outlined how the debts, disruptions, generated 
ill  will, and economic losses would outweigh any benefits of surveillance and 
disruption of village aid to the Vietcong. The report made the motives and lives 
of Viet nam ese peasants understandable to agencies seeking to control them. It 
clarified that  these peasants  were “more favorably disposed to the side which 
ofers [them] the possibility of a better life,” yet the inherent problems in the 
Strategic Hamlet Program could easily lead  these farmers to turn against the 
program’s American designers (Donnell and Hickey 1962: 15).
Donnell and Hickey supported changing portions of the Strategic Hamlet 
Program to better meet the needs of villagers, while maintaining the U.S. mili-
tary’s control over the hamlets. They recommended manipulating conditions 
so that farmers living in the strategic hamlets could derive direct benefits from 
the programs in which they  were forced to participate. Donnell and Hickey 
used concrete examples to illustrate why rational peasants disliked their reloca-
tion and the disruption of their normal agricultural activities. They explained 
that  because farmers had short- term views of  future payofs, the immediate 
reductions in tobacco cash crops  were rationally viewed as failures rather than 
simply as the incon ve niences claimed by American Strategic Hamlet propo-
nents. Donnell and Hickey warned that if the cultural views and needs of  these 
 people  were not accommodated, the villagers’ support as allies would be lost. 
They wrote that “ these farmers are the backbone of the village warning and 
auxiliary guard systems. In our opinion, they  will participate in  these security 
activities willingly and efectively only if, in the very near  future, they see evi-
dence that the strategic hamlet to which they have made such heavy contribu-
tions in time, materials, land, and reduced secondary crop yields is capable of 
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improving their economic, social, and po liti cal welfare beyond the narrower 
aspect of the greater physical security it ofers them” (Donnell and Hickey 1962: 
16–17). Their report viewed peasants as rational actors whose needs and values 
should be understood and respected if the Strategic Hamlet Program  were to 
achieve its desired ends of control. They did not recommend the end of the 
forced relocation of villagers but instead suggested that peasants receive in-
creased compensation for their work and cooperation, as well as more oppor-
tunities to participate in  actual decision making.3
Hickey and Donnell recognized that many of the features of  these hamlets 
alienated the villagers they  were designed to protect, but their analy sis did not 
address how long it would take to implement such a program or how difficult and 
expensive such an efort would be. Their vision of an “improved” hamlet pro-
gram ignored larger problems of costs and scale. Roger Hilsman, the director 
of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research  under President 
Kennedy,  later explained that the British counterinsurgency experiences in Ma-
laya taught American policy makers that the Strategic Hamlet Program could 
work, but it would take a long time. Even de cades  later, Hilsman insisted, “It 
would have taken twenty years, but it would have worked. Instead of chasing 
Communist troops all over the jungles, you would have slowly enlarged the 
secure areas, like an oil block with strategic hamlets moving out” (National 
Security Archives 1998). Hilsman’s plan would have increasingly locked down 
Viet nam ese peasants in strategic hamlets  until well into the early 1980s. His-
torian Eric Bergerud  later observed that Donnell and Hickey understood that 
 unless the Strategic Hamlet Program was overhauled to better fit the cultural 
and economic needs of the  people living within the hamlets, it would fail, and 
“when Diem was overthrown, the junta in Saigon ended the Strategic Hamlet 
Program immediately, citing as reasons many of the points raised by Hickey 
and Donnell” (1991: 52).
Hickey’s Other rand Reports
Though Hickey’s 1962 recommendations to rand on the Strategic Hamlet Pro-
gram  were ignored, he continued producing military- related reports for rand 
throughout the de cade. In 1964, Hickey published a rand report describing 
South Viet nam ese highland ethnic groups, drawing on published and unpub-
lished reports and ethnographic writings on the highland tribes. Hickey presented 
ethnographic information on the Rhadé, Jarai, Mnong, Stieng, Bahnar, and 
Sedang tribes using a uniform format in which he presented basic cultural 
information about each group, then described settlement patterns, sociopo liti-
cal organ ization, and religious information. Many of his sources  were unpub-
lished and  were consulted in France, primarily French ethnographic writings 
(thirty- eight out of forty- four  were written in French, two in Viet nam ese) or 
historical or geographic reports written by scholars who did not anticipate the 
rand audience and military uses of this information.
Hickey compared Vietnam’s highland and lowland cultural formations, 
stressing how Indian and Chinese cultural traditions had influenced cultures 
of the Indochinese lowlands but had had only limited impacts on highland cul-
tures, which “have not become part of any of the  great traditions that have 
touched them; they have not been ‘civilized’ ” (1964: 2). Hickey described high-
land groups’ reliance on swidden agriculture, growing dry rice and other gar-
den crops while also raising livestock.
Hickey identified villages as the basic po liti cal unit in highland culture, de-
scribing the importance of the village headman and the village council and 
outlining the basic principles of the “village- centered justice” system and the 
importance of rituals (1964: 8). He provided an overview of historical traditions 
of intervillage warfare and traditional institutions of alliance and peacemaking. 
He noted that, although the French had generally “abolished” highland warfare, 
it still occurred:
Institutions such as the aforementioned toring of the Bahnar, or clans among the 
Rhadé and Jarai which create intervillage kinship ties, serve to diminish wars and 
conflicts between villages. But among all the groups the favored means for avoid-
ing them are the alliances. Through the  father- son alliance or the “ great xep” blood 
oath, for example, villages can prevent or end wars and other conflicts and can 
force bonds of co- operation. By the same token, of course, such alliances can be a 
means of gaining allies with whom to carry on a war more effectively. And families or 
clans can ally themselves so as to be able to carry out vendettas. (9, emphasis added)
Hickey’s narrative was designed not as some act of public education but to in-
form rand’s military- intelligence audience concerned with tasks of domina-
tion and control. Hickey situated his pre sen ta tion on cultural distinctions not 
only with frames of geography but also with frames of history and domina-
tion, writing that “the history of the highlands reveals the per sis tent role of 
the area as a bufer zone in the struggles among the Khmer, Cham, Siamese, 
Lao, Viet nam ese, and colonial powers, as well as in the recent war between the 
French and the Viet Minh, and in the current conflict between the Viet Cong and 
the government of South Vietnam” (1964: 14). Hickey noted how the Sedang, 
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Stieng, and Mong tribes successfully resisted French domination and staged re-
volts, explaining how  these groups resisted external control with religious rev-
elations such as the 1935 reincarnation of the Thunder Spirit’s son (15). Hickey’s 
historical summary highlighted themes of sorcery, recurrent tales of rumored 
ghostly spirits undermining colonial eforts, intertribal warfare, revolts, the im-
portance of gifts to highland leaders, and failed eforts of missions to dominate 
the highlands.
He drew attention to how French eforts,  under Léopold Sabatier’s administra-
tion, to provide ser vices and aid to Darlac Province in the early twentieth  century 
helped subdue re sis tance in the region, and he summarized French land reform 
plans for the highlands — and indigenous eforts to resist  these plans (Hickey 
1964: 25–26). The role of blood oaths in establishing alliances and peace treaties 
was described in some detail; stressing the importance of proper participation 
in  these acts, he wrote, “To refuse a friendship alliance is an act of bad faith. This 
was illustrated in the Odend‘hal afair, when the French administrator refused 
to drink the blood- oath mixture prepared by the Sadet of Fire, whose anger at 
the insult undoubtedly contributed to Odend’hal’s subsequent slaying” (40).
Hickey’s discussions of the social structure of specific highland groups stressed 
the particulars of organ ization, drawing special attention to the roles of elders, 
headmen, extravillage liaisons, and supravillage power relations. The report’s 
final sections described specific details of dif er ent tribal groups. For example, 
one section of Hickey’s summary of Stieng social organ ization reported that 
“ every village has a headman selected by the  house hold heads. Tribunals for 
wrongs of varying degrees are or ga nized in the village. Crimes of the first de-
gree, entailing punishments above the value of two bufaloes, are dealt with by 
a tribunal composed of the village headman and two el derly men versed in tra-
ditional customs. When the contesting parties are from dif er ent villages, both 
headmen must sit on the tribunal, and no kinsmen are permitted to attend” (1964: 
57). Given the report’s military audience and the state of the war, Hickey’s dis-
cussions of blood oaths, tribunals, and friendship rituals mandating alliances 
 were specifically selected social features that could possibly be leveraged by his 
readers (see D. H. Price 2011f: 133–38). Hickey made no direct recommenda-
tions on how such information might be used, though the Phoenix Program 
and cords would  later weaponize such knowledge in armed counterinsurgency 
campaigns (see Valentine 1990).
As part of a 1965 rand and arpa sponsored proj ect assessing military advi-
sors, Hickey interviewed “several hundred” individuals (Hickey 1965: iv). The 
factors he identified as influencing the efectiveness of American advisers  were 
the ability to recognize cultural diferences, spending time in field  battle settings, 
levels of training, linguistic competence in Viet nam ese, availability of skilled 
translators, experience with dif er ent forms of military training, and training in 
the specific conditions that they faced in Vietnam.
Many American advisers misinterpreted Viet nam ese behaviors as indicat-
ing the Viet nam ese  were lazy, unreliable, dishonest, dirty, wasteful, and unable 
to complete complex tasks (Hickey 1965: viii).4 Hickey tried to  counter  these 
impressions by recommending that U.S. military advisers receive specific cul-
tural and language training before being posted to Vietnam, writing that they 
needed training in “history, economics, government, sociology, ethnic com-
position, major religious sects, and general customs of the country as well as 
on the special characteristics of the region to which they are being assigned” 
(xiii). He also recommended that “language and cultural training centers, simi-
lar to  those that some missionary socie ties have found useful, might be set up 
as a pi lot proj ect within South Vietnam. In them, carefully selected personnel 
would live and study for several months in a community away from Saigon 
and without contact with other Americans, the instruction to be supplemented 
by frequent field trips to dif er ent regions of Vietnam” (xv).5 While such sug-
gestions for cultural training continued the sort of work anthropologists had 
designed and implemented during the Second World War, the po liti cal difer-
ences between American intervention in Vietnam’s civil war and the previous 
war against fascism and nationalist occupations brought significantly dif er-
ent attitudes regarding the po liti cal ends to which anthropology was to serve. 
 These, however,  were distinctions not made by Hickey.
rand Visions
At times Hickey’s analy sis drew on classic sociocultural theory. His rand re-
port from 1967 contextualized the ethnic and historical complexities of Viet-
nam ese social life with a Durkheimian analy sis of the structural pulls at work in 
Viet nam ese society. As he wrote, “Social and po liti cal complexity in any given 
society does not necessarily mean confusion and chaos; given the right circum-
stances, the interdependence that is intrinsic to such complexity can give rise to 
a kind of solidarity. It would be similar to Durkheim’s organic solidarity which 
arises out of the interdependence and need to cooperate as the division of  labor 
in society becomes more specialized and diverse. Without this type of solidarity 
the society would fragment and perhaps collapse” (Hickey 1967a:1).
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In September 1967, rand published The Highland  People of South Vietnam 
(1967b), Hickey’s most substantial arpa report on the social and economic 
development of  these  people. This was an impressive piece of anthropological 
work combining data Hickey collected from villages of twenty- one highland 
ethnic groups (iii). Hickey drew on ethnographic fieldwork he had undertaken 
throughout the previous de cade, as well as field research conducted in the com-
pany of Special Forces units (10).
Hickey’s writing at times strayed from anthropological analy sis to advocat-
ing military strategies; for example, in a 1967 report he advocated that the South 
Viet nam ese government end its opposition to the Front Unifie de Lutte des 
Races Opprimees (fulro) and support fulro autonomy. Hickey argued that 
this alignment would result in
the immediate acquisition of an estimated 3000 to 5000 armed men skilled in 
jungle warfare and familiar with the mountain terrain near Cambodia[;] it would 
greatly help the government’s intelligence network at the village level in areas 
where fulro has much popu lar following. Also evidence of fulro’s pro- gvn 
stand and of the government’s willingness to let the Highlanders assume a larger 
role within the nation would lessen not only the chance of open discontent and 
protest but also the demand for autonomy and, most impor tant, the Highland-
ers’ susceptibility to the appeal of the Viet Cong, whose presence in the highlands 
would thus become increasingly untenable. (1967b: vii– viii)
As anthropologist Oscar Salemink notes, Hickey’s support for fulro separated 
his analy sis from “French anthropologists like Dournes and Condominas, as 
well as critical American scholars, [who] saw fulro as a movement of tribal 
mercenaries or ga nized and supported by the cia” (2003: 247). From the mid-
1960s to 1971, Hickey wrote a series of memos advocating that General William 
West moreland and members of the U.S. military command take specific ac-
tions (Emerson 1978: 287), including increased highland agricultural assistance 
and eforts to resolve land tenure disputes with lowlanders as a means of build-
ing support for  these needed allies.
While Hickey conducted interviews in French or Viet nam ese, he also some-
times used translators from the Summer Institute of Linguistics to help with his 
work (Hickey 1967b: 16–22). Hickey’s rand report titled U.S. Strategy in South 
Vietnam: Extrication and Equilibrium (1969) argued that the United States did 
not understand the po liti cal nature and nuanced history of the war, and out-
lined American military withdrawal scenarios.
Hickey’s final rand report, from 1971, retreated into a detailed historical analy-
sis of past Viet nam ese historical incidents.6 It generated a narrative (which 
detailed topics like “recent economic innovation; the French Period to the 
Present”) that was disconnected from the military realities traumatizing the 
Vietnam of the present (Hickey 1971: 137).7
Over the course of a de cade, Hickey’s work for rand found him shifting 
from counterinsurgency support eforts involving the destruction of tribal vil-
lages in order to save them, to providing cultural information of strategic value 
and trying to inform a military- intelligence audience of the cultural intricacies 
of the world in which they  were waging a war they  were increasingly losing. 
Reading Hickey’s rand reports and his memoir, it seems almost as if he did not 
understand how dif er ent his  imagined mission (self- conceived of as reducing 
harm for tribal groups) was from that of the larger military and intelligence 
institutions that  were consuming his reports. Yet this disconnect (and what ap-
pears to be an enduring, naive hope of prevailing over deep institutional forces) 
seems to have propelled him forward and kept him engaged with a military 
complex that appeared to ignore his recommendations while continuing to 
sponsor works containing detailed accounts of cultural customs that it likely 
believed could have militarized uses.
Hickey’s Back- Home Retcon
In late 1970, Hickey wrote his dissertation adviser, Fred Eggan, inquiring about 
the possibility of landing a visiting professorship at the University of Chicago. 
Eggan expressed excitement at this prospect. But funds  were scarce, and when 
Eggan advised him to try to secure outside funding, Hickey turned to the Ford 
Foundation and rand. Eggan warned him that “ there is also a strong feeling on 
the part of some students and a few of the faculty about research for the govern-
ment and even stronger feeling about classified research” (Hickey 2002: 297). 
 These “strong feelings”  were growing concerns within American anthropology 
over military and intelligence agency uses of anthropological information in 
Southeast Asia. When Eggan wrote a memo to department chair Bernard Cohn 
advocating for a yearlong appointment for Hickey, he added that he knew of 
“no evidence of any violation of ethic standards, as I have practiced them and 
as I have tried to teach them to gradu ate students” (298). Eggan wrote Hickey 
of growing departmental concerns about Hickey’s secret rand or Defense De-
partment research. Hickey replied that his work had been “classified” but not 
“secret”— missing the larger issue that writing noncirculating reports that mili-
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tary and intelligence agencies could access raised concerns with his colleagues 
(298).  After Chicago’s anthropology department voted against ofering Hickey 
a one- year position, the Wall Street Journal ran an article characterizing this 
decision as “McCarthyism of the Left” (301).
Hickey  later complained that his advice was largely ignored by rand and the 
military, while in the acad emy he was demonized by his fellow anthropologists. 
He wrote: “If my accommodation- coalition approach earned me the reputa-
tion in some American po liti cal [military/policy] circles of being a heretic, my 
being in Vietnam with the rand corporation earned me pariah status among 
my academic colleagues” (Hickey 2002: 296). Yet Hickey’s experience of being 
ignored in Vietnam was not one in which his influence decreased over time; 
in fact, from his earliest years onward, his experience was that his colleague’s 
“report was suppressed and mine was ignored” (350). Hickey did not give up 
when his Strategic Hamlet evaluation was ignored, but neither did he seem 
to question the ethical and po liti cal issues raised by such  battle fieldwork and 
contributions to counterinsurgency, nor did he adequately consider that his de-
clared interests in the  people of Vietnam  were so at odds with the U.S. military’s 
institutional behaviors and values that his contributions stood no chance of 
accomplishing what he envisioned. But over time, his views seemed to coalesce 
with the strategic thinking of the military.
 There is an otherworldliness in the ethnographic repre sen ta tions in Hickey’s 
 later rand reports. He wrote as if he were living between dimensions in a world 
where traditional Viet nam ese ethnic and linguistic groups maintained an ex-
istence outside of the American carpet bombing, napalm, and Agent Orange. 
Hickey wrote just- so- story vignettes in which hardworking cap i tal ist peasant 
entrepreneurs  rose above their poverty with cash crops like cofee — yet the nar-
rative frame of  these peasants’ success was not expanded to incorporate capital-
ism’s war raining down on them.
The po liti cal and historical context in which Hickey produced his rand 
work transformed  these reports into works with meanings and uses far beyond 
the sum of their parts. Meanings hinge on uses, and Hickey took pieces of eth-
nographic work produced by himself and  others and transformed disparate ele-
ments into weaponized knowledge — political knowledge that he knew would 
be used in military contexts to manipulate, as identified in the title of one of his 
works for rand, the “major ethnic groups of the South Viet nam ese highlands.” 
Despite Hickey’s latter- day complaints about military and intelligence agencies’ 
neglect of the “proper” use of his research, his continual participation in this 
pro cess documents a form of complicity that is difficult to reconcile.
Oscar Salemink’s research adds a chilling final chapter to the tragic unintended 
consequences of Hickey’s research. Salemink found that in the years  after 
American military forces left Southeast Asia, Viet nam ese scholars used Hick-
ey’s ethnographic writings to identify and persecute the Montagnard fulro 
village leaders Hickey made identifiable in his book Fire in the Forest: Ethnohis-
tory of the Viet nam ese Central Highlands (1982). Hickey had published “a list of 
‘One Hundred Highlander Leaders: Ethnic affiliation, approximate birth date, 
and religion.’  After his books  were published and arrived in Vietnam, security 
officials who  were still fighting fulro started to arrest  every person mentioned 
in the book. Thanks to the courageous intervention of a Viet nam ese ethnolo-
gist  these persons  were gradually released” (Salemink 2003: 4). When Salemink 
 later relayed to Hickey  these unintended outcomes of his fieldwork and publi-
cation, Hickey was “very upset” (4).
Hickey did not understand how dif er ent his anthropological purposes  were 
from  those of the individuals who consumed his rand reports. He wanted to 
protect  those he studied while steering the military  toward a kinder form of 
conquest, at the same time arguing that he was serving the needs of  those to be 
conquered. While the contradictions of this approach did not cause Hickey to 
disengage from his sponsors, this ongoing cross- purpose relationship funda-
mentally served the military’s needs and apparently served as a salve to Hickey’s 
conscience, at least in the short term. Such relationships of cross- purposes and 
lopsided outcomes favoring sponsors’ desires are not unique to military- linked 
projects and can be found in a variety of ongoing applied anthropology projects 
throughout the years (see Downing 2002; D. H. Price 1989).
Delmos Jones and the Complicity of All
While Hickey naively sought to reshape American military- intelligence actions 
in Southeast Asia from within the system, other anthropologists openly resisted 
such uses of anthropological knowledge for counterinsurgency. Delmos Jones’s 
reaction to U.S. military and intelligence agencies’ eforts to use his anthropo-
logical field research to assist military actions in Southeast Asia pre sents a stark 
contrast to Gerald Hickey’s contributions.
In 1965, while a doctoral student in anthropology at Cornell University, Jones 
was selected for a Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowship, which financed 
his first fieldwork in Thailand. His wife, Linda Jones, and their children accom-
panied him to Thailand, and his  family lived in Chiang Mai while he collected 
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data for his dissertation work examining cultural variation in several Lahu vil-
lages in northern Thailand (LJ to DHP 3/3/08; Jones 1967).
The Jones children attended school in Chiang Mai, while their  father con-
ducted research in Lahu villages, regularly traveling back and forth between his 
research sites and his  family. Chiang Mai had a small air force installation with 
significant radar and communications facilities that Jones and  others in the 
community assumed  were monitoring Chinese communications. The Joneses 
and other expatriates assumed some sort of intelligence operation was being 
run out of Chiang Mai. Delmos Jones’s now former wife, Linda Jones, wrote me, 
almost four de cades  later, that at the time they “ were aware of American activi-
ties being conducted out of Chiang Mai. ‘Air Amer i ca’ had lots of planes flying 
in and out of Chiang Mai airport (an other wise pretty sleepy place).  People 
who ostensibly worked for vari ous American agencies, but who  were known to 
be cia would board he li cop ters and go of, sometimes never to return. Their 
wives could never get any information and  were eventually removed from the 
country” (LJ to DHP 3/3/08).
Eforts  were made to maintain a pretense that Chiang Mai was not a covert- 
ops base, but with the Jones’s children attending the area’s only En glish lan-
guage school and playing with the children of personnel stationed at Chiang 
Mai, it became apparent from socializing with this community that this base 
was being used for clandestine operations.  These paramilitary activities occur-
ring in the background of his fieldwork troubled Jones, and as  these activities 
 later crept into the foreground, the knowledge of military- intelligence interests 
in his own work became increasingly difficult for Jones to ignore.
 After returning from this fieldwork, Jones completed and defended his dis-
sertation at Cornell in 1967 without delving into the po liti cal backdrop of his 
traditional comparative village study. Like so many other anthropologists who 
 were encountering American paramilitary or intelligence activities while con-
ducting fieldwork, he wrote his dissertation without remarking on  these events. 
This has long been the standard practice of the discipline, and to do other wise 
would have been unusual and academically inadvisable (see Nader 1997b).
We now know that the cia was trying to monitor the spread of communist 
sympathies in the area of northern Thailand where Jones was working. The Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate report titled “Communist Insurgency in Thailand” 
(1968) described agricultural programs implemented in the region of Jones’s 
work as vital elements of the region’s counterinsurgency campaign. The cia 
monitored counterinsurgency operations, giving special attention to the use of 
“Mobile Development Units (mdu), teams of specialists working on small- scale 
projects and attempting to stimulate self- help eforts in selected villages, and 
the village- level programs of the Community Development Department” and 
the ard [Accelerated Rural Development] program they hoped would  counter 
“the economic deficiencies which the Communists attempt to exploit” (cia 
1968a: 8–9).
In 1970 a Fulbright Fellowship allowed Jones to return to Chiang Mai, where 
he expanded on his earlier village- based research. Once in Chiang Mai, Jones 
found that American intelligence operations in the region had drastically in-
creased. Linda Jones  later wrote me:
I remember we  were quite proud of [the Fulbright Fellowship], but discovered 
how naive we had been when we discovered that in Chiang Mai we would report 
to usis (known to be cia). Shortly  after we settled in Chiang Mai, we went to the 
Chiang Mai  hotel for dinner. While we  were eating, an American came over to 
speak with us. He told Del that he was part of an arpa program collecting infor-
mation about the Hill Tribes. Del was uninterested in cooperating. This fellow said 
it  didn’t  matter. They had computerized and indexed all of his papers and notes 
anyway. Eye- opening shock number 2! So it went for I think about 5 months when 
Del had had enough of the situation. He told the head of usis that we wished to 
leave Thailand immediately. In return, he was told that our fare home would not 
be paid. Del threatened to publish what he knew and they backed of. Our fare was 
paid and we left.
It was out of this ferment that Del began to write and speak about how the work 
of anthropologists could be used, even if they did not explic itly cooperate with 
governments. We talked about how it was common for anthropologists to note 
in their reports the names of village leaders, population counts and geo graph i cal 
locations.  These facts could then be used in ways that would not be in the best inter-
ests of the tribes. At that time, the tribal villages  were suspected of harboring com-
munists. To remove this opportunity, entire villages would just be uprooted and 
moved against their  will. The idea was to get them out of the mountains, but their 
knowledge of agriculture was geared to that environment, not to that of the valleys. 
Also, the Thais  were very prejudiced against the tribal  people. Once they  were relo-
cated to the valleys, they  were handy targets for mistreatment. (LJ to DHP 3/3/08)
Jones had not looked to become involved in a contentious po liti cal issue, but he 
understood that if he did not withdraw from his planned research proj ect, his 
work would be used by military or intelligence operatives for purposes that he 
did not approve, and to which his research participants had not consented.
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Jones returned to the United States and began writing about how troubled 
he was by his experiences in Thailand. His angst was channeled into the short 
piece “Social Responsibility and the Belief in Basic Research: An Example from 
Thailand,” published the following year in Current Anthropology. He identified 
the dangers facing anthropologists and research participants, not only when 
anthropologists engaged in military- sponsored research but even when they 
conducted basic in de pen dent research that had potential uses in informing 
counterinsurgency operations.
Jones described the economic importance of the highland and lowland re-
gions of Vietnam and stressed the military significance of highland villages 
 because they “can be of tremendous strategic importance for storing supplies 
and establishing camps for guerrilla forces” (1971b: 347). He connected  these 
same dynamics with the situation in Thailand’s highlands and lowlands and 
asked, did “the anthropologists who rushed into the area to do basic descriptive 
studies consider  these po liti cal facts? It is safe to say that most of us did not” 
(347). Jones questioned  whether it was a coincidence that funding for research 
on the cultures of  these highland peoples had increased throughout the de cade, 
by arpa and nonmilitary organizations (348).
He wrote that the Thai Information Center was “controlled and funded” by 
arpa, and that it held a collection of more than fifteen thousand documents 
gathered by the Thai and American governments (Jones 1971b: 348). But Jones’s 
fundamental criticism was not directed at arpa; he considered all anthropolo-
gists culpable, himself included, and argued, “Most of us who have conducted 
basic research in Thailand have in fact contributed to that end, we might as well 
have taken arpa’s money. The question of ethics and responsibility may have 
 little to do with the source of funding and much more with the social and po-
liti cal context within which the data are produced” (348).
Jones described specific reports and publications focused on counterinsur-
gency and the control of highland populations and argued that “the more in-
formation  there is available, the easier it is to develop new techniques of dealing 
with the  people whom the government is trying to manipulate. The techniques 
may not be ones the social scientist himself conceives; the results may not be 
ones he would approve. Nevertheless,  those approaches that have been devel-
oped and are being developed by the United States and Thai governments to 
deal with hill peoples have been aided by all of us who have done research on 
hill culture” (1971b: 348).  Because of the po liti cal context in which this field-
work was conducted, Jones saw a clear ethical course of action. He argued that 
anthropologists should “consider seriously the po liti cal implications of research 
and publication and cease  doing both where the situation warrants” (349). Jones 
insisted that anthropologists needed to embrace their po liti cal values and to use 
their scholarly research to advance po liti cal causes they supported. This was 
not an anticounterinsurgency stance but one insisting that since anthropologi-
cal work was being used for unintended ends, researchers should clarify their 
po liti cal stance and integrate it into the work they published. He wrote, “An-
thropologists who wished to aid the counterinsurgency eforts of the United 
States in Southeast Asia should do so, and do so with conviction. Such persons 
can at least be respected. I would class as unethical only  those who attempt to 
hide  behind the idea of pure research while their activities aid the preserva-
tion of the status quo” (349). Jones’s argument bestowed res pect on anthropolo-
gists like Gerald Hickey, while damning a seeming majority of anthropologists 
whose silence appeared to support a belief in the neutrality of research.
While Jones’s call for anthropologists to acknowledge their research as in-
evitably embedded within larger po liti cal pro cesses that left them without the 
option of neutrality, his call for anthropologists to acknowledge their po liti cal 
stance helped clarify this situation, but it did not resolve problems of anthropo-
logical data being used for ends they did not approve. An anthropologist who 
clarified his or her anticounterinsurgency stance while continuing to report 
ethnographic information that could be used for counterinsurgency campaigns 
still left studied populations vulnerable.
Jones argued that anthropologists should cease chasing funding and publish-
ing opportunities that advanced their careers but could endanger  those they 
studied, arguing that “ there is no longer any excuse for any of us to pretend that 
the results of our research are not being used to help bring about the oppression 
of groups. This has been the traditional role of the anthropologist, it seems” 
(1971b: 349).
Anthropologists on the New York Review of Books Warpath
In November 1970, Joseph Jorgensen and Eric Wolf published a lengthy analy sis 
in the New York Review of Books, “Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand,” 
describing military and intelligence eforts to use anthropological knowledge 
for counterinsurgency operations in Southeast Asia, and ofering an impor tant 
critique of anthropology’s historical connections with colonialism, military and 
intelligence agencies. They described the collection of identifying data on indi-
viduals and ethnic groups as a means of tracking and manipulating populations 
in Thailand, including proposals by the Tribal Data Center, in Chiang Mai, 
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Thailand to monitor villagers using village data cards. They also championed the 
recent work of an unnamed anthropologist (Delmos Jones) who resisted eforts 
to co- opt his fieldwork in Thailand for counterinsurgency programs. Jorgensen 
and Wolf also wrongly assumed that it was the brouhaha deriving from the 
Student Mobilization Committee’s leaking of documents that led the unnamed 
Jones to take a stand against what he had seen in Thailand earlier that year (Jor-
gensen & Wolf 1970; Jones 1971b).
On July 22, 1971, Delmos Jones published a response to Jorgensen and Wolf ’s 
essay, clarifying that his decision to speak out against the abuses of anthropologi-
cal research in Thailand was unrelated to the Student Mobilization Committee’s 
revelations (Jones 1971a). Jones identified himself as the unnamed anthropolo-
gist described in their article and explained that he had chosen not to publish 
his findings  because of his concerns that the military would abuse his work. 
Jones bristled at being cast as the hero of Jorgensen and Wolf ’s piece, pointing 
out the article’s errors and mischaracterizations both large and small and end-
ing his response by striking back at the authors, writing that “the distortions 
presented in the Wolf and Jorgensen article are disturbing.” According to Jones, 
“They seized upon the more or less individual examples ofered, rather than 
the general issues which  were being discussed. The prob lem is not restricted to 
Thailand. The comments which I made about anthropologists  were meant to 
apply to anthropologists in general, not only to  those who worked in Thailand. 
The prob lem comes even closer to home as we begin to shift our attention to the 
study of urban areas in the United States” (1971a).
In 1973,  after learning that  U.S. Special Forces had translated his ethno-
graphic writings and used them in armed campaigns, Georges Condominas 
acknowledged that anthropologists’ writings could be used by military and in-
telligence agencies in ways anthropologists never intended, but he argued that 
Jones went too far in suggesting that anthropologists should refrain from pub-
lishing altogether. Condominas argued that anthropologists  were engaging in 
what he termed a “double exaggeration”: the first exaggeration occurred when 
they overestimated the military’s understanding of how to use anthropologi-
cal reports against local populations; the second exaggeration was the assump-
tion that even if military or intelligence personnel learned how to exploit an-
thropological knowledge, it would be difficult to convince anyone within the 
entrenched military- intelligence bureaucracy to take action using this knowl-
edge (Condominas 1979: 192). Condominas’s second point certainly voiced a 
recurrent experience of many World War II anthropologists (see D. H. Price 
2008a: 197).
Condominas believed anthropologists’ self- deceptions came from a “lack of 
modesty” and that the media embraced and spread  these ideas. He wrote:
We all know how difficult it is to convince specialists even with training in the 
social sciences to admit the practical importance of the cultural frame in a limited 
program of development. It is difficult to conceive how the military, or their so- 
called advisors, whose creed is force, would be able to use such data on such a large 
scale as they fight against counterinsurgency. Even if one of them, as a technically 
good anthropologist having betrayed his profession, wanted to launch himself into 
such an operation, he would very soon be blocked by an institution as strictly 
structured as an army.  There are of course some kinds of documents which give 
information useful for police operations, such as demographic data. But for that 
job they have no need of anthropologists; a local border police sergeant, such as 
 those in Thailand, is more than enough. (Condominas 1979: 192)
Condominas ridiculed claims that anthropological knowledge could shift 
counterinsurgency operations as betraying “naïve confidence in science” and 
revealing a predilection for wasteful military spending (Condominas 1979: 192).
Delmos Jones’s admonition that anthropologists “consider seriously the po-
liti cal implications of research and publication and cease  doing both” (1971b: 
349) to undermine the militarization of anthropological knowledge cut to the 
heart of Cold War anthropology’s dual use problems, but it ignored the po liti cal 
economy that governed the lives of most anthropologists. In academic settings 
where struggles for tenure and promotion guide many of the contingencies reg-
ulating research and publication decisions, such an altruistic call to not publish 
is doomed (to abuse an evolutionary meta phor) to lead to an evolutionary dead 
end, as  those following this ethical call for silence would inevitably be selected 
against. Outside the acad emy, applied anthropologists choosing to not write 
reports would face even grimmer survival prospects. As Eric Ross observed, 
“While anthropologists readily profess to be the advocates of the dispossessed, 
their theoretical tendencies nonetheless have often been in conflict with the 
needs of the world’s poor by failing to clarify the structural sources of injustice 
or to endorse radical, systemic solutions” (1998a: 497).
On Good Intentions, Naiveté, and Bad Outcomes
While Hickey tried to influence American policy in Vietnam by working within 
the system to afect incremental change, other anthropologists used less ortho-
dox means to direct attention to the failures of American actions. In August 
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1965, Marshall Sahlins paid his own way to Saigon and traveled for ten days in 
South Vietnam, talking with American soldiers and learning about the Ameri-
can presence  there (Sahlins 2000a; MS to DHP 8/1/14).8 Returning home, he 
published his essay “The Destruction of Conscience in Vietnam” (1966), and 
his reports of his interactions with some locals and U.S. and South Viet nam ese 
military personnel broke a significant silence, as he wrote: “It is often said of South 
Vietnam that the day belongs to the government, the night to the ‘Vietcong.’ 
Perhaps it is better said of An Phu District that the day belongs to the Neolithic, 
the night to the Cold War of the mid- twentieth  century” (Sahlins 2000a: 229).
Sahlins’s contributions  were unlike Hickey’s eforts to redirect or shore up 
the failed American military presence by hoping for a less destructive, more 
efective activities; instead, Sahlins found a corruption of mission so pervasive 
that regardless of individual intentions, no good outcome could be achieved 
in a war requiring that the conscience of  those fighting “must be destroyed” 
(2000a: 248). Sahlins understood the intentions of  those trying to diminish the 
impact of the war to be admirable, writing that “the motivation and dedication 
of American aid  people is beyond question and not at issue. Many, I under-
stand, work tirelessly  under dangerous conditions to bring a modicum of bet-
terment to the countryside. Likewise the small Special Forces detachment I saw 
at An Phu was committed to a program of medical and economic aid for the 
 people — the Peace Corps of the War Corps. But  these slim mea sures of good 
intention have to be put in the balance against the huge, unplanned subsidiza-
tion of de cadence in the cities to determine a final reading on the American 
presence” (237).
Jones’s stance was perhaps even more radical than Sahlins’s as his analy-
sis questioned the responsibility of all anthropologists who made their work 
public. Jones and Hickey ofered stark choices to anthropologists with needed 
expertise during times of war, a choice between  either blind optimism that 
individuals can redirect institutional uses of knowledge or maintain a state 
of recalcitrant skeptical silence. Hickey believed he could steer the military 
straight; Jones believed that military and intelligence agencies would rob his 
and other anthropologists’ work for their own ends and that he had no control 
over  these uses. Hickey’s memoir chronicled how his reports  were used only 
in selective ways or ignored, yet he did not adequately consider the possibility 
that structural dynamics governing the military’s consumption of anthropo-
logical knowledge necessarily led to such outcomes —  unless anthropologists 
front- load their assumptions to meet with military culture, a tendency that 
often seems to increase over time. Hickey acknowledged that  these structural 
dynamics are rooted in the forms of military and civilian decision making but 
they also derive from the deeper contingencies bred within forms of warfare in 
neo co lo nial states seeking to suppress occupied insurgents.
Hickey was a slow learner. Over the course of a de cade he was unable to 
acknowledge that the larger forces unleashed when he and other anthropolo-
gists engaged with military decision makers doomed his ability to control how 
ethnographic reports would be used. Hickey’s cameo in The Quiet American 
leaves us with an ironic moment for viewing his contributions to American 
military and intelligence policies over the dozen years that followed his film 
debut, but this afterimage also portrays him as having an early awareness of 
Graham Greene’s critique of the cia’s interventions and intentions in Vietnam. 
Hickey appears as a tragic figure — but why he is tragic changes with dif er ent 
readings. One can read him as a martyr or a willfully ignorant, tragic hero, or 
as naive, self- serving, or uncaring, but  there is no reason for contemporary 
anthropologists to not learn from his experiences. Some might claim the moral 
of Hickey’s story is that we must work harder to make the military understand 
what anthropology has to ofer, but such an interpretation ignores the impor-
tance of institutional culture and the possibility of larger contingencies govern-
ing the use of military knowledge. One lesson from Hickey’s years trying to 
protect groups with his failed eforts to redirect American military actions is 
that in the last instance, motivations can have  little impact on outcomes. As Gra-
ham Greene’s narrator Thomas Fowler said of Alden Pyle, “I never knew a man 
who had better motives for all the trou ble he caused” (1955: 60).
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The days of naïve anthropology are over. It is no longer adequate to  
collect information about  little known and powerless  people; one needs  
to know also the uses to which that knowledge can be put.
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T H I R T E E N   A N T H R O P O L O G I S T S  
F O R  R A D I C A L  P O  L I T I  C A L  A C T I O N  
A N D  R E V O L U T I O N  W I T H I N  T H E  A A A
By the mid-1960s, American anthropologists  were at the forefront of growing 
movements on American campuses to stop the war in Vietnam. In March 1965, 
Marshall Sahlins led the movement to establish the first teach-in against the 
war in Vietnam on the campus of the University of Michigan. This was a pre-
cipitous cultural moment of anarchic simplicity and power, loosely bringing to-
gether scholars with relevant perspectives on the war and American militarism 
and a large audience hungering for critique. The moment spread like wildfire. 
“Within weeks of the first teach-in at Michigan,” according to Sahlins, “ there 
 were over 100 such events in colleges and universities across the country, cul-
minating in mid- May with an all- day National Teach- In in Washington, DC” 
(2009: 4). What ever lessons of conformity, silence, and disengagement had 
been imparted to anthropologist- activists in the 1950s  were quickly set aside, 
as anthropologists became central figures in radical critiques of militarism and 
the war in Vietnam and played central roles in campus uprisings and national 
debates (Sanjek 1995; Gough 1968; D. H. Price 2004b: 306–40).
Within the American Anthropological Association, the establishment of the 
Radical Caucus in 1967 brought the association a firm critical voice, yet  until a 
change was made in the bylaws in 1969, the gradu ate students who  were devel-
oping this voice  were disenfranchised from voting on association business.1 The 
Radical Caucus and,  later, Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action or ga-
nized an impressive collection of sessions at aaa meetings in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s focusing on themes of liberation, anthropological praxis, Marxist 
theory, and colonial critiques. The aaa’s 1969 business meeting demonstrated 
the power of the Radical Caucus, as members  adopted eigh teen resolutions, all 
of which  were  later ratified in a mail vote (D. H. Price 2008b).
In ratifying the Radical Caucus’s 1969 slate of resolutions, the membership 
supported the following: an investigation of uses made of  U.S. arms sent to 
Latin Amer i ca (passed by a vote of 1,450 to 573); “developing sanctions against 
discrimination based on sex” (passed, 1,367 to 633); and Karen Sacks’s resolutions 
that “members  shall not engage in secret or classified Research” (passed, 1,077 
to 941) and that “field workers  shall not divulge information about in for mants 
that might endanger their well- being or cultural integrity” (passed, 1,607 to 
433) (naaa 1970 11[6]: 1; naaa 1970 11[1]: 7). Other resolutions, presented in 
 table 13.1, ofered moral support to Alaskan natives in land disputes, took a stand 
against sex discrimination, and opposed the construction of California’s Dos 
Rios Dam (see naaa 1970 11[1]: 7; naaa 1970 11[6]: 1).
While the membership’s votes demonstrated that the Radical Caucus’s po liti-
cal stances represented a disciplinary norm,  these positions  were not generally 
shared by the association’s established power base. This schism would come 
to dominate the dramas to be acted out at the association council meetings in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The aaa leadership’s narrative during this pe-
riod conjured up visions of an undemo cratic mob hijacking control of council 
meetings, while the views of a claimed  silent majority of members  were not 
present. But the mail votes of the wider membership in 1969, 1970, 1971, and 
 later demonstrated that when aaa voting members  were able to vote on a full 
docket of radical propositions, they  adopted nearly  every radical resolution 
that they had the opportunity to consider.
The Thai Affair
The Student Mobilizer was an “underground” tabloid- size paper published by 
the national organ ization, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the 
War in Vietnam (smc). The April 2, 1970, cover of the Mobilizer proclaimed, 
“Counterinsurgency Research on Campus exposed,” referring to the title of a 
sixteen- hundred- word exposé based on documents stolen from the ucla of-
fice of anthropologist Michael Moerman.  These stolen documents detailed the 
work of Moerman and three other anthropologists (Herbert Phillips, Steven 
Piker, and Lauriston Sharp) on arpa- sponsored counterinsurgency research 
projects in Thailand, and of the Academic Advisory Committee for Thailand 
(aact), usaid, seadag, and other organizations. Other Student Mobilizer 
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articles focused on seadag membership, the role of Abt Associates in Proj-
ect Agile, ending campus- based counterinsurgency research, Michigan State 
University’s past role in Vietnam counterinsurgency research, usaid’s role in 
Thailand, and a geographic listing of Thai experts at American universities 
(Mobilizer 1970).
The stolen documents  were quoted at length in the Mobilizer and showed how 
the Defense Department’s arpa used anthropologists and other social scientists 
 TA B L E   1 3 . 1   aaa Resolutions Ratified in 1969 (Source: naaa 1970 11[6]:1)
1. Recognition of the legitimacy and importance of research and training in 
contemporary American Society (1,962 to 1,360).
2. Recruiting into anthropology members of minority groups (1,847 to 233).
3. Continuing support of unesco (2,030 to 67).
4. Endorsing the academic freedom and tenure statements of the aaup and caut 
(1,962 to 123).
5. Urging just and equitable settlement in the native Alaskan land claims (1,945 
to 143).
6. Demanding investigation of uses made of U.S. arms to Latin Amer i ca (1,450 to 
573).
7. Urging moral support and professional skills be ofered to the Alaskan natives 
in their land claims (1,971 to 121).
8. Urging endorsement of the 10- point resolution prepared for the Experimental 
Session on  Women in the Professions (1,231 to 741).
9. Resolving that the aaa go on rec ord against sex discrimination (1,816 to 260).
10. Establishing a committee to collect and publish data and to take action on all 
cases of sex discrimination in anthropology (1,370 to 662).
11. Publishing data on sex ratios in positions in anthropology in the Newsletter of 
the American Anthropological Association (1,453 to 586).
12. Developing sanctions against discrimination based on sex (1,367 to 633).
13. Resolving that aaa members  shall not engage in secret or classified research 
(1,077 to 941).
14. Resolving that fieldworkers  shall not divulge information about in for mants 
that might endanger their well- being or cultural integrity (1,607 to 433).
15. Condemning Jensen’s article on racial diferences in intelligence (1,795 to 239).
16. Requesting all anthropologists to use all available media outlets to inform the 
public on the correct facts of  human variability and that reports on such 
activity be included in a special section in the Newsletter (1,803 to 218).
17. Opposing construction of the Dos Rios dam and its subsequent destruction of 
 human values (1,789 to 171).
to improve the military’s understanding of the cultural groups it sought to con-
trol in rural Thailand (Mobilizer 1970: 3). The Mobilizer printed excerpts from 
a 1967 letter by Herbert Phillips complaining about the poor quality of arpa 
social science, which was conducted by “only two professionally trained an-
thropologists” and a collection of  people with bachelor’s degrees in subjects 
such as physics or public administration taking the title of anthropologists, 
“to provide them with a veneer of legitimacy.” Phillips estimated that “ there 
are about eight of  these pseudoanthropologists in the entire arpa proj ect” 
(Mobilizer 1970: 26).
The Mobilizer’s published documents did not show  these anthropologists 
walking in lockstep with the military. In a letter that Phillips sent to anthro-
pologist William Rittenberg on May 1, 1967, Phillips wrote, “ There is  little that is 
particularly secretive, earth- shaking, or cia’ish about arpa activities; most of 
their  people are intelligent, but bumbling American bureaucrats trying to ob-
tain basic descriptive materials on aspects of Thai society” (Mobilizer 1970: 26). 
In this 1967 letter Phillips worried about arpa hiring fake “anthropologists” 
and about the in efec tive ness of arpa’s governmental bureaucracy, arguing that 
“ there is  little that we, as scholars, can do about it,  unless we choose to become 
applied anthropologists or advisors to arpa — a position that is not without its 
professional and moral dilemmas, but one that does involve more intellectual 
and moral responsibility than sitting on the sidelines and simply condemn-
ing arpa for its immorality or in efec tive ness” (Mobilizer 1970: 26).  These 
documents showed usaid, arpa, and aact buying access to Piker, Moerman, 
Sharp, and Phillips, as well as economists, po liti cal scientists, and geographers, 
to gain their expertise for Thai counterinsurgency programs operating  under 
euphemisms like “village security” programs.  Whether this purchased access 
meaningfully altered American interactions with Thai populations, or sim-
ply addressed the legitimacy concerns raised by Phillips and  others that  these 
agencies  were only using fake “anthropologists” was open to interpretation; but 
the revelations of  these anthropologists’ interactions with  these appendages of 
Amer i ca’s intelligence apparatus shocked the discipline.
The smc held a press conference in San Francisco and read from a tele gram, 
sent on April 1 by Marshall Sahlins and Eric Wolf, and a statement by Gerald 
Berreman condemning anthropological contributions to counterinsurgency 
(ebw, MM to GF 4/24/70).  Because Wolf and Berreman  were members of the 
aaa Committee on Ethics,  these early condemnations soon became the focus 
of criticism by the accused anthropologists and their supporters.
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On April 3, 1970, in his role as chair of the aaa’s Committee on Ethics, Eric 
Wolf sent letters of inquiry to Michael Moerman, Herbert Phillips, Lauriston 
Sharp, and Steven Piker informing them that he and Joseph Jorgensen had 
seen “a number of documents bearing on the involvement of anthropologists 
in secret research.” Wolf informed  these individuals that their names appeared 
on  these documents and that the Committee on Ethics was investigating this 
 matter. Wolf wrote that the committee would “deal with cases on as anonymous 
a basis as pos si ble” and that it was making eforts to “develop an approach to 
cases without penalizing any individuals.” He invited them to make statements 
“especially in view of the past resolutions of our Association on the subject of 
clandestine research and restricted, non- public publication of research results” 
(ebw, EBW to MM 4/3/70).
While the letters sent to  these anthropologists  were identical,  there  were 
some variations in the responses Wolf received. Moerman responded with out-
rage,  others with a tone of personal hurt, having been attacked in the press 
before receiving Wolf ’s letter. Each argued that The Student Mobilizer’s uses of 
quotes without context created the false impression that their interactions with 
arpa assisted nefarious governmental actions in Southeast Asia. They  were 
angry that  others did not interpret their actions as eforts to correct misguided 
military acts.
The Accused Respond
Moerman wrote Wolf of his unease about how to address him or Sahlins. Moer-
man knew them as his former professors and friends but now found them “be-
having inhumanely . . .  and unprofessionally”  toward him (ebw, MM to EBW 
4/8/70). He insisted he had done nothing against the aaa’s Code of Ethics and 
believed that the tele gram to the Mobilizer indicated he had been prejudged as 
guilty. Moerman viewed Sahlins and Wolf ’s sending the tele gram as unprofes-
sional conduct, and he accused Wolf of acting in collusion with the Mobilizer 
(ebw, MM to EBW 4/8/70). Wolf wrote Moerman that on March 30, he and Jor-
gensen had received copies of the documents  later published in the Mobilizer 
and that  after reading  these, they responded to the ethical implications of this 
work in a message to the newspaper. Wolf stressed that he had not identified 
any individuals in his comments to the Mobilizer, and that he had no connec-
tion to the publication or control over what it published (ebw, EBW to MM 
4/14/70).
On April 10, 1970, Charles Keyes circulated a sixteen- hundred word state-
ment to colleagues, explaining both the circumstances  under which his name 
had appeared in The Student Mobilizer article and his involvement with seadag. 
He indicated that his research in Thailand was funded by the Ford Foundation’s 
Foreign Area Fellowship program and the nsf, not by the military. Keyes had 
joined seadag to voice concerns about U.S. policies in circles that included 
policy makers. With time he “grew disillusioned with seadag owing to the fact 
that its structure and leadership have prevented it from being such a forum,” 
and he had not participated in any seadag activities for three years (st 62, 8, 
4/10/70). Keyes came to understand that policy makers tended to ignore cri-
tiques from scholars not aligned with their preconceptions or with U.S. poli-
cies. But Keyes did not completely withdraw from his engagement with usaid 
policy groups;  after disengaging with seadag, in early 1968 he joined usaid’s 
Academic Advisory Council for Thailand. Keyes wrote that he had no idea 
that aact was involved in counterinsurgency operations  until he attended a 
recent Association for Asian Studies meeting — where he had learned the Re-
gents of the University of California had authorized aact- usaid counterin-
surgency work (st 62, 8, 4/10/70).
Keyes wrote that he and other aact members  were never asked to contrib-
ute to Thai counterinsurgency operations, and that all proceedings of aact 
 were open to the public and reported in the Newsletter of the Association of 
Asian Studies. He explained that his only interaction with arpa had occurred 
in January 1967 when he traveled to Washington, DC,
to protest the allocation of extremely large sums of money for social science re-
search on counterinsurgency in Thailand. As a result of that meeting, I realized 
that arpa was unwilling to reconsider its decision to undertake the work it had 
projected and thus I wrote to my colleagues warning them that arpa research was 
of such a scale that no scholar undertaking field work in Thailand would be able 
to leave it out of account. My worst fears have subsequently been realized as it is 
now apparent that all research by Americans in Thailand has been seriously compro-
mised by the fact that the greatest proportion of research funds spent by Americans in 
Thailand and the largest number of American researchers involved  there have been 
connected with agencies whose aim it is to further the objectives of counterinsurgency 
programs. (st 62, 8, 4/10/70, emphasis added)
Keyes was concerned about the “size and character of the American presence 
in Thailand,” and he expressed his opposition to counterinsurgency research.
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Herbert Phillips wrote angry replies to Wolf (ebw HP to EBW 4/5/70; 4/6/70) 
and Berreman (ebw HP to GB 4/4/70).  After Wolf replied in a lengthy circum-
spect letter (ebw EBW to HP 4/12/70), Phillips  adopted a more mea sured tone, 
but he continued to call for Wolf ’s, Berreman’s, and Jorgensen’s resignations 
(ebw HP to EBW 4/16/70). Phillips complained that he had not seen a copy 
of the documents taken from Moerman’s office  until May 19, 1970, and that he 
had to request  these from the committee (ebw, HP to aaa Committee on Eth-
ics 5/19/70). Phillips stressed  there was nothing secret about arpa’s relation-
ship with anthropologists working in Thailand, and that “any social scientist 
who has been in Thailand for a week knows about the role that arpa — with 
its annual bud get of 5–12 million dollars — plays in subverting the purpose and 
direction of social science research in that country” (ebw, HP to aaa Com-
mittee on Ethics 5/19/70). Phillips told Wolf that he had overstepped his role as 
chair of the Committee on Ethics and asked him to resign from the committee 
(ebw, HP to EBW, 4/5/70); he also chided the committee, writing that “if this 
is the way you treat your in for mants in the field, God help the anthropological 
profession” (ebw, HP to aaa Committee on Ethics 5/19/70).
Steven Piker’s response to Wolf was calm and nonthreatening (EBW; SP 
to EBW 4/6/70). Piker replied that he was “happy . . .  to make known to your 
committee — and anyone  else who might inquire — the specifics of all research 
and professional work generally in which I have been involved since my as-
sociation with anthropology began more than ten years ago” (ebw, SP to EBW 
4/6/70). To demonstrate his long- standing opposition to American militarism 
in Southeast Asia, Piker mailed Wolf two academic papers, from 1966 and 1969, 
voicing his opposition to U.S. military policy in Vietnam and Thailand (ebw, 
SP to EBW 4/6/70).
On April 8, 1970, Lauriston Sharp sent a memo, titled “Allegations of Profes-
sional Impropriety,” to the officers of Cornell University and sent carbon copies 
to a large group of colleagues (st 62, 8, 4/8/70). Sharp wrote that the “scholarly 
integrity” of aact had recently been attacked in The Student Mobilizer, making 
charges that
aact conducts, organizes, coordinates, and initiates “counterinsurgency” re-
search on Thailand according to the needs of the Agency for International Devel-
opment, that its members work “secretly (or semi- secretly) serving as instruments 
of counterinsurgency programs in Thailand,” and that it has “been employed by 
the United States government as part of a counterinsurgency program directed 
against revolution in the Kingdom of Thailand.” Charges that aact in pursuit of 
its alleged “counterinsurgency” interest improperly intervened in the scholarly 
meetings of the Association of Asian Studies on April 3, 1970,  were rejected by the 
A.A.S. Program Committee and received and not acted on by the Board of Direc-
tors. (st 62, 8, 4/8/70)
Sharp’s enclosed documents described the work undertaken by aact, as well as 
copies of The Student Mobilizer article and an aact reply to a New York Times 
story on aact (see nyt 1970, for original story).
Sharp asked colleagues to examine “selected excerpts from some of the pur-
loined documents as published in The Student Mobilizer on April 2, 1970, of 
which I unfortunately purchased only two copies at the Association for Asian 
Studies and Committee of Concerned Sian Scholars meeting in San Francisco 
last week,” as well as an aact press release and other aact documents (st 62, 
8, 4/9/70). Answering accusations that he and  others at aact had engaged in 
clandestine activities, Sharp explained that  after checking with  others attend-
ing this meeting, he had confirmed that  there  were no reports issued (st 62, 8, 
4/9/70). He acknowledged that he was a member of the American Institute for 
Research, which he described as “a private organ ization which, I believe, had 
done classified research in Thailand for arpa and the Department of Defense, 
but with which I have never had any communication whatsoever” (st 62, 8, 
4/9/70).
Sharp sent a memo to colleagues across the country.  After quoting from pas-
sages published in The Student Mobilizer claiming that he and aact engaged 
in “secret” or “semi- secret” counterinsurgency research, Sharp complained that 
“nowhere is the term ‘counterinsurgency’ defined.” Sharp conceded that aact 
did “advise and consult with staf of the Agency for International Develop-
ment who are concerned with Thailand,” but he clarified that none of this re-
search dealt with “banditry, terrorism, or insurgency” (st 62, 8, 4/10/70). Sharp 
claimed that his work with aact “is totally unlike another kind of relationship 
in which universities undertook contracts to provide technical assistance di-
rectly,” specifying that arrangements with aact  were not like “Michigan State 
University’s famous Vietnam Public Administration Institute contract” or Cor-
nell’s work in the Philippines. He explained that aact was a prob lem- oriented 
research group drawing on scholars’ expertise as part of “U.S. non- military as-
sistance to Thailand” to share information about development for Thailand.
In his memo, Sharp argued this was an innocent study group, completely un-
connected with the counterinsurgency campaigns of the wars of Southeast Asia, 
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as if aid programs themselves existed outside of a specific geopo liti cal frame-
work. He assured colleagues that instead of working on military counterinsur-
gency operations, “aact is dealing with problems of agricultural production, 
land tenure, education, regionalism in North Thailand, population increase, 
urbanization and the urban- rural gap, investment, and means for supporting 
more research by Thai in Thailand” (st 62, 8, 4/10/70). But claims that  these 
development projects in Northern Thailand  were removed from the context of 
counterinsurgency rang false to many anthropologists.
Sharp maintained that none of this research was hidden from the public and 
that had smc “been more patient, we would have gladly sent them a full re-
port of this conference published in En glish and Thai” (st 62, 8, 4/10/70). He 
acknowledged that this conference included issues of civil security in isolated 
villages but claimed that in its “eagerness to depict aact as sinister,” smc “con-
cludes gratuitously that ‘security in this context is  really  counter insurgency’ ” 
(st 62, 8, 4/10/70).
 Because aact worked with groups with names similar to  those recently iden-
tified as working with the cia (e.g., Sharp mentioned aact’s association with 
the “Asia Society” being confused with the exposed cia- linked “Asia Founda-
tion”), Sharp argued, it was being accused of “guilt by association.”2 He believed 
the false claims that aact did Pentagon research created an “argument as vi-
cious and spurious as any concocted by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy” (st 
62, 8, 4/10/70). Sharp made no efort to distance himself or aact from usaid’s 
work in Thailand and stated that aact members “judge its work to be benevo-
lent and on the  whole beneficent and wanted by most Thai” (st 62, 8, 4/10/70). 
He stressed that aact had “complete control over their own work,” and as-
sured his colleagues that  there had “been no improper conduct as defined by 
my conscience or by the aaa 1967 ‘Statement on Ethics.’ ” He explained that 
he had been “moved to work with aact” by an interest in seeing if academic 
knowledge could improve policy, stressing his personal admiration of the Thai 
 people (st 62, 8, 4/10/70).
Sharp mailed Wolf memos he had sent to colleagues at Cornell in the after-
math of the Mobilizer article’s revelations. He pointed out several errors in the 
article (including claims that Sharp had been at a meeting in Bangkok in June 
and July 1969) and objected to eforts to not diferentiate between seadag, 
aact, and arpa work and the cia and other Pentagon programs (ebw, LS to 
Cornell Anth. 4/9/70). Sharp asked Wolf, Jorgensen, and Berreman to resign 
from the Committee on Ethics and then to  either make specific documented 
allegations or issue an apology (ebw, LS to EBW 4/17/70).
Questions of Which Party Engaged in Misconduct
Moerman, Phillips, Piker, and Sharp each wrote aaa president George Foster, 
arguing that if any wrongdoing was to be investigated by the aaa, it should be 
the be hav ior of Wolf, Berreman, and Jorgensen, not any accusations against 
themselves. Sharp wrote President Foster on May 8, 1970, that he would not 
cooperate with the Committee on Ethics given Wolf ’s and other committee 
members’ “slanders.” He requested that Foster appoint an aaa ad hoc commit-
tee to investigate Wolf ’s, Jorgensen’s, and Berreman’s unethical be hav ior (ebw, 
LS to GF 5/8/70).
Michael Moerman sent President Foster a thirteen- page letter requesting the 
appointment of an ad hoc committee to investigate the conduct of Wolf, Berre-
man, Jorgensen, and Sahlins, claiming that “a kangaroo court has been loosed 
on the profession, and we  were only the first to be kicked” (ebw, MM to GF 
4/24/70). Moerman explained that once he saw the  actual documents,
it was clear that my files had been stolen — no difficult task since the papers  were 
all personal, and not “secret” in any official sense and since the University cabinet 
in which they  were stored has no lock. That same eve ning I learned the last name 
of the man who had first presented my papers to the smc. His name was the same 
as that of a married gradu ate student who had worked for me as a typist  under my 
nsf grant from 12 June to 13 March and who had quit just before I was about to 
fire her. . . .  Since I had hired and retained this student (whose formal ma com-
mittee chairman I had been) only  because a colleague had recommended her and 
 because she pled poverty, my suspicions of her (since confirmed) made me feel 
that I had been used and my trust (I supervised neither her activities nor the hon-
esty of her time- reports) abused. The instantaneous corruption of trust caused by 
the smear tactics that have been used is also suggested by the suspicions that Phil-
lips and Wilson, long- time friends, had of me. (ebw, MM to GF 4/24/70)
Moerman called for Wolf ’s, Berreman’s, and Jorgensen’s resignations, arguing 
that “since I am accusing about half of the Ethics Committee of unethical be-
hav ior, it is clear that the Ethics Committee is not the arena for hearing my 
charge.” He worried that many other documents might have been stolen from 
his office, some of which could be misinterpreted in a bad light, and that if he 
made statements about the limits of his work, some forgotten exception could 
impeach his claims.
Moerman claimed to have evidence that a Committee on Ethics member was 
part of a conspiracy in which he “knew the kind of case which smc was assem-
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bling, ofered to fund it, and is sufficiently a party to  these operations to be told 
where the next files have been stolen from and to be sent copies of them. It is a 
charming slogan, ‘Even paranoids have enemies’ ” (ebw, MM to GF 4/24/70).3 
Moerman sent a copy of a letter to Foster that he claimed supported this as-
sertion, but soon Moerman dropped this claim from his litany of arguments.4
In April 1970, President Foster asked Ralph Beals  whether the actions of 
Keyes, Moerman, Phillips, Piker, and Sharp  were improper  under the standards 
Beals identified in the Statement on Problems of Anthropological Research and 
Ethics (spare), which the aaa had  adopted in 1967. Beals replied that  because 
this work was not clandestine, he did not identify specific activities as violating 
spare’s principles (Wakin 1992: 183). Beals wrote that it was an individual deci-
sion  whether or not an anthropologist contribute to governmental programs, 
and he indicated that Wolf, Jorgensen, and Berreman had acted unethically in 
speaking out as members of the Committee on Ethics and should resign from 
the committee (183–84).
Public Discourse in the aaa Newsletter and Beyond
In the June 1970 issue of the aaa Fellow Newsletter, the Executive Board pro-
vided a summary of the purloined documents published in the Student Mobi-
lizer and shared concerns raised by two of the (unidentified) professors who 
feared “their professional reputations have been adversely afected” and who 
questioned “the propriety of the action of two Ethics Committee members in 
this  matter.” The Executive Board reaffirmed the aaa’s spare document from 
1967 and the association’s recently  adopted resolutions prohibiting “secret or 
classified research” and research that “might endanger [the] well- being or cul-
tural integrity” of studied populations. The board wrote that Wolf ’s and Jor-
gensen’s actions “went beyond the mandate of the Executive Board” to the Com-
mittee on Ethics, and it admonished the committee to stick to its charge and 
clarified that personal statements must not be confused with official positions 
(aaafn 1970 11[6]: 10).
Wolf and Jorgensen responded to the board’s criticisms by providing additional 
information about the documents they received from the Mobilizer (naaa 1970 
11[7]: 2). Their response itemized the documents they received, listing minutes 
of the JASON group, an arpa counterinsurgency proposal, a 1969 report of a 
visit to rural Thai villages, a usaid contract, meeting agendas, and minutes. 
They wrote that  because  these documents contradicted the aaa’s resolution 
opposing clandestine and secret research, “we feel that they raise the most 
serious issues for the scientific integrity of our profession.” They rejected most 
of the Executive Board’s claims about pro cess and clarified they had not in-
discriminately circulated documents (naaa 1970 11[7]: 2). Wolf and Jorgensen 
stressed that this counterinsurgency research conflicted with the ethical prin-
ciples identified in Beals’s 1967 statement and  adopted by the association, and 
they presented examples of their correspondence.
Frustrated that the Executive Board so narrowly interpreted the Committee on 
Ethic’s charge, Wolf and Jorgensen stressed that while the board was trying to avert 
conflict, limiting the committee’s activities and chastising Wolf and Jorgensen cre-
ated more conflict.  Because of the board’s actions, Wolf and Jorgensen closed 
their letter by resigning from the Committee on Ethics (naaa 1970 11[7]: 19).
The Newsletter of the aaa published a letter from David Aberle registering 
his misgivings over the Executive Board’s criticisms of Wolf and Jorgensen. As 
a board member and the board’s liaison with the Committee on Ethics, Aberle 
had been a part of the board’s discussions leading to its criticism of Wolf and 
Jorgensen while ignoring the problems of anthropologists working for arpa in 
Thailand. In frustration, Aberle resigned as the board’s liaison with the com-
mittee (naaa 1970 11[7]: 19).
The Newsletter carried angry letters representing a broad spectrum of mem-
bers’ views, making arguments about ethics, politics, pro cess, fascism, and to-
talitarianism; one even (mistakenly) claimed that Eric Wolf ’s book Peasants 
contained a photo graph produced by a Soviet propaganda agency (naaa 1970 
11[8]: 12). In one letter, Robert Ehrich sounded an alarm that Berreman could 
win the upcoming aaa presidential election if he split the establishment vote 
with the three establishment candidates (Albert Spaul ding, James Spuhler, and 
Anthony Wallace) all remaining in the election (naaa 1970 11[7]: 22). The next 
issue of the Newsletter carried an announcement that Spaul ding and Spuhler 
had withdrawn their candidacy (naaa 1970 11[8]: 1). As discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, Jorgensen and Wolf raised the public profile of this crisis by 
publishing “Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand” in the November 19, 
1970, issue of the New York Review of Books.
In the November Newsletter, David Schneider and David Aberle published 
(as a “minority report”) a lengthy resolution that they had submitted to the 
Executive Board at its October meeting, but which had failed to garner board 
support. Their resolution called for the establishment of a fact- finding commit-
tee to investigate claims that anthropologists  were assisting counterinsurgency 
campaigns in Thailand, in violation of the aaa’s expressed position in the 1967 
Beals statement. Some of the accused used the Newsletter as a platform for de-
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fending themselves. Herbert Phillips attacked the Committee on Ethics in the 
Newsletter, claiming it had “misinformed the membership” and forfeited claims of 
impartiality (naaa 1971 12[1]: 2, 7–9). Moerman explained he had been a usaid 
con sul tant from 1964 to 1970, out of a conviction that American policy in Thai-
land was based on ignorance and he wished to improve it (naaa 1971 12[1]: 
9–11). He described his work on usaid’s ard program not as counterinsur-
gency but as development work, and he explained that his work with jason (at 
an unclassified meeting) was an efort to add some understanding of the com-
plex environment in which foreign aid was being directed (naaa 1971 12[1]: 10).
The 1970 annual report of the Committee on Ethics stated that Wolf had 
acted properly in calling for more information  after he received documents 
from The Student Mobilizer. It found Wolf ’s statements as a private citizen  were 
appropriate and concluded that “acting as a body, we therefore gave our unan-
i mous support and endorsement to Wolf and Jorgensen at our May 2 meeting, 
transmitting the first resolution” (naaa 1970 11[9]: 12). The report’s Appendix A 
was the committee’s proposed Principles of Professional Responsibility (ppr).
At the 1970 aaa annual council meeting, the Radical Caucus maintained 
a forceful presence, passing thirteen resolutions, including ones from Radical 
Caucus members on gay rights, the status of  women, and the treatment of Bra-
zilian Indians.5 One  adopted resolution required the Executive Board to adopt 
the resolution that Schneider and Aberle initially had failed to pass within the 
Executive Board (subsequently published in the Newsletter) calling for the for-
mation of an ad hoc committee to investigate the Thai afair. In response to this 
motion  adopted at the council meeting, the Executive Board  adopted a motion 
calling for the “establishment of an ad hoc committee of inquiry to deal with 
the controversy over research and other activities of United States anthropolo-
gists in Thailand and their implications for anthropology as a profession and 
for anthropological research throughout the world” (naaa 1971 12[1]: 1). The 
motion clearly stated that the ad hoc committee’s charge was to investigate con-
troversies involving U.S. anthropologists working in Thailand; it did not charge 
the committee with investigating the actions of Wolf, Jorgensen, or the aaa 
Committee on Ethics — yet the Executive Board would soon take actions to 
subvert this demo cratically approved resolution, leading to this result.
Heading  toward the Mead Committee
George Foster and most of the Executive Board represented the discipline’s 
older generation, a group that largely opposed the sort of antiwar militancy 
that Wolf, Sahlins, and many younger anthropologists advocated.6 Had Foster 
charged a task force with investigating the propriety of Wolf ’s, Berreman’s, and 
Jorgensen’s actions,  there would have been a significant uproar from the aaa’s 
increasingly or ga nized and activist radical members. When Foster first charged 
the ad hoc committee, its instructions  were broad and phrased in such a way 
that it appeared the committee would primarily investigate the ethical pro-
priety of anthropologists assisting counterinsurgency operations in Southeast 
Asia. At its February 1971 meeting, the Executive Board deci ded the inquiry 
charge endorsed at the 1970 council meeting would have prohibitive costs due 
to the need to hire attorneys and gather testimony, and the board modified the 
description of, and charge for, the committee (naaa 1971 12[3]: 1).
The new charge instructed the committee to use primarily existing docu-
mentation, requesting additional written statements as needed from designated 
parties. The committee was also instructed to “determine what, if any, aspects 
of  these activities  violated the principles of that 1967 statement or subsequent 
resolutions pertaining to ethics and professional conduct passed by the Asso-
ciation” (naaa 1971 12[3]: 1). The committee was now also charged with investi-
gating the conduct of members of the Committee on Ethics. It was to “prepare 
a report to the Board for release to members of the Association”; this report was 
to summarize findings and make recommendations (naaa 1971 12[3]: 1, 6–7). 
The committee was to consider  whether the approved 1967 ethics statements 
(spare), as well as the pending Code of Professional Conduct (which would 
become the previously mentioned ppr), had been  violated (see Wakin 1992: 
202–3). By revising the charge, Foster cleared the way for Mead’s committee to at-
tack Berreman, Jorgensen, and Wolf while ignoring the ethical questions raised 
by anthropologists working on counterinsurgency projects.
The anthropologists appointed to the aaa’s Ad Hoc Committee to Evalu-
ate the Controversy Concerning Anthropological Activities in Thailand  were 
Margaret Mead (chair), David L. Olmstead, William H. Davenport, and Ruth S. 
Freed (executive secretary); the Newsletter carried an announcement request-
ing anyone with pertinent information to send it to Ruth Freed (naaa 1971 
12[4]: 1). The ad hoc committee requested that the Newsletter stop publishing 
letters on the Thai controversy and that all such letters instead be diverted to 
the committee. The editors of the Newsletter cooperated and notified its readers 
of this decision (naaa 1971 12[6]: 2).
Mead’s committee received a wealth of correspondence and statements from 
anthropologists working in governmental settings and from opponents to military- 
linked anthropological work, and its members read a range of published docu-
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ments and critiques (aaap 328). The committee submitted its report to the 
Executive Board in September 1971, requesting that the board not release it 
to the aaa membership  until  after the annual meeting in November. When 
board member David Aberle objected to this request, he was told by the aaa 
executive director that should he or anyone  else leak their copy of the report, 
they would be detected  because “ there  were distinct mistakes on each copy to 
allow for the tracing of leaks” (Wakin 1992: 204). Aberle continued to pressure 
the board to officially release the document to aaa members, and it was only 
mailed to the membership in the weeks before the annual November meeting 
(Wakin 1992: 204).
The ad hoc committee’s report had two sections; the first covered “anthropo-
logical activities in Thailand,” and the second ofered “guidelines on  future pol-
icy.”7 The report acknowledged that all members of the ad hoc committee found 
the Indochina war to be “unconstitutional, unwise, and unnecessary,” but the 
committee did not find the activities of the accused anthropologist con sul tants 
to be unethical  under  either the aaa’s spare or the proposed ppr. The report 
described a range of “optimistic” consultancy relationships of anthropologists 
working with organizations such as usaid, seadag, and aact but found  these 
to not be secret or clandestine relationships. The committee stressed that none 
of the stolen documents printed in the Mobilizer  were classified as secret. As 
acknowledged in the report:
It is very likely that secret and clandestine intelligence work among Thai  people has 
been conducted at the instigation of special U.S. military and government intel-
ligence units. The ad hoc committee has no information about such covert work, 
nor could it be expected to have. The committee has been informed about some 
American anthropologists who have been approached with proposals that they en-
gage in such intelligence activity and who report that the proposals  were refused. 
We mention this only in order clearly to distinguish such clandestine intelligence 
from the applied anthropology or mission- oriented research and consultation that 
American anthropologists, as well as anthropologists from other countries, have 
openly pursued. (qtd. in Wakin 1992: 288)
The committee explic itly rejected the premise that anthropological contribu-
tions to war zone counterinsurgency operations are “sinister” (288). The report 
described American academia’s historical problems with McCarthyism, anti- 
intellectualism, and other factors that limited the availability of nondirective 
governmental research funds.  There instead developed prob lem- related research 
funds from governmental agencies focusing on contemporary issues such as 
“communications” or “ mental health” that provided funds for the problems of 
an era.
The report argued that community development and counterinsurgency  were 
simply the contemporary issues providing funding opportunities for anthro-
pologists. It noted that while anthropological contributions to community de-
velopment or rural public health projects  were counterinsurgent insofar as they 
reduced the likelihood of revolutionary uprisings “such activity is well within 
the traditional canons of acceptable be hav ior for the applied anthropologist, 
and is counterinsurgent only for present funding purposes; a de cade ago it might 
have been ‘ mental health’ ” (qtd. in Wakin 1992: 289). The report also argued 
that soft power anthropological contributions to military operations  were all 
part of applied anthropologists’ historical legacy and therefore  were not to be 
judged as ethical violations regardless of their contributions to military actions. 
This historical argument was used to normalize counterinsurgency work, and 
instead of questioning the ethical nature of this past work, the present was ex-
cused without critical examination.
The report stressed that all anthropologists need to be aware of the dangers 
that their work could be reused by  others for military action, citing the Tribal 
Research Centre at Chieng Mai as a pos si ble example of how centralized files 
could be used for targeted military strikes (qtd. in Wakin 1992: 290).
The committee reserved its criticism for the unnamed members of the Com-
mittee on Ethics (Berreman, Jorgensen, and Wolf) who had publicly criticized 
the anthropologists identified in The Student Mobilizer and other documents. 
The report found their “unauthorized identification of themselves as members 
of [the ethics] committee in connection with their public denunciations,” their 
use of stolen documents, and accusations without due pro cess to be “repre-
hensible” (qtd. in Wakin 1992: 291). The report’s conclusions exonerated the 
anthropologists contributing to counterinsurgency projects of any wrongdoing 
but found members of the Committee on Ethics to have “acted hastily, unfairly, 
and unwisely in making public statements” (293).
The Mead Committee understood that the report would generate contro-
versy among the aaa membership, and when its eforts to suppress the public 
distribution of the report failed, the stage was set for a public showdown. Since 
the 1968 meeting,  there had been a broad co ali tion of radical members who or-
ga nized before and during the annual meetings and, despite earlier association 
rules limiting the po liti cal participation of younger members, to use organ-
ization skills and their numbers to make their voices heard.
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The 1971 aaa Council Meeting
Eric Wolf contacted anthropologist Richard Lee in the months leading up to the 
1971 aaa annual meeting. Wolf was upset that the Mead Committee’s report found 
more fault with Wolf and Jorgensen than it did with the anthropologists who con-
tributed to counterinsurgency projects, and he asked Lee to “or ga nize colleagues 
to lead a floor fight at the business meeting raising objections to the Mead Report’s 
equal apportioning of blame” (Lee 2008: 1). Lee joined forces with anthropologist 
Steve Barnett and  others to or ga nize opposition to Mead’s report at the meeting.8
At the November  19, 1971, aaa council meeting at the New York Hilton 
 Hotel, Wolf and Jorgensen passed out a lengthy rebuttal statement to attend-
ees.9 Their statement disagreed with the Mead Report’s characterization of their 
work and findings, and they objected to the report’s claim that the operations of 
anthropologists in Thailand  were “well within traditional canons of acceptable 
be hav ior for the applied anthropologist.” They rejected the claim that “counter-
insurgency” was merely a trendy buzzword for funding, and that it had no more 
necessary links to military or intelligence research than did “ mental health” 
or “communication” research in earlier de cades.10 They  were “appalled by the 
degree to which the committee tries to disguise  human and cultural realities 
through the use of an Orwellian language which turns phenomena into their 
very opposites. We are as much dismayed by the callousness of the report as by 
its factual and theoretical faults” (naaa 1972 13[1]: 3).
The day before the council meeting, the Executive Board officially accepted 
(without approving or rejecting) the committee’s report. When the discussion 
of the report came forward at the council meeting, Mead asked that the report 
not be voted on, but only that it be received; she was greeted by hisses from 
many of the seven hundred in attendance.
From the floor, Berreman and Wolf read potions of their rebuttal, and Wolf 
stirred up outrage in the audience by reading sections from a 1965 report titled 
“Low- Altitude Visual Search for Individual  Human Targets: Further Field Test-
ing in Southeast Asia” that he told the crowd had been written by a member of 
the aaa. Wolf explained to the assembly that this report sought optimal ways of 
identifying and killing  human targets in Southeast Asian rice fields. While Wolf 
did not identify the author by name, it was  later determined, by Herbert Phillips, 
that Wolf had confused the nonanthropologist author Donald Blakeslee with an 
aaa member archaeologist of the same name. While Wolf ’s reading of this report 
angered his listeners, it remains unclear what efect this  mistake had in galvanizing 
the crowd in opposition to the Mead report; some claimed it was a decisive  factor, 
 others that it was but one small piece of a larger picture. As Eric Wakin observed 
two de cades  later, “The importance attributed to the name confusion seems to 
correlate with one’s position on the Thailand Controversy” (1992: 211).11
A motion from the floor divided the report into three sections, for discus-
sion and approval, and over the course of the long eve ning, the sections  were 
successively rejected by floor votes (the first section, by a vote of 308 to 74; 
the second, 243 to 57; the third, 214 to 14), with attendance dwindling as the 
meeting continued past midnight. More than three de cades  later, Richard Lee 
recounted the eve ning’s drama:
Mead entered the hall, a striking matriarchal figure, with her shepherd’s crook and 
flowing robes, and was seated at the front with her committee members in tow. 
When the agenda inched its way and the Mead Report was tabled for consideration 
by the membership, I  rose and summoning my limited eloquence, pointed out the 
gross injustice of equating anthropological actions which contributed to the killing 
of real  people with actions of Wolf and Jorgensen that brought the wrong- doing to 
light; employing the idiom of the day, I commended the whistleblowers for bear-
ing witness to evil, and for speaking truth to power. I moved that Part One of the 
Mead Report be struck down, and Steve Barnett quickly and with far more elo-
quence, seconded the motion. A furious floor fight followed with Mead’s backers 
vigorously defending her position and lauding the report’s even- handedness. De-
fenders of Wolf and Jorgensen spoke with equal passion. (2008: 2–3; cf. Lee 1972)
The rejection of the Mead Committee report exposed generational fissures 
within the association and indicated a shift in the aaa establishment’s ability 
to maintain top- down policy making for the association. Stephen Isaacs’s story 
on the clash for the New York Times characterized Margaret Mead as being 
“furious” and insisting that the report was never intended to be voted on by 
the association; he wrote that Mead “indicated that she had been tricked by the 
board.” Isaacs observed that “what became clear in the meeting was that the 
association’s younger members see the 69- year- old Dr. Mead as a kind of an-
thropological  Uncle Tom. And it became obvious very quickly, the younger 
members had the votes” (1971: A10).
Mead joined the majority in voting to reject the report for which she had 
been the primary author (naaa 1972 13[2]: 1). Some weeks  after the 1971 meet-
ing, Ester Goldfrank wrote Mead:
I have been wanting to tell you since the meetings ended that your Ad Hoc Report 
said just what needed to be said. I sensed things would go the way they did when 
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I learned in the after noon that [Gerald] Berreman had been elected to a three year 
term on the Board. The Radical Caucus in the eve ning, you  will remember, had an 
attendance of about 700 and the applause for the speakers [who authored the re-
port] was certainly not exuberant. I had enough by 8:30 and left. I  wasn’t surprised 
to learn that the meeting ended at 1:20 a.m. The vote was 248 to 14 against your 
report. So almost 500 persons who had been at the earlier meeting that eve ning 
had melted away.  There is a good old Communist tactic — you wear down your op-
ponents with endless and not too relevant discussion and amendments, and when 
you are sure you can win, you call for a vote.
In the after noon Pete Murdock said if he  were ten years younger he would start 
a new scientific association. Perhaps what we  ought to try first is to or ga nize a 
Scholarly Caucus so that our membership could be kept informed regarding what 
is  really at issue. . . .  I wanted to resign when I learned what had happened on the 
Night of Infamy in November, but my younger friends have been urging me not 
to — to see if something  can’t be done to overcome the politicization of our Asso-
ciation — a pro cess that has gone far already. (eg, EG to MM 1/3/72)
Goldfrank described articles in a recent edition of Liberation magazine detailing 
the growth of radical Marxist anthropology and tracing the crypto- Marxian el-
ements of Leslie White’s and  others’ anthropology (see Moore 1971). She signed 
of, writing, “If you are interested in a concerted move to ofset the damage 
being done by what I think is a small but well- integrated minority I would be 
glad to hear from you. Yours for a better — but not a politicalized — anthropol-
ogy” (eg, EG to MM 1/3/72). Goldfrank’s claim to want an anthropology without 
politics was ironic given her own role and that of her husband, Karl Wittfogel, 
as fbi informers who secretly attacked anthropologists and colleagues whose 
politics they disliked by reporting their suspicions that they might be Commu-
nists (D. H. Price 2004b, 2008c).
Mead replied to Goldfrank that she was “glad to have the references you sent. 
 After all  there has been boring from within before, as you and I well know.” 
This may have been a reference to the 1948 aaa meeting in Toronto, which 
led George Murdock to become an fbi informer  after he incorrectly  imagined 
that a group of fellows speaking out for the academic freedom of a colleague 
(Richard Morgan), sufering a McCarthyistic attack,  were part of a Communist 
plot to take over the association (eg, MM to EG 1/25/72; see D. H. Price 2004b: 
70–89).
Mead’s views  were shared by many of the older generation of American an-
thropologists whose views on making disciplinary contributions to warfare had 
been  shaped by their contributions to the Second World War. Mead’s papers 
contain a series of letters she received following the 1971 aaa meeting support-
ing the position taken in her committee’s report. Among  those writing with 
support  were L. Pospisil, M. Estelleie Smith, Murray Wax, Raoul Naroll, and 
Douglas Oliver (mm E12). Max Gluckman wrote that he was “inclined to resign 
from the aaa, to persuade other Foreign Fellows to do so,” and he asked Mead 
if she believed this would be the correct stance to take (mm E12, MG to MM 
12/21/71). Mead replied that no one should resign from the aaa  because it was 
“in a sense a disavowal of democracy to get out instead of stay in and fight” 
(mm E12, MM to MG 1/23/72). L. Cabot Briggs wrote Mead that he and Robert 
Ehrich  were thinking of leaving the aaa to break of and form their own pro-
fessional association (mm E12, LCB to MM 11/21/71).
A few days  after the council meeting, Joseph Jorgensen sent a curt note to 
“Mead’s Ad Hoc Committee” that read, “I want to thank you for your unwitting 
eforts to smite imperialist anthropology. I suspect the clincher was the subtle 
 counter insurgency– mental health analogy, but the overall high comic pre sen ta-
tion may well have turned the trick. What ever the case may be, thanks for your 
excessive help.” In a postscript he asked, “Mead, did you  really say all of  those 
nasty and condemning things about Eric and me between the time that our nyr 
article was published and you accepted the post as chairwoman of your unbiased 
committee?” (mm E12, JJ to MM 11/24/71). Mead replied that she did not know 
what nasty and condemning things he was referring to, adding that if Jorgensen 
was still at the council meeting when the voting occurred, he would know that 
“the motion in  favor of continuing vigilance on the part of the American An-
thropological Association was seconded by me” (mm E12, MM to JJ 12/30/71).
The schisms of the 1971 meeting remained power ful within the aaa and af-
fected association business for years to come, although in ways that  were not 
always vis i ble.  After the meeting, Mead oversaw the destruction of the seven 
thousand pages of materials that had been collected for the report, thereby lim-
iting the understanding and analy sis of  future generations of anthropologists 
(Davenport 1985: 68).
Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action:  
Reor ga niz ing the Radical Caucus
Years  later, Richard Lee recalled a festive mood and late- night parties through-
out the  hotel following the rejection of the Mead Committee’s report and noted, 
“From the critical writing that has grown up around it, the rejection of the 
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Mead Report was a pivotal moment in American Anthropology” (2008: 3). 
This sense of coming change led a group of radical anthropologists to or ga-
nize an ongoing anthropological re sis tance to the war in Vietnam, following 
orga nizational models developed by the Union of Radical Po liti cal Economy 
(urpe) (3). During the months  after the rejection of the Mead Report,  there 
 were eforts to maintain the momentum by developing a network of anthro-
pologists working for radical activist change. Lee’s datebook rec ords that on 
January 27, 1972, he was “standing at a bus stop somewhere on the Upper West 
Side of Manhattan with Marvin Harris and Eleanor Leacock discussing the new 
organ ization. It was Harris who said let’s call it Anthropologists for Radical Po-
liti cal Action, arpa, an ironic dig at the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects 
Administration, an agency which funded academic research on a wide range 
of the sciences including way at the bottom of the list, Anthropology. It was a 
branch of arpa [Advanced Research Projects Administration] that had funded 
the original research on Thailand that had launched Wolf and Jorgensen’s ca-
reers as whistleblowers” (3). Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action drew 
on the strategies and base of the aaa’s Radical Caucus, using decentralized 
local collectives to work on issues throughout the year.12
In April 1972, Stanley Diamond hosted an Anthropologists for Radical Po-
liti cal Action meeting at the New School for Social Research at which attendees 
pooled resources, generated names of hundreds of progressive anthropologists 
across the country, and or ga nized a mailing campaign that resulted in “over 
four hundred responses” and the creation of Anthopologists for Radical Po liti-
cal Action “collectives” in several cities (Lee 2008: 4). In the arpa Newsletter, 
which was established in the fall of 1972, Lee outlined the four basic anarchistic 
principles of the organ ization as decentralization, nonsectarianism, combining 
theory and practice, and facilitating communication (Lee 1972).
In 1972, Lee left New York for a position at the University of Toronto, where 
he or ga nized a Canadian Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action chapter. 
James Faris returned to the United States from fieldwork in the Sudan, where, 
he  later wrote, he “consequently became a rabid anti- imperialist” (2008: 3). When 
Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action made its first appearance at the 
1972 aaa council meeting, it pushed through nine motions — successes that led 
the aaa leadership to limit members’ ability to set association policy from the 
council meeting floor. But that year, the aaa’s old guard was battling a signifi-
cant demographic shift. In 1972, “the majority of anthropologists at the meet-
ing  were young — fully half (1520) of the 3106 registrants  were students; only 
649  were Fellows and 475 Voting Members — yet in most sessions, even in the 
Council Meeting, members  were largely in accord” (naaa 1973 14[1]: 14). When 
the aaa’s elected leaders realized that opening up the voting membership be-
yond the exclusive fellow category had weakened the older generation’s grip 
on power, they began enforcing rules governing the council meetings that the 
Executive Board had  violated for years.
At the 1972 council meeting, the present members passed “nine motions 
brought before them  there, but defeated the one resolution which was submit-
ted a week prior to the meeting as required by the constitution of the Associa-
tion” (naaa 1973 14[1]: 1). The aaa leadership wrote in the Newsletter, “This 
year, council members followed the constitutional requirement and all legisla-
tion proposed at the sessions was in the form of motions — advisory to, but 
not binding upon, the Executive Board and not needing mail referendum to 
the Council at large. Texts of the motions with their authors and co- signers, 
all passed by voice vote, are given below. They  were released to the press and 
distributed to appropriate organizations by the Executive Office as many of 
the motions specifically requested and the Board then moved should be done” 
(naaa 1973 14[1]: 1). Still stinging from the Radical Caucus’s role in leading the re-
jection of the aaa’s ad hoc committee’s Thailand Report, aaa staf and the Ex-
ecutive Board maneuvered to strictly interpret the association’s bylaws so that 
the ongoing practice of allowing motions passed at the council meeting to be 
passed along to the membership for a mail vote would no longer occur (see 
naaa 1973 14[1]: 1). In 1969, the Executive Board had  violated  these same rules 
it now sought to enforce (naaa 1970 11[1]: 7).13 Now that the violation of  these 
rules was being efectively used to weaken the power of the Executive Board, 
the board enforced the rules to suit its own purposes.14
The Executive Board Limits Floor Democracy
 After the Radical Caucus demonstrated its control over the agenda at council 
meetings, and Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action’s successes at the 
1972 meeting, in October 1973 the aaa’s Executive Board,  under aaa president 
Joseph Casagrande, took direct action to limit the impact of the group at up-
coming council meetings. The October 1973 Newsletter carried a statement, “at 
the request of ” aaa executive director, Edward J. Lehman, by Daniel Whitney, 
chairman of the aaa Resolutions and Motions Committee, and Robert Benja-
min, aaa parliamentarian. The statement specified the procedures that would 
be followed at that year’s annual meeting (naaa 1973 14[8]: 1, 8).
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Whitney and Benjamin notified aaa members that Section 4 of the associa-
tion’s bylaws stated that “new legislation or resolutions proposed by members 
of the Council” must be submitted to the Executive Board “at least one week 
in advance of the annual meeting if they are to be placed on the agenda.” This 
was indeed the language of the bylaws, but the Radical Caucus had successfully 
argued, with a two- thirds majority at the meeting, that  under the bylaws mem-
bers could add resolutions and other items to the agenda, and  these should be 
sent to the general membership in a mail ballot as had been done in previous 
years. Whitney and Benjamin noted that the bylaws also allowed for the pas-
sage of a “referendum”  under the following conditions: “A referendum vote may 
be held by mail ballot at any time upon the initiation of the Executive Board or 
a signed petition of fifty (50) of the Council members in good standing” (naaa 
1973 14[8]: 1, 8; D. H. Price 2008b).15
The aaa leadership’s mono poly on interpreting rules restricted the radical 
group’s ability to set association policy from the floor of business meetings. The 
inability of members to send motions from the meeting floor to all members 
for a mail vote diminished the aaa business meetings’ central importance and 
initiated a trend of diminishing attendance. At the 1973 meeting, activist mem-
bers of the association again submitted one resolution (on conditions in Chile), 
and fifteen motions  were passed from the floor, including resolutions on civil 
liberties  under the Chilean military junta and ones on issues of gender equality.
The years following 1973 marked a decline in eforts by activists to pass reso-
lutions at council meetings. The two resolutions raised in 1974, which passed 
easily,  were the least po liti cal of any passed at aaa meetings in years: one was 
a friendly blanket resolution encouraging “research across national borders”; 
the other supported “archaeological excavations for educational purposes.” The 
absence of po liti cal motions was con spic u ous, but not surprising, given that 
the decision to hold the meeting in Mexico City meant that Anthropologists 
for Radical Po liti cal Action’s base could not aford the expense of traveling to 
 these distant locations; it was as if the aaa business meeting had been relocated 
within the walls of a gated community.
By 1975, the central po liti cal purpose for mobilizing radical anthropologists, 
the war in Vietnam, was no longer the pressing issue it had once been: the pub-
lic had turned on the war, and the American retreat from Vietnam was  under 
way. In 1975, the Newsletter observed that council meeting attendance “was 
light, with observers almost as numerous as Council members.” Even as the 
aaa leadership achieved its goal of alienating radicals attending the meeting, 
Rayna Reiter ( later Rayna Rapp) pushed back with a resolution directing the 
Executive Board “to inform the membership through the newsletter of action 
taken and not taken on all resolutions and motions passed at the Council meet-
ing and/or by mail ballot” (naaa 1976 17[1]: 1, 9). The resolution was itself a 
commentary on the Executive Board’s disdain for bottom-up democracy in the 
association; the aaa leadership had succeeded in killing members’ interest in 
attending the business meeting (D. H. Price 2008b).
 Because Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action was a decentralized move-
ment, the exact date of its dissolution is unclear. Jim Faris wrote that arpa’s end 
“coincided with the end of the Vietnam War as well, and arpa finally went the 
way of many radical organizations of the time — into quiet abandon. By the  later 
1970s, it was gone, short- lived as it was, our weak and largely  under- organized 
struggles within the aaa essentially defeated. Working for usaid, dod, the 
World Bank and  others was no longer even remotely considered the unethical or 
morally wrong  thing to do. Money flowed uphill in the opposite direction to what 
most of us would consider a principled way to practice our craft” (2008: 7–8). As 
Amer i ca retreated in defeat from Vietnam, the group’s moment passed, though 
anthropologists’ opposition to war, and more specifically their opposition to ap-
plying anthropology as an instrument of warfare of oppression, left deep impacts 
on the aaa. Yet like most institutional reforms, many of the changes initiated 
in opposition to the war would be short- lived.
Not with a Bang, but a Whimper
The deep divisions among aaa members that  were exposed at the 1971 council 
meeting  were not easily repaired in the years that followed. Reactions to the 
po liti cal and ethical issues involved in deploying anthropology in the ser vice of 
counterinsurgency largely, though not entirely, split the association along gen-
erational lines and  were embedded in the contemporary struggles of Amer i ca’s 
imperial wars in Southeast Asia, yet  these issues  were much deeper. The Mead 
Report’s claim that anthropologists’ contributions to soft power campaigns to 
quell uprisings or maintain power relations  were in fact common features of 
applied anthropology projects revealed a profound truth, yet this observation 
could just as easily have been used to condemn many other applications of 
anthropology as to excuse, as the Mead Committee did, the counterinsurgency 
activities of  these anthropologists.
What ever gains had been made in rejecting the Mead Committee’s report 
 were short- lived and established  little  counter- inertia against the push of larger 
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po liti cal economic forces steering the  future course of the association. In 2008, 
James Faris reflected, “We currently have something of a statement, but no 
sanctions prohibiting members from  doing the work of dod and other sinister 
agencies. Margaret Mead, indeed, won. She kept the aaa safe for the Amer i ca 
we know  today and the aaa safe from us” (2008: 4–5).
In response to the insurgent movements of the Radical Caucus and Anthro-
pologists for Radical Po liti cal Action, the aaa leadership used its power to sub-
vert the demo cratic  will of the majority of association members. The Executive 
Board worked hard to wrestle power from the Radical Caucus and other bot-
tom-up manifestations of the membership’s power — and the Radical Caucus 
and Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action proved they could use asso-
ciation rules to seize power at the annual business meeting. One mea sure of the 
success of  these grassroots groups in exerting their po liti cal  will on the larger 
association is seen in the leadership’s legalistic response of reinterpreting extant 
rules to limit their power at the aaa’s annual meetings.16
 These historical events had mixed outcomes. On the one hand, during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the radical anthropologists efectively pushed the aaa to 
adopt official public policies opposing the militarization of the discipline and 
the Vietnam War, and supporting positions of gender, racial, and economic 
equality. On the other hand, the aaa’s power structure efectively disarmed this 
rebellion by selectively using association rules.
It is somewhat ironic that an essentially anarchistic group was in part sub-
dued by institutional rules, but this was only a small part of what occurred. In 
truth, Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action was more than a mechanism 
for controlling the aaa business meeting. Most members cared  little about the 
legitimacy of getting their floor mea sures  adopted by the aaa’s rank and file in 
a mail ballot; most impor tant, by the time the aaa power structure coordinated 
its defensive eforts and enforced rules to minimize their use of the business meet-
ing to set association- wide policy, the American withdrawal from Vietnam was 
already  under way. Any statement Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action 
wanted to make, it could still make from the council meeting floor as a motion, 
and in the short term it mattered  little if  these motions  were voted on by the 
entire membership. But  there  were long- term consequences of adopting this 
approach.
Perhaps the most enduring outcome of this history was the steady decline 
in aaa members’ participation in the annual council meetings. The aaa 
membership’s lack of interest in the annual business meetings was not an ac-
cidental occurrence; it was initiated as an intentional design feature of the 
sort Laura Nader (1997a) refers to as “controlling pro cesses,” enacted to thwart 
a flare-up of troublesome democracy through pro cesses of institutionalized 
disenfranchisement.
The radical critique of the militarization of anthropology and the adoption 
of disciplinary ethical standards born of this critique remain impor tant disci-
plinary connections to this period. But many of the fundamental issues raised 
during this period remain unresolved. Anthropology could not save itself, 
much less the world it studied. While the moral outrage of the period was 
connected to the privileges of wealth that produced it, it cannot be reduced 
to this.  These concerns of social justice and abuses of power reflected growing 
domestic awareness of the abuses of the peoples subjected to American military 
power, an awareness at least in part funded by programs hoping for more he-
gemonic analy sis.
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“But,” says Arthur, “I  wouldn’t be proud of your clothes 
For  you’ve only the lend of them, as I suppose 
But you dare not change them one night, for you know 
If you do, you’ll be flogged in the morning 
And although that we are single and  free 
We take  great delight in our own com pany 
We have no desire strange places to see 
Although that your ofers are charming 
And we have no desire to take your advance 
All hazards and dangers we barter on chance 
For you would have no scruples for to send us to France 
Where we would get shot without warning.”
“A R T H U R  M C B R I D E  A N D  T H E  S E R G E A N T ” |  
early nineteenth- century traditional Irish folk song
F O U R T E E N   U N TA N G L I N G  O P E N  S E C R E T S , 
H I D D E N  H I S T O R I E S ,  O U T R A G E  D E N I E D ,  
A N D  R E C U R R E N T  D U A L  U S E  T H E M E S
The shift in Amer i ca’s military mission from the Second World War’s fight 
against fascism and totalitarianism to Cold War policies supporting neo co-
lo nial ism, militarism, and an expanding American empire helped transform 
American anthropologists’ attitudes to align with collaborations with military 
and intelligence agencies. Many of  these changes  were  under way soon  after 
the Second World War, but such shifts in mission  were apparent to few Ameri-
cans, as  there was no public awareness of the secret policy developments driv-
ing American Cold War strategies. The public had  little understanding of the 
National Security Act of 1947 and no knowledge of nsc-68’s plan for global 
containment of communism or Kennan’s “Policy Planning Study 23,” much less 
of the cia’s covert and illegal activities: assassinations, foreign coups, interroga-
tion experiments, kidnappings, and subversion of foreign demo cratic movements 
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threatening American corporate interests. In 1968, Kathleen Gough wrote 
that while “in the Fifties, it looked to some of us as though much of the non- 
Western world might gain genuine po liti cal and economic in de pen dence from 
the West by peaceful means, this is no longer the case” (1968: 17). In the short 
span of just over two de cades, American anthropologists’ high hopes for global 
changes favoring the peoples they so frequently studied shifted from postwar 
optimistic alignment with U.S. government programs to growing support for 
revolutionary movements opposing American hegemony. While many debates 
over the militarization of anthropology focused on professional ethics, this po-
liti cal shift was the taproot of this movement.
By the time Dell Hymes published Reinventing Anthropology in 1972, growing 
numbers of American anthropologists challenged the discipline’s relation-
ships to power, though not all anthropologists shared  these critiques. As the 
generational confrontation over the Mead Committee’s report on the Thai Af-
fair demonstrated, deep schisms had developed. In his review of Reinventing 
Anthropology for the New York Review of Books, Sir Edmund Leach appeared 
ofended that  these crass Americans would bring po liti cal concerns to the fore of 
their anthropology in ways that he believed oversimplified complex systems 
of oppression. Leach wrote:
The trou ble with all the essays in Hymes’s collection is their denial of historical real-
ity. The authors have been shocked by the fact that, in south- east Asia and South 
Amer i ca, professional anthropologists have functioned as intelligence agents on 
behalf of the cia and the American armed forces, from which they have inferred 
that a po liti cally neutral anthropology is an impossibility. They take it for granted 
that the “ others” whom anthropologists study are, by definition, in a state of po-
liti cal subjugation. Since they hold that attempts at objectivity in social studies are 
positivist illusions, it follows that the anthropologist must always be “involved” 
in his research situation. He then has a  simple moral choice: he can side  either 
with the oppressors or with the oppressed. From this it is readily deduced that it is 
always morally deplorable to serve any established authority and always morally 
virtuous to side with liberation movements. That sympathies may be divided or 
solutions elusive does not seem to occur to  these writers. All the anthropologist’s 
actions must be immediately relevant to the manifest problems of  those whom he 
observes. (1974: 35)
Leach’s dismissive slaps at a movement challenging the discipline’s historical 
complacency and its default siding with (to use Leach’s terms) the oppressed over 
oppressors revealed a generational dividing line marking many anthropologists’ 
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responses to  these issues, with many older anthropologists’ experiences during 
the Second World War tempering their responses to  these new critiques.
You Like It, It Likes You: Did the cia  
and the Pentagon Get What They Paid For?
The ways that Cold War cia- and Pentagon- aligned funding impacted anthro-
pology  were nonmonolithic and inconsistent, and at vari ous times they pro-
duced desired, undesired, direct, distant, or no meaningful outcomes of direct 
use to governmental regimes of power.  There  were ample funds aligned with 
strategic interests coming from private foundations and governmental agen-
cies for anthropological work ranging from classroom language study to field-
work research projects.  These funds financed a theoretically and geo graph i cally 
broad range of research activities, with the work of conservatives, conform-
ists, liberals, progressives, Marxists, Maoists, and other radicals (during the late 
1960s and the 1970s) financed by public and private sources. But even with the 
rise of critical anthropological analy sis in the late 1960s and early 1970s, anthro-
pology still produced enough knowledge of use to the national security state 
for it to comfortably justify  these expenditures, and the in de pen dence of peer 
reviewed scholarship had a value that could not be produced within govern-
mental structures (see Eickelman 1986:39).
Government and foundation funding programs spread their resources broadly. 
While much of the research funded in the postwar 1940s and throughout the 1950s 
aligned well with the needs and ideologies of the American Cold War state, in the 
1960s and 1970s radical voices used  these funds to generate their own critiques. 
The links between Cold War funds and outcomes  were often not just nonlinear; 
at times they  were oppositional, as scholars like Andre Gunder Frank and June 
Nash financed their gradu ate work, leading to power ful radical critiques, with 
funds from military- linked projects. While such unintended consequences had 
real significance in the development of American anthropology,  these outcomes 
do not argue against payofs for the national security state’s gambit — which still 
produced knowledge of use to national priorities and helped train generations of 
younger scholars, including some who would work within  these governmen-
tal systems.1 Regardless of the analytical or po liti cal orientation of a par tic u lar 
work, anthropological writings informed a larger intellectual zeitgeist and sup-
ported the training of a broad universe of area specialists outside the discipline.
Cold War agendas  shaped anthropological research projects — sometimes 
in direct ways (e.g., anthropologists funded at soro, cress, the Research in 
Contemporary Cultures proj ect, the Rus sian Research Center, the  Human Ecol-
ogy Fund), and other times in secondary ways (working in critical geographic 
areas, even if conducting radical analy sis), but  there  were still  either large or 
small po liti cal dimensions of this work. The Cold War’s progression at times 
influenced funding opportunities and analytical approaches.
In the postwar 1940s and throughout the 1950s,  there was  little room for crit-
ical work challenging American domestic or international policies. Threats of 
McCarthyism’s punishments clarified the narrow range of allowable critiques, 
and at times “the wandering dialogue of science with the unknown [was] 
straightjacketed for petty military projects” (Goodman 1967:18). In the 1960s, 
a greater breadth of critical analy sis was allowed, even while some (at soro, 
hraf, cress,  etc.) did work that was directly aligned with meeting military- 
intelligence needs. Often, both researchers and the national security state got 
something they wanted — though frequently this was something as nonnefarious 
as generating general knowledge about geographic regions of general potential 
national security interest, and field research opportunities for the anthropologist. 
Anthropology’s knowledge of “strategic cultures” and other topics enticed mili-
tary interests, while funding opportunities provided enticements that directed 
some anthropological inquiries. But recognizing that multiple parties gained is 
not to claim that all  these anthropologists would have pursued the same projects 
had dif er ent funding opportunities or dif er ent po liti cal pressures existed.
In the end, the cia, the Pentagon, and a host of civilian programs mostly got 
what they paid for — though I suspect many contemporary scholars misjudge 
what it was that the military- industrial complex understood it was buying. The 
desired outcomes  were clearly stated in the numerous postwar reports envision-
ing coming funding streams of public and private funds (see Pool 1963; Stew-
ard 1950; Wagley 1948).  These reports called for the establishment of ongoing 
funding to train scholars and finance research projects around the globe that 
would have general and potential applications to strategic American policy is-
sues — programs to establish a body of knowledgeable experts in regions of 
geopo liti cal interest.  These postwar plans for area studies and increased gov-
ernmental and foundational support for international research acknowledged 
that much of what was funded would be general scholarship contributing to the 
formation of the American academic brain trust. The directive nature of foun-
dation funding helped shape the scope of research, but it only inconsistently 
succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of funded anthropologists. Func-
tionally, this was only a minor incon ve nience. Anthropologists produced enough 
useful knowledge to justify  these relationships; loyalties  were of minor impor-
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tance.  These interactions transformed anthropology in ways large and small. And 
while much remains unknown about all of the ways that the cia and the Penta-
gon used  these contacts, we know enough to map some of the ways  these agencies 
and anthropologists each, though dual use pro cesses, used  these interactions.
As dual use partners, anthropology and the national security state both 
gained from Cold War relationships. Military and intelligence agencies, other 
civilian branches of government, and aligned private foundations gained a 
steady supply of well- trained specialists with linguistic, cultural, and po liti cal 
expertise covering the globe. Scholars  were sometimes  free to pursue a broad 
range of ideas, yet regardless of  whether  these scholars’ work aligned with military 
or diplomatic policies, it engaged with and informed academic environments 
feeding  these operations. Sometimes scholars knowingly served as con sul tants 
to the cia or the Department of State, or in ongoing consultancies like the 
Prince ton Con sul tants. Some anthropologists used open sources to write copy 
for army handbooks, to which classified materials  were  later added. Sometimes, 
the cia or the Department of Defense asked professors at top universities to have 
gradu ate students unwittingly pursue questions of interest to the government, 
 later secretly sharing  these findings with governmental agencies. Harvard’s We-
berians and Parsonians embraced “value- free science” while hitching their wag-
ons to an impressive array of value- laden Cold War– linked projects.
Anthropologists supported by the cia through funding fronts contributed 
as unwitting subcontractors to larger projects — projects that included research 
informing the work of  those producing the cia’s interrogation manual, and nu-
merous projects establishing contacts in developing nations; in other instances, 
fronts financed esoteric anthropological research to provide needed illusions 
of legitimacy. The academic projects financed by cia funding fronts generated 
publications and reports that  were generally indistinguishable from non- cia- 
funded projects.
Anthropologists’ fieldwork in underdeveloped nations produced reports on 
peoples courted by the Soviets and the Americans as potential clients or play-
ers in the Cold War’s proxy wars; it generally mattered  little what analytical 
perspective was used in their writings. The cia’s “ Family Jewels” report showed 
that usaid field projects provided “a major source of information” to the agency. 
Some anthropologists worked on economic assistance projects distributing soft 
power gifts and loans, achieving counterinsurgent ends while cultivating cli-
ents, debt, and dependence.
Agencies like rand, cress, and soro drew on anthropologists’ ethno-
graphic reports to synthesize counterinsurgency plans for operations in South 
Amer i ca and Southeast Asia. At times, military and intelligence organizations 
simply stole anthropologists’ work for their own purposes — purposes frequently 
linked to counterinsurgency programs. This included instances like the  U.S. 
Special Forces’ unauthorized translation and pirating of George Condominas’s 
book, or the arpa program uncovered by Delmos Jones reading unpublished 
reports from northern Thailand to model counterinsurgency plans: anthropo-
logical knowledge fed a range of counterinsurgency operations. The  Human 
Relations Area Files’s academic research provided military and intelligence 
agencies with a dual use retrieval system to locate cultural information of value 
to counterinsurgency operations, hoping to transform ethnographic lit er a ture 
into knowledge that could control  others.
Elisabeth Bacon’s correspondence with Ralph Beals described the steps used 
by the cia to contact anthropologists returning from the field, hoping to de-
brief them on what they saw and learned. Bacon’s knowledge of scholars with 
oss backgrounds bridging transitions to the cia, and appearing on grant se-
lection committees and boards, shows how the agency influenced the se lection 
of anthropologists’ field research. The cia’s fake anthropologists, like Lloyd 
Millegan, at times gained access to developing nations or used claims of anthro-
pological research to gather information from  actual anthropologists working 
in  these countries. Sometimes embassy personnel pumped anthropologists for 
insights on what they knew from the remote villages where they lived.
During the Cold War, the aaa occasionally provided valuable information to 
the cia. At times, the agency sent personnel, unannounced, to aaa meetings. 
The cia secretly helped design the collection of information for the aaa’s first 
comprehensive cross- indexed membership roster; cia computers compiled, 
collated, and stored all the private data the aaa had collected on its members 
for the roster. Using the Asia Foundation as a front, the cia collected informa-
tion on the aaa’s Asian anthropologists. The cia also used the Asia Founda-
tion to provide generous travel funds for Asian anthropologists traveling to 
conferences, settings where foundation staf seeking further information had 
opportunities to approach them. Even while most American anthropologists 
during the early Cold War had  little direct contact with military or intelligence 
agencies,  these Cold War dynamics indirectly impacted their work.
Military and intelligence agencies  were not the only ones that benefited; an-
thropologists also profited from  these interactions. Area study centers, private 
foundations, and governmental grants funded anthropologists’ research in de-
veloping nations. In some instances,  these field research opportunities, as in 
the case of Louise Sweet, had hidden links to military or intelligence agencies; 
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usually, however, no such duplicity occurred, as other more general gains in the 
development of a pool of regional experts  were achieved.
Anthropologists benefited from new centrally funded, multischolar or inter-
disciplinary collaborative research projects like the Modjokuto Proj ect, cima, 
or the Research in Contemporary Cultures proj ect.  These projects held theo-
retical significance to participating scholars that was unrelated to governmental 
interests. The cia’s secret funding of academic books provided new publishing 
opportunities for anthropologists and other scholars. Millions of dollars in con-
tract funds allowed hraf to translate and code ethnographic works; dual use 
pro cesses provided the army with the basic unclassified texts it needed for its 
handbook series, while hraf used the resulting funds to buy materials it used 
in its basic theoretical research completely unrelated to  these military and intel-
ligence projects.
When the cia secretly placed personnel in key positions within foundations, 
or maintained contacts with foundations funding projects focusing on under-
developed nations, anthropologists  were among the scholars who benefited 
from such arrangements. The paper trail is necessarily incomplete, but ex-
amples showing cia- linked personnel at the Asia Foundation suggesting who 
should, and who should not, present at an academic conference on Southeast 
Asia, or seeding funds within the aaa to gain access to young Asian scholars 
demonstrates the cia shifting discourse and gaining access in ways that we 
can assume occurred elsewhere with other organizations. Likewise, seadag 
funded anthropological research by scholars employing a broad range of po-
liti cal and theoretical frameworks. Even anthropologists who  were unwittingly 
supported by cia funding fronts like the Asia Foundation or the  Human Ecol-
ogy Fund at times worked on projects of their own design, undertaking re-
search of interest to them without noticeable constraints from their funders.
The Cold War made previously unimaginable levels of funding available for 
diverse research topics — topics ranging from studying culture at a distance, 
to village studies in remote contested regions, to Rus sian economic studies, to 
physical anthropological studies of somatological typologies.  There  were funds 
to attend high- status junkets in New York, Washington, DC, Moscow, Salz-
burg, Hawaii, and elsewhere. Asian anthropologists received virtually  free aaa 
memberships and at times  were given money to attend academic conferences, 
and the aaa received a small fortune in  free computer time from the cia when 
completing work on its first comprehensive membership roster.
Some anthropologists found steady work outside of universities at places 
like  rand, cress, soro, usaid, the cia, and the Department of Defense. 
 Archaeologists, anthropologists, and other scholars working in the developing 
world with cia links, like Donald Wilber, John Dimick, or James R. Hooker, 
mixed their travels with agency work. Frank Bessac gained valuable experi-
ences as a cia agent, exploring remote regions of Central Asia that he would other-
wise have not visited, experiences that established the foundations of his  later 
academic research.
Perhaps anthropology’s greatest gains from  these dual use relationships came 
from the wealth of governmental and private funds available for language train-
ing and basic research in regions of the world deemed geopo liti cally significant. 
Anthropology gradu ate students had scholarships, fellowships, grants, and tu-
ition waivers subsidized by federal and private programs supporting the produc-
tion of expertise on geographic regions of strategic interest. Likewise, a range 
of programs with few direct ties to national security programs funded field re-
search around the globe, with no commitments for scholars to contribute di-
rectly to governmental programs, yet the establishment of  these programs during 
the postwar period was explic itly rationalized to support national security.
Cold War anthropologists’ research followed shifts in funds favoring spe-
cific geographic regions or languages. It has never been particularly difficult 
for research funders to redirect scholars’ interests and inclinations. Shifting the 
availability of specific language funds, at times favoring programs directing an 
influx of work in Latin Amer i ca, Africa, Rus sia, or China, produced vis i ble re-
sults that changed with Cold War geopo liti cal developments.
Yet, beyond the anthropologists, foundations, and military and intelligence 
agencies that gained from this work  were the  people who  were studied and im-
pacted by  these relationships. To the extent that American foreign policies, 
military actions, and covert activities damaged the autonomy and interests 
of anthropologists’ subjects, anthropologists’ contributions to the knowledge 
systems supporting such outcomes undermined primary anthropological com-
mitments to research participants.
Situating Interpretations
In many cases scholars  were relatively  free to pursue questions of interest to 
them with a mix of government and private foundation funds assuring the 
maintenance of a brain trust generating regional expertise, or knowledge on 
topics of interest to governmental agencies or policy makers.  These funds 
helped stock universities with regional expertise. Anthropologists often studied 
theoretical questions of their choosing, yet in instances where hidden or open 
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governmental funds supported specific forms of research, we must question 
 whether  these choices  were always as  free as is often assumed. This leaves us 
with contested interpretations of relationships between anthropologists, spon-
sors, military and intelligence agencies, and their research outcomes.
While my interpretation of military and intelligence agencies’ impacts on 
the development of American anthropology and other disciplines aligns with 
the work of other scholars (see Diamond 1992; González 2010; Ross 1998a, 2011; 
Wakin 1992; and Jorgensen and Wolf 1970), still  others find  little impact of  these 
interactions on anthropology and other branches of academia. During the two 
de cades since the publication of Sigmund Diamond’s breakthrough book Com-
promised Campus (1992), scholars have added more peer- reviewed research 
establishing how links between the cia, the military, and social scientists func-
tioned during the Cold War.  After Diamond and other critical scholars began 
documenting and critiquing  these Cold War intrusions into academia, a first 
wave of academic critics responded with skepticism, but as more documented 
examples  were published (e.g., Bundy 1977),  there has been a perceptible shift 
from disbelief, to critics adopting a dismissive commitment to downplaying the 
significance of such relationships. Countering conservative positions shifting 
from skepticism to dismissive revisionist ac cep tance can be a bit like loading a 
truck full of mercury with a pitchfork (Brautigan 1976).  Today, a new group of 
scholars acknowledge many of  these links but discount their significance, argu-
ing that cia or Pentagon ties did not meaningfully alter the nature of academic 
research.  These scholars find few significant connections between Cold War 
dynamics and the produced work.
Intellectual historians now analyze Harvard’s Rus sian Research Center, ac-
knowledging cia funding without meaningfully probing its influence (Enger-
man 2009); or argue that the cia’s covert funding of po liti cal and academic 
movements supported rather than altered intellectual and po liti cal trajectories 
(Wilford 2008, 2013); or interpret Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Geof-
frey Gorer’s postwar culture and personality work as if they might have freely 
chosen this exact research path without the enticement of previously unimagi-
nable levels of military funding (Mandler 2013); or find minimal impacts of 
institutional framing in government- funded war zone ethnographic research 
(Oppenheim 2008). Some who lived through this period insist that they “did 
not tailor . . .  theories to suit Walt Rostow or to serve the interests of the cia, 
nor did we busy and bury ourselves in irrelevant projects in order to avoid con-
troversy” (H. Lewis 2005: 108; cf. Rauch 1955). Some argue that the many ex-
amples of Cold War era anthropological work that cannot be tied to military or 
intelligence agendas mitigate the significance of established connections. But 
such arguments are reminiscent of the claim by piano virtuoso Glenn Gould 
(a notoriously bad driver) that “it’s true I’ve driven through a number of red 
lights on occasion, but on the other hand I’ve stopped at a lot of green ones but 
never gotten credit for it” (Hafner 2008: 203). As Laura Nader argues in her 
essay “The Phantom  Factor: Impact of the Cold War on Anthropology” (1997), 
most of the anthropologists who came of age during the early Cold War gave 
 little thought to  these pro cesses shaping them and their work. That some who 
developed and prospered in this world  later refused to acknowledge its impact 
is not surprising; if cultural insiders had sufficient insight to analyze the culture 
in which they live,  there would be no need for anthropology itself.
From outside the Pentagon and the cia, it remained difficult to access the 
fruits of many cia- and Pentagon- funded projects. But a 1963 cia memo from 
Asia Foundation president Russell Smith reporting on his first year as founda-
tion president indicates that some cia- funded programs that from a distance 
appeared disconnected from cia matters often had agency uses that  were not 
apparent to outsiders. As the cia reported, “Mr. Smith acknowledged that a 
small percentage of the [Asia] Foundation’s programs  were for the sake of ‘win-
dow- dressing,’ public relations, or entrée into fields of interest. In discussing 
such projects, however, Mr. Smith remarked that since becoming President he 
has learned that some projects which, at first appearance seem to be frivolous, 
may have concealed edges [of] potential” (foia cia- 1705143 1/28/63, dtpil-
lar 3, 24 p. 2).
Rewarding individuals whose work aligned with or informed larger projects 
of the American national security state helped some scholars “freely” choose 
topics or theoretical approaches of interest in ways that maintained certain illu-
sions of academic  free  will. Most academics spend their lives agreeably working 
within the confines of their disciplines, departments, and universities, content 
enough with the par ameters delimiting the boundaries of mainstream scholar-
ship. For  those who seldom question the directions of funded research,  there is 
 little to see that does not appear as freely chosen areas of study. To some degree, 
all  people create illusions of agency and choice while reinforcing cultural norms. 
To argue that the dominant cultural milieu and political- economic forces did 
not shape anthropologists’ work would place the discipline of anthropology 
outside of the sort of usual influences of culture that anthropologists normally 
take for granted when studying other cultures. From the postwar rush to follow 
the funding of area studies onward, the Cold War brought recurrent episodes 
of anthropologists shifting their work to align with the era’s funding opportu-
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nities, and instances of governmental agencies acquiring and consulting the 
work  these anthropologists produced; yet Ralph Beals’s account of Senator Fred 
Harris’s chief of staf describing ware houses in Washington with “ great piles” of 
unread research reports (see chapter 11) ofers some relief in the consolation of 
government incompetency.
 There are high stakes for the discipline itself concerning how to interpret the 
writings of generations of anthropologists who traveled to the field and theo-
rized using funds mixing academic pleasures with the business of empire. If, 
for example, we find that the writings of prominent Harvard scholars such as 
Clyde Kluckhohn and Talcott Parsons  were in some way elevated  because of 
their alignment with a power elite (explic itly rejected by Parsons) that included 
the cia and the fbi, while  others (Gene Weltfish, Richard Morgan, Richard 
Armstrong, Jack Harris,  etc.) who opposed such regimes of power  were driven 
to the edges of the discipline by the fbi, then we are left to confront new ques-
tions about this work.
I would not argue that the work of Kluckhohn, Wilber, Mead, Benedict, or 
 others whose research aligned with the interests of cia or the Pentagon was 
necessarily of an inferior quality, or that it should not be taken seriously simply 
 because of  these relationships, only that it should be read and interpreted with 
 these relationships firmly in mind. Anthropologists study contexts, and  these 
relationships are impor tant elements of the context in which this work was pro-
duced and consumed. Cliford Geertz’s Agricultural Involution should not be 
dismissed as nothing more than a piece of cenis- influenced propaganda; it is 
something more than that, yet the context in which it was produced is part of 
the text that must be brought to the surface if we are to understand it. Burying 
the po liti cal context of this and other work obscures impor tant elements of its 
meanings. While the po liti cal context of Jack Stauder’s essay “The ‘Relevance’ 
of Anthropology  under Imperialism” (1972), Kathleen Gough’s “Anthropology 
and Imperialism” (1968), Marshall Sahlins’s “The Destruction of Conscience 
in Vietnam” (2000a), or Marvin Harris’s Portugal’s African Wards (1958) might 
seem obvious to most readers,  these texts are no more or less po liti cal than Ag-
ricultural Involution; it is their clarity of po liti cal position — as well as their op-
position to elite power structures — that creates illusions that they are somehow 
more po liti cal than  those texts with more hidden po liti cal orientations.
Anthropology needs to concretely consider how regimes of power influence 
disciplinary developments in ways large and small. Such considerations neces-
sitate formulating the sort of metanarratives of power that declined with the rise 
of some popu lar postmodern strains. Anthropologists who adapted Lyotard’s 
“incredulity towards metanarratives” had no means of systemically interpret-
ing recurrent intrusions of military and intelligence agencies on the discipline, 
leaving anthropology vulnerable to recurrent episodes of exploitation (Lyotard 
1984: xxiv). As William Roseberry observed, “ ‘ Grand narratives’ . . .  are never 
sufficient, but they remain necessary” (1996: 22). While many anthropologists 
are stepping back from the extremes of postmodern reflexivity, a clear focus 
on anthropology’s relationship to the military economies in which it is embed-
ded remains elusive, and the footprint of this inward turn remains deep. Even 
with recent calls for renewed attention to ontological developments, the disci-
pline’s postmodern avoidance of  grand narratives of power fosters notions that 
the Cold War po liti cal economy did not meaningfully alter the production of 
knowledge.
Social theory (or anti- theory stances) can selectively blind anthropologists, 
even as it fuels interpretation and understanding. During the Reagan years, an-
thropologists became increasingly entranced with postmodern inward- focused 
narratives and particularist versions of disciplinary history that, while ritualisti-
cally poking at colonialism, power, and othering, led us away from confronting 
ongoing disciplinary links to American militarism and other pressing po liti cal 
issues. Many postmodern and interpretivist narratives focus indulgently on the 
meanings and subjective engagements of ethnographers, even, as Geertz’s expe-
riences show us, to the extent of missing massive bloody genocidal campaigns.2
With time, the programmatic rejection of metanarratives ironically become 
an unacknowledged metanarrative undermining explanatory paths of inquiry 
not taken in ways that made it difficult to identify and confront recurrent 
power relations. David Graeber recently critiqued this reflective turn as “vulgar 
Foucauldianism, which si mul ta neously developed the subjective experience of 
professional- managerial work arrangements as the basis for a universal princi-
ple of  human sociality, and denied the central importance of  either capitalism, 
or the threat of direct physical vio lence, at exactly the moment the threat of 
direct physical vio lence was becoming central to the operation of capitalism” 
(2014: 84).
Anthropologists’ research choices are routinely  shaped by regimes of pun-
ishment and reward. During the 1950s, McCarthyism efectively corralled an-
thropological inquiry, limiting research that challenged tenets of American 
Cold War dogma; anthropologists learned to disengage from analy sis focusing 
on stratification, open Marxist- derived analy sis, applying anthropological re-
search on racial equality to activist campaigns, and postwar anticolonial cam-
paigns (D.  H. Price 2003b, 2004b). As the Cold War progressed beyond the 
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scare tactics of the McCarthy era, funding seeds  were cast broadly, with  little 
efort to limit critical analy sis.
It would be instructive to study the variety of research projects that  were not 
funded during the 1950s, or at least not funded more than once, but beyond 
tallying numbers of unfunded proposals, foundations do not usually retain the 
rec ords of rejected grant applications. Foundations named  after dead tycoons 
paid anthropologists to study peasants, princes, and displaced peoples around 
the globe, with few funds forthcoming to study the public and private lives of 
Western elites. Governmental funding bodies expressed clear concerns about 
supposed left- wing biases and certain po liti cal uses of social research. At the 
National Science Foundation, specific policies  were  adopted, according to the 
nsf’s Harry Alpert, to “eschew identification with social reform movements 
and welfare activities, and especially, the unfortunate phonetic relationship to 
socialism” (qtd. in Solovey and Pooley 2011:250). Such policies meant govern-
mental funding programs supported social science research seeking only spe-
cific types of social change, while dooming  others.
Some progressive social research was unfundable during this period  because 
of negative associations with “activism,” yet social research providing yeoman’s 
ser vice to the national security state rarely sufered such setbacks.  There  were 
more funding opportunities for scholars to support the debt- laden regimes 
of modernization than to question them. Cold War biases against materialist 
theoretical perspectives during the 1950s caused several analysts to cloak their 
theoretical writings in obscure references and cumbersome logic. Leslie White 
hid his Marxist roots, while Julian Steward encrypted the notions of base and 
superstructure to such an extent that his model of  human ecol ogy at times con-
tradicted itself (see Peace 2004). It took Karl Wittfogel, a committed anticom-
munist and fbi informer, to openly reintroduce anthropology to Marx’s Asi-
atic mode of production during the darkest days of McCarthyism (D. H. Price 
2008c).
Anthropological Ambivalences
An evaluation of anthropologists’ eforts to efect positive change within gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental agencies linked to American wars in Southeast 
Asia would have difficulties finding positive mea sur able outcomes in which an-
thropologists had the desired impacts on the agencies with which they engaged. 
Anthropologists hoping to correct or reshape what they viewed as misguided 
policies had  little success.  These general failures had thematic connections with 
many anthropologists’ contributions to the Second World War and  today’s con-
temporary militarized engagements. The prospects for anthropologists work-
ing within military or intelligence agencies to change policies do not appear 
promising, though I suppose renewed interest and funding opportunities may 
present new ways for enthusiastic anthropologists to reconceive such mea sures.
Charles Keyes’s early correspondence with arpa in 1966 expressed concerns 
that anthropologists’ contributions to arpa’s proj ect could lead to an Asian 
Camelot- like scandal. He threatened to expose the program in the press, but 
Seymour Deitchman convinced Keyes that he could help reshape the Rural Se-
curity Systems Study. With similar motivations, Gerald Hickey began working 
for rand, in hopes of helping the U.S. military do less harm in Vietnam. Keyes, 
Hickey, Moerman, Piker, Sharp, and  others expressed similar motivations for 
their work on  these projects, and I found no rec ords or correspondence con-
tradicting this. Yet, their work with  these military or advisory groups showed 
 little impact on  these groups, their participation brought a desired layer of 
legitimacy to  these programs, and they had no control over the uses of their 
contributions. Efecting internal change on a bureaucratic organ ization as ro-
bust as the Pentagon is daunting even  under the most favorable conditions, and 
when advocated changes cut against the grain of the core beliefs and behaviors 
of the Pentagon and the larger military- industrial economy, it is unlikely that 
any meaningful change  will occur. Continuing to work  under such conditions 
raises questions about the naïveté or cynicism of scholars who remain in such 
well- paid positions while efecting no significant change.
American anthropologists’ experiences with military and intelligence agen-
cies trying to harness anthropological knowledge have spawned several eforts 
to limit  these incursions by strengthening professional ethics codes. From the 
Society for Applied Anthropology’s post– World War II code, to the aaa’s Viet-
nam era eforts to establish ethics codes, war forced the discipline to grapple 
with  these issues of identity and meaning (see D. H. Price 2011f: 11–31). War-
fare recurrently tempts anthropologists to betray assumed and assured trusts 
with  those with whom they have lived and studied; but warfare does not create 
unique opportunities to betray trusts so much as it reveals raw components of 
existing relationships and weaknesses that exist in most anthropologists’ re-
search interactions.
Professional ethics codes establish social norms, mark disciplinary borders, and 
affirm shared values and agreed- upon best practices. Clarifying professional 
ethics codes becomes an impor tant proj ect for professional associations dur-
ing or  after times of war, yet in times of war  these codes have also been used to 
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avoid po liti cal discussions. Constructing ethics codes declaring the importance 
of voluntary informed consent, mandating disclosure, and prohibiting reports 
that studied populations cannot access can help delineate appropriate activities for 
anthropologists conducting research in any research context, yet such prescriptive 
guidelines ignore the core po liti cal questions raised by anthropologists within the 
Radical Caucus, the Committee of Concerned Anthropologists, Anthropologists 
for Radical Po liti cal Action, and other waves of critical anthropology that devel-
oped during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Unless professional associations like 
the aaa can address  these core po liti cal issues (which they are loath to do, pre-
cisely  because they are po liti cal issues),3 associations like the aaa  will continue 
to sidestep core issues of what anthropology is, what it should be used for, and 
what is it good for, by addressing only ethical research issues.
While attention to research ethics remain vital for all anthropologists, the 
aaa’s compartmentalization of concerns with disciplinary militarization as 
primarily an ethical prob lem fails to address the po liti cal issues raised by prac-
ticing anthropology in an American po liti cal economy and within an inter-
national policy of escalating militarization. The aaa and other professional 
organizations need to address the po liti cal problems necessarily embedded in 
practicing anthropology in settings dominated by a growing military- industrial 
complex, neo co lo nial militarization, and expanding fears of terrorism.  There 
is no single answer to  these po liti cal questions. But  until anthropologists con-
front and hash out  these po liti cal issues directly, the discipline seems doomed 
to recurrently suddenly discover militarized misappropriations of what it self- 
conceives of as its heart and soul, with repeated crises and misguided eforts to 
solve po liti cal problems using ethics, not politics.
As the generation of 1960s and 1970s activists retires and dies of, universi-
ties increasingly find themselves without a generation of professors who know 
firsthand the history of cia and Pentagon intrusions on our campuses and in 
our disciplines. With the loss of this institutional memory, the remaining gen-
erations of scholars need to study this history to understand why  these rela-
tionships endanger prospects of  free inquiry.  Those who bother learning this 
history  will strug gle against an incoming tide, as three de cades of neoliberal 
programs’ impacts on student loan debt, campus austerity programs, and new 
enticements of military funding converge to transform American universities 
into even greater extensions of military and intelligence programs, as increas-
ingly the remaining tenured faculty respond with silence.
 Today’s anthropology students face increasing student debt, with new fund-
ing opportunities carry ing direct or indirect links to military and intelligence 
projects. Programs like the National Security Education Program, the Pat Rob-
erts Intelligence Scholars Program, and the Intelligence Community Scholars 
Program now fund undergraduate and gradu ate students (in some instances, 
secretly) while requiring recipients to work in national security sectors at some 
 future date (D. H. Price 2011f: 33–90). Some older funding programs without 
mandated  future payback stipulations, like the former National Defense For-
eign Language Fellowships, now renamed the Foreign Language and Area Stud-
ies (flas) fellowships, continue to fund students studying “strategic languages” 
that are assumed to have importance in military, intelligence, and policy circles. 
While  these programs exist as part of the broader national security apparatus, 
the lack of restrictions on participants’ work raises more passive than active 
forms of dual use issues and does not tie students to  future work for govern-
mental agencies.
Biologists’ and other researchers’ awareness of dual use issues at times forces 
them to consider potential unintended dual use outcomes for their research as 
part of their research design pro cess. Anthropologists can follow  these exam-
ples and develop protocols for considering how our work can be weaponized 
by  others at  later dates.  There is too much history of such interactions to ignore 
 these possibilities. Anthropology needs to develop historical and contemporary 
critiques of how its research interfaces with the po liti cal economy in which it 
is embedded. American anthropologists cannot proceed as if disciplinary links 
with military and intelligence agencies are not part of the social milieu in which 
we work;  there can be no ignorance that such agencies (and industry) have 
made unintended uses of our work. But what this awareness means and how 
we use this knowledge to proceed is unclear beyond maintaining a heightened 
awareness to consider how such agencies may selectively harvest the analysis 
we produce. In some instances it may mean that anthropologists withhold ma-
terial from publication if we have reason to believe work can be used against 
studied populations. In other instances it may mean that the discipline’s profes-
sional associations identify, confront, and try to alter the ways that knowledge 
informs military and intelligence agencies.
It is not that anthropology can or should disengage from po liti cal issues. As 
anthropologists’ journalistic and academic writings clarify, the discipline has 
a lot to ofer international policy discussions (see González 2004; Besteman 
and Gusterson 2005). And while anthropologists have contributed to policy 
developments, historically, military operations have looked to anthropology 
for assistance with the cultural problems that arise with conquest, occupation, 
and counterinsurgency. While current militarization trends render unlikely 
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any significant anthropological contributions to national policy decisions in 
the United States in the near  future, anthropology and American policy would 
be strengthened by renewed eforts to establish the forms of in de pen dent so-
cial science research funding advocated by Senator Fred Harris in the 1960s. 
Such an in de pen dent funding source could focus on problems of domestic and 
global poverty, stratification, health care, police brutality, education reform, 
participatory democracy, peace studies that are something other than war stud-
ies by another name, racism, sustainable agriculture, and many other social 
issues. Yet  under a po liti cal economy so devoted to warfare, such in de pen dence 
often remains a distant yet worthy goal.
The contradictions of working within a po liti cal economic system operating 
in a state of perpetual warfare create difficulties for  those who do not want to 
produce work that may inadvertently feed back into this system. The dominance 
of the militarized backdrop creates conditions in which even humanitarian 
eforts to assist war victims increasingly become tools of counterinsurgency or 
control (see Feldman 2007; D. H. Price 2014a).
The solutions to  these problems are not  simple, but acknowledging their ex-
istence is a vital step. Anthropology needs metanarratives of power relations 
that expose recurrent episodes of the weaponization of the field. Part of this 
metanarrative includes explicit understanding that funds for language and 
area specialization study have historically been granted with expectations that 
gained expertise and knowledge  will  later be available for national militarized 
projects, often directed against the  people anthropologists study, and  those they 
are generally ethically committed to not harm. Anthropologists must come to 
grips with the limits of individual agency, acknowledging the unlikelihood 
that individuals working within agencies devoted to warfare and conquest can 
meaningfully alter the core functions of  these organizations.
At a minimum, anthropology must develop dual use research protocols, iden-
tifying harm that may come from work should  others use research findings, 
and disengage from research or publications that present significant prospects 
of such harmful outcomes. As the aaa’s current code of ethics argues: “Anthro-
pologists should not only avoid causing direct and immediate harm but also 
should weigh carefully the potential consequences and inadvertent impacts of 
their work. When it conflicts with other responsibilities, this primary obliga-
tion can supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge and can lead to decisions 
to not undertake or to discontinue a proj ect” (ppr 2012). I see  these pro cesses as 
broad and far- reaching, and do not remove my own work, including this book, 
from such considerations.4 While such mea sures are imperfect and incomplete, 
they are necessary as a minimal step connecting our work with the world we 
study, inhabit, share, and inevitably alter.
Revisiting the Gift
During the Cold War, foundations and governmental agencies  were able to 
“decide which prob lem areas merited their support and reward  those scholars 
whose research fits the approved categories. The impetus for new directions that 
formerly came from collegial discussions now came from directives issued by 
the agencies” (Denich 1980: 173). It is surprising that a discipline that embraced 
Marcel Mauss’s (1925) notion that gifts necessarily entail obligations paid so 
 little attention to the obligations accompanying the precious gifts it received 
and became increasingly reliant upon. Instead,  these gifts  were widely sought and 
welcomed on university campuses with  little concern about  these matters. As 
Sigmund Diamond observed, during the early Cold War years, the U.S. gov-
ernment became an “invited guest in campuses and quadrangles, and  there is 
precious  little evidence that the universities objected to, or even thought much 
about, the price that was being exacted for the benefits they sought. In a sense, a 
 great potlatch was being celebrated: the government brought gifts, highly vis i-
ble ones; the universities also brought gifts, research results in permissible areas” 
(1992: 275). Participants in the kula ring, potlatches, or other gift exchange 
systems generally reject nontraditional explanations for failing to recognize 
the meanings of  these transactions to participants, and anthropological expla-
nations focusing on the counterflow of goods, other economic functions, or 
created social relations generate greater interest among outsiders than among 
members of  these cultures. Such analy sis tends to strike participants as crass, 
claiming participants are following cultural illusions and reducing complex 
personal motivations to unidimensional mercenary transactions removing in-
dividual autonomy.
Anthropology has its own gifts to ofer the world. Even with fundamental 
epistemological disagreements in the discipline, we produce unique knowledge 
and ways of understanding our species, the  human condition, the nature of 
culture, and humanity’s place in the universe. Anthropologists’ contributions to 
studies of language, culture, primatology,  human prehistory, gender, hominid 
evolution, stratification, po liti cal economy, power relations, warfare, peace, cul-
ture contact, kinship, social movements, the cultural construction of race, cul-
ture change, biocultural interactions, and a long list of other topics have been 
significant and remarkably dif er ent from  those of any other discipline. Cold 
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War anthropologists made tremendously impor tant contributions to  these and 
other areas of inquiry, yet many still lost sight of how, while the discipline ac-
complished its half of the dual use bargain, some disciplinary gaze was selec-
tively diverted.
In 1972, Radical Caucus leader Jack Stauder described some of the direct links 
between social science funding and the work produced, observing that anthro-
pologists’ belief in po liti cal “semi- autonomy” from the government funding 
their research was “an illusion.”5 Stauder predicted that “to the degree they are 
dependent on government money, anthropologists  will be increasingly pressed 
into ser vice to do work more relevant to short- term imperialist interests. The 
pressures are likely to be subtle, mainly taking the form of selective funding 
and the greater availability of money for ‘relevant’ research. The appeal of ‘rel-
evance’ capitalizes on the ambiguity of the term to enlist students and faculty 
who, often from dif er ent interests, also want ‘relevance’ ” (1972: 78). While not 
specifying a time scale, Stauder accurately described the coming shift in fund-
ing opportunities that would develop in the next four de cades, with a decline 
in traditional gradu ate funding opportunities, reduced state and federal tuition 
subsidies, and the expansion of new “payback” programs (such as the National 
Security Education Program) linking gradu ate funds to  future national security 
work (see D. H. Price 2011f).
In 1973, Gerald Berreman summarized the aaa’s Vietnam War era ethics 
conflicts, detailing eforts to prohibit anthropologists from conducting secret 
research.  Because the strug gle within the association had been largely waged 
along generational lines, he predicted that the generational “reverberations  will 
be felt for many years for the demand that anthropological research be relevant 
and socially responsible is increasing. The age structure of the Association and 
the mortality of its members virtually assure that  these demands  will win out 
in the end” (Berreman 1973: 8). Berreman’s optimism was understandable, but 
history finds that he misjudged the power of economic forces to shape the at-
titudes not of some distant unborn generation but of his own generation and 
the academic generation to follow. A de cade and a half  later, the aaa revised its 
ethics code, once again opening the doors for anthropologists to do covert re-
search and to produce secret proprietary reports that studied populations could 
not access (D.  H. Price 2011f: 11–31). The motivations for  these changes had 
every thing to do with market forces leading anthropologists to increasingly 
conduct proprietary corporate research, and  little to do with seeking employ-
ment with the Pentagon or the cia. But once they  were propped open,  these 
doors would be used soon enough by anthropologists seeking validation for 
their work in military and intelligence agencies. Berreman failed to realize just 
how power ful the economic forces of Amer i ca’s military- industrial complex 
would be in shaping the attitudes of anthropologists needing to eat and pay of 
student loans in an era of limited employment possibilities.
While the economic contingencies governing university departments  favor 
the careers of successful grant writers,  there remains an elusive rare freedom 
for  those who find ways to pursue unfunded, or alternatively funded, research 
programs. Anthropologists need to consider the high price of surrendering in-
tellectual in de pen dence for the projects of  others with agendas both known 
and unknown. The luxuries of remaining in de pen dent and  free to keep our 
own com pany have immea sur able value.
Anthropologists can learn from this history. We can develop standards to 
maintain some in de pen dence from militarized agendas and remain aware of 
how our work can be abused. I  don’t know if we can learn that attempting to 
mitigate harm by joining and trying to change military and intelligence organi-
zations has  little chance of even limited success (see Hastings 2015; Price 2011f: 
155–72). Some steps  toward the demilitarization of the discipline may be easy 
to identify;  others are fraught with complexities. It is not that lines of participa-
tion or disengagement can always be clearly drawn — if anything, this history 
shows the difficulties in understanding when knowledge production has links 
to militarized projects. Yet, if anthropologists do not try to disambiguate  these 
lines,  there is no hope of not contributing to the militarization of the discipline 
with  these endemic dual use relationships.
Re sis tance is not futile.  There is much in the history of anthropologists’ ef-
forts to confront the militarization of the discipline that can inform campaigns 
to limit such encroachments. One impor tant lesson is that or ga nized re sis tance 
matters. This re sis tance can occur both within and outside of professional or-
ganizations like the aaa. The successes in the 1960s and 1970s of Anthropolo-
gists for Radical Po liti cal Action, the aaa’s Radical Caucus, the Committee of 
Concerned Anthropologists, and groups like the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists  were models for the formation of the Network of Concerned Anthropolo-
gists, in 2007, as an orga nizational tool for pressuring the aaa to limit military 
and intelligence incursions into the discipline (see nca 2009). While far from 
a panacea, the formation of the nca as a loose collective pressed the aaa to 
address concerns of militarization, and as an identifiable organ ization, it gave 
the aaa’s bureaucratic structure a body to approach when addressing relevant 
association policy changes.
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In 2009, pressure from aaa members concerned about increased uses of 
anthropological knowledge by military and intelligence agencies led the asso-
ciation to reinstate bans on secret research, which itself led to an overhaul of the 
aaa’s ethics code (DeSantis 2012; Jaschik 2009; D. H. Price 2011f: 11–31). Along 
with the renewed prohibition against producing reports that studied popula-
tions cannot access, the aaa’s new code (the Principles of Professional Re-
sponsibility) contains new language that stresses the importance of considering 
unintended uses of research, and a new focus on the ethical problems of compart-
mentalized research, stating: “Compartmented research by design  will not allow 
the anthropologist to know the full scope or purpose of a proj ect; it is therefore 
ethically problematic, since by definition the anthropologist cannot communicate 
transparently with participants, nor ensure fully informed consent. Anthropolo-
gists have an ethical obligation to consider the potential impact of both their re-
search and the communication or dissemination of the results of their research. 
Anthropologists must consider this issue prior to beginning research as well as 
throughout the research pro cess” (ppr 2012). Although it remains difficult for 
researchers to definitively know how  others may use their work, this insistence 
that anthropologists avoid research projects that compartmentalize and repur-
pose their field research is a meaningful step  toward addressing some of the 
historical abuses of anthropological research by military and intelligence agen-
cies. While institutional eforts to address dangers of militarization are impor tant, 
many of the most impor tant eforts to resist come from individuals.
In 2013, Marshall Sahlins resigned from the National Acad emy of Sciences 
over objections that the nas was using its anthropologist members to seek ap-
plicants for research projects to be funded by the Army Research Institute. In 
his resignation letter, Sahlins described his growing awareness of the ways that 
the nas contributed to the legitimization of militarized social science, which 
had led him to a point where he did not “wish to be a party to the aid, comfort, 
and support the nas is giving to social science research on improving the com-
bat per for mance of the US military, given the toll that military has taken on 
the blood, trea sure, and happiness of American  people, and the sufering it has 
imposed on other peoples in the unnecessary wars of this  century” (D. H. Price 
2013a). With the post-2001 shifts to normalize militarized uses of anthropology, 
such principled resignations are rare occurrences, yet this is the sort of stance 
anthropologists need to take to mark the appropriate uses of the discipline.
The outrage and hope expressed in writings by members of the Radical Cau-
cus and Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action mark the moral conscience 
of a generation resisting militarized po liti cal uses of disciplinary knowledge. 
 These reactions  were rooted in social movements outside the discipline, but 
 these  were specific anthropological expressions of critical re sis tance that ofer 
hope to other generations of anthropologists facing new abuses of our work. 
Most of  these discipline- specific elements grew from bonds of responsibility 
linking anthropologists to the individuals and communities that share their 
lives with them.
While the challenges facing current and  future generations of anthropologists 
difer from  those faced by past generations,  there remain impor tant connec-
tions concerning questions of what is to be done with the fruits of anthropolo-
gists’ labors — questions whose answers must acknowledge, as Cora Du Bois 
expressed  after the Second World War, that “ there is no end to the intricate chain 
of responsibility and guilt that the pursuit of even the most arcane social re-
search involves” (1960: iv– v).
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Preface
1. For more information on my use of foia in this Duke University Press series, see 
Price 2004b: 355–61.
2. For information on the Cambridge Working Group, see http:// www . cambridge 
workinggroup . org / ; information on Scientists for Science is available at http:// www 
. scientistsforscience . org / . Accessed 8/15/14.
3. I am grateful to Roberto González for suggesting the theme of dual personality 
features  after reading an early draft of this preface.
O N E  Po liti cal Economy and Intelligence
1. President Truman used the fifty- six- page, top secret “Park Report” to discredit, and 
disband, the oss as an amateurish outfit, infiltrated by communists.
2. iris  later became the Bureau of Intelligence Research.
3. The span of time between the dissolution of the oss (October 1, 1945) and the es-
tablishment of the cia (July 26, 1947) was 664 days.
4. While the cia viewed the rising anticolonialist movement as a potential threat, 
anthropologists like John Embree, Raymond Kennedy, and Jack Harris championed 
 these transformations as hopeful developments. Ironically, the cia had tried to recruit 
Jack Harris, though he declined its ofer in part  because the oss had broken promises 
to individuals who had helped him out of “difficult situations” during the war (Melvern 
1995: 55).
5. The 1954 Doolittle Commission was appointed by President Eisenhower to evaluate 
the range of secret work undertaken by the cia.
6. Peter Richardson reports that the cia undertook retaliatory action against Ramparts, 
including increased surveillance on the magazine’s staf and a range of “dirty tricks to 
hurt their circulation,” and other acts that included considerations of blackmail against 
vulnerable staf (Richardson 2009: 79–80).
7.  These New York Times articles included De Onis 1967; Emerson 1967; Farnsworth 
1967; Flint 1967; Fox, 1967; Herbers 1967; Kenworthy 1967a, 1967b; Lelyveld 1968; nyt 
1967a, 1967b, 1967c; Reed 1967; Sheehan 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1967d; and Turner 1967.
8. In 1974, John Marks published a methodologically improved efort to identify cia 
agents in his essay “How to Spot a Spook,” which focused particularly on identifying 
embassy “po liti cal officers” (Marks 1974).
9. John Ehrlichman and H. R. Halderman met with Helms on June 23, 1972, to request 
that the cia disrupt the fbi’s Watergate investigation (Powers 1976: 54).
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10. The committee was chaired by Rocke fel ler and consisted of John T. Connor, C. 
Douglas Dillon, Erwin N. Griswold, Lane Kirkland, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Rea-
gan, and Edgar F. Shanon Jr.; attorney David W. Belin served as executive director.
11.  After publishing Inside the Com pany, Agee faced ongoing cia surveillance and ha-
rassment while living abroad (Agee 1987). The State Department revoked Agee’s pass-
port in 1979, but he continued to travel on Grenadian, Nicaraguan, and German pass-
ports, returning to the United States in the early 1990s.
12. This passage is not suggesting that “the big three” (Ford, Rocke fel ler, and Car ne-
gie) did not also collaborate with the cia; this is simply not  under consideration  here.
13. A cia memo from a few years earlier expressed agency concerns that Ford Foun-
dation applicants  were asked to affirm that they  were not linked to American intelli-
gence agencies (foia cia- rdp80B01676R004000140025–8, 5/2/53).
14. In 1998, cia historian Gerald Haines published an analy sis drawing on internal 
cia documents and other sources on the Pike and Church committees’ investiga-
tions. Haines contrasted Pike’s in de pen dence with Church’s cooperative work with cia 
staf, observing that the Pike Committee “and its staf never developed a cooperative 
working relationship with the Agency or the Ford administration” (Haines 1998: 81). 
This animosity and contempt for the cia’s lawless be hav ior created difficulties in obtain-
ing documents, which impacted their analy sis.
T W O  World War II’s Long Shadow
1. The aaa recorded that in 1948, seventy- nine U.S. colleges and universities ofered 
anthropology courses (nbaaa 1948 2[1]: 22).
2. The book was never completed.
3. Leighton described the riots at the 1948 Bogotá Inter- American Conference and 
noted that the cia had warned the State Department that such protests  were likely, add-
ing that “no use was made of his findings” (Leighton 1949: 128).
4. On October  10, 1951, the Marshall Plan was replaced by the $7.5 billion Mutual 
Security Act.
5. Emilo Morán observed the Marshall Plan had “ little use for anthropologists” 
(1996: 27).
6. The cia’s archives contain rec ords of an oss interview, a month  after the Nazis’ 
surrender, in which Claude Lévi- Strauss told the oss agent that with the war over in 
France, “it might have been better to kill 50,000 collaborationists immediately” than to 
face  these quislings in the years to come or let the French judicial system deal with them 
(Mehlman 2000: 181).
7. The “new Ruth Benedicts” showed few positive mea sur able results, designing and 
joining programs like  Human Terrain Systems (see González 2010; nca 2009).
8. This work stands in contrast to the national character studies conducted by Gorer, 
Mead, and  others, which essentialized culture and personality in ways that did not allow 
such rapid shifts and adaptations due to deep cultural trends.
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9. From 1949 to 1951, John W. Bennett was the chief of the Public Opinion and So-
cio log i cal Research Division of the Civil Information and Education Section at ghq, 
working  under the supreme commander for the Allied powers in Japan. In 1951, Bennett 
was funded by the onr for Japa nese field studies (Bennett 1951).
10. Tami Tsuchiyama was the first Japa nese American  woman to earn a PhD in an-
thropology at the University of California, Berkeley. During the war she conducted 
covert research among Japa nese Americans interned at the Poston, Arizona, camp, as-
sisting sociologist Dorothy Thomas’s Bureau of So cio log i cal Research and the Japa nese 
American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (D. H. Price 2008a: 143–70).
11. For more on  these pro cesses, see Steven Millhauser’s short story “The Next  Thing” 
(2008).
12. One 1951 advertisement for a job at Maxwell Air Force Base notified applicants 
that “security clearance is necessary” (nbaaa 1951 5[4]: 4).
T H R E E  Rebooting Professional Anthropology
1. The Temporary Organ izing Committee consisted of Homer Barnett (chair), Julian 
Steward, John Provinse, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Frank Roberts (Frantz 1974: 9).
2. In 1993, I learned of David Stout’s reported history of American anthropology dur-
ing the Second World War; my correspondence with members of the anthropology de-
partment at suny and with Stout’s  widow failed to locate this manuscript.
3. This study was authored by a group dominated by Prince ton scholars: Ansley J. Coale 
(Office of Population Research, Prince ton University); W. Phillips Davison (Council on 
Foreign Relations); Harry Eckstein (Center of International Studies, Prince ton University); 
Klaus Knorr (Center of International Studies, Prince ton University); Vincent V. McRae 
(Office of Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Washington, DC); Lucian W. Pye 
(cenis, mit); Thomas C. Schelling (Center for International Afairs, Cambridge, MA); 
Wilbur Schramm (Institute for Communications Research, Stanford University).
4. Huizer and Mannheim observed that “each foundation is controlled by a single 
 family, such as Ford, Duke, Rocke fel ler, Car ne gie, Kellogg,  etc. To prevent the loss of 
 family- controlled businesses through inheritance taxes, large blocks of stock are en-
trusted  under the name of the foundations. The  family members then place themselves, 
or their representatives, as trustees of the foundation. In this way foundations exist on 
the outer fringe of the cap i tal ist system and experiment constantly with new ‘nonviolent’ 
ways by which the social organ ization of the society can better serve the economic needs 
of the ruling class” (1979: 481).
5. Steward’s concerns about the politicization of the discipline betray a narrow con-
ceptualization of po liti cal action. At the 1949 aaa annual meeting, a resolution was passed 
by the membership supporting Point IV, even while the aaa was taking extremely weak 
protective actions for Richard Morgan and Morris Swadesh, appointing fbi informer 
George P. Murdock to the association’s committee protecting members’ academic free-
dom (Price 2004b: 71–80).
6. See http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / cia - rdp 
80 R01731R003400050047–3 . pdf. During the postwar period,  there  were other eforts 
to compile rosters of anthropologists. In 1947, the Viking Fund and the aaa provided 
grants to the nrc’s Committee on International Cooperation in Anthropology for the 
production of an international anthropological roster (aa 1948, 50[1]: 176).
7. In 1947, the nrc compiled a list of “anthropologists outside of the United States” 
(nbaaa 1[3]: 25).
8. Prior to approaching the Executive Board with this proposal, Johnson had privately 
told David Stout of the cia’s involvement with this proj ect. In February 1951, Johnson 
briefed Stout about the roster. Johnson wrote: “Shortly I  shall prepare a memorandum 
for the Executive Board which  will explain a proposal made by the [handwritten: “Cen-
tral”] Intelligence Agency. In essence they propose to do all the work connected with com-
piling a roster except for the mailing. Also the roster  will be officially a proj ect of the 
Association. Please do not jump to conclusions about this nor broadcast the idea  until I 
can get the memorandum distributed” (aaa 36, FJ to DS, 2/19/51; more correspondence 
in D. H. Price 2003a).
9. This appears to refer to the following individuals: [Marshall T.] Newman, [Wil-
liam N.] Fenton, [Henry B.] Collins, [George] Foster, [Regina] Flannery, [F. H. H.] Roberts, 
and [Matthew] Stirling. The reference to “Jim Andrews” likely refers to archaeologist 
James Madison Andrews IV, then working at the cia (see chapter 6).
10. My foia requests for cia and fbi rec ords pertaining to the aaa produced limited 
results, and statements that rec ords relating to the association had been destroyed.
11. It is pos si ble that the “Francis Kelly” referenced  here and earlier is the Francis J. 
Kelley identified by Ray et al. (1979: 518) as working for the cia in Liberia and Cyprus 
during the 1960s and 1970s.
12. In 1945, Johnson had instructed Steward, “It might be a good idea to add [provi-
sions within the restructuring of the aaa] permitting balloting on questions by mail in 
the event that an annual meeting cannot be held. You  will remember I did this with the 
saa when we raised our dues. It was illegal as hell but practical and necessary so nobody 
kicked — but they could have done so and upset the  whole  thing” (aaap 131, 10/5/45).
13. My foia requests for cia rec ords on the aaa  were denied, “to the extent that [my] 
request seeks rec ords that would reveal a covert connection between cia and the [aaa’s 
1952 roster proj ect].” The cia claimed  these rec ords should remain undisclosed despite 
Executive Order 12958 (cia to DHP 8/14/98).
14. Kenneth Holland worked for Nelson Rocke fel ler at the Committee on Inter-
national Activities Abroad during the war and  later became president of the Institute 
of International Education (iie). At iie he compiled lists of scholars working on in-
ternational research for the Central Index of Education Exchanges. Holland oversaw 
the compilation of a list of more than two hundred thousand students participating in 
international education program (see baaa 1955 3[1]: 13). Gerald Colby and Charlotte 
Dennett described Holland’s iie years during the 1960s as functioning as a “cia con-
duit that administered the Fulbright Scholarship and student exchanges from its offices 
at U.N. Plaza. Holland had served on the [Or ga ni za tion of American States] Task Force 
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on Education and was considered well informed on student afairs during the tumultu-
ous 1960s” (1995: 832). A CounterSpy article linked Holland to the American Institute 
for  Free  Labor Development (aifld), a cia asset (CounterSpy 1975 2[2]: 42). In 1952, 
Holland joined the Board of the Foundation of Youth Student Afairs, where he “not 
only provided cover for the cia but also annually screened applicants for [the National 
Student Association’s] International Student Relations Seminar, a summer program that 
recruited (secretly) and trained  future nsa international- staf ” (Paget 2006: 77).  Under 
foia, the cia released documents establishing correspondence and meetings between 
dci Dulles and Holland during the early 1960s (cia- rdp80B01676R003500110024–8).
15. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 1705143 / SYMP 
HONY %20%20%20VOL . %201 _ 0011 . pdf. Another cia- released document described 
Maday being sent to Vienna in early 1946 to reor ga nize the Hungarian Red Cross 
office, noting that “he seems to be honest, but dumb and apparently is being used by 
the  others, who staf the section.” http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document 
_ conversions / 1705143 / SYMPHONY%20%20%20VOL . %202 _ 0009 . pdf (cia foia doc. 
1705143, 4/27/46, Julius Schulz to Nikolaus Korda).
F O U R   After the Shooting War
1. For Rocke fel ler, see Stocking 1985.
2. Among exceptions to this trend  were several Bureau of Indian Afairs projects and 
Car ne gie’s Yucatan Community Studies’ Maya Program (Redfield 1948).
3. The conference was held in New York on November 28–30, 1947, and had 106 par-
ticipants (75 university faculty, 17 from federal government, 5 from foundations, and 9 
from scholarly institutions) of which 24  were anthropologists, from nineteen universi-
ties and about two dozen academic departments (Wagley 1948: 3). Columbia, Yale, and 
Harvard sent the most individuals (14, 12, and 11 respectively); the State Department sent 
9 individuals (Wagley 1948: 53–57).
4. Among  those attending the conference  were A. E. Hindmarsh (U.S. Naval Intel-
ligence School); Elbert G. Matthews (Division of South Asian Afairs, Department of 
State); John A. Morrison (National War College); Howard Piquet (Select Committee on 
Foreign Aid, U.S. House of Representatives); Henry Lee Smith Jr. (Foreign Ser vice In-
stitute); Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr. (Division of Eastern Eu ro pean Afairs, Department 
of State); Rudolph A. Winnacker (National War College) and Bryce Wood (Rocke fel ler 
Foundation) (Wagley 1948: 53–57).
5. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP80 
R01731R003100040052–1 . pdf (accessed 5/18/13).
6. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP80 
R01731R003500150016–5 . pdf (accessed 5/18/13).
7. Friedrich’s considerable linguistics skills and his  father’s prominence at Harvard 
contributed to his se lection for this work. His  father, Harvard po liti cal theorist Carl 
Friedrich, studied totalitarianism and coauthored the classic Totalitarian Dictatorship 
and Autocracy (1956) with Zbigniew Brzezinski.
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8. http:// www2 . gwu . edu / ~nsarchiv / NSAEBB / NSAEBB78 / propaganda%20034 . pdf, ac-
cessed 5/23/13.
9. Sweet  later taught anthropology for many years at the University of Manitoba.
10.  There is conflicting information surrounding who created the Modjokuto Proj ect. 
Geertz remembered it originating with Oliver (see Handler 1991: 604–5), while Oliver 
remembered Kluckhohn’s and Millikan’s involvement in the proj ect’s conception (Oliver 
interview 7/10/95; Geertz phone interview 7/19/95). In 1952 the News Bulletin of the aaa 
announced, “Rufus Hendon  will replace Douglas Oliver as director of a Gadjah Mada U. 
(Djokdjakarta)– Harvard University Proj ect” (nbaaa 1952 6[4]: 8).
11. The Modjokuto Proj ect fieldworkers  were Alice Dewey, Donald Fagg, Cliford Geertz, 
Hildred Geertz, Rufus Hendon, Robert Jay, and Edward Ryan.
12. For more on cenis and the po liti cal context of “the three I’s,” see Blackmer 2002: 
67–69.
13. Gilman observed that “Geertz nowhere made his po liti cal position explicit” (2002: 
15). But Geertz’s silences, his opposition to applying academic knowledge to po liti cal 
movements opposing the Vietnam War, and his Council of Foreign Relations member-
ship shed some light on his po liti cal engagements and orientation (see Rosen 2005).
14. Paul Rabinow described the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Na-
tions as “one of numerous Third Way attempts that marked the twentieth  century” 
(2006: 6), but this missed how analyses by Geertz, Fallers, and other proj ect participants 
restated Rostow’s modernization theory in ways that expanded dependencies and had 
nothing to do with progressive visions of “Third Ways.”
15. The Council on Intercultural Relations,  later known as the Institute for Intercul-
tural Studies, was created during the Second World War as a clearing house for anthro-
pologically informed work on national character research of  enemy cultures “at a 
distance” (Mandler 2013: 68–70; Métraux 1980: 362).
16. Mead and Bateson described the roots of their interdisciplinary approach as influ-
enced by pre- and postwar Macy Conferences, which pioneered studies of cybernetics 
and other innovative work (Brand 1976).
17. The po liti cal bias of this culture and personality work was critiqued by Soviet and 
Chinese anthropologists for its oversimplifications, and in China, it was said to “hide rac-
ist assumptions about the superiority and inferiority of dif er ent peoples. Mead’s cham-
pioning of the American model seemed to declare American culture a cut above  others 
and worthy of imitation” (Guldin 1994: 121–22).
18. Wolf wrote Mead in 1940 concerning his research on “psychobiological aspects of 
peptic ulcer” (mm C6, HW to MM 9/3/40). Mead  later suggested to Edwin Embree that 
Wolf join Gregory Bateson, Lyman Bryson, Mead, and Embree on a proj ect (mm M1, 
MM to EE 3/5/43). Mead asked Wolf to help Mark Zborowski get nimh funding in 1951 
(mm M17, MM to HW 3/21/51).
19. Instead of celebrating or protecting Steinbeck’s  free speech rights, the fbi undertook 
extensive surveillance and harassment for his critiques of American capitalism (H. N. 
Smith 1949: 35–36; fbi hq-9–4583, hq 100–106224).
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20. Kluckhohn and Parsons helped bring Nicholas Poppe, a Rus sian scholar of Mon-
golian ethnography, to the United States. At the war’s end, Poppe was held by the Soviets 
as a Nazi collaborator. Poppe  later claimed he had only translated for the Nazis “in the 
interest of the local  people” (Poppe quoted in Oppenheimer 1997:77), but  others found 
he assisted “the Nazis at the Wannssee Institute and his research helped round up Jews 
and Gypsies for the death squads,” and that he was “a kind of ‘Nazi sociologist’ ” (Porter 
1996: 606, 608; see also O’Connell 1990; Oppenheimer 1997). Documents released  under 
the cia Sources Methods Exemption 382B Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act confirm 
cia knowledge of Poppe’s Nazi connections even as the cia worked to bring him to the 
United States without detection (foia cia, vol. 1_0001, outline of Poppe movements 
5/17/49–4/2/50). Parsons, Taylor, and Kluckhohn helped Poppe establish a teaching po-
sition at the University of Washington (GET 1/34: GET to Clyde Kluckhohn 7/18/49; 
GET 1/34: CK to GET 7/27/49, http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document 
_ conversions / 1705143 / POPPE%2C%20NIKOLAI%20%20%20VOL . %201 _ 0056 . pdf). A 
1949 cia cable stated, “Taylor has made a firm ofer which Poppe . . .  has accepted, any-
thing that we might do would be  after the fact of the contract” (foia cia “Secret ck nr 
194 to: Seattle from Washington/ from [Lyman B.] Kirkpatrick,” 7/21/49). Another cia 
cable documents that Taylor was not told of the cia’s contact with Poppe (foia cia, 
7/21/49, L. B. Kirkpatrick to Acting Chief, Seattle Office; Poppe vol. 1_0057).
21. Rauch wrote, “The [Viking] Fund’s founder, Axel L. Wenner- Gren, is a Swedish- 
international industrialist and financier who in May– July, 1939, figured in international 
politics. He was the non- publicized contact man in the Goering- Chamberlin eforts 
towards an English- German rapprochement based upon a common enmity towards 
the Soviet Union. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, 3rd series, VI (Lon-
don, 1953), 736–42. More recently, Wenner- Gren has been spending $10 million on a 
Bahama Island playground for international aristocracy. Time, March 22, 1954, 39–40. 
Mr. Wenner- Gren also has purchased major holdings in the Ruhr steel producing firm 
manufacturing 25% of West Germany’s annual output and,  after his meeting with Al-
fred Krupp, speculation has been rife that Wenner- Gren  will gain control of Krupp’s 
impor tant Constantine coal mine. New York Herald- Tribune, October 1, and 23, 1954” 
(Rauch 1955: 416).
F I V E  Anthropologists and State
1. Results of my 1999 Defense Information Systems Agency foia request for defense 
projects indexed as involving “anthropology” located 237 projects, 18  percent of which 
 were archaeological projects (dtic- rsm, foia 99–125, 4/19/99); other identified proj-
ects included cima and soro projects and a range of ethnographic studies, including 
onr- sponsored Tlingit research — exemplifying dual use research unarticulated from 
direct militarized ends, furthering culture and personality models (de Laguna 1952: 1).
2. Fischer’s arguments  were identical to  those made by contemporary anthropolo-
gists’ explanations of their reasons for engaging with Pentagon and intelligence agencies: 
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arguments that they are not “tools” (cf. Fischer 1951: 133), claimed abilities to mitigate 
“the amount of natu ral disturbance” (133), to “serve as a channel of communication from 
the  people to the administrator” (133).
3.  Because John Embree died as he was developing this critique, questions remain 
about where his critique would have gone next. When he died, Embree was undergoing 
an extensive fbi background check as part of his clearance relating to a governmental 
employment opportunity. Given his radical critique, had Embree lived, he might have 
been the target of McCarthyist attacks, with the same sort of  career problems as  those 
faced by anthropologist critics such as Richard Morgan, Gene Weltfish, Jack Harris, and 
Morris Swadesh.
4. In August 1953, remaining iiaa projects  were transferred to the tca and the foa.
5. Stephen Reed, Lucien Hanks, John Useem, David Mandelbaum, Lauriston Sharp, 
and Fred Eggan  were associate editors for the manual proj ect (aa 1951 [3]: 449; aa 
1952(2)287).
6. In 1949, Willey consulted with Wendell Bennett, Julian Stewart, John  H. Rowe, 
Harry Tschopik, Frederick Johnson, Cora Du Bois, and Edward Kinnard about Point 
IV plans.
7. Rostow  later wrote that this memorandum was essentially “a rough first draft” of 
what would become their 1957 book, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (see 
Rostow 1972: 89).
8. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP80 
B01676R000100100032–7 . pdf.
9. Anthropologists listed in the 1969 seadag directory are William L. Bradley (Rocke-
fel ler), Edward M. Bruner (Illinois), Clark Cunningham (Illinois), Fred Eggan (Chicago), 
Cliford Geertz (Chicago), Peter  R. Goethals (University of North Carolina), Joel  M. 
Halpern (UMass), Gerald Hickey, Jasper Ingersoll (Catholic University), Robert R. Jay 
(Brown), Charles Fenton Keyes (Washington), A. Thomas Kirsch (Prince ton), Melvin 
Mednick ( Temple), Michael Moerman (ucla), Manning Nash (Chicago), Herbert  P. 
Phillips (Berkeley), Lauriston Sharp (Cornell), Wilhelm G. Solheim II, Robert B. Textor 
(Stanford), and Aram A. Yengoyan (Michigan).
10. In 1968, seadag hosted its Asian- American Research Conference in Honolulu in 
late January (seadag 1969: x).
11. Marchetti and Marks (1974: 76) described the cia convincing unwitting National 
Student Association officers to sign what they believed to be normal nondisclosure 
agreements, before revealing that the association had secret links to the cia.
S I X  Cold War Anthropologists at the CIA
1. See also nbaaa 1948 2[1]: 22. Andrews had worked with Hooton analyzing somato-
type photographs of members of the U.S. military (nbaaa 1[3]: 49).
2. Dubberstein committed suicide in 1983 while facing charges claiming in 1977 he 
had passed along sensitive intelligence about regional military capacities to Muammar 
Gadaffi (Ayres 1983).
378 | N O T E S  T O  C H A P T E R  F I V E
3. Lepowsky (2000: 162–63) suggested that Gower began working for the cia in part 
 because of widespread gender discrimination on American university campuses.
4. Worman became an international art expert, serving as president of the American 
Historical Print Collectors Society, and specialized in and collected the work of British 
orientalist travel illustrator William H. Bartlett. The Smithsonian’s Archives of American 
Art holds the Eugene C. Worman Research Material on William H. Bartlett, 1835–1995, 
in the Archives of American Art (see ecw).
5. William Johnson identified Worman as the author of the CIA’s internal “five volume 
unpublished transcript” history, deposited at the CIA archives in 1971: History of the Of-
fice of Current Intelligence (see Johnson 1976: 27n18).
6. The cia refused to release rec ords on James Madison Andrews IV  under foia, reply-
ing that “to the extent [my] request might concern rec ords containing information that 
would divulge the identity of an unacknowledged employee, it is denied” (cia to DHP 
6/3/98).
7. The memo described Andrews as “(Edward) wyllys andrews IV, #2769, a former 
oss/cia employee who has lived in Mexico for many years and has continued to have 
social contacts with representatives of this Agency in Mexico as well as with Agency 
employees from Headquarters who visit him from time to time. andrews, like cain, 
was born in Chicago of parents who also  were born in the general area of Chicago” (cia 
104–10419–10321).
8. Bessac’s claim of joining the cia, prior to its creation in September 1947, pre sents its 
own problems. As Laird argues, while the cig was the official governmental intelligence 
institution in July 1947 when  these events occurred, “cig’s name was changed to the cia 
informally as early as May 1, 1947, though it would not be formalized  until September” 
(2002: 23).
9. Bessac  later told  people in Tibet he was not an official U.S. representative but was 
instead “a lost Fulbright scholar,” thereby using his Fulbright status as a cover for his 
cia- linked work (Laird 2002: 220).
10. Bessac claimed that soon  after he resigned from the cia, he “continued his lan-
guage studies and applied for a Fulbright scholarship.” The  legal prohibitions against 
cia agents using Fulbright fellowships as a cover for intelligence work present the most 
parsimonious explanation for Bessac’s inconsistencies (Laird 2002: 98).
11. Bessac knew that “recipients of Fulbright grants  were explic itly warned not to use 
their research as cover for intelligence work for the cia” (Bessac and Bessac 2006: 79).
12. Laird rejects the possibility that Bessac resigned, citing information from Mongol 
and American sources. A former cia agent told Laird that “Bessac would not have been 
allowed to quit  after being sent back to China as a contract undercover agent” (Laird 
2002: 57).
13. In the late 1970s, the aufs’s institutional members  were the University of Alabama, 
the Asia Society, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Brown University, the 
 Institute for the Study of World Politics, the University of Kansas, Michigan State Uni-
versity, the University of Pittsburgh, Rampo College of New Jersey, and the University of 
Wisconsin (jla, Box 10, LD to JLA 11/23/78).
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14. See chapter 11 for a discussion of Elizabeth Bacon’s suspicions of the aufs as a 
cia front.
15. Fischel was a key player in msug’s cia work in Vietnam (Ernst 1998). At Michigan 
State, Hanifi initially studied police administration,  later taking up anthropology. When 
I asked Hanifi about the cia’s presence in international policing studies during this pe-
riod, he replied: “I doubt that the choice of my studying police administration involved 
the cia. As I remember this decision was grabbed out of the air by the Afghan minister 
of finance (Abd al- Malik Abdulrahimzai) on the spot. He and my  father  were friends 
and of the same Paxtun tribe. I guess they both thought (or hoped) I could become 
rich like all other customs high officials in the country!” (MJH to DHP 11/5/05). Hanifi 
recalled “large numbers of Viet nam ese who  were brought to msu for police training” 
(MJH to DHP 11/5/05).
16. John Allison’s fieldwork in Af ghan i stan in the 1960s led to his recruitment for 
 Human Terrain Systems in 2009 (see D. H. Price 2011f: 155–72).
17. John Allison  later reflected: “I think it was Jack (John) Shroder at University of 
Nebraska, Omaha, who told me this story that typifies the swash- buckling clown ver-
sion of Dupree’s image:  There was a major dinner for Eu ro pe ans and [Americans] with 
Afghan po liti cal leaders and privileged members of the ruling class, maybe even the King 
was  there. Dupree was one of the main [American] guests. At the time dinner began, Louis 
and Nancy had not arrived. Then, when dinner was over, and the drinking was beginning, 
 there is a knock at the door. When the door is open, Louis leaves a well- dressed Nancy 
standing at the door and comes  running in and does a series of forward hand flips across 
the marble floor, and ends up standing in front of the Afghan and Euro- American dig-
nitaries, smiling. He is more or less well dressed, but, he has on a red dress shirt and has 
pulled the shirt front through the zipper of his pants suit and zipped it up so the red 
shirt is sticking straight out through the zipper, resembling, for all to see, a dick” (2012).
18. However, a 1980 congressional investigation of the Soviet invasion of Af ghan i stan 
mentions a Soviet who “falsely” identified Dupree as a cia operative (U.S. Congress 
1980: 121).
19. Examples of such dubious assertions include his claims to have originated the idea 
of moving the monuments at Abu Simbel displaced by the Aswan Dam, and engaging in 
wife sharing in the Egyptian village of Gurna (Wilber 1986: 15, 17).
20. Other American anthropologists working in Iran during this period include 
Elizabeth Bacon, Henry Field (summer 1950) (nbaaa 1950 4[3]: 4), and Carleton Coon 
(summer 1949) (nbaaa 1949 3[3]: 5).
21. Roo se velt claimed he designed the cia’s coup plan, though Wilber’s (1986: 187–95) 
cia account, released in the New York Times’ foia request, shows Wilber’s central role.
22. In his book Countercoup, Roo se velt described Wilber’s involvement in the plan-
ning of the coup, though it did not identify him by name. Roo se velt wrote, “Another Per-
sian expert — an exceptionally thin man with a razor- sharp mind and less guilt- ridden 
than our other professional friend — participated in a key role during preparation of 
much of the plan. He enjoyed it thoroughly and in return gave much enjoyment to his 
co- workers. Soon  after I had first met him, he unnecessarily informed me that he had a 
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‘lithp.’ He was not, in appearance, anyone’s idea of a secret operator, being very tall and 
very shy, with a diffident air and a modest almost, self- deprecating grin. His sense of 
humor was deceptively casual, and even  after one knew him well, it was difficult to be 
sure  whether he was serious or teasing in his proposals” (1979: 128). Wilber  later con-
firmed that this passage referred to him (Wilber 1986: 188).
S E V E N  How Funding Fronts  Shaped Research
1. In 1961, Frederick Praeger ofered to publish a book by Allen Dulles, but Dulles 
declined (foia cia- rdp80B01676R003500210012–0, 8/19/61).
2. Fodor’s distributors denied cia connections, but Hunt claimed that Eugene Fodor 
was “a former agent for the C.I.A. in Austria” (Hersh 1974a: 4). Fodor admitted he “had 
cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency” but denied Hunt’s accusation he was a 
cia agent in Austria, while refusing to comment on Hunt’s claim that he used his status 
as a travel writer as cover for cia operations (Van Gelder 1975).
3. Hunter’s intelligence links stretched back to the war, when his oss ser vice over-
lapped with that of Gregory Bateson, Julia Child, and Cora Du Bois at the oss installa-
tion in Kandy, Ceylon (Hunter 1959: 12, 14).
4. The cfa’s board included presidents of the University of California, Stanford, and 
Standard Oil and the novelist James A. Michener (Defty 2004: 207; Cummings 2010: 
48–49).
5. This quote by John F.  Sullivan comes from a cover letter, dated March 25, 1953, found 
in the interlibrary loan copy I read (in 2010) of Land Reform: Communist China, Nation-
alist China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan.
6. Ekvall, born to American missionaries, spent de cades in China and undertook gradu-
ate studies in anthropology at the University of Chicago.
7. This was the Conference of the Western Regional American Assembly on the United 
States and the Far East (RB 1,6).
8. The foundation personnel and the assigned geographic regions listed in the directory 
 were President Robert Blum, Robert B. Hall (Japan), Laurence G. Thompson ( Korea), 
Earl Swisher (Taiwan), James T. Ivy (Hong Kong), L. Albert Wilson (Philippines), Edgar 
N. Pike (Viet Nam), Leonard C. Overton (Cambodia), Noel F. Busch (Thailand), Patrick 
Judge (Malaya), Raymond V. Johnson (Indonesia), John H. Tallman (Burma), William 
T. Fleming (Ceylon), Richard J. Miller (Pakistan), and Harold L. Amoss Jr. (Af ghan i-
stan) (More house 1957: 52–53).
9. Sources in More house 1957: Association of Asian Studies (56); Boy Scouts of Amer-
i ca (64); East Asia Teacher Training (70); Burmese scholars (56); Japa nese scholars (71); 
book buying (83); citizen education (86–87); business education (143); summer study 
(239); radio commentaries (289); economic analy sis (395).
10. I first reported this cia- aaa relationship at the 2011 aaa annual meeting (D. H. 
Price 2011a).
11. The aaa’s Asia Foundation grant committee was composed of David Mandel-
baum, Richard K. Beardsley, Cora Du Bois, and Edward Norbeck.
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12. This count of 413 individuals includes some who participated for multiple years. 
The gaps in the aaa’s rec ords suggest that the total number of recipients was likely 
higher than the recorded 413 (aaap 73).
13. One aaa document from 1958 rec ords that Kwang- Chih Chang was awarded 
$205.90 to travel from Cambridge to Memphis and back to observe a Peabody Museum 
excavation that was  under way (aaap 49, Du Bois to Godfrey 4/17/58). In 1959, the fol-
lowing Asian anthropologists  were provided hundreds of dollars in Asia Foundation 
grants to enable them to attend the aaa annual meeting in Mexico City: R. P. Srivastava, 
Yih- yuan Li, K. N. Sharma, Hiroko Sue, and Alfredo Villanueva (aaap 73, BM to DM 
10/19/59). Another Asian anthropologist at a New  England university received ninety- 
eight dollars to attend the aaa annual meeting in Chicago in 1958 (aaap 49, M. Nag 
to W. Godfrey 1/27/58); in 1959, five Asian anthropologists  were provided hundreds of 
dollars to attend that year’s aaa annual meeting in Mexico City (aaap 73, BM to DM 
10/19/59).
14. For Robert Spencer, see bic 2014c; for Agehananda Bharati, see Bharati 1970: 263; 
for Wilton Dillon, see aaafn 1966 7[7]: 8. While several conspiracy- minded writers have 
attempted to connect President Obama’s  mother to the cia through Asia Foundation 
funding or other means, I know of no evidence supporting such a connection. Stanley 
Ann Dunham received Asia Foundation funds in 1972 for Indonesian research more 
than five years  after the cia stopped funding the Asia Foundation (for misleading claims 
of Obama- Dunham cia links, see Madsen 2012).
15. Asia Foundation board members identified by the New York Times  were President 
Haydn Williams (former U.S. assistant secretary of defense); Robert B. Anderson (former 
secretary of the Trea sury); Barry Bingham (publisher); Ellsworth Bunker (U.S. ambas-
sador to South Vietnam); Arthur H. Dean (State Department); Mortimer Fleishhacker 
Jr. (San Francisco businessman); Caryl O. Haskins (president, Car ne gie Institute of Wash-
ington); Charles  J. Hitch (vice president, University of California); Paul Hofman 
(former president, Ford Foundation), Grayson  L. Kirk (president, Columbia Univer-
sity); Turner H. McBain ( San Francisco  lawyer); Walter H. Mallory (former executive 
director; Council on Foreign Relations); Robbins Milbank (New York advertising pro-
fessional); Mrs. Maurice T. Moore (chair, Institute of International Education); Lucian W. 
Pye (professor of po liti cal science, mit); Edwin O. Reischauer (former U.S. ambassador to 
Japan); Russell G. Smith (vice president, Bank of Amer i ca); J. E. Wallace Sterling (presi-
dent, Stanford University); Adlai Stevenson (U.S. representative to the un); and  J. D. 
Zellerbach (U.S. ambassador to Italy) (Turner 1967: 17).
16. The 303 Committee — named  after National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 
establishing its existence on June 2, 1964 — was the oversight body reviewing cia covert 
actions. The 303 Committee reported to the president; it was first chaired by McGeorge 
Bundy and was succeeded by the 40 Committee.
17. See http:// www . state . gov / r / pa / ho / frus / johnsonlb / x / 9062 . htm 8/5/66 (accessed 
8/23/12).
18. Marchetti and Marks (1974: 200–201) report the foundation secretly received a 
large severance package.
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19. Attending the April 17–18 meeting in New York City  were Irving Rouse (president), 
Cora Du Bois (president- elect), Harold Conklin, David French, Conrad Arensberg, Helen 
Codere, Dell Hymes, David Schneider, Charles Frantz (executive secretary), Ward Good-
enough, and Edward Lehman (business man ag er).
E I G H T  Unwitting CIA Collaborators
1. Without direct evidence, McCoy speculates that Stanley Milgram’s research was co-
vertly funded by the cia  under such programs; Milgram’s biographer rejects this pos-
sibility (cf. McCoy 2006: 49; Blass 2006).
2. Expenses for the Society for the Investigation of  Human Ecol ogy’s expenses included 
a high- rent town house ($1,200 a month) and $180,000 a year in salaries and other oper-
ating expenses; the organ ization spent $5 million of cia funds during its last three years 
(G. Thomas 1989: 153–54).
3. In 1935, Wolf experimentally induced and mea sured controlled headaches in research 
subjects at Cornell (Science News 1935).
4. dci Dulles wrote Wolf a personal reply  after receiving a copy of the interrogation arti-
cle “ Every Man Has His Breaking Point” (1960) (foia cia- rdp80B01676R003700110110, 
3/28/60).
5. Some  Human Ecol ogy Fund rec ords survive in Wolf ’s professional papers at Cor-
nell Medical School. Draft materials for the 1957 report, cut from the final report, include 
a list of six proposed studies considered for funding : (1) studying “comparable groups 
of frequently ill and essentially healthy  people drawn from a homogeneous working 
population”; (2) social mobility among business executives; (3) studying the population 
of New York’s National Diabetes Association camp; (4) ecological factors contributing 
to coronary occlusions; (5) lab research on functions of the central ner vous system; 
(6) publish data from previous  Human Ecol ogy studies (hw 6, 15).
6. Organizations that financially supported  Human Ecol ogy included Baird Founda-
tion, Broad- High Foundation, Derwent Foundation, Foresight Foundation, Littauer 
Foundation, Michigan Fund, Phoenix Foundation, Social Research Foundation, Son-
nabend Foundation, and Southern and Western Foundation (HEF 1963: 10). Organiza-
tions that received  Human Ecol ogy funds included the Acad emy of Science for East 
Africa (sfiher 1963); the African Research Foundation (sfiher 1963); Dunlap and As-
sociates, Inc. (Suggs 1962; Yarnold and Suggs 1961); the Foundation for Instrumentation 
Education and Research (Slater 1961); and Panoramic Research Inc. (sfiher 1963).
7. Rhodes participated in a series of unethical drug experiments, including eforts 
to dose unsuspecting  people with an aerosol of lsd supplied by an MK- Ultra research 
program (Marks 1979: 156–57, 99).
8. Mead maintained a friendship with Wolf for several de cades; they had known each 
other since at least the mid-1940s (mm M3, HW to MM 5/24/45). A story in the Novem-
ber 1951 issue of the News Bulletin of the aaa stated that Mead was the “representative 
of anthropology” at the nimh- sponsored Work Conference in  Mental Health Research, 
where she worked alongside Wolf (nbaaa 1951 5[4]: 4–5). In 1951, Mead corresponded 
N O T E S  T O  C H A P T E R  E I G H T  | 383
with Wolf regarding Mark Zborowski’s anthropological studies of pain (mm M17, 
MM to HW 4/21/51). In 1958, she alerted Wolf to Daniel Gadjusek’s research into Kuru 
among the Fore of New Guinea (mm C41, MM to HW 7/21/58). Wolf, who was on the 
board of ifis, received funds from the Research in Contemporary Cultures proj ect for 
“a medically oriented proj ect, studies in  Human Ecology– China” that he directed (R. Mé-
traux 1980: 362).
9. See also aaafn 1966 7[2]: 8; erratum aaafn 1967 8[4]: 8.
10. In the “Ticker Tape USA” section of jet magazine (10/26/61, 23),  under a headline 
reading, “Africa Needs U.S. Negro Teachers, Says Scholar,” a notice mentioned Kenne-
dy’s  Human Ecology– funded proj ect.
11. Stephenson received a grant from the sihe in 1956–57 (bic 2014a).
12.  These catatonics are reminiscent of the precogs that had appeared in Philip K. Dick’s 
short story “The Minority Report” (Dick [1956] 1987).
13. Stover wrote elsewhere about science fiction’s potential for illuminating anthropo-
logical findings (Stover 1968, 1973).
14.  Human Ecology– funded grants appearing to fit this model include Janet Hartle’s 
$948.75 grant to reexamine Central Mongol skulls (hef 1963: 19); Robert  C. Suggs’s 
$700 grant to compare Marquesan be hav ior with that found on vari ous Polynesian is-
lands (hef 1963: 18); ethnomusicologist William Kay Archer’s study of “the ecol ogy of 
 music” (Archer 1962, 1964); a study on psychological impacts of circumcision on Turk-
ish boys — though it is pos si ble that this and other studies provided information on 
cultural elements of separation, trauma, and reintegration that are core elements of the 
interrogation lit er a ture (Marks 1979: 158).  Human Ecol ogy’s interest in funding research 
by Dr. Beatrice Berle (wife of  Human Ecol ogy board member Adolf Berle) on  family 
illnesses in Harlem remains unclear (hef 1963: 41). It may be that the fund provided 
a board member’s spouse with a nepotistic kickback unrelated to MK- Ultra’s interests.
15. Charles Osgood  later stated he did not know he was receiving cia funds for his 
 Human Ecology– sponsored cross- cultural communications research.  These communi-
cations projects aligned with larger MK- Ultra projects studying efective propaganda 
techniques, with specific emphasis on cultural barriers to efective cross- cultural com-
munication (see Tanaka, Oyama, and Osgood 1963).
16. The  Human Ecol ogy Fund provided funds to B. F. Skinner to write an autobio-
graphical essay for his Festschrift (Skinner 1970: 1n1).  Human Ecol ogy funds also 
supported Skinner’s work for the Symposium on the Application of Operant Condition-
ing at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association (see Skinner 
1966: 13).
17. The emphasis occurs in the original document and likely signified that  these terms 
 were cross- indexed in the cia files.
18. From 1959 to 1964, Samuel  B. Lyerly (former editor of Psychometrika) was the 
research director of the  Human Ecol ogy Fund, a position that likely required knowledge 
of the cia’s involvement in the fund (poq 1964).
19. Prior to receiving this grant, Carr produced papers such as “China’s Young Com-
munist League, Functions and Structures” (see Franke 1959: 549). In March 1964, Carr 
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joined  Human Ecol ogy’s staf (aaafn 1964 5[5]: 6; see also Carr and Tullock 1965). Years 
 later,  Human Ecol ogy grant recipient Leon Stover (1974) wrote on Chinese cultural ecol-
ogy, but this work appears unconnected to  these projects.
20. Hall previously taught cultural sensitivity at the Department of State and the Stra-
tegic Intelligence School (Coffield 1959).
21. In The  Silent Language, Hall discussed the role played by cultural expectations in the 
interrogation of Japa nese prisoners during World War Two (E. T. Hall 1959: 77).
22. In 1959, the cia’s journal, Studies in Intelligence, reviewed Hall’s book The Silence 
Language, stressing that “the understanding of foreign cultures is critical to intelligence 
operations and to intelligence analy sis; and such a considerable contribution to new 
thinking as The  Silent Language makes can but stimulate more progress  toward this un-
derstanding” (Coffield 1959).
23. Air Force contract No. af 18(600)1797.
24. Marvin Opler arranged Anderson’s  Human Ecol ogy support (Anderson 1965: 
181n1).
25. Sociologist Jay Schulman was part of  Human Ecol ogy’s program studying Hun-
garian refugees (see  U.S. Senate 1977: 60).  There may be a publication by Schulman 
describing his work with  Human Ecol ogy that I am unaware of, or Scott may have been 
thinking of Stephenson’s account (1978) or the article by Greenfield (1977) that quotes 
Schulman.
26. Another  Human Ecol ogy research proj ect undertaken by Howard or ga nized data 
he collected in fieldwork studying Rotuman sexuality (Howard and Howard 1964: 282). 
Almost two de cades  later, Howard coauthored a paper (with no connection to  Human 
Ecol ogy) examining symbolic and functional features of torture traditionally practiced 
by the Huron on prisoners of war and other cultural groups (Bilmes and Howard 1980).
27. Howard and Scott’s 1965 article acknowledged the help of Leonard Cottrell Jr., who 
had chaired the Defense Department’s advisory group on psychological warfare and sat 
on similar boards at the air force and army (Simpson 1994: 61).
28. dci Stansfield Turner mistakenly testified that the Privacy Act prevented the iden-
tification of all scholars working on MK- Ultra projects at  Human Ecol ogy (U.S. Senate 
1977: 13). At least one witting researcher, Harold Wolf, was dead and thus had no Privacy 
Act protections.
29. Among Wolf ’s surviving papers is correspondence with a Bureau of Narcotics of-
ficer, George H. White, on the topic of po liti cal prisoner abuse (e.g., hw 6; GHW to 
HGW 12/27/56). White was  later exposed during the Church Committee hearings, and 
Kennedy’s Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research Senate hearings for his role 
in doping unsuspecting members of the public with lsd and other power ful drugs, and 
operating a safe  house at 225 Chestnut Street in San Francisco.
N I N E  Cold War Fieldwork
1. Howell observed that “an indicator of the degree of trust and good  will of the local 
population is probably found in the frequency with which investigators are accused of 
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spying, a charge that is difficult to defend against when one is  there in search of informa-
tion, and the uses to which it  will be put cannot easily be explained to the locals” (1990: 97).
2. The cia sometimes monitored foreign anthropologists in their own countries. A 
1954 cia report on the Sociedad de Amigos de Guatemala identified Mexican anthro-
pologist Dr. Alfonso Caso as supporting Jacobo Árbenz, noting Caso’s presence at the 
1949 Mexico City and 1952 Montevideo Continental Peace Congresses (cia 1953). “So-
ciedad de Amigos de Guatemala,” doc_0000914527, 12/21/53.
3. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP80 
R01731R000500020001–8 . pdf (accessed 4/20/13).
4. http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default / files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP80 
R01731R000500020005–4 . pdf (accessed 4/20/13).
5. See cia, mori DocID: 242535, Roland Dulin to R. C. Read 1/4/46; cia mori DocID: 
242537, RD to RCR 1/9/46.
6. Kennedy’s classroom attacks on religion, as a “ matter of ghosts, spirits and emo-
tions,” in his “Introduction to Anthropology” course so ofended his undergraduate stu-
dent William F. Buckley that Buckley wrote Man and God at Yale, in part as a reaction 
to Kennedy (Buckley 1951: 14).
7. During the 1950s, Kattenburg regularly briefed the Intelligence Advisory Committee 
(cia 2/5/55 cia- rdp85S00362R000200060028–3; http:// www . foia . cia . gov / sites / default 
/ files / document _ conversions / 5829 / CIA - RDP85S00362R000200060028–3 . pdf).
8. Kattenburg speculated that Darul Islam might have been involved in the murders 
or that Kennedy and Doyle may have been “victims of local thugs intent on capturing 
the several thousand U.S. dollars that many in West Java knew Kennedy had with him” 
(Gardner 1997: 68n50).
9. http:// www . trumanlibrary . org / oralhist / cadyjf . htm.
10. In a 2012 conversation, Harold Conklin told me he had not known Kennedy, but 
as a gradu ate student at Yale with a working knowledge of Indonesian, he was asked to 
edit Kennedy’s notes; see also Conklin 1998: xxiv.
11. For example, one entry in his field notes read: “The knil [Koninklijk Nederland-
sch Indisch Leger] is about 40,000 strong, highly trained, consisting mainly of Ambo-
nese, Minahasans and Indos” (1953b: 222).
12. Between the war and his work for the cia, Millegan briefly worked for the Depart-
ment of State (see Far Eastern Quarterly 1948, 7[4]: 411; Millegan 1942; J. W. Hall 1952: 294).
13. Handy founded Genethnics Inc., a corporation collecting data on heredity, per-
sonality, and environmental data on individuals with hopes of developing explanatory 
theories.
14. Nine years  later, Millegan’s master’s thesis (1959) examined Indonesian heteroge-
neity and the po liti cal context of Indonesian Protestantism, exploring Indonesian Prot-
estants’ alignment with the Indonesian state’s opposition to communism.
15. Axel Wenner- Gren’s fbi file began in 1940 with a report monitoring the travels of his 
yacht, The Southern Cross, and his reported contacts with Nazis. One letter from J. Edgar 
Hoover to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle expressed concern over Wenner- 
Gren’s “contacts with Field Marshal Herman Goering of Germany” (fbi 65–885783, 
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9/10/40). George Dixon’s story in the Washington Times Herald (3/22/49) on Wenner- 
Gren’s successful campaign to get his name removed from the State Department’s black-
list, described Wenner- Gren as a “one time crony of Herman Goering” and as having 
pulled “ every wire at his command to have the barrier lifted” (fbi 65–8857- A). Dixon 
credited former New York state senator John A. Hastings with helping remove Wenner- 
Gren from the blacklist.
fbi reports summarized Wenner- Gren’s financial dealings with the Nazis during the 
war as linked to his financial control of the Bofors Armament Works (previously held 
by Krupp). One fbi report quoted a “confidential source” who reported “hearing Goe-
ring say in 1933 that Wenner- Gren was one of the most power ful instruments which 
the Nazis would be able to use in their economic operations with impor tant  people in 
 England, France, and the United States” (fbi 100–769–33538, 1/16/61). The report stated: 
“Goering allegedly claimed that Wenner- Gren mentioned impor tant connections in the 
United States and  England, claimed he was personally acquainted with the President of 
the United States and indicated he might negotiate a peace settlement. Goering alleg-
edly stated that Wenner- Gren’s peace plan was regarded by Hitler as a very confused 
proj ect and was rejected. Goering further was reported to have stated that he personally 
believed Wenner- Gren was an opportunist, who, when in Berlin, was very flattering 
concerning the National Socialist system and its successes, but undoubtedly was just 
as critical of National Socialism when he was talking with persons not sympathetic to 
Nazism” (fbi 100–769–33538, 1/16/1961; fbi 65–8857–862).
We are left with more questions than answers concerning Axel Wenner- Gren’s al-
leged links to the Nazis; but regardless of the veracity of  these allegations, his foundation 
would likely have complied with government requests made during  these postwar years. 
Like other postwar foundations, some Viking Fund projects in this period had links to 
governmental concerns (see Ross 1999), including projects such as the $10,000 provided 
in 1947 to the National Research Council and the “Pacific Science Board for anthropo-
logical work in Micronesia” linked to cima and onr funding (Viking Fund 1951:15).
16. Inga Arvad’s extensive fbi file (exceeding one thousand pages) documents fbi 
investigations of her war time sexual relationship with John F. Kennedy and her meet-
ings with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and other high- ranking Nazis (fbi 65–39058).
17. Fejos wrote Millegan in 1954, requesting a final report for his 1950–51 (no. 508) 
fellowship. Millegan responded that his parents had died in a plane crash in December 
1950; that his “preliminary work” in Indonesia was carried out between September and 
October 1950; and that illness, the death of his parents (December 1950), and housing 
problems prevented him “from completing the survey and publishing the results” (lsm, 
LM to PF 1/19/55). Fejos requested more information on Millegan’s accomplishments 
and an accounting of funds for the Board of Directors (lsm, PF to LM 1/27/55). Millegan 
again sent a copy of his June 15, 1951, preliminary report, which Fejos accepted as a final 
report (lsm, PF to LM 2/12/55).
18. “Dr. Eckel” was apparently Paul Edward Eckel, who may have had contact with 
Millegan while both conducted oss Asian intelligence work during the war. Eckel 
worked at the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Ser vice and was with the cia for years. 
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He was reportedly the cia agent who assisted in South Africa’s arrest of Nelson Mandela 
in August 1962 (see Albright and Kunstel 1990).
19. An other wise unknown individual identified as George Nievel was listed as provid-
ing start-up funds (fbi 100–346660–1, 8/26/46).
20. Pacific Book’s incorporation date of 1946 predates the establishment of the cia, 
though this was a period in which Lloyd Millegan’s son Chris reports his  father was 
associated with one of the military intelligence branch units bridging the transition be-
tween oss and cia (KM 9/28/10).
21. This appears to be Kenneth Landgon, whose wife, Margaret Langdon, wrote The King 
and I, in part based on their years in Thailand in the diplomatic corps.
22. See Publishers Weekly 1951, 160: 1904, 2252; Publishers Weekly 1951, 160: 768. The 
business address is identified in Publishers Weekly as Pacific Book and Supply Corpora-
tion, 667 Madison Ave nue, New York, NY; see also bdna 1956: 109.
23. Publishers Weekly identified Franklyn R. Forkert as Pacific Book and Supply’s late-
1950s “sales man ag er and trea surer in New York City” (see Publishers Weekly 1965, 188: 
84). A 1957 Publishers Weekly article from 1957 announced Pacific Book’s Joseph Cul-
bertson was operating a “portable model American Book Shop” with five thousand 
books in Indonesia (Publishers Weekly 1957, 172: 16). Joseph L. Culbertson’s involvement 
is listed in the 1987 membership directory of the Association of Former Intelligence Of-
ficers (afio 1987).
24. Anthropologists gathered other forms of Cold War– linked data from remote 
corners of the world. For example, some of Napoleon Chagnon’s fieldwork among the 
remote Yanomami of Brazilian- Venezuelan rain forests was funded by the Atomic En-
ergy Commission as he assisted James Neel’s eforts to retrieve blood samples from the 
Indians to mea sure levels of trace fallout radiation from distant nuclear weapons tests 
(see Ferguson 1995).
T E N  Cold War Counterinsurgency Dreams
1. One 1951 cia memorandum on “intelligence support for psychological operations” 
stressed the importance of anthropological research for such operations. The memo 
described anthropologists providing information on topics such as “level of education, 
standard of living, po liti cal views or cultural ties of vari ous groups such as French  labor, 
Uzbek tribesmen,  etc.” (foia cia- rdp80R01731R003500180010–8, 6/14/51).
2. hraf was founded in 1948 as a “cooperative interuniversity organ ization” origi-
nally consisting of ten universities and the Office of Naval Research (Roe 2007: 53).
3. See Barnett 1958; Harris 1958a, 1958b; Lipsky 1959; Steinberg 1959; Changdu 1960; 
Fitzsimmons 1960; LeBar and Suddard 1960.
4. Graham was the former executive secretary of the Department of Defense’s Com-
mittee on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare. At the Brookings Institute, Gra-
ham studied how military and intelligence organizations could better access academic 
research (see Graham 1954; hraf 1959: 24).
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5. Committee members included Robert K. Merton, Clyde Kluckhohn, Max Millikan, 
and Samuel A. Stoufer.
6. hraf’s use of this quote in its annual report stopped short of stating that years of 
hraf data collection and classification had “been supported by grants from the military 
departments” (Bauer et al. 1958: 225).
7. The production of  these reports  later shifted from hraf to soro’s Foreign Area 
Studies Division (fasd).
8. Vreeland was a student of Owen Lattimore and a scholar of Mongolian society. De-
spite his marriage to a White Rus sian and pro- military associations, he was suspected by 
the fbi of being a Communist  after Lattimore’s 1952 perjury indictment (fbi 128–5130).
9.  After hraf’s subcontractors completed the initial text for the Army Handbooks, 
soro oversaw revisions and expansions of the handbooks for military consumption 
(soro Box 1, soro memo, Standing Operating Procedures for the Production of For-
eign Area Handbooks  under Contract da-49–083- osa-2427, 10/16/63).
10. Riddleberger  later became a spokesperson at the World Bank.
11. In 1965, while on leave from the University of Kansas, Moos received a $61,000 
Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency Research soro grant to study “soro 
Elements of  Human Factors and Operations” (associated with the “Research Of-
fice —  Korea”) (soro Box 1 Final Report Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences Defense 
Science Board, 1965 DoD, 40; see also aaafn 1965 2 [1]: 7).
12. The report acknowledged assistance from soro “staf anthropologists,” Herbert H. 
Vreeland III, and Howard K. Kaufman and Dr. Ritchie P. Lowry (trained in sociology) 
(Lippincott and Dame 1964: i).
13. See the discussion of Maday in chapter 3.
14. Horo witz wrote that Galtung rejected the premise that the military could be in-
volved in reducing conflict and “was deeply concerned about the possibility of Eu ro pean 
scholars being frozen out of Latin American studies by an inundation of sociologists 
from the United States. Furthermore, he expressed fears that the scale of Camelot hono-
raria would completely destroy the social science  labor market in Latin Amer i ca” (1965: 5).
15. Nutini told Ralph Beals that he “absolutely never said that Camelot would be fi-
nanced by nsf” (rb 75, HGN to RB 9/17/66).
16. Murdock was then the head of the nas/nrc Social Science Division.
17. The nrc’s Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sci-
ences (acgpbs) included psychologists, sociologists, geographers, economists, and po-
liti cal scientists, as well as anthropologists: Allen Holmberg, George Foster, Alexander 
Spoehr, and Donald R. Young (chair) (see Deitchman 1976: 206). The committee argued 
that, while military and intelligence agencies sought specific forms of behavioral science 
knowledge, “the primary responsibility for government support for behavioral sci-
ence research and training conducted in foreign countries by universities in the United 
States [should] be placed in agencies and programs committed to basic research and re-
search training, particularly the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of 
Health, and the proposed Center for Educational Cooperation  under the International 
N O T E S  T O  C H A P T E R  T E N  | 389
Education Act” (acgpbs 1968: 9). The committee recommended increased general nsf 
funding for social sciences.
18. Rohde (2007: 284–93) indicates the credited m- vico authors  were at soro during 
the following periods: James Price (1962–69), Barbara R. Butler (1962–65), Doris Condit 
(1956–70), Bert Cooper (1961–69), Michael Conley (1964–69), and Richard H. Moore 
(1964–68). From this information we can fix the date of m- vico as between 1964 (when 
Conley and Moore began working for soro) and 1965 (when Butler left soro). None 
of the m- vico authors  were anthropologists, and the authors came from the following 
disciplines: Price, Butler and Cooper: international relations; Condit and Conley: his-
tory; Moore: military science (soro 2 roster; Rohde 2007).
19. The introduction to m- vico refers to cinfac in the  future tense, writing that it 
“ will be conceived and or ga nized along pragmatic lines” (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: 
intro. 1).
20. It is unclear  whether hraf was aware that soro had  adopted and republished its 
copyright- protected ocm as a governmental document.
21. A cia memo, “Unauthorized Release of ocr Intelligence Publication Index (ipi) 
to Department of Army Contractor” (1967), indicated that from 1962 to 1965, cress 
had access to the dia’s classified Intelligence Publication Index (cia documents, sent 
6/25/09).
22. Rohde identified cress’s director, psychologist Preston Abbot, as continuing this 
director role at the American Institute for Research (air) (2007: 250). Abbot had been 
director of Research Programs at the  Human Ecol ogy Fund; in 1975 he left air, found-
ing Abbot Associates, which produced intelligence policy reports on the  Middle East 
(Rohde 2007: 256; aaafn 1966 7 [2]: 8).
23. The eigh teen identified “tribal groups”  were the Bahnar, Bru, Cua, Halang, Hre, 
Hroi, Jarai, Jeh, Katu, Koho, Ma, M’nong, Muong, Raglai, Rengao, Rhade, Sedang, 
Stieng; the seven chapters on “other minority groups” discussed the Binh Xuye, Cao 
Dai, Cham, Chinese, Hoa Hao, Khmer, and Indians and Pakistanis (Schrock et al. 1966).
24. Among the social scientists whose work was cited  were Gerald Hickey (Schrock 
et al. 1966: 52), Frank LeBar, Gerald Hickey, and John K. Musgrave (88), David Thomas 
(52), Georges Coedés (87), Georges Condominas (523), George Devereux (647), Frederic 
Wickert (649), John D. Donoghue (717), and Paul K. Benedict (1119).
25. Suspicions and accusations of links between the sil and the cia are widespread 
among anthropologists. Most claimed links are circumstantial. I made extensive cia 
foia requests for sil rec ords (resulting in the release of cables relating to reports of kid-
napped missionaries and other news accounts) and have read the published lit er a ture 
critiquing sil and made several archival inquiries. Although Colby and Dennett and 
Stoll establish a series of clear symbiotic relationships between the sil and American 
economic, military, and intelligence ventures,  there remains a lack of firm documenta-
tion establishing direct, directive connections between the cia and the sil (see Colby 
and Dennett 1995; Stoll 1982).
26. References to this 1954 cinfac and hraf document can be found in Schrock 
et al. 1966: 920, 929.
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27. Ember misrepresented his knowledge and that of  others at hraf about hraf’s 
cia connections by claiming that the board had not been told (while Shweder con-
firmed that as a hraf board member he was aware of hraf’s cia links). Ember wrote 
to me that “the cia was an Associate Member of the hraf consortium between 1979 
and 1983, and I  don’t think that the Board of Directors was told about it” (ME to DHP 
7/18/95).
28.  There are enough instances of the military republishing and translating the published 
writings of unaware anthropologists that it is pos si ble they did not consult hraf about 
this adaptation of their rubrics — though soro’s relationship with hraf at American 
University reduces this likelihood (see Condominas 1973).
E L E V E N  Uses of Disciplinary Knowledge
1. The provision granting fellow status to some anthropologists holding bachelor’s de-
grees did not mean that most gradu ate students could vote; it meant that working an-
thropologists (frequently archaeologists), “actively engaged in anthropology,” might be 
granted voting rights.
2. Suggs and Carr received  Human Ecol ogy Fund grants, and in 1964 Carr joined the 
 Human Ecol ogy Fund’s staf (aaafn 1964 5[5]: 6).
3. See also aaafn 1962 3[7]: 4–6; aaafn 1962 4[5]: 2.
4.  After the 1965 aaa annual meeting, Peter Kunstadter protested to the Executive 
Board what he misunderstood to be an official resolution by the aaa Council disap-
proving of anthropologists’ “negotiations with the Department of Defense to carry out 
research” (rb 75, eb Minutes 5/20–21/66).  After Kunstadter received more information 
on the board’s position, he withdrew his complaint.
5. Beals came from a  family with radical po liti cal roots. During his childhood, his 
 mother had run for state office and was a Socialist; Beals fled to Mexico with his brother 
Carleton during the First World War, as Carleton sought to avoid the draft (AB to DHP 
1/16/05).
6.  Because of his government contract work, Kunstadter was viewed by some anthro-
pologists with suspicion during the 1970 Thai controversy (see Wakin 1992: 181).
7. Without hesitation, the three anthropologists working in Af ghan i stan I asked to 
speculate on the identity of this individual named Louis Dupree as the anthropologist 
referenced  here, though Dupree began his Af ghan i stan work in 1949, not 1959.
8. My foia requests for cia rec ords on the aaa led to the limited release of documents 
but included the (undated) cia’s “Report on the Annual Meeting of the American An-
thropological Association,” in which it was reported to the cia that “prominent at the 
meeting in the lower- level orga nizational roles  were individuals from ■■■■  and the 
Committee of Returned Volunteers (crv), a group of largely Peace Corps returnees ac-
tive in the protest movement. A crv member said ■■■■■■■■■■■  that they had spon-
sored a trip of an individual to Thailand” (cia FOIA F94–1900).
9. The Institute for Cross- Cultural Research was a division of Operations and Policy 
Research Inc., Washington, DC (aaafn 1969 10[2]: 7–8).
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10. For the following sources on  these foundations as cia fronts: for American Friends 
of the  Middle East, see Eveland 1980: 125; Wilford 2008: 126; 2013. For the Asia Founda-
tion, see Turner 1967; for Operations and Policy Research, Inc., see Sheehan 1967b.
11. Testifying in 1977 before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, hold-
ing confirmation hearings for Andrew Young’s appointment as un ambassador, Alan 
Ogden (U.S.  Labor Party) expounded on several far- fetched conspiracy theories per-
taining to Young’s background, including claims of Field Foundation cia links and Tri-
lateral Commission plots (U.S. Senate 1977: 50–55).
12. This concern was addressed by  later press and congressional investigations estab-
lishing that long- standing foundations channeled the cia’s funds to front foundations.
13. The other contributors to this volume ( there  were two editions, from 1956 and 
1962)  were Charles A. Ferguson, Dr. Peter G. Franck, and Dr. Pieter K. Roest. Ferguson 
was a linguist with strong governmental and military connections. He established an 
Arabic language training program for U.S. foreign ser vice officers in Beirut in 1947, and 
in 1953–55, the Foreign Ser vice Institute Field School of Arabic Language and Area Stud-
ies Department of State from 1953–1955 (Rouchdy 1992: 209). Peter G. Franck was a 
diplomatic adviser to Af ghan i stan in 1948–60. Pieter K. Roest served in postwar oc-
cupation of Japan, where he was a lieutenant col o nel. He had a PhD in anthropology 
and sociology from the University of Chicago and had done postdoctoral international 
relations work at usc (Koikari 2008: 55–56).
14. The aaa’s statement was printed in the Washington Post on July 8, 1966.
15. The New York Times and international news coverage of Beals’s findings renewed 
international concerns about anthropologist- spies. News of the cia sold newspapers, 
and the New York Times did a story on Beals warning that “secrecy and pressures by 
United States intelligence agencies  were eroding the efectiveness and prestige of Ameri-
can scholarly research abroad” (Raymont 1966: 1).
16. See the letter from Mario C. Vásquez and Julio Romani Torres, president and sec-
retary, respectively, of the Asociación Peruana de Antropólogos, voicing concerns about 
anthropologists and counterinsurgency research (aaafn 1967 8[1]: 14).
17. For example, see letters by Robert W. Ehrich, John P. Gillin, George P. Murdock, 
Alexander Spoehr, and Arthur Neihof (aaafn 1967 8[2]: 7–9) or by Raoul Naroll 
(aaafn 8[4]: 10).
18. See also letters by Richard Frucht (aaafn 1967 8[6]: 8), Stephen P. Dunn (aaafn 
1967 8[6]: 9), Raoul Naroll (aaafn 1967 8[4]: 10), and Kathleen Gough Aberle (aaafn 
1967 8[6]: 11).
19. Van den Berghe was contacted  because he was raised in the Congo and  because 
of his academic expertise.
20. Abt Associates was a contractor, based in Cambridge, Mas sa chu setts, that devel-
oped computer models for counterinsurgency operations (see Herman 1998: 118; Klare 
1972: 104–5).
21. Deitchman wrote of Kunstadter’s concerns that the Defense Department had so 
“saturated the area with social scientists studying the local  people for ‘applied’ reasons, 
[Kunstadter] would not be able to continue his research on the culture in the existing 
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state. Our interpretation was that, in efect, he was concerned that we would be spoiling 
his museum” (1976: 302). Deitchman’s Spenserian logic insisted that modernization was 
coming to northern Thailand, “and that if the dod  were supporting research on how 
the changes afected  people and on how to ease the inevitable burdens of their cultural 
evolution, this was an objective which they would not condemn” (303).
22.  Under the 1968 rules, resolutions to be voted on at the aaa council meeting had to 
be mailed out to all aaa voting members before the meeting was held.
23. The sources of  these characterizations are as follows: “legislate a socio- ideological 
system” (Anthony Leeds, aaafn 1969 10[6]: 3); Nazi comparisons (Laura Thompson, 
aaafn 1969 10[7]: 4); totalitarian tactic (Esther Goldfrank, aaafn 1969 10[7]: 4); 
 Animal Farm (Otto von Mering, aaafn 1969 10[7]: 5); “Censorship Committee” (Joe 
Pierce, aaafn 1969 10[8]: 2); “Ethical Surveillance Committee” (Igor Kopytof, aaafn 
1969 10[10]: 8).
T W E L V E  Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia
1. Francis Ford Coppola indicated his contemporary source for Kurtz was not Poe but 
Green Beret commander Col o nel Robert Rheault (Branfman 1975: 56–58;  M. Isaacs 
1999).
2. Rostow viewed strategic hamlets as a laboratory for proving his theories of modern-
ization, and while Rostow never acknowledged the failures of the program, in the years 
 after its failure, as an advisor to President Johnson, he advocated Operation Rolling 
Thunder, the Vietnam War’s showcase of armed hard power (Milne 2008: 200–203).
3. If we compare  these recommendations with  those made by World War II anthro-
pologists at the War Relocation Authority camps, we find groups advising that better 
management and control could be achieved by adding more elements of normalcy to the 
daily lives of  these constrained populations (D. H. Price 2008a: 142–70).
4. Anthropologist Lieutenant Col o nel Donald Marshall, PhD, had joined the military 
 after a failed tenure efort at Harvard (see Elliott 2010: 328; Salemink 2003: 241). Mar-
shall supported Hickey’s eforts.
5. Hickey worked with Dr. Richard Pitman and David Thomas, of Wyclife Bible Trans-
lators. Hickey drew on  these relationships when he  later needed translators to produce 
rand counterinsurgency reports (Hickey 2002: 68).
6. This report acknowledged his reliance on the Institute for Defense Analy sis, arpa, 
usaid, and the cords program and made development recommendations for high-
lander economic programs.
7. Hickey’s final work in Vietnam was for the “Herbicide Study Group,” in which he 
documented the horrors Agent Orange brought to highland villages. This report was 
highly critical of U.S. military action and was submitted to the U.S. Senate in February 
1974 (Hickey 2002: 341–46).
8. Sahlins’s trip to Vietnam “was self- financed, but it was suggested by a meeting of 
 those involved in the Vietnam Teach- In in Washington, the National Teach- In in May” 
(MS to DHP 8/1/14).
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T H I R T E E N  Anthropologists for Radical Po liti cal Action
1. This bylaw change allowed gradu ate students and individuals with PhDs from aligned 
fields to vote and extended fellow status to non- PhD- holding anthropologists. (This 
amendment passed by a vote of 546 to 119 [73  percent to 27  percent] [naaa 1970 11(3): 
1].) All aaa members became voting members in early 1970; this ended a two- tier mem-
bership system in which elder anthropologists’ voices determined aaa policies and 
opened the door for more activism within the association.
2. While the Asia Society’s funding was not connected to the cia (not to be confused 
with the Asia Foundation), as a pet proj ect of John D. Rocke fel ler III, the Asia Society 
was aligned with the same sort of counterinsurgency “state- building” strategic philoso-
phy that pervaded the cia- funded Asia Foundation (Colby and Dennett 1995: 572).
3. The copy of the letter I consulted was located in Wolf ’s papers, so Wolf eventually 
learned of  these accusations.
4. I have not found a copy of this letter in the archives I consulted.
5.  These thirteen resolutions  were sent to the membership for ratification. Four other 
floor motions  were  adopted but not sent to the membership in mail ballots (naaa 1971 
12[1]: 2).
6.  After reading tens of thousands of pages of fbi reports on hundreds of anthropol-
ogists, I find the fbi’s 1969 report entertaining the possibility that an antiradical like 
George Foster might be a Communist to be illustrative of the routine comedic levels of 
paranoid blindness that prevailed in Hoover’s fbi (fbi sf 105–24157 C 1/7/69).
7. The report recommended how the aaa could better respond to contemporary and 
 future problems. Recommendations included changes to the proposed ethics code, stress-
ing that bans on secrecy did not address issues of nonsecret data being used to harm 
studied populations, and proposing that applied anthropologists follow a separate ethics 
code from the aaa’s (Wakin 1992: 293–98).
8. The Radical Caucus or ga nized multiple sessions on Marxist anthropology at the 1971 
aaa meeting. One session, or ga nized by Peter Newcomer and James Faris, featured 
Marvin Harris as a discussant and included papers by Brian Turner, Harold Hickerson, 
Brian Hill, Karen Sacks, James Faris, and Peter Newcomer; the second session featured 
discussants Harry Magdof (Monthly Review) and Stanley Diamond, with papers from 
Jack Stauder, Judy Torres, Kathleen Gough, Eric Larson, Bernard Maguband and John 
O’Brien, and David Epstein (mm E11).
9. The statement distributed by Wolf and Jorgensen at the 1971 aaa council meeting was 
 later published in the Newsletter of the AAA (naaa 1972 13[1]: 3).
10. Given Mead’s role on the advisory board of the cia’s mk- Ultra- funded Research in 
 Mental Health Newsletter (Marks 1979: 159),  there is some irony that she would use this 
“ mental health” research as her example of harmless trendy research (see also nbaaa 
Nov. 1951: 4–5).
11. In December 1971, Herbert Phillips wrote Donald Blakeslee, at the University of 
Wisconsin– Milwaukee Department of Anthropology, asking about the arpa report 
Eric Wolf claimed Blakeslee had written titled “Low- Altitude Visual Search for Indi-
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vidual  Human Targets.” Blakeslee replied that he was a gradu ate student working in 
North American archaeology, with no connection to Thailand or arpa (mm E12, HP to 
DB 12/15/71; mm E12, DB to HP 1/27/72). Wolf had confused him with another Donald 
Blakeslee who was not an anthropologist.
Phillips wrote James Gibbs and the aaa Executive Board, informing them that Wolf 
had misidentified Blakeslee. Phillips wrote Gibbs about two other aaa members with 
arpa connections, Lee Huf and Bob Kickert, adding that Kickert “resigned from arpa 
a few months before the Cambodian invasion  because he refused to complete and sub-
mit his ethnography of the Akha to arpa — a resignation that they initially refused to 
accept, but eventually did. He has since been unemployed living in Vienna. It is pos si ble 
that he may eventually try to publish his Akha materials and other data from Thailand” 
(mm E12, HP to JG 12/29/71).
12. To avoid confusion between the two groups known as arpa, in this book I refer to 
the Advanced Research Projects Administration as arpa and spell out Anthropologists 
for Radical Po liti cal Action, though both  were known simply as arpa.
13. This previous violation had occurred when a floor motion opposing the construc-
tion of the Dos Rios Dam in California passed and the board then sent this resolution to 
the full aaa membership in a mail ballot.
14. See Marvin Harris’s article “Why a Perfect Knowledge of All the Rules One Must 
Know to Act Like a Native Cannot Lead to the Knowledge of How Natives Act” (1974), 
which argues that all organizations operate  under conflicting sets of rules, and that 
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8). The aaa leadership’s distinction between “motions” and “resolutions” was not found 
in Robert’s Rules of Order, the guiding rules of aaa council meetings. Had Anthropolo-
gists for Radical Po liti cal Action members used Robert’s Rules to fight the establish-
ment’s assertion of authority, they might well have prevailed (or at least muddied the 
waters to a satisfying degree), but as radicals committed to using any means necessary, 
their use of prim rules of order as a line of defense was far less attractive than continu-
ing to or ga nize and carry out a floor takeover of the council meetings, even if the results 
of this po liti cal theater  were less officially binding. The parliamentary procedural rul-
ing did not diminish their ability to control the business meetings — it only diminished 
their ability to set official association policy.
16.  Under the 1971 aaa By- Laws (Annual Meeting, Section One), “new legislation or 
resolutions proposed by members of the Council” had to submit  these to the Executive 
Board “at least one week in advance of the annual meeting if they are to be placed on the 
agenda” (naaa 1973 14[8]: 1). Members could still add agenda items from the floor (fol-
lowing the procedure in Robert’s Rules of Order). Thus, in the early 1970s, aaa members 
could add motions from the floor of the aaa’s annual business meeting.
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1. One example of  these distant influences is found in  future dci William Colby’s 
interest in anthropology courses while he was a freshman at Prince ton, which his bi-
ographer speculated influenced his approach to “pacification” in Vietnam in  later years 
(Prados 2003: 24–25).
2. Other theoretical schools had similar blind spots. Orin Starn (1991) observed that 
ecological and structural Andean anthropologists working in Peru  were so focused on 
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2007c: 21–22).
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(see Goldhaber 1969a, 1969b). For more on Stauder’s post-1960s po liti cal journey, see 
Stauder 1995.
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